Ellis v. City of Fort Worth
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket26-10465
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 26-10465 Document: 24-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 26-10465 November 17, 2026
____________
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
Eric Ellis,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of Fort Worth; Officer Carlos Daniel Cervantes;
Officer Matthew Anderson,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:23-CV-685
______________________________
Before Richman, Graves, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Eric Ellis, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to vacate a pre-filing injunction entered against him. We AFFIRM.
I.
Ellis sued the City of Fort Worth and two Fort Worth police officers.
A magistrate judge recommended that Ellis be declared a vexatious litigant
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 26-10465
and required him to obtain leave before filing additional complaints based on
his extensive litigation history in that district, which included filing ten cases
during the previous seventeen months.
Over Ellis’s timely objections, the district judge entered an order
adopting the recommendation, enjoining Ellis from filing additional
complaints in the district without leave of court, and warning him that
monetary sanctions may be imposed for future vexatious litigation. He also
entered a final judgment dismissing the case without prejudice.
Ellis moved, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), to vacate the district
judge’s order. He argued, as he does on appeal, that the pre-filing injunction
violated his due process rights because he did not receive notice that the
magistrate judge was considering a pre-filing injunction or an opportunity to
be heard before the recommendation issued. The district court denied the
motion, and Ellis appealed.
II.
“This [c]ourt reviews a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(4)
motion to set aside a judgment de novo.” Callon Petrol. Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co,
351 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000,
1005 (5th Cir. 1998)). A judgment may be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4) “if
the district court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Id.
“Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is
premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of
due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.”
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Novinger, 40 F.4th 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010)).
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III.
Ellis is correct that “notice and a hearing are required if the district
court sua sponte imposes a pre-filing injunction . . . to deter vexatious
filings.” Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 189 (5th Cir. 2008).
But a magistrate judge may issue a recommendation for sanctions without
first warning the litigant. See, e.g., Fuller v. Donahoo, 33 F.3d 1378 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding a litigant need not be warned before a magistrate judge
recommends sanctions). Here, the recommendation gave Ellis sufficient
“notice [of the proposed injunction] and an opportunity to respond.” See
Halloway v. Polk, No. 25-11262, 2026 WL 2656630, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 9,
2026) (citing Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2010));
Jones v. City of Dallas, Texas, No. 24-10803, 2025 WL 2491127, at *6 (5th
Cir. Aug. 29, 2025) (citing Magourik v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir.
1998)).
Ellis also contends the district court failed to apply the four-factor test
in Baum for imposing a pre-filing injunction. Baum requires district courts to
weigh the relevant circumstances before imposing a pre-filing injunction,
including:
(1) the party’s history of litigation, in particular whether he has
filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether
the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or
simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the
courts and other parties resulting from the party’s filings; and
(4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions.
Baum, 513 F.3d at 189. Here, the recommendation addressed Ellis’s litigation
history in the district, including the ten cases he filed during the preceding
seventeen months as well as the burden those filings imposed on the court,
and it concluded his pattern of filings constituted vexatious and harassing
litigation. “Baum instructs courts to consider the four factors, [but] it never
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requires courts to explicitly articulate findings on the record for each one.”
See Reyna v. Nelson, No. 26-50004, 2026 WL 1896211 (5th Cir. July 1, 2026)
(citing Baum, 513 F.3d at 189).
Lastly, Ellis contends the pre-filing injunction is void because it is not
narrowly tailored. This court has held that “‘a broad[] injunction, prohibiting
any filings in any federal court without leave of that court’ may be
‘appropriate if a litigant is engaging in a widespread practice of harassment
of different people.’” Baum, 513 F.3d at 184 (citing Clark v. Mortenson, 93
Fed. App’x 643, 655 (5th Cir. 2004)). Given Ellis’s pervasive lawsuits, he has
not shown that the district court erred by finding “a[] [district-wide]
injunction . . . appropriate.” Id.
AFFIRMED.
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