Full Opinion

Opinion filed September 17, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-24-00133-CV __________ PAMUELA J. WINNICK, Appellant V. CITY OF FORT WORTH, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2024-000541-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Pamela Winnick, proceeding pro se, appeals the county court’s order that her dog be euthanized pursuant to Section 822.003 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 822.003 (West 2017). 1 This appeal was transferred to this court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket equalization order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West Supp. 2025). Therefore, as the transferee court, we must decide the issues raised in this appeal in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals if its precedent conflicts with ours. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. The trial court found that the dog caused serious bodily injury to a person, and that the dog’s enclosure was not reasonably certain to keep a person under the age of eight from entering. See id. § 822.003(f)(5). We liberally construe Appellant’s brief as asserting four issues on appeal. First, Appellant asserts that she is entitled to a new trial because a portion of the trial record was lost or destroyed. Second, she argues that the dog was seized pursuant to an invalid warrant, and, as a result, the trial court’s refusal to return the dog was in error. In her third issue, she argues that her motion for new trial was improperly overruled because it included additional evidence to support the exception to destruction under Section 822.003(f)(5). Fourth, she asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the county court’s findings that the dog caused serious bodily injury and that the dog’s enclosure was not sufficiently secure. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction, or alternatively, we affirm. Background Facts On January 5, 2024, officers from the Fort Worth Police Department were dispatched to Appellant’s home based upon a report of a dog bite. Officer Pamela Rodriguez with the Fort Worth Police Department was one of the first officers to arrive on scene. Her body camera footage showed officers arriving at Appellant’s residence before being directed across the street to the child victim’s grandparents’ home where the child had been taken after the incident. The child was almost two years old at the time. Responding officers encountered Appellant who explained that she was babysitting the child in her home, and without her knowledge, the child had gone out of the back door and into the yard where her two Chow Chow dogs were being kept. When Appellant realized the child was missing, she walked outside and saw the dog attacking the child. Appellant told officers that the dogs were “mauling her like a wild animal.” We note in this regard that Appellant was covered in the child’s blood while talking to the officers. 2 Inside the grandparents’ home, officers observed the child lying on a bed covered in blood. She had a gash to the back of her head, a partially detached ear, and multiple puncture wounds to her neck, back, and chest. EMS responded and quickly transported her to the hospital. Animal control officers arrived after the child was taken to the hospital and spoke with Appellant about the incident and the resulting quarantine requirements for the dogs involved. They gave Appellant the option of surrendering the dogs to their custody or seeking a private facility for the quarantine by 6:00 p.m. the following day. Appellant chose to investigate private options. Animal control and police officers then observed the dogs through the fence where they observed blood on one of the dog’s head and mouth. Despite their initial conversation with Appellant at the scene, officers later elected to obtain a warrant to seize the dogs after further investigation of the child’s injuries resulted in a determination that the dogs had caused serious bodily injury. On January 12, 2024, the municipal court of Fort Worth, a municipal court of record, determined that only one of Appellant’s dogs caused serious bodily injury to the child. See GOV’T §§ 30.00381–30.00402 (West 2023). As a result, the municipal court found that one dog was involved in the incident and the other was not. It ordered that the dog that was involved in injuring the child, “Lincoln,” be destroyed and it ordered the return of the other dog to Appellant.2 On January 16, 2024, Appellant appealed to the County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County. Appellant denoted her appeal as a “de novo” appeal, and the county court at law obliged her request by conducting a de novo trial. The county court at law held a hearing on February 7, 2024, where no record was apparently kept of the proceedings. This hearing resulted in an order to hear the de novo appeal 2 Unless otherwise noted, we restrict our discussion to the dog that both the municipal court and county court at law ordered to be euthanized. 3 on March 7, 2024. On February 23, 2024, the City of Fort Worth (the City) filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on its contention that an appeal does not exist from a municipal court’s order under Section 822.003. The county court at law overruled the plea to the jurisdiction, and it conducted a de novo trial of Appellant’s appeal. At trial, the City offered evidence that Appellant’s dog caused serious bodily injury to the child through the testimony from responding police officers and animal control officers and photographs of the child’s injuries. The child’s mother also testified about her daughter’s injuries. The child suffered from over nineteen bites and lacerations to the head and neck. The largest laceration was on the back of her head and required over twenty stitches and two surgeries to treat. The child’s left ear was also detached during the incident. Though doctors were able to reattach her ear, the injury still impacted proper closing of the ear canal, resulting in potential effects to the child’s hearing in the future. At the time of the hearing, the child’s neck remained fractured, and she was required to wear a neck collar for two more months. Detective Horacio Solis, an animal control investigator with the City of Fort Worth, testified that he was called to obtain a warrant to seize the animals because the incident resulted in serious bodily injury to the child. The affidavit and warrant were admitted into evidence, and, in the affidavit, Detective Solis made an application for a “warrant to seize a cruelly treated animal under the authority of T.H.S.C.” Appellant’s attorney argued that the dog should be returned to Appellant based on an illegal seizure from an invalid warrant because the case did not involve animal cruelty. The City argued that the error was a typographical error that did not make the warrant defective because the remainder of the affidavit identified that the reason for the seizure was “serious bodily injury.” Detective Solis confirmed in his testimony that the first line of the affidavit was an error. The county court at law declined to return the dog at that time, and the hearing proceeded. 