Srinaath Ravichandran, V Harini Sridhar
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket88915-0
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 88915-0-I
SRINAATH RAVICHANDRAN, DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and
HARINI SRIDHAR,
Appellant.
SMITH, J. — Harini Sridhar challenges the trial court’s entry of a domestic
violence protection order (DVPO) restraining her from contact with Srinaath
Ravichandran and their son as part of the final orders in their dissolution
proceeding. She claims the trial court exceeded its statutory authority, violated
her right to due process, and imposed the DVPO without adequate factual basis.
Because the court properly entered the DVPO in the dissolution proceedings of
which Sridhar had actual notice and substantial evidence supports the court’s
findings of fact to impose the DVPO, we affirm.
FACTS
Srinaath Ravichandran and Harini Sridhar married in March 2021 and had
a child in September 2022. Ravichandran petitioned for dissolution in June 2023.
On July 18, he petitioned for a domestic violence protection order (DVPO), and a
superior court commissioner entered a temporary DVPO. On July 26, Sridhar
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petitioned for a DVPO and moved to modify the DVPO against her. In August,
the commissioner continued the DVPO proceedings and ordered an investigation
by Family Court Services (FCS) to determine whether either parent had
committed acts of domestic violence. At that time, the commissioner entered a
temporary parenting plan with Ravichandran as the residential parent and daily
supervised visitation for Sridhar. The temporary parenting plan also required
Sridhar to undergo a psychological evaluation and follow all treatment
recommendations.
FCS issued its report in December 2023. The report recommended the
court grant Sridhar’s request for a DVPO to protect both her and the child. FCS
also recommended Sridhar as the residential parent with Ravichandran to have
supervised visitation after he enrolls in domestic violence treatment.
The commissioner entered new temporary family law orders and parenting
plan in January 2024, specifically declining to adopt the recommendations of the
FCS report after noting the child had been in the father’s care for seven months
and “is doing well and is used to the father’s care.” The commissioner also
acknowledged that Sridhar’s psychological evaluation “provides a diagnosis,
treatment recommendations, and prognosis that is inconsistent with restriction.”
The commissioner declined to enter either party’s proposed parenting plan,
instead ordering a phased increase in residential time to allow the child to
transition from residing with his father and supervised visitation with his mother to
an equal, shared residential schedule. Additionally, the parents had not met their
burdens in their respective DVPO proceedings, but the commissioner found their
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“general mistrust and the conflict present in their dynamic is obvious and severe,”
and entered mutual restraining orders.
Sridhar moved for revision of the commissioner’s orders, arguing for
adoption of her proposed parenting plan based on the FCS report. The court
agreed that the phased approach to residential time was unnecessary because
Sridhar “has established a bond with the child through regular visitation and the
basis for having those visits supervised does not exist.” The court ordered the
parties to proceed to 50/50 residential time.
The trial occurred in November 2025, after two continuances for Sridhar to
obtain medical treatment. Sridhar, representing herself, did not appear until late
afternoon when she joined remotely to ask for the court to hear an emergency
motion to stay the proceedings. Sridhar informed the court she would be “filing
an extended accommodation letter,” and she needed 48 hours because she was
waiting on the letter from her provider. She stated, “I’m still not physically able to
appear and talk coherently for more than 30 to 40 minutes.” Sridhar explained,
“by speaking for 30 minutes, it still does some damage, but talking for trial over
four days and five days, being pro se, is extremely difficult and impossible for
me.” In response, the court noted that Sridhar had not followed the court rules
and procedures in her request for the emergency stay. Additionally, she had
recently filed several motions, including a motion for reconsideration of a prior
decision and a motion to disqualify the judge, all noted for after the trial date.
The trial court summarized the requests Sridhar made in her motions:
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[Y]ou want to stay this trial that is ongoing right now for
determination of the motion to disqualify me for cause, which
you’ve noted for November 17th, for resolution of your motion for
reconsideration of temporary financial relief, which you noted for
November 14th, for proper coordination with [the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)1], accommodations, staff for
technological and participation modifications, which you have not
brought to this Court’s attention at all. The last ADA anything that
I’ve heard from you was in July. And in the intervening four
months, nothing. . . . Set a short status hearing is the next thing that
you want to for address counsel access and revised scheduling
once accommodations and pending motions are resolved.
The court then denied the motion to stay the ongoing proceedings, stating that
Sridhar did not seek to shorten time for her motions and waited several days
before filing a motion for reconsideration. Additionally, the court noted that it had
granted two prior continuances based on information from Sridhar’s medical
providers and had received no further requests for additional ADA
accommodations. According to the court,
[t]here’s all kinds of accommodations you could have requested
over the past three months. You have not ever done so. So,
staying this so that we can then suddenly do a timeout in the middle
of trial—trial has begun, we’ve been going all day. You’ve just
chosen not to be here. So, suddenly just stopping trial, so we can
then have this ADA conference that for the first time you’re asking
for, today, is inappropriate. And I think it’s 100 percent consistent
with [opposing counsel’s] observation of a pattern of delay on your
part.
After the court denied Sridhar’s motion to stay, she remained online to participate
in the proceedings. She did not appear for the second and final day of the
proceedings.
