Ashanda Finegan and Marcia Huff v. US Bank National Association
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMay 3, 2023
Docket2D2022-1122
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
ASHANDA FINEGAN and MARCIA HUFF,
Appellants,
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee on behalf of the Holders
of the Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-7 Home Equity Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2006-7; UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF ASHANDA
FINEGAN; CARROLLWOOD VILLAGE PHASE III HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.; HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA; and
UNKNOWN PERSON(S) IN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY,
Appellees.
No. 2D22-1122
May 3, 2023
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; Melissa M. Polo, Judge.
Ashanda Finegan and Marcia Huff, pro se.
Benjamin B. Brown, Joseph T. Kohn, and Gabriela N. Timis, of Quarles
& Brady LLP, Naples, for Appellee U.S. Bank National Association.
No appearance for remaining Appellees.
LaROSE, Judge.
Ashanda Finegan and her mother, Marcia Huff, appeal the trial
court's nonfinal order denying the "Motions to Vacate Final Judgment,"
filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) in a foreclosure
lawsuit between Ms. Finegan and U.S. Bank National Association, as
trustee on behalf of the holders of the Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-7
Home Equity Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-7.
We dismiss the appeal as to Ms. Huff. She cannot challenge the
order on appeal because she was not a party in the trial court. See Fla.
R. App. P. 9.020(g)(1) (defining "Appellant" as a "party"); Mkt. Tampa
Invs., LLC v. Stobaugh, 177 So. 3d 31, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("[B]ecause
the trial court did not permit Market Tampa to intervene or to be
substituted as a party, . . . Market Tampa was not a party to the
foreclosure proceedings and does not have standing to appeal the merits
of the final judgment of foreclosure." (footnote omitted)); Yankeetown
Mgmt., LLC v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 164 So. 3d 744, 745 (Fla. 2d DCA
2015) ("We dismiss the appeal because the appellant, Yankeetown
Management LLC, lacks standing to challenge the final judgment of
foreclosure in this case. Yankeetown did not seek to intervene before the
final judgment was rendered; therefore, it is a legal stranger to the
action."); Turkell-White v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 273 So. 3d 1021, 1022
(Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (dismissing the appeal as to Turkell-White where
"[t]he record below and on appeal clearly showed that neither Barbara A.
Turkell-White nor her estate were named parties in the suit below").
As to Ms. Finegan,
a trial court is restricted in vacating a final judgment under
[rule] 1.540 to the narrow grounds stated therein, and is not
empowered to revisit a final judgment on the merits so as to
correct errors of law as the trial court may do on a motion for
rehearing under [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.530.
Balmoral Condo. Ass'n v. Grimaldi, 107 So. 3d 1149, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA
2013) (quoting Herskowitz v. Herskowitz, 513 So. 2d 1318, 1319 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1987)). Thus, Ms. Finegan's claim that U.S. Bank lacked standing
to seek foreclosure is not permitted under rule 1.540. See id.; see also
Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 83 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA
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2012) ("Even where a judgment is entered in favor of a plaintiff that lacks
standing, the judgment is merely voidable, not void. A judgment that is
merely voidable cannot be set aside under rule 1.540(b)(4)." (citation
omitted)). We cannot adequately review the remainder of Ms. Finegan's
claims on appeal absent a transcript of the hearing in the trial court.
See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152
(Fla. 1979) ("Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court
can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude
that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an
alternative theory."); John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co. v. Lorelys Elec.
Corp., 69 So. 3d 1099, 1101 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ("Where no
transcript of the hearing on the motion to set aside exists, there is a
presumption that the trial court correctly ruled on the motion below."
(citing Larjim Mgmt. Corp. v. Cap. Bank, 554 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1989))). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order as to Ms.
Finegan.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part.
BLACK and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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