4 Appellant’s attorney argued that the exception to destruction of the dog under Section 822.003(f)(5) applied because the dog’s enclosure was sufficient to keep out a person under the age of eight. Appellant testified that the back entrance of her home comprised two doors—a steel screen door with a deadbolt and a traditional door. The backyard was fenced all the way around with chain link, and a portion of the chain link was backed up by an eight-foot wood fence. Appellant initially stated that on the day of the incident, the traditional door was open, but the screen door was shut with the deadbolt latched. When questioned on cross-examination about her statement on body camera footage that the back door was unlocked, she stated that she was sure it was shut but not that it was locked. She testified that no child had ever managed to make it past the screen door when it was deadbolted. The county court at law found that: (1) the child sustained serious bodily injury; (2) the child was younger than eight years of age; and (3) the exception under Section 822.003(f)(5) did not apply. The county court at law also awarded costs against Appellant. Analysis Appellant is a pro se appellant. Therefore, we construe her brief liberally. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Aaron v. Fisher, 645 S.W.3d 299, 312 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.). Nevertheless, Appellant is still held to the same standards as any licensed attorney and is required to comply with all applicable rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank, 573 S.W.2d at 184–85; Aaron, 645 S.W.3d at 312. We may not consider evidence that is not included in the appellate record or factual assertions that appear solely in the appellate briefs that were not presented to the trial court for determination. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.1; Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1998); Unger Tex. Stone, LP v. Deere Credit, Inc., 735 S.W.3d 917, 922 n.5 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2026, no pet.) (collecting cases). 5 Subject Matter Jurisdiction “Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993); Jurgens v. Martin, 631 S.W.3d 385, 396 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.). “‘Subject matter jurisdiction . . . may not be waived by the parties,’ and it may— indeed, must—be raised by an appellate court on its own.” Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246, 260 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal question that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); AIM Media Tex., LLC v. City of Odessa, 663 S.W.3d 324, 331 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). As we noted in footnote no. 1, this is a transfer case from the Second Court of Appeals, and the precedent from that court governs our analysis of this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. In In re Loban, the Second Court of Appeals addressed an attempted appeal from the municipal court of record of the City of Grapevine to a Tarrant County court at law with respect to a determination that two dogs were dangerous. 243 S.W.3d 827, 828 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, orig. proceeding); see HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.0421. The Second Court of Appeals concluded that an appeal from a municipal court of record to a Tarrant County court at law in a civil matter is not cognizable based upon its interpretation of Section 30.00014 of the Texas Government Code, which governs appeals from municipal courts of record. Loban, 243 S.W.3d at 828–31; see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 30.00014. Based upon our research, the holding in Loban has not been overturned by the Second Court of Appeals. 3 Accordingly, under the applicable precedent of the Second Court of 3 We note that at least one court, the Fifth Court of Appeals, expressed its disagreement with Loban. See State By & Through City of Dallas v. Dallas Pets Alive, 566 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied). However, the dissenting opinion in Dallas Pets Alive expressed its agreement with Loban. Id. at 921–22 (Lang, J., dissenting). 6 Appeals, the Tarrant County Court at Law No. 1 did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s appeal from the Fort Worth Municipal Court. There is another matter involving subject-matter jurisdiction that potentially defeats Appellant’s appeal. The order for destruction of Appellant’s dog occurred under Subchapter A of Chapter 822 of the Health and Safety Code based upon the lower courts’ determinations that the dog caused serious bodily injury. See HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 822.002, .003. But Subchapter A does not contain a provision authorizing an appeal from that determination.4 Justice Lang opined in his dissenting opinion in Dallas Pets Alive that, in the absence of a statute granting an appeal for a determination under Subchapter A, none is available. 566 S.W.3d at 919–22 (Lang, J., dissenting). Justice Lang’s reasoning accords with Loban’s holding. For the reasons expressed in Justice Lang’s dissent, we agree Subchapter A does not provide a right to appeal a determination under Subchapter A to the intermediate courts of appeals. As noted by the Second Court of Appeals in Loban, the civil jurisdiction of municipal courts is limited—it is wholly dependent on statutory creation. 