Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed October 28, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D26-0312 Lower Tribunal No. 23-29033-CA-01 ________________ Reybel Hernandez, Appellant, vs. Barclays Mortgage Trust 2022-RPL1, Mortgage-Backed, Appellee. An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ariana Fajardo Orshan, Judge. Reybel Hernandez, in proper person. Atlas | Solomon LLP, and Eric M. Levine (Stuart), for appellee. Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ. LINDSEY, J. Appellant Reybel Hernandez appeals the trial court’s order denying his emergency motion to vacate a foreclosure sale and stay further proceedings, overruling his objection to the foreclosure sale, and directing the Clerk of Court to issue a certificate of title. 1 Hernandez argues we should reverse the trial court’s denial of his motion because: (1) appellee Barclays Mortgage Trust 2022-RPL1 failed to file the original note and thus did not establish its standing to bring the foreclosure action; (2) Hernandez provided evidence of a broken chain of title and fraudulent certification of the note, which the trial court did not address in denying his motion and objection; (3) the trial court erroneously applied section 702.036 even though Barclays was the purchaser of the property; and (4) the trial court erroneously failed to grant a stay pending appeal. The trial court did not err. We affirm because Hernandez failed to preserve any of his arguments for appellate review. Even if Hernandez had preserved his arguments, we would still affirm because they do not establish reversible error. 1 We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A); U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Vogel, 137 So. 3d 491, 492 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citing Popescu v. Laguna Master Ass’n, 126 So. 3d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (explaining that an order denying a motion to vacate foreclosure sale is a discrete final order). 2 BACKGROUND Hernandez executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. in April 2005 and signed a modification in December 2014. Barclays brought the underlying foreclosure action against Hernandez in December 2023, alleging that it was the holder of the original note and mortgage and that Hernandez had defaulted on the modified loan in November 2022. Barclays attached a “certification of possession” and copy of the note to the complaint. According to the certification of possession, Barclays was in possession of the note as of November 7, 2023. The copy of the note reflected a blank indorsement. Barclays filed the original note and mortgage with the trial court in November 2024. The original note reflected the same blank indorsement as the copy. In October 2025, the trial court entered a final judgment of foreclosure in Barclays’ favor. In the final judgment, the court explained that Barclays had established its standing via possession of the original note endorsed in blank. Hernandez did not appeal the final judgment of foreclosure. However, he filed a motion to stay the foreclosure sale and vacate the final judgment. 3 The trial court rendered an order on Hernandez’s motion on November 17, 2025, but that order was not included in the appendix. 2 The property at issue was subsequently sold to Barclays at a foreclosure sale in January 2026. Hernandez moved to vacate the foreclosure sale and stay further proceedings and filed an objection to the certificate of sale. In his motion to vacate the foreclosure sale, Hernandez argued that he had filed “emergency notices and motions” informing the trial court of “pending federal proceedings involving the same parties and property” and asked the trial court to stay the foreclosure sale prior to the foreclosure sale. Hernandez argued that the foreclosure sale took place despite the lack of a ruling on these motions. Hernandez asked the trial court to vacate the foreclosure sale and enter a stay because “[v]acatur and a stay are necessary to preserve the status quo, avoid irreparable harm, and prevent conflicting rulings with the pending federal action.” Hernandez’s objection to the certificate of sale similarly argued that, at the time the certificate of sale issued, there were pending unresolved post- judgment motions and jurisdictional issues. Hernandez further argued that 2 The appendix to the answer brief on appeal includes a summary of the trial court’s docket, which reflects when the trial court entered its order on Hernandez’s motion to vacate final summary judgment and stay the foreclosure sale. 4 there were contemporaneous proceedings pending in federal court. Hernandez argued issuance of the certificate of sale would cause irreparable harm by foreclosing judicial review of the unresolved issues. The trial court denied Hernandez’s motion and objection. This appeal timely followed. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a foreclosure sale for a gross abuse of discretion.” 2275 NE 120 St., LLC v. Sanchez Struve Bus. Advisors, LLC, 336 So. 3d 757, 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (citing Vogel, 137 So. 3d at 493). The Florida Supreme Court first applied the gross abuse of discretion standard when reviewing trial court rulings on motions to vacate defaults. See N. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1962); Coggin v. Barfield, 8 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 1942); Benedict v. W.T. Hadlow Co., 42 So. 239, 241 (Fla. 1906); Russ v. Gilbert, 19 Fla. 54, 57 (1882). Application of this heightened level of deference in such cases furthers Florida’s longstanding public policy of liberally granting motions to set aside defaults so that cases can be decided on their merits. See M.W. v. SPCP Grp. V, LLC, 163 So. 3d 518, 519-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. v. Ronco Inventions, LLC, 890 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 2d 5 DCA 2004) (citing Lindell Motors, Inc. v. Morgan, 727 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). Similarly, when reviewing rulings on motions to set aside foreclosure sales, appellate courts apply the gross abuse of discretion standard because bidders and buyers at such sales seek to make a profit, and establishing a precedent that encourages the easy setting aside of foreclosure sales would “destroy the incentive which prompts bidding at [a] sale and thereby work a hardship on both debtors and creditors.” Long Beach Mortg. Corp. v. Bebble, 985 So. 2d 611, 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting City of Sanford v. Ashton, 179 So. 765, 767 (Fla. 1938)). Application of the gross abuse of discretion standard “ensure[s] a competitive market in the foreclosure sale process.” Id. There is no definition of what constitutes a gross abuse of discretion or how it differs from an abuse of discretion, though it is, on its face, more egregious than the garden variety abuse of discretion standard. See Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 890 So. 2d at 302. A typical abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court. Id. (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980)). Thus, it follows that the gross abuse of discretion standard requires an appellate court to be as deferential to a trial judge’s decision as possible, 6 “upsetting it very rarely and only with undeniable provocation.” Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Laska, 977 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The burden this standard imposes on a litigant seeking appellate review is “almost insurmountable.” M.W., 163 So. 3d at 519. B. Preservation As a preliminary matter, Hernandez failed to preserve any of the arguments he now raises for appellate review. “[T]o be preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.” Homeowner’s Choice Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Oakes, 431 So. 3d 1005, 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026) (emphasis added) (quoting Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005)). Arguments that are not preserved are waived. Id. (quoting State v. Clark, 373 So. 3d 1128, 1131 (Fla. 2023)). In the proceedings below, Hernandez argued that the foreclosure sale should be vacated and the trial court proceedings stayed because there were pending federal proceedings involving the same parties and property and it was necessary to preserve the status quo, avoid irreparable harm, and prevent conflicting rulings with the federal court. In contrast, Hernandez’s 7 arguments on appeal are that the trial court erred by denying his motion because: (1) Barclays did not establish its standing to foreclose because it failed to file the original note; (2) Hernandez provided evidence of a broken chain of title3; (3) Barclays was the purchaser of the property, and thus section 702.036, Florida Statutes, did not apply; and (4) the trial court should have granted Hernandez’s request for a stay in light of the lack of original note, broken chain of title, and inapplicability of section 702.036. Because Hernandez did not raise these specific arguments in his motion or objection below, they were not preserved for appeal and are waived. See Oakes, 431 So. 3d at 1013 (quoting Robbins, 914 So. 2d at 928). C. Merits Even if Hernandez had preserved these arguments for appeal, we would still affirm because the arguments raised do not establish a gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. First, Hernandez’s claim that Barclays failed to provide the original note in the proceedings below is 3 Hernandez also argues he provided evidence that Barclays’ certification of the note was fraudulent or misleading. Beyond making this conclusory assertion, Hernandez offers no argument as to why the certification was fraudulent. “Claims for which an appellant has not presented any argument, or for which he provides only conclusory argument, are insufficiently presented for review and are waived.” Hammond v. State, 34 So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (first citing Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482-83 (Fla. 2008); and then citing Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 217 n.6 (Fla. 1999)). 8 refuted by the appendix, which reflects that Barclays filed the original note in November 2024. By attaching a certification and copy of the note to the complaint and filing the original note prior to the entry of the judgment of foreclosure, Barclays satisfied the requirements of Florida law. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.115(c) (“If the claimant is in possession of the original promissory note, the claimant must file under penalty of perjury a certification contemporaneously with the filing of the claim for relief for foreclosure that the claimant is in possession of the original promissory note. . . . The original note and the allonges must be filed with the court before the entry of any judgment of foreclosure or judgment on the note.”). Second, as to Hernandez’s argument that he presented evidence of a broken chain of title, Florida law states that a litigant does not need to be the note holder and the note owner to have standing to bring a foreclosure action. Aquasol Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 312 So. 3d 105, 110 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). “[S]tanding may be established from a plaintiff’s status as the note holder, regardless of any recorded assignments.” Roif v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 283 So. 3d 383, 385 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). Assuming Hernandez is correct that he presented evidence that the chain of title was 9 broken, such evidence is immaterial because Barclays established its standing to foreclose based on its status as the holder of the note, which bore a blank indorsement. Third, Hernandez argues the trial court erroneously treated the sale to Barclays as a protected sale under section 702.036, Florida Statutes (2025). However, the trial court made no reference to section 702.036 in its order denying Hernandez’s motion, nor does there appear to be any other reference to section 702.036 in the appendix. Accordingly, Hernandez has failed to establish reversible error on this point. Finally, Hernandez argues the trial court erred by denying his request for a stay pending appeal because the lack of original note, the fraudulent or misleading certification, the broken chain of title, and the inapplicability of section 702.036 established his likelihood of success on the merits; he would suffer irreparable harm if he was displaced from his home; and public interest favored the entry of a stay. Because we affirm as to Hernandez’s other arguments, we also affirm the trial court’s denial of Hernandez’s request for a stay because Hernandez has no likelihood of success on the merits. See Dunn v. Flores, 426 So. 3d 576, 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“Among the factors relevant in considering whether to issue a stay are ‘the moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits, and the likelihood of harm should a stay 10 not be granted.’” (quoting Perez v. Perez, 769 So. 2d 389, 391 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999))). CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s order denying Hernandez’s motion to vacate the foreclosure sale and overruling Hernandez’s objection to the foreclosure sale. Hernandez did not preserve the specific arguments he raises on appeal; and even if he had preserved them, they do not establish reversible error. Affirmed. 11