Tidewater Preserve Master Association, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Transportation
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledDecember 17, 2021
Docket2D21-0223
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
TIDEWATER PRESERVE MASTER ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Appellee.
No. 2D21-223
December 17, 2021
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court
for Manatee County; Charles Sniffen, Judge.
Andrew Prince Brigham, Trevor S. Hutson, and Christopher C.
Bucalo, of Brigham Property Rights Law Firm, Jacksonville, for
Appellant.
Marc Peoples, Assistant General Counsel, Department of
Transportation, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
In this appeal of the trial court's order granting the Florida
Department of Transportation's (FDOT) petition for an order of
taking, Tidewater Preserve Master Association, Inc., argues that the
court erred in determining that FDOT had made a good faith
estimate of the value of the affected property based upon a valid
appraisal. Having considered the parties' arguments in their briefs
and at oral argument in light of the record and the pertinent
caselaw, we affirm.
This appeal arises out of FDOT's project to construct new
interstate bridge structures over both land and water in Manatee
County. Because the project will affect a portion of the
Association's property, FDOT petitioned for an order of taking
pursuant to the "quick take" procedure set forth in Chapter 74,
Florida Statutes (2020).
[I]n a "quick take" proceeding, the condemning authority
must file a declaration of taking that includes a good
faith estimate of value based on a valid appraisal. Prior
to taking possession of and title to the condemned
property, the taking authority is required to make a
deposit of sufficient funds with the court. The amount to
be deposited in the court registry in a quick-take
proceeding is determined by the trial judge.
Fla. Water Servs. Corp. v. Utilities Comm'n, 790 So. 2d 501, 504
(Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (first citing ยง 74.031, Fla. Stat. (1999); then
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citing ยง 74.061, Fla. Stat. (1999)1; and then citing Bainbridge v.
State Rd. Dep't, 139 So. 2d 714, 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)).
While the deposit of the estimate of value into the court's
registry enables a condemning authority to take title to
the land, the estimate does not establish the value of the
property rights, and the court's determination that the
estimate was made in good faith based upon a valid
appraisal is not a finding of just compensation.
Pierpont v. Lee County, 710 So. 2d 958, 961 (Fla. 1998) (citing Fla.
E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Broward County, 421 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 4th DCA
1982)). Rather, the determination of just compensation is
ultimately for a jury to decide. See Rorabeck's Plants & Produce,
Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cnty., 853 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2003) ("The amount to be deposited by the taking authority in
a quick-take condemnation proceeding represents the trial court's
judgment of the amount necessary to fully compensate the property
owner based on the evidence presented, subject to a final
determination by a jury at trial." (citing Fla. Water Servs. Corp., 790
So. 2d at 504)).
1 These statutory provisions have not changed.
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On appeal, the Association argues that FDOT acted in bad
faith because it instructed its appraiser to rely on hypothetical
conditions that would limit the size of the "parent tract" and
categorically exclude the possibility of temporary and permanent
severance damages.2 The Association argues further that the
appraiser's chosen methodology of determining the parent tract
rendered his appraisal invalid. To put it bluntly, however, these
arguments find no support in the record.
FDOT's appraiser, Ron Sparks, is a state-certified general real
estate appraiser with thirty-plus years of experience. At the
hearing, the Association accepted Sparks as an expert without
objection. Sparks testified that he had visited the site between ten
and twenty times over the course of preparing his appraisal.
Sparks testified regarding the methodology that he had
employed in conducting his appraisal and his reasons for employing
2 See Dade County v. Midic Realty, Inc., 551 So. 2d 499, 500
(Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ("Where only a portion of a larger tract of land is
condemned, severance damages may be awarded as to the
remainder portion, if both the remainder portion and the
condemned portion are part of a 'single tract' or, in other words, the
'parent tract.' ").
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it. He testified concerning his evaluation of contiguity, unity of
ownership, and unity of highest and best useโthe three factors
that must be considered in connection with determining the parent
tract. See Dade County v. Midic Realty, Inc., 551 So. 2d 499, 500
(Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ("The determination of what portion of property
is to be considered the 'parent tract' is made based upon the three
factors of physical contiguity, unity of ownership, and unity of use."
(citing Dep't of Transp., Div. of Admin. v. Jirik, 498 So. 2d 1253,
1255 (Fla. 1986))). With regard to FDOT's instruction that Sparks
consider hypothetical conditions in conducting his appraisal, the
evidence established that consideration of hypothetical conditions is
consistent with Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice, and there is no dispute that Sparks fully disclosed in his
appraisal all of the hypothetical conditions that he had considered
pursuant to FDOT's authorization.
The Association's expert, certified real estate appraiser
Matthew Ray, testified that although he had not yet appraised the
property or even actually set foot on it, he had driven past it on the
highway multiple times and had reviewed pictures. Ray testified
that FDOT's hypothetical conditions were inappropriate given the
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development plan. He testified further that the methodology that
Sparks had employed to identify the parent tract was inappropriate
given the relationship between Sparks's proposed parent tract and
the surrounding property and the nature and use of the property as
a whole. He disagreed with Sparks's assessment of the requisite
three factors.
But one expert's disagreement with another expert's chosen
methodology is hardly sufficient to establish that either expert's
methodology is "invalid." At most, Ray's testimony casts doubt on
the accuracy of Sparks's appraisal (just as Sparks's appraisal casts
doubt on the accuracy of Ray's testimony) and FDOT's estimate, but
"inaccurate" is not the same as "in bad faith" or "invalid," and in
any event, the accuracy of FDOT's estimate was not the question
before the trial court. Because the Association has wholly failed to
establish error in the court's resolution of the question that was
before it, we affirm.
Affirmed.
LaROSE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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