Full Opinion

Case: 26-10465 Document: 24-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 26-10465 November 17, 2026 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk Eric Ellis, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus City of Fort Worth; Officer Carlos Daniel Cervantes; Officer Matthew Anderson, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:23-CV-685 ______________________________ Before Richman, Graves, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Eric Ellis, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate a pre-filing injunction entered against him. We AFFIRM. I. Ellis sued the City of Fort Worth and two Fort Worth police officers. A magistrate judge recommended that Ellis be declared a vexatious litigant _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 26-10465 Document: 24-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 26-10465 and required him to obtain leave before filing additional complaints based on his extensive litigation history in that district, which included filing ten cases during the previous seventeen months. Over Ellis’s timely objections, the district judge entered an order adopting the recommendation, enjoining Ellis from filing additional complaints in the district without leave of court, and warning him that monetary sanctions may be imposed for future vexatious litigation. He also entered a final judgment dismissing the case without prejudice. Ellis moved, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), to vacate the district judge’s order. He argued, as he does on appeal, that the pre-filing injunction violated his due process rights because he did not receive notice that the magistrate judge was considering a pre-filing injunction or an opportunity to be heard before the recommendation issued. The district court denied the motion, and Ellis appealed. II. “This [c]ourt reviews a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a judgment de novo.” Callon Petrol. Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co, 351 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998)). A judgment may be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4) “if the district court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Id. “Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Novinger, 40 F.4th 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010)). 2 Case: 26-10465 Document: 24-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 26-10465 III. Ellis is correct that “notice and a hearing are required if the district court sua sponte imposes a pre-filing injunction . . . to deter vexatious filings.” Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 189 (5th Cir. 2008). But a magistrate judge may issue a recommendation for sanctions without first warning the litigant. See, e.g., Fuller v. Donahoo, 33 F.3d 1378 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding a litigant need not be warned before a magistrate judge recommends sanctions). Here, the recommendation gave Ellis sufficient “notice [of the proposed injunction] and an opportunity to respond.” See Halloway v. Polk, No. 25-11262, 2026 WL 2656630, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2026) (citing Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2010)); Jones v. City of Dallas, Texas, No. 24-10803, 2025 WL 2491127, at *6 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025) (citing Magourik v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998)). Ellis also contends the district court failed to apply the four-factor test in Baum for imposing a pre-filing injunction. Baum requires district courts to weigh the relevant circumstances before imposing a pre-filing injunction, including: (1) the party’s history of litigation, in particular whether he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the party’s filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions. Baum, 513 F.3d at 189. Here, the recommendation addressed Ellis’s litigation history in the district, including the ten cases he filed during the preceding seventeen months as well as the burden those filings imposed on the court, and it concluded his pattern of filings constituted vexatious and harassing litigation. “Baum instructs courts to consider the four factors, [but] it never 3 Case: 26-10465 Document: 24-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 26-10465 requires courts to explicitly articulate findings on the record for each one.” See Reyna v. Nelson, No. 26-50004, 2026 WL 1896211 (5th Cir. July 1, 2026) (citing Baum, 513 F.3d at 189). Lastly, Ellis contends the pre-filing injunction is void because it is not narrowly tailored. This court has held that “‘a broad[] injunction, prohibiting any filings in any federal court without leave of that court’ may be ‘appropriate if a litigant is engaging in a widespread practice of harassment of different people.’” Baum, 513 F.3d at 184 (citing Clark v. Mortenson, 93 Fed. App’x 643, 655 (5th Cir. 2004)). Given Ellis’s pervasive lawsuits, he has not shown that the district court erred by finding “a[] [district-wide] injunction . . . appropriate.” Id. AFFIRMED. 4