243 S.W.3d at 831 (citing Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA–0316 (2005) (discussing appeals from municipal courts and municipal courts of record and explaining that these statutes provide a limited right to appeal from decisions of municipal courts and municipal courts of record)). If the statute that vests the municipal court with jurisdiction over a civil matter does not create a right of appeal, we conclude that no right of appeal exists. 5 4 This omission was the basis for the State’s plea to the jurisdiction. 5 We are aware that a right to appeal exists in Subchapter D of Chapter 822. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.0421; Jaramillo v. City of Odessa Animal Control, No. 11-23-00117-CV, 2024 WL 3362927 (Tex. App.—Eastland, July 11, 2024, no pet.). (mem. op.). However, we disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion in Dallas Pets Alive that a right of appeal in Subchapter D would apply to a proceeding under Subchapter A. 566 S.W.3d at 917. 7 We conclude that, under Loban and for the reasons expressed in Justice Lang’s dissent in Dallas Pets Alive, the Tarrant County court at law did not, under these circumstances, have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the Fort Worth municipal court of record. Further, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from either lower courts’ order. Merits of Appeal In the event we have erred in our determination about subject matter jurisdiction, we will address the merits of the appeal. Trial Record Lost or Destroyed In her first issue, Appellant argues that she is entitled to a new trial under Rule 34.6(f) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure because a portion of the reporter’s record was lost. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(f). Under Rule 34.6(f), Appellant would be entitled to a new trial if: (1) she timely requested a reporter’s record; (2) without the fault of Appellant, a significant exhibit or significant portion of the court reporter’s notes and records had been lost or destroyed; (3) the lost portion of the reporter’s record was necessary to the appeal’s resolution; and (4) the lost portion could not be replaced by agreement of the parties. Id. For a record to be “lost or destroyed” within the meaning of Rule 34.6(f), the court reporter must first make a recording of the proceedings or exhibits and then lose or destroy the record. See Haase v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrels, Agosto & Friend, L.L.P., 499 S.W.3d 169, 179 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). When the complaining party cannot show that the court reporter ever recorded the missing proceedings, the party is not entitled to a new trial under Rule 34.6(f). Huston v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 434 S.W.3d 630, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). In her brief, Appellant describes her extensive e-mail correspondence with the court reporter regarding her request to obtain the records from the proceedings. In 8 that correspondence, the court reporter informed Appellant that no record was taken of the hearing on February 7, 2024. We note at the outset that this e-mail correspondence is not part of the appellate record, and it is therefore not properly before this court for appellate review. See Unger Tex. Stone, LP, 735 S.W.3d at 922. Appellant argues that the February 7 hearing involved procedural errors that would warrant reversing the county court’s ruling, but she does not identify those errors. Without a showing to support that a record was made for the February 7 hearing, Appellant is unable to show that the remedy under Rule 34.6(f) is available to her. Moreover, the record from the February 7 proceeding is not necessary to this appeal’s resolution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(f)(3). Rule 34.6(f)(3) provides that a new trial is required when the missing portion of the record is necessary to the appeal’s resolution. Id. Appellant has the burden of establishing that the missing portion of the record is necessary to the appeal’s resolution. In re J.A.N., 563 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). Rule 34.6(f)(3) “is itself a harm analysis.” Coplin v. Mann, 622 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (quoting Gavrel v. Rodriguez, 225 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)). In this regard, if the missing portion of the record is not necessary to the appeal’s resolution, the missing portion is harmless under the rule and does not warrant the remedy of a new trial. Gavrel, 225 S.W.3d at 761. The appellate record reflects that the county court at law conducted a trial de novo on March 7. Accordingly, there is no indication that Appellant was unable to present her appeal in the absence of a record of the February 7 hearing. We overrule Appellant’s first issue. Validity of Warrant to Seize the Dogs In her second issue, Appellant asserts that the warrant to seize her dogs was invalid because the corresponding affidavit requested the authority to seize “a 9 cruelly treated animal(s)” when there was no allegation of cruelty. Appellant’s trial attorney did not file a motion to suppress, but rather requested during the trial de novo that the county court return the dog to Appellant because of the error. Section 822.002 of the Texas Health and Safety Code provides that: (a) A justice court, county court, or municipal court shall order the animal control authority to seize a dog and shall issue a warrant authorizing the seizure: (1) on the sworn complaint of any person, including the county attorney, the city attorney, or a peace officer, that the dog has caused the death of or serious bodily injury to a person by attacking, biting, or mauling the person; and (2) on a showing of probable cause to believe that the dog caused the death of or serious bodily injury to the person as stated in the complaint. (b) The animal control authority shall seize the dog or order its seizure and shall provide for the impoundment of the dog in secure and humane conditions until the court orders the disposition of the dog. HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.002. The trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether the dog caused death or serious bodily injury within ten days of the issuance of the warrant. Id. § 822.003(a). If the trial court finds that the seized dog caused serious bodily injury to the person as alleged, the