Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 88915-0-I SRINAATH RAVICHANDRAN, DIVISION ONE Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and HARINI SRIDHAR, Appellant. SMITH, J. — Harini Sridhar challenges the trial court’s entry of a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) restraining her from contact with Srinaath Ravichandran and their son as part of the final orders in their dissolution proceeding. She claims the trial court exceeded its statutory authority, violated her right to due process, and imposed the DVPO without adequate factual basis. Because the court properly entered the DVPO in the dissolution proceedings of which Sridhar had actual notice and substantial evidence supports the court’s findings of fact to impose the DVPO, we affirm. FACTS Srinaath Ravichandran and Harini Sridhar married in March 2021 and had a child in September 2022. Ravichandran petitioned for dissolution in June 2023. On July 18, he petitioned for a domestic violence protection order (DVPO), and a superior court commissioner entered a temporary DVPO. On July 26, Sridhar No. 88915-0-I/2 petitioned for a DVPO and moved to modify the DVPO against her. In August, the commissioner continued the DVPO proceedings and ordered an investigation by Family Court Services (FCS) to determine whether either parent had committed acts of domestic violence. At that time, the commissioner entered a temporary parenting plan with Ravichandran as the residential parent and daily supervised visitation for Sridhar. The temporary parenting plan also required Sridhar to undergo a psychological evaluation and follow all treatment recommendations. FCS issued its report in December 2023. The report recommended the court grant Sridhar’s request for a DVPO to protect both her and the child. FCS also recommended Sridhar as the residential parent with Ravichandran to have supervised visitation after he enrolls in domestic violence treatment. The commissioner entered new temporary family law orders and parenting plan in January 2024, specifically declining to adopt the recommendations of the FCS report after noting the child had been in the father’s care for seven months and “is doing well and is used to the father’s care.” The commissioner also acknowledged that Sridhar’s psychological evaluation “provides a diagnosis, treatment recommendations, and prognosis that is inconsistent with restriction.” The commissioner declined to enter either party’s proposed parenting plan, instead ordering a phased increase in residential time to allow the child to transition from residing with his father and supervised visitation with his mother to an equal, shared residential schedule. Additionally, the parents had not met their burdens in their respective DVPO proceedings, but the commissioner found their 2 No. 88915-0-I/3 “general mistrust and the conflict present in their dynamic is obvious and severe,” and entered mutual restraining orders. Sridhar moved for revision of the commissioner’s orders, arguing for adoption of her proposed parenting plan based on the FCS report. The court agreed that the phased approach to residential time was unnecessary because Sridhar “has established a bond with the child through regular visitation and the basis for having those visits supervised does not exist.” The court ordered the parties to proceed to 50/50 residential time. The trial occurred in November 2025, after two continuances for Sridhar to obtain medical treatment. Sridhar, representing herself, did not appear until late afternoon when she joined remotely to ask for the court to hear an emergency motion to stay the proceedings. Sridhar informed the court she would be “filing an extended accommodation letter,” and she needed 48 hours because she was waiting on the letter from her provider. She stated, “I’m still not physically able to appear and talk coherently for more than 30 to 40 minutes.” Sridhar explained, “by speaking for 30 minutes, it still does some damage, but talking for trial over four days and five days, being pro se, is extremely difficult and impossible for me.” In response, the court noted that Sridhar had not followed the court rules and procedures in her request for the emergency stay. Additionally, she had recently filed several motions, including a motion for reconsideration of a prior decision and a motion to disqualify the judge, all noted for after the trial date. The trial court summarized the requests Sridhar made in her motions: 3 No. 88915-0-I/4 [Y]ou want to stay this trial that is ongoing right now for determination of the motion to disqualify me for cause, which you’ve noted for November 17th, for resolution of your motion for reconsideration of temporary financial relief, which you noted for November 14th, for proper coordination with [the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)1], accommodations, staff for technological and participation modifications, which you have not brought to this Court’s