Jones v. Hattingh CA5

Filed 11/9/26 Jones v. Hattingh CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DREXWELL M. JONES, F090953 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. FL-25-002979) v. MICHELLE HATTINGH, OPINION Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Alan K. Cassidy and David Hood, Judges. * Law Offices of Brunn & Flynn and Drexwell M. Jones for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent. -ooOoo- * Judge Cassidy presided over the November 7, December 1, and December 4, 2025, hearings. Judge Hood signed the November 7 order on Judge Cassidy’s behalf and presided over the December 8 and December 15, 2025, hearings.  INTRODUCTION Appellant Drexwell M. Jones appeals from the issuance of a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) and a number of orders which followed. Appellant argues (1) the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the DVTRO; (2) the trial court failed to timely set an order to show cause hearing as required by Family Code sections 242 and 245; (3) the trial court exceeded its authority by “decoupling” the domestic violence restraining order proceedings; and (4) the trial court violated his due process rights by continuing the DVTRO without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. We find the scope of the instant appeal is limited to review of the appealable November 7, 2025, order issuing the DVTRO only, and affirm the trial court’s order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. Procedural History. Appellant married Michelle Hattingh in 2018, and together they had two children. The relationship deteriorated, and on November 3, 2025, appellant came home from work to discover Hattingh had taken the children and left their house to an undisclosed location. On November 5, 2025, appellant filed an emergency ex parte petition for custody and support of the minor children. The same day, Hattingh filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) with an attached request for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO). On November 7, 2025, appellant filed an objection to the DVRO. On November 7, 2025, the trial court granted appellant’s emergency petition, ordered appellant receive physical and legal custody of the children and control of the family residence. The order also prohibited traveling with the children outside of Stanislaus County or California and implemented measures to enforce the order, such as 2. requiring the turnover of passports and other documents and notification of the children’s current address and any proposed moves. On November 7, 2025, the trial court also granted Hattingh’s request for a DVTRO pending evidentiary hearing on the DVRO. Because the DVTRO order conflicted with the contemporaneous custody and property order issued appellant, the DVTRO listed only Hattingh as a protected person. A child custody and visitation order attached to the DVTRO, however, restrained appellant from custody, care, travel or visitation with the children. Both appellant’s and Hattingh’s matters were scheduled for December 1, 2025, and December 15, 2025, for hearing. Appellant filed an objection to the issuance of the DVTRO on November 7, 2025, and a response and objection to the DVRO on November 26, 2025. On December 1, 2025, the trial court issued a custody and visitation order based upon the agreement of both parties. The DVRO matter was continued by order of the court to March 9, 2026, and the DVTRO was ordered to remain in full force and effect except for brief and peaceful contact as required for court-ordered visitation. On December 4, 2025, the trial court reassigned the matter due to the judge recusing himself pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3. 1 On December 8, 2025, the trial court issued an amended temporary custody order set to expire at the end of the hearing on December 15, 2025. On December 15, 2025, the trial court issued an amended temporary custody order set to expire at the next hearing, which was rescheduled per appellant’s request to January 20, 2026. The DVTRO was ordered to remain in full force and effect until further order from the court. On December 29, 2025, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from “Temporary Restraining Order; Findings and Order After Hearing; Findings and Order After Hearing” 1 All further undesignated references to code are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated. 3. dated November 7, 2025, December 1, 2025, December 4, 2025, December 8, 2025, and December 15, 2025. On January 6, 2026, appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court. The petition was denied on January 15, 2026. Appellant filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on January 26, 2026, which was denied on March 11, 2026. 2 II. Allegations. Hattingh provided a “description of abuse” as an attached declaration to the request for DVRO. (Capitalization omitted.) In the description, Hattingh stated on November 3, 2025, appellant was upset about one of the children having a potty-training accident. He was calling Hattingh “ ‘cunt’ ” and other names, calling her “ ‘the problem,’ ” and “ ‘damaged.’ ” Hattingh told him, “[I]t didn’t hurt [her] anymore,” and appellant opened the kitchen drawer. Hattingh described appellant’s eyes flashing between her and the drawer. Hattingh asked if appellant was threatening to stab her. Appellant responded, “[I]t’s a fantasy.” Hattingh clarified, “with knives?” Appellant stated he would not do it and “[i]t [was] just a fantasy.” Hattingh described that on November 2, 2025, appellant told her he would “destroy” her and leave her homeless “with nothing.” Appellant described how “filthy” Hattingh’s clothes would be and said he hoped Hattingh died “by injury and a car.” Hattingh described other, undated instances of abuse. She stated appellant would punch walls and doors, would shout, break things, and wreck and threaten to throw away Hattingh’s things. Hattingh stated when she refused to do the things appellant wanted, he would “punish” her by locking her out of the apartment, threatening to kick her out, and keep her from her money or having access to the finances. Hattingh also alleged appellant had shoved her and said that he would not “fulfill his wish” of punching her in 2 At oral argument appellant indicated that the DVRO hearing remains pending and is currently scheduled for January 2027. 4. the face because he was an attorney. Hattingh concluded that she feared for her safety and the safety of her children. DISCUSSION Respondent has not filed a brief. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2), we decide the appeal on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by the appellant, and “reverse only if prejudicial error is found.” (Walker v. Porter (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 174, 177.) I. The DVTRO Issued on November 7, 2025, Is Appealable; However, the Orders Issued December 1, 4, 8, and 15, 2025, Are Interlocutory Orders and Not Appealable at This Time. “An appealable judgment or order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal.” (Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 392; see § 904.1.) “Ordinarily, orders rendered after the judgment or order from which an appeal is noticed do not fall within the scope of that appeal.” (Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 564, 572.) Section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) allows an appeal “[f]rom an order granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction.” “All orders granting or refusing either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction are directly appealable.” (Courtesy Temporary Service, Inc. v. Camacho (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1286.) The November 7, 2025, order issuing the DVTRO is an appealable order pursuant to this section. However, the orders dated December 1, 2025, December 4, 2025, December 8, and December 15, 2025 (together the “December orders”), are not appealable. These orders are interlocutory, and an appeal “does not lie from interlocutory judgments or orders unless specifically made appealable by statute.” (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 560.) “Generally speaking, under the one final judgment rule, 5. interlocutory or interim orders are not appealable, but are only ‘reviewable on appeal’ from the final judgment.” (Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565.) There are several exceptions to the final judgment rule. Interlocutory orders may be appealed if they are made appealable pursuant to section 904.1, subdivisions (a)(1) through (14). The December orders are not appealable as “orders after final judgment” because the DVTRO is not a final judgment as described in section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1). 3 They are not made appealable by the Family Code. 4 (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(10).) The orders are not a final order or judgment in a bifurcated proceeding regarding child custody or visitation rights. (Id., subd. (a)(14).) In supplemental briefing, appellant argues the December orders are new injunctions because either the previous injunction expired or the orders granted entirely new injunctions with different injunctive relief. Alternatively, appellant argues the orders refused to dissolve an injunction. In both instances, appellant argues the December orders are appealable pursuant to section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6). “ ‘When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain, commonsense meaning of the language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]henever possible, significance must be given to every word [in a statute] in pursuing the legislative purpose, and the court should avoid a construction that makes some words surplusage.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1131.) “ ‘We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the 3 Section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1) permits an appeal “[f]rom a judgment, except an interlocutory judgment, other than as provided in paragraphs (8), (9), and (11), or a judgment of contempt ….” Section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) permits an appeal “[f]rom an order made after a judgment made appealable by paragraph (1).” 