trial court has discretion to order the dog destroyed. Id. § 822.003(e). Here, a Fort Worth municipal court issued the warrant on January 5, set the hearing for January 12, and issued the destruction order on January 12. Appellant does not assert that the affidavit fails to establish probable cause; instead she contends, among other things, that the supporting affidavit was inaccurate and included the language “a cruelly treated animal(s).” In this regard, Appellant points out that, because there is allegation in this matter that she treated her animals cruelly, the affidavit is inaccurate and therefore invalid. Even if a discrepancy could render the warrant defective, the exclusionary rule does not 10 apply in this civil proceeding. See State v. One (1) 2004 Lincoln Navigator, VIN#5LMFU27RX4LJ28242, 494 S.W.3d 690, 700–01 (Tex. 2016) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings and collecting Supreme Court decisions declining to extend the exclusionary rule beyond criminal cases); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2018) (limiting its evidentiary exclusion to criminal cases). A Chapter 822 proceeding to determine the disposition of a dog is civil in nature and predicated on the conduct of the dog, not the seizure itself. 2004 Lincoln Navigatgor, 494 S.W.3d at 700–01 (“[T]he forfeiture proceeding itself [is not] predicated on seizure; rather, it is predicated on whether the property is contraband.”). We overrule Appellant’s second issue. Additional Evidence in Motion for New Trial In her third issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it overruled her motion for new trial because the motion provided additional evidence to support that the exception in Section 822.003(f)(5) applied. HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.003(f)(5). In her motion for new trial, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the exception to destruction did not apply, and she provided additional evidence to suggest that the dog’s enclosure was “sufficient” under Section 822.003(f)(5). We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2009). Under this standard, we must determine whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). The exercise of discretion is within the sole province of the trial court, and an appellate court may not substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. Johnson v. Fourth Ct. App., 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court reaches a decision that is “so 11 arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Id. at 917. Appellant claims that the trial court failed to consider the “new evidence” provided in the motion for new trial. Rule 324 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that one type of new trial complaint is “newly discovered evidence.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(1). To establish the evidence was newly discovered: the party must show that she acquired knowledge of the evidence since the trial; that she exercised due diligence to acquire such knowledge sooner; that it is not cumulative; and that it is so material that it would probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983) (citing New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jordan, 359 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1962)). Evidence offered on a motion for new trial which was offered or available during the course of the trial will not be received or considered in the granting of a new trial. Highlands Cable Television, Inc. v. Wong, 547 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. App.—Austin 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Tax Payers Ass’n of Lubbock v. City of Lubbock, 565 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1978, no writ). Most of Appellant’s motion for new trial did not concern newly discovered evidence under the standard set out above. The additional evidence provided with the motion consisted of descriptions and photographs of the enclosures used by the City of Fort Worth’s animal shelter, screenshots of the shelter placing the dog for adoption, and Animal Control’s e-mail to a prospective adoptee denying the dog’s availability for adoption due to the ongoing court case. Photographs and descriptions of the animal shelter’s enclosures would have been available to Appellant prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence. See Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809. Additionally, though the screenshots of the shelter’s adoption ad were dated four days after the final hearing, the listing indicated that it had been available online 12 for over two months. Such information would also have been available to Appellant at the time of trial through the exercise of due diligence. Animal control’s e-mail correspondence with the prospective adoptee is the only evidence that would not have been available to Appellant prior to the trial on the merits. Appellant did not demonstrate the four elements establishing that the evidence was newly discovered in her motion for new trial. However, even assuming the elements were fulfilled, whether a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence will be granted or refused is generally a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. In re A.G.C., 279 S.W.3d 441, 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809). The trial court considers the weight and importance of the new evidence in connection with the evidence received at trial. Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809. Every reasonable presumption will be made in favor of the trial court’s order denying a request for a new trial. Id. at 809–10. Significantly, the trial de novo conducted by the county court at law was a bench trial. As such, the county court at law was able to assess Appellant’s new trial evidence to determine whether it would have affected the outcome at trial. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion for new trial. It was within the trial court’s discretion to determine the weight of the e-mail correspondence in connection with the evidence that was presented at trial. We overrule Appellant’s third issue. Sufficiency of the Evidence In her fourth issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the dog caused serious bodily injury to the child. She also challenges the evidence with respect to the sufficiency of the enclosure in which the dog was kept. With respect to serious bodily injury, Appellant asserts that the testimony of 13 responding officers and the child’s mother regarding the extent of the child’s injuries was not enough to establish that the injuries were sufficiently “serious.” Appellant asserts that the lack of testimony from treating physicians or nurses about the extent of the injuries rendered the evidence insufficient. Appellant focuses her argument about the sufficiency of the enclosure on the evidence about the height and sufficiency of the fencing around her yard. When parties challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adverse finding on which they did not have the burden of proof at trial, they must demonstrate that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). Under a legal sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, make every reasonable inference in that party’s favor, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 822, 827. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder if the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 822. The evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding only if (1) the record discloses a complete absence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810. “Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding.” Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). “More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach different conclusions.” Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 259 (Tex. 2014). “However, if the evidence is so weak that it only creates a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, it is 14 regarded as no evidence.” Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex. 2014). Section 822.002 of the Texas Health and Safety Code authorizes the seizure of a dog upon the sworn complaint of any person that the dog “caused the death of or serious bodily injury to a person by attacking, biting, or mauling the person.” HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 822.002. Section 822.001 defines “[s]erious bodily injury” as: [A]n injury characterized by severe bite wounds or severe ripping and tearing of muscle that would cause a reasonably prudent person to seek treatment from a medical professional and would require hospitalization without regard to whether the person actually sought medical treatment. Id. § 822.001. In the criminal law context, whether an injury constitutes serious bodily injury is determined on a case-by-case basis. Wade v. State, 663 S.W.3d 175, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). “‘[S]erious bodily injury’ may be established without a physician’s testimony when the injury and its effects are obvious.” Id. at 185. Lay witness opinion testimony may support a finding of serious bodily injury. Id. (citing Hart v. State, 581 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979)). Section 822.001’s definition of serious bodily injury is less demanding than the Penal Code’s definition of serious bodily injury, in that it does not require a substantial risk of death, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of function. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (West Supp. 2025). Instead, serious bodily injury under the Texas Health and Safety Code must only be characterized by bite wounds or ripping and tearing of muscle that would induce, but does not require, a victim to seek medical treatment and require hospitalization. HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.001. 15 Here, the trial court heard significant evidence to support its finding that the child sustained serious bodily injury. Officer Rodriguez testified that she observed the child to be covered in blood with lacerations to her head, chest, and back. She also testified that the child’s ear had been partially severed. Animal control officers confirmed that the child was transported to the hospital from the scene. Photographs of the child’s injuries were also admitted into evidence and reflected the injuries witnessed by the officers. Additionally, the child’s mother testified to the extent of the child’s injuries, noting that the child had nineteen lacerations to her head and neck, a fractured skull and neck, and a partially detached ear that required multiple surgeries to correct. Considering all evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, there is more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the child sustained serious bodily injury as a result of the incident. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 48. The absence of testimony from a physician does not render the evidence insufficient to support this finding. See Wade, 663 S.W.3d at 185. With respect to the sufficiency of the enclosure, Section 822.003(f)(5) provides that: (f) The court may not order the dog destroyed if the court finds that the dog caused the serious bodily injury to a person by attacking, biting, or mauling the person and: .... (5) the injured person was younger than eight years of age, the attack, bite, or mauling occurred in an enclosure in which the dog was being kept, and the enclosure was reasonably certain to keep a person younger than eight years of age from entering. HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.003(f)(5). Appellant contends that the fence surrounding her backyard was reasonably certain to keep a child younger than eight from 16 entering. But in advancing this argument, Appellant ignores the fact that the child victim, who was not quite two years old, entered Appellant’s backyard from inside her home through her back doors. As such, these doors were a part of the enclosure of Appellant’s backyard. Irrespective of whether the doors were locked or closed, a very small child was able to navigate through the doors into Appellant’s backyard. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the enclosure of Appellant’s backyard was not reasonably certain to keep a child younger than eight from entering it. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s fourth issue. This Court’s Ruling We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. Alternatively, in the event that jurisdiction exists, we affirm the judgment of the county court at law. JOHN M. BAILEY CHIEF JUSTICE September 17, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 17