Ravichandran sought a parenting plan with him as the parent with whom
the child would reside and supervised visitation for Sridhar, with possible
1 § 101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(A).
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increased time with Sridhar if she received mental health and domestic violence
treatment. Ravichandran also requested a DVPO to protect himself and the
child.
After two days of testimony, the trial court agreed that a DVPO was
warranted to protect Ravichandran and the child. The court entered a DVPO
restraining Sridhar from contact with her son for five years, except as ordered in
the final parenting plan.
Sridhar appeals only the DVPO.
ANALYSIS
Sridhar challenges the court’s entry of the DVPO restraining her. We
review a superior court’s decision to grant or deny a protection order for abuse of
discretion. Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 590, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017). A
court abuses its discretion when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based
on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Chandola, 180
Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). “A court’s decision is manifestly
unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and
the applicable legal standard.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47,
940 P.2d 1362 (1997). A decision “is based on untenable grounds if the factual
findings are unsupported by the record,” and “based on untenable reasons if it is
based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the
correct standard.” Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 47. The court’s findings of fact are
accepted as verities if they are supported by substantial evidence defined as that
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which is “sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter
asserted.” Chandola, 180 Wn.2d at 642.
DVPO Issued in Dissolution Proceeding
Sridhar contends the trial court erred by entering a DVPO without
complying with the statutory provisions for restraining orders as established in
chapter 7.105 RCW. She alleges the court imposed the DVPO without a proper
petition, notice, and hearing. She also claims the terms of the DVPO violate
certain provision of chapter 7.105 RCW. Because the court entered the DVPO in
the dissolution proceedings, we disagree.
RCW 7.105.100 establishes “an action known as a petition for a protection
order,” that includes a petition for a DVPO. Chapter 7.105 RCW outlines the
requirements necessary to pursue an action for a DVPO including the form of the
petition, service, notice, and opportunity for a hearing. See RCW
7.105.100(1)(a); RCW 7.105.160(1); RCW 7.105.310(4)(b). Sridhar correctly
asserts that Ravichandran did not petition for a DVPO action and she was not
served as specified by RCW 7.105.160(1). But Ravichandran requested, and the
court issued, the DVPO in the dissolution proceedings rather than in a separate
action.
As part of its duties when entering a decree of dissolution of marriage, the
court shall “make provisions for the issuance within this action of the restraint
provisions of a domestic violence protection order or antiharassment protection
order under chapter 7.105 RCW.” RCW 26.09.050(1). RCW 7.105.550(1)(a)
explicitly states, “[a]ny order available under this chapter, other than an extreme
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risk protection order, may be issued in actions under chapter. . . 26.09 [RCW].”
Therefore, the court had the authority to enter a DVPO in the dissolution
proceedings, without the need for Ravichandran to commence a separate action
for a protection order under chapter 7.105 RCW.
Due Process
Sridhar asserts that failure to comply with provisions of chapter 7.105
RCW resulted in a lack of notice and opportunity to be heard and violated her
right to due process. She further claims that the trial court’s findings that she had
notice are unsupported by the record. We disagree.
Ravichandran’s dissolution petition included questions as to whether he
would like the court to issue a protection order or restraining order “as part of the
final orders in the case.” Ravichandran answered “RESERVED,” therefore
providing Sridhar with notice that he could seek a protection order in the
dissolution proceedings. Additionally, the trial court specifically found that
Sridhar had notice of the dissolution trial:
Trial occurred in the matter on 11/4 and 11/5. Respondent
appeared for part of the day on 11/4. Respondent was aware of
the date of trial both by Court order emailed to the parties and via
email to the parties. Respondent communicated with the Court and
Petitioner’s counsel as to her reason for not appearing.
Respondent appeared remotely during trial to present an
emergency motion to stay the trial, which motion this court denied.
Respondent had ample notice of these proceedings.
Sridhar asserts that the finding that she was present at the trial is
“contradicted by the records under GR 33 and is materially false.” According to
Sridhar, she did not appear “due to documented medical emergency,” as she
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was in the emergency room and “medically unable to attend.” Contrary to these
claims, the record does not include GR 33 records, medical documentation, or
evidence that she was unable to attend because of to a medical emergency.2
During her brief appearance at trial, Sridhar made no mention of an emergent
medical issue or that she was in the emergency room. She merely requested
additional time to obtain a letter from her medical provider to request
accommodations and claimed that she could not speak coherently for longer
periods of time. At that critical moment, she failed to give the court any indication
that she was unable to attend the trial because of a medical emergency.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that Sridhar had actual
knowledge of the trial proceedings. Had she attended the full trial, she would
have had her opportunity to be heard on the issue of the DVPO. Her due
process claims are, therefore, unavailing.
Provisions of the DVPO
The trial court issued the DVPO for five years, limited Sridhar to contact
with her son only as provided in the final parenting plan, and ordered her to
obtain a mental health evaluation and participate in state-certified domestic
2 Sridhar filed a RAP 9.10 motion to supplement the record to include
GR 33 and medical documents that were never entered into the trial court
docket. A commissioner of this court denied the motion to supplement because
“an attempt to supplement the record with material beyond the trial court record
is not appropriate under RAP 9.10.” Despite this ruling, Sridhar refers to these
documents as numbered clerk’s papers. These documents are not part of the
record on appeal and we do not consider them.