4 Temporary custody orders are not appealable and are “interlocutory by definition.” (Lester v. Lennane, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 559.) 6. various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616.) The plain language of section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) allows an appeal only from an order “granting” or “dissolving” an injunction, or “refusing to grant” or “dissolve” an injunction. We first turn to the interpretation of these terms. The term “grant,” in the context of granting an injunction, interpreted plainly, means the issuance of an injunction. The term “grant” is distinguishable from a continuance, and “[a] ruling on a motion for a continuance is not an appealable order.” (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 527.) Appellant argues the December orders each affirmatively issued injunctive relief that otherwise would have expired or dissolved. The statutory framework governing DVROs and DVTROs does not support this interpretation. Family Code section 240 et seq., governs the process of petitioning for a protective order described in Family Code section 6320 5. Family Code section 246 permits a request for a temporary restraining order be “granted or denied” the same day that a petition for a protective order is submitted to the court. Family Code section 242 requires a hearing on the petition for protective order within 21 days, or if good cause appearing, 25 days, from the date that a temporary restraining order is “granted or denied.” Family Code section 245 allows the trial court, on its own motion, to grant a continuance of the hearing on the petition for protective order (Fam. Code, § 245, subd. (b)), and “[i]f the court grants a continuance, any temporary restraining order that has been issued shall remain in effect until the end of the continued hearing, unless otherwise ordered by the court” (id., subd. (c), italics 5 Hattingh’s petition for DVRO was made to enjoin acts of abuse as described in Family Code section 6320. 7. added). The statutory structure of Family Code section 240 et seq. clearly distinguishes between the grant or issuance of a temporary restraining order, and the persistence of an existing temporary restraining order when a continuance of the hearing on the petition for protective order is granted pursuant to Family Code section 245. Appellant asks this court to find any order which exercises authority over an existing injunction be appealable pursuant to section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6). Such a rule would render every interlocutory order following any preliminary or temporary injunction appealable even while the main action remains pending. Every continuance and order after hearing, either substantive or housekeeping, would be independently appealable because such orders would “maintain” the injunction. Such a rule would be entirely untenable and encompasses exactly why the Legislature implemented statutory limits on appealable orders. Likewise, accepting appellant’s argument would lead to absurd results and render Family Code section 245 superfluous. Family Code section 242 requires a hearing “25 days from the date that a temporary restraining order is granted.” (Fam. Code, § 242, subd. (a), italics added.) If every continuance of a hearing on a petition for protective order past the 25-day limit prescribed by Family Code section 242 constituted a “grant” of a new temporary restraining order, Family Code section 242 itself would reset the 25- day deadline, rendering the continuance unnecessary. Such an interpretation would create a legal ouroboros—the trial court exercising its discretion pursuant to Family Code section 245 would negate the need for that discretion. We cannot accept such an interpretation, as it “ ‘ “would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.” ’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 616.) An order extending the duration of an existing temporary restraining order is not a “grant” of an 8. injunction as described in Family Code section 242 and section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6). 6 Nonetheless, we briefly review whether the December orders contain language that can be interpreted as “granting” a new injunction within the meaning of section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6). The December 1, 2025, order stated that “[t]he temporary restraining orders shall remain in full force and effect except for brief and peaceful contact as required for court-ordered visitation, until 03/09/2026.” The December 4, 2025, order made no mention of the DVTRO and stated only that “[t]his matter shall be continued for hearing on Monday, December 8, 2025 … for consideration of non-professional supervised visitation.” The December 8, 2025, order made no mention of the DVTRO. Finally, the December 15, 2025, order stated that “[t]he Court Trial scheduled for March 9, 2026 on Father’s objection to Restraining Order is advanced to January 20, 2026 .… [¶] … [¶] All temporary restraining orders shall remain in full force and effect until further order of the court.” (Some capitalization omitted.) None of the language in the December orders indicates the trial court issued or granted new restraining orders at each respective hearing. The term “dissolve” in the context of dissolving an injunction, interpreted plainly, means the termination of an existing injunction. The process of dissolving an injunction is governed by statute. Section 532 states, “[i]f an injunction is granted without notice to the person enjoined, the person may apply, upon reasonable notice to the judge who granted the injunction, or to the court in which the action was brought, to dissolve or modify the injunction.” (§ 532, subd. (a).) This statute applies to DVTROs granted pursuant to the Family Code. “ ‘Unless another statute or rule applies, proceedings under the Family Code are generally governed by the standards set forth in the Code of Civil 6 Because the matter is outside the scope of this appeal, we make no finding whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion continuing the hearing on the DVRO. 9. Procedure.’ ” (In re Marriage of G.E. & I.D. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1119.) Because a DVTRO is a type of injunction, “section 533,[ 7] which governs the modification or dissolution of injunctions, sets forth legal ‘standards for a trial court to apply when considering whether to [modify or] dissolve’ ” a DVTRO. (Ibid.) An order dissolving or refusing to dissolve an injunction would necessarily be responsive to some motion, notice or objection made pursuant to section 532. (See Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52 Cal.2d 601 [appeal taken from a separate motion to vacate preliminary injunction]; People v. Brewer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 122 [appeal taken from a motion to set aside transfer order]; Gawzner Corp. v. Minier (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 777 [appeal taken from motion for dissolution of permanent injunction].) Appellant argues the trial court continuing the DVTRO functioned as a refusal to dissolve the existing injunctive relief. We disagree. For the trial court to refuse to dissolve the DVTRO, appellant must have first made a request to dissolve8 it. But a review of the record does not show appellant making such a request. 9 In the December 1, 2025, order, the DVTRO was ordered to remain in effect until March 9, 2026, with no note of an objection by appellant of the extension. The 7 Section 533 states, “In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order.” 8 Appellant need not use the term “dissolve” specifically. In this case, any language requesting that the DVTRO be terminated or made inapplicable would have sufficed. 9 We note that appellant filed an “Objection to Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order” on November 7, 2025. The motion requested “the court to consider my opposition to the issuance of a temporary domestic violence restraining order.” This was an objection to the issuance of the DVTRO, not a request for its subsequent dissolution. The issuance of the DVTRO in the first instance is reviewed on its merits below. 10. December 4 and 8, 2025, orders make no mention of the DVTRO. Finally, a review of the transcript of the December 15, 2025, order provides the following exchange: “[Appellant]: “… I want to assert my objection to actually this proceeding, the hearing set for March 9th, 2026, on the marriage of the DVRO and the previous custody orders based on Family [C]ode 242 and violation of due process. “So I think that I …was entitled, given the legislative scheme, to have a hearing on the merits so that I don’t have to have determinations of custody and control of property made, one with statutory presumption set against me and with the allegation of domestic violence hanging over my head.” “THE COURT: Okay. [¶] … [¶] “THE COURT: First of all, I haven’t made any findings of domestic violence. There is no … Family Code 3044 presumption. [¶] Secondly, if you look at [F]amily [C]ode section 245[, subdivisions] (b) and (c), I do have the authority to continue entering on my own motion, which I have done, and then we had set it for March. I know it is not as soon as you would like, but -- I understand you don’t agree with me, but I’m saying, I believe that I have the authority to do that. “As far as the custody and the visitation, we are talking about visitation. That needed to be taken care of. That needs to be worked on. [¶] … [¶] “[APPELLANT]: And it is the practice … of the courts in this county not to -- in a contested DVRO, not to give a date for the trial on the merits within 25 days? “THE COURT: That’s correct. [¶] … [¶] “[APPELLANT]: And, again … supporting the argument that this proceeding is arguably in excess of judicial jurisdiction is Family Code section 6340, and that talks about basically the ability to extend domestic violence prevention act orders, protective orders after a hearing on the merits, and I just want to direct the Court to an appellate case [In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 935.] And I don’t know if the Court is familiar with the case, but it discusses the due process ramifications of not having a hearing on the merits prior to having the determinations on the protective order.” After some discussion regarding custody, the trial court clarified: “[APPELLANT]: So -- but what I understand that you just said earlier is that you weren’t making a finding of domestic violence. 