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violence treatment. Sridhar asserts these provisions exceeded the court’s
statutory authority or amount to an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
Sridhar cites RCW 7.105.315(2)(a) in support of her claim that terms of
the DVPO exceed the court’s statutory authority by imposing the DVPO for five
years. Under RCW 7.105.315(2)(a), “[i]f a protection order restrains the
respondent from contacting the respondent’s minor children, the restraint must
be for a fixed period not to exceed one year.” But Sridhar fails to acknowledge
that RCW 7.105.315(2)(a) specifically exempts DVPOs entered in dissolution
proceedings: “This limitation is not applicable to protection orders issued under
chapter 26.09, 26.26A, or 26.26B RCW.” Because the DVPO was entered under
chapter 26.09 RCW, the one-year limitation does not apply.
Similarly, Sridhar claims that RCW 7.105.310(4)(a) forbids the court from
ordering her to undergo mental health evaluation and treatment. The statute
states, “the court may not order the petitioner to obtain services including, but not
limited to, drug testing, victim support services, a mental health assessment, or a
psychological evaluation.” RCW 7.105.310(4)(a). But Sridhar is not the
petitioner, she is the respondent to the dissolution petition and the DVPO.
RCW 7.105.310(4)(a) does not preclude the court from ordering assessment or
treatment for a respondent. The court did not exceed its authority by including
these requirements in the DVPO.
Finally, Sridhar contends the court entered the DVPO without an
evidentiary basis and relied on findings of domestic violence, mental illness, and
physical disability unsupported by evidence or contradicted by prior evaluations.
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First, we note that findings in support of the DVPO do not reference physical
disability. Therefore, Sridhar’s claim that the court relied on physical disability is
unsupported by the record.
As to her assertion that the trial court improperly relied on findings of
domestic violence and mental illness, the court based its findings on the
uncontested testimony provided by Ravichandran at trial. Sridhar did not rebut
this testimony. While she contends that evidence of domestic violence and
mental health issues had been contradicted by prior evaluations, the FCS
evaluation and psychological evaluation occurred in 2023, two years before the
trial, and do not account for the intervening years. Moreover, evidence
presented at trial and described in the findings demonstrates ongoing issues and
threats. For example, the findings of fact in the DVPO stating that Sridhar
“targeted medical professionals, attorneys, evaluators, and friends of the
Petitioner in order to intimidate them and to harass them from participating in this
case or to cause harm to the Petitioner without regard to the harm to the child,”
stems from events that occurred in 2024 and 2025.3 Therefore, testimony of
recent abusive behaviors provides substantial evidence to support the trial
3 Sridhar also contends that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar
relitigation of allegations previously adjudicated and rejected in the 2023-2024
DVPO proceedings. But the record does not include the prior DVPO petitions or
reports of proceedings from those actions to discern any issues that were
previously litigated. As the appellant, Sridhar has the burden of presenting a
record for adequate review of her appeal. St. Hilaire v. Food Servs. of Am., Inc.,
82 Wn. App. 343, 352, 917 P.2d 1114 (1996). “An insufficient record on appeal
precludes review of the alleged errors.” Bulzomi v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 72
Wn. App. 522, 525, 864 P.2d 996 (1994).
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court’s findings as to domestic violence and mental health issues and the
resulting entry of the DVPO.
The trial court acted within its discretion to enter a DVPO with the ordered
conditions as part of the dissolution proceeding. Substantial evidence supports
the court’s findings that Sridhar had notice of the proceedings and posed a
credible threat to the safety of Ravichandran, the child, and others associated
with them. We conclude the court’s entry of the DVPO was not an abuse of
discretion.
Attorney Fees on Appeal
Ravichandran requests attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.9(a) and
RCW 7.105.310(1)(j).
A prevailing party may recover attorney fees authorized by statute,
equitable principles, or agreement. Sullivan v. Schuyler, 31 Wn. App. 2d 791,
814, 556 P.3d 157 (2024). If fees are available at trial, the prevailing party may
recover fees on appeal. Sullivan, 31 Wn. App. 2d at 814. Under RCW
7.105.310(1)(j), the court has broad discretion to grant relief including an order
that requires the respondent to a DVPO petition to pay reasonable attorney fees
and costs incurred in bringing the action. We decline to exercise our discretion to
impose fees on Sridhar under this statute.
RAP 18.9(a) allows this court to order payment of fees by a party who files
a frivolous appeal. “An appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues on
which reasonable minds might differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there
is no reasonable possibility of reversal.” In re Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wn.
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App. 634, 644, 316 P.3d 514 (2013). Any doubts as to whether the appeal is
frivolous are resolved in favor of the appellant. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App.
at 644. Here, Sridhar raises due process issues related to a DVPO that limits her
contact with her child. We cannot say that her due process concerns are
frivolous. Therefore, we deny Ravichandran’s request for fees under
RAP 18.9(a).
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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