11.  “THE COURT: That’s right. [¶] … [¶] “THE COURT: Your status is there is a temporary in place right now for purposes of … keeping the peace, okay, and then being able to try to work some of these things out in the hopes that there will not need to be a trial. We already have it set. But in a lot of cases, I have found there doesn’t need to be a trial because when you have that breathing space, things can start to be worked out, and there is no need to push on the restraining order. [¶] Now, I have not made findings of domestic violence, which gives me the freedom then to talk about custody as well as visitation.” After further discussion regarding custody and other related issues, the trial court moved the DVRO hearing to January 20, 2026, pursuant to appellant’s request. The final mention of the DVTRO, in passing, was when appellant stated, “I feel like Ms. Hattingh is under the impression that we absolutely can’t have any contact at all, and I think that maybe if the judge said that we could have brief and peaceful contact to discuss and work out some of these issues, it would be really beneficial.” The trial court agreed, and advised Hattingh, “[T]hat’s actually a pretty typical order for the best interests of the kids, if you can have brief and peaceful contact … simply to discuss issues regarding the children.” None of these exchanges can be interpreted as a request to dissolve the DVTRO. While appellant did object, it appears he objected to the setting of the DVRO hearing in March, while being under the impression that the trial court made domestic violence findings for purposes of custody. The trial court confirmed it had not made any such findings and clarified that there was a “temporary” in place, referring to the DVTRO. When the trial court moved the DVRO hearing to January 20, 2026, appellant did not request the DVTRO be dissolved pending the hearing but rather acknowledged it and requested the trial court affirm the clause in the DVTRO permitting brief and peaceful contact. Because no request to dissolve the DVTRO specifically was made, the trial court’s order did not “refuse to dissolve” an injunction within the meaning of section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6). The December orders are therefore not appealable as orders that issued an injunction or refused to dissolve an injunction. 12.  Appellant argued the December orders are directly appealable because the proceedings were being conducted outside the trial court’s jurisdiction and in violation of statutory timing requirements. Thus, appellant argued, his due process rights were violated, and the orders must be reviewed on appeal. However, section 904.1 does not support this argument. Section 904.1, subdivisions (a)(1) through (14) do not provide an appellate remedy for orders on the basis of having been made outside the trial court’s jurisdiction or in violation of statute. Nor does the section provide an appellate remedy for orders on the basis of a violation of appellant’s Constitutional rights. As discussed below, interlocutory orders not otherwise appealable that contain or give rise to these alleged errors are properly reviewed by petition for writ of mandate. Finally, the December orders are not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 367.) The doctrine provides that “[w]hen a court renders an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or performance of an act, direct appeal may be taken.” (Id. at p. 368.) “To qualify as appealable, the interlocutory order must be a final determination of a matter that is collateral—i.e., distinct and severable—from the general subject of the litigation.” (Koshak v. Malek (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1545.) The December orders are not dispositive of a collateral matter that is “distinct and severable” from the general subject of the litigation—the DVRO and issues pertaining to child custody and visitation—and therefore the December orders are not appealable under this doctrine. As explained, this court’s jurisdiction on appeal is strictly limited. The November 7, 2025, order is made appealable pursuant to section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) as an order granting an injunction, and this court therefore has jurisdiction to review appellant’s arguments pertaining to that order. The December 1, 4, 8, and 15, 2025, orders are not appealable and are reviewable on appeal only from the final judgment. (Rao v. Campo, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1565.) 13.  Appellant argued that review of the December orders from the final judgment would be too little too late. To that point, the proper remedy to challenge interlocutory rulings before entry of a final judgment is a petition for writ of mandate. (Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 621, 628; see § 1086.) On January 6, 2026, appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court, after filing the instant appeal on December 29, 2025. The writ of mandate challenged the November 7, 2025, DVTRO and the December orders. Appellant argued (1) the trial court’s procedures for processing DVTROs and DVROs were unlawful and violated statute and his due process rights, (2) the trial court prejudiced appellant by applying section 3044’s rebuttable presumption without allowing appellant to dispute the domestic violence allegations, (3) the trial court erred when it issued the DVTRO, and (4) the cumulative errors irreparably prejudiced appellant’s custody and property rights. The petition for writ of mandate was denied in this court on January 15, 2026. Appellant then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on January 26, 2026. The petition for review was denied on March 11, 2026. Appellant’s argument that the trial court failed to timely set an order to show cause hearing pursuant to sections 242 and 245, his argument that the trial court exceeded its authority “decoupling” the DVTRO and DVRO proceedings, and his argument that the trial court violated his due process right by continuing the DVTRO pending the order to show cause hearing, all require review and consideration of the December orders. These arguments are not cognizable from the November 7, 2025, order alone. As discussed above, the December orders are not appealable but may be reviewable in a later appeal from a final judgment. They are outside the scope of this court’s jurisdiction in the instant appeal. We therefore must limit our discussion to appellant’s allegation that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the November 7, 2025, DVTRO based on an unreliable and factually deficient declaration. 14.  A. Applicable law. The DVTRO in this case was issued pursuant to the authority of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). The purpose of the DVPA “is to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.” (Id., § 6220.) The DVPA defines domestic violence as “abuse” perpetrated against enumerated individuals, including a spouse, former spouse or child. (Id., § 6211.) It further defines “abuse” to mean any of the following: “(1) [t]o intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury; (2) [s]exual assault; (3) [t]o place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another; or (4) [t]o engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to [Family Code] [s]ection 6320.” (Id., § 6203, subd. (a).) The DVPA specifies that “[a]buse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (Id., subd. (b).) The behavior that may be enjoined under Family Code section 6320 includes “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating … , falsely personating … , harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls … , destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party ….” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a).) Disturbing the peace of the other party “refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party” and “includes, but is not limited to, coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” (Id., subd. (c).) Examples of coercive control include, but are not limited to “(1) [i]solating the other party from friends, relatives, or other sources of support; (2) [d]epriving the other 15. party of basic necessities; (3) [c]ontrolling, regulating, or monitoring the other party’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services; (4) [c]ompelling the other party by force, threat of force, or intimidation … to engage in conduct from which the other party has a right to abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the other party has a right to engage; (5) [e]ngaging in reproductive coercion ….” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c).) “The statute authorizes ex parte restraining orders (DVTROs) pending a hearing ([Fam. Code,] §§ 6320–6327) and long-term restraining orders (permanent DVROs) issued after notice and hearing ([id.,] §§ 6340–6347).” (In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1125 (A.M.).) “An order may be issued under this part to restrain any person for the purpose specified in [Family Code] [s]ection 6220, if an affidavit or testimony … shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse. The court may issue an order under this part based solely on the affidavit or testimony of the person requesting the restraining order.” (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a).) “An ex parte restraining order issued pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with [Family Code] [s]ection 6320) shall not be denied solely because the other party was not provided with notice.” (Id., subd. (b).) “The grant or denial of injunctive relief is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. This standard applies to the grant or denial of a protective order under the DVPA.” (A.M., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1126.) B. The trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction or violate appellant’s due process rights when it did not schedule an order to show cause hearing on the DVRO upon issuing the November 7, 2025, DVTRO. Appellant argues the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and violated his due process rights when, upon issuing the DVTRO, the court failed to immediately set a date for an order to show cause hearing on the DVRO within the 21 or 25 days prescribed by Family Code section 242, subdivision (a). Appellant asserts this date should have been 16. set upon issuance of the November 7, 2025, DVTRO, and failure to do so rendered the issuance of the DVTRO improper. Appellant asks this court to vacate the DVTRO and all subsequent orders. The issuance of the DVTRO was authorized by statute and the trial court therefore had jurisdiction to issue it upon a proper petition and showing. Family Code section 240 et. seq. applies to a temporary restraining order issued under the provisions of the DVPA commencing with Family Code section 6320. Family Code section 6320, subdivision (a) states a court “may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party” from contact with a protected person. The trial court may issue the order after notice and a hearing (Fam. Code, § 6340, subd. (a)(1)) or may issue an ex parte order based solely on the affidavit of the person requesting the order even if the other party was not provided with notice. (Fam. Code, § 6300, subds. (a), (b).) Family Code section 242, subdivision (a) requires a hearing on the petition for DVRO within 21 days, or good cause appearing, 25 days from the date a temporary restraining order is granted or denied. If the hearing is not held within the time provided, the DVTRO shall no longer be enforceable unless it is extended under Family Code section 245. (Fam. Code, § 242, subd. (b).) Family Code Section 245, subdivisions (b) and (c) in turn, grant the trial court the authority to grant a continuance on its own motion and extend the DVTRO. Appellant argues this would mean the trial court can extend the hearing on the petition for DVRO indefinitely. So long as the trial court has good cause, appellant is correct. Likewise, Family Code section 242, subdivision (a) only requires the trial court to set a hearing “[w]ithin 21 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days…” Nothing in the statute requires the trial court to set a date for the hearing on the day that it issues the temporary restraining order. The trial court is only required to either hold the hearing on the petition for DVRO within the specified time period or extend the matter 17. pursuant to its authority under Family Code section 245, as the trial court ordered in this case. Finally, appellant’s requested remedy is not statutorily authorized. Failure to hold a timely hearing on the petition for DVRO after the issuance of the temporary restraining order does not render the temporary restraining order “improper” as argued by appellant. Family Code section 242, subdivision (b) explicitly states that failure to hold a timely hearing only renders the DVTRO no longer enforceable rather than improperly issued. And even if the DVTRO was vacated, it would have no effect on the remaining orders in this case. Family Code section 6340 provides in no uncertain terms, “[i]f the court makes any order for custody, visitation, or support, that order shall survive the termination of any protective order.” C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the DVTRO. Appellant argues Hattingh’s declaration lacks specificity and the factual basis required to constitute reasonable proof of past abuse. Appellant asserts he did not threaten Hattingh on November 3, 2025, and assured her violence would never occur. Appellant contends there was no physical abuse or history of physical abuse, and no violence ultimately occurred during the argument. Appellant also denies the majority of the factual allegations in the declaration, and argues that even if taken as true, the allegations do not amount to a credible threat of violence. Appellant finally argues that the declaration was presented without factual support, has no corroboration by third-party witness accounts, police reports, or medical records, and the trial court’s failure to consider appellant’s competing account and declarations was an abuse of discretion. In her request for DVRO, Hattingh alleged appellant called her degrading and derogatory names, told her he would “destroy” her and leave her homeless “with nothing.” She further alleged appellant punished her by locking her out of their apartment and threatened to kick her out and keep her from having access to money or 18. finances. Hattingh alleged appellant punched walls, doors, shouted and broke things, threw out and destroyed her things, and in one instance shoved her, saying that he would not “fulfill his wish” of punching her in the face. On November 3, 2025, Hattingh alleged that appellant had opened a kitchen drawer with knives, and when she asked appellant if he was threatening to stab her, he responded, “It’s just a fantasy.” “[T]he DVPA does not impose a heightened standard for specificity, nor does it contain any corroboration requirement.” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 118.) Appellant’s argument that Hattingh’s declaration is not sufficiently specific and is uncorroborated goes to the declaration’s credibility. When a trial court finds a witness is credible, the