attention at all. The last ADA anything that I’ve heard from you was in July. And in the intervening four months, nothing. . . . Set a short status hearing is the next thing that you want to for address counsel access and revised scheduling once accommodations and pending motions are resolved. The court then denied the motion to stay the ongoing proceedings, stating that Sridhar did not seek to shorten time for her motions and waited several days before filing a motion for reconsideration. Additionally, the court noted that it had granted two prior continuances based on information from Sridhar’s medical providers and had received no further requests for additional ADA accommodations. According to the court, [t]here’s all kinds of accommodations you could have requested over the past three months. You have not ever done so. So, staying this so that we can then suddenly do a timeout in the middle of trial—trial has begun, we’ve been going all day. You’ve just chosen not to be here. So, suddenly just stopping trial, so we can then have this ADA conference that for the first time you’re asking for, today, is inappropriate. And I think it’s 100 percent consistent with [opposing counsel’s] observation of a pattern of delay on your part. After the court denied Sridhar’s motion to stay, she remained online to participate in the proceedings. She did not appear for the second and final day of the proceedings. Ravichandran sought a parenting plan with him as the parent with whom the child would reside and supervised visitation for Sridhar, with possible 1 § 101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(A). 4 No. 88915-0-I/5 increased time with Sridhar if she received mental health and domestic violence treatment. Ravichandran also requested a DVPO to protect himself and the child. After two days of testimony, the trial court agreed that a DVPO was warranted to protect Ravichandran and the child. The court entered a DVPO restraining Sridhar from contact with her son for five years, except as ordered in the final parenting plan. Sridhar appeals only the DVPO. ANALYSIS Sridhar challenges the court’s entry of the DVPO restraining her. We review a superior court’s decision to grant or deny a protection order for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 590, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017). A court abuses its discretion when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). “A court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). A decision “is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are unsupported by the record,” and “based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard.” Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 47. The court’s findings of fact are accepted as verities if they are supported by substantial evidence defined as that 5 No. 88915-0-I/6 which is “sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” Chandola, 180 Wn.2d at 642. DVPO Issued in Dissolution Proceeding Sridhar contends the trial court erred by entering a DVPO without complying with the statutory provisions for restraining orders as established in chapter 7.105 RCW. She alleges the court imposed the DVPO without a proper petition, notice, and hearing. She also claims the terms of the DVPO violate certain provision of chapter 7.105 RCW. Because the court entered the DVPO in the dissolution proceedings, we disagree. RCW 7.105.100 establishes “an action known as a petition for a protection order,” that includes a petition for a DVPO. Chapter 7.105 RCW outlines the requirements necessary to pursue an action for a DVPO including the form of the petition, service, notice, and opportunity for a hearing. See RCW 7.105.100(1)(a); RCW 7.105.160(1); RCW 7.105.310(4)(b). Sridhar correctly asserts that Ravichandran did not petition for a DVPO action and she was not served as specified by RCW 7.105.160(1). But Ravichandran requested, and the court issued, the DVPO in the dissolution proceedings rather than in a separate action. As part of its duties when entering a decree of dissolution of marriage, the court shall “make provisions for the issuance within this action of the restraint provisions of a domestic violence protection order or antiharassment protection order under chapter 7.105 RCW.” RCW 26.09.050(1). RCW 7.105.550(1)(a) explicitly states, “[a]ny order available under this chapter, other than an extreme 6 No. 88915-0-I/7 risk protection order, may be issued in actions under chapter. . . 26.09 [RCW].” Therefore, the court had the authority to enter a DVPO in the dissolution proceedings, without the need for Ravichandran to commence a separate action for a protection order under chapter 7.105 RCW. Due Process Sridhar asserts that failure to comply with provisions of chapter 7.105 RCW resulted in a lack of notice and opportunity to be heard and violated her right to due process. She further claims that the trial court’s findings that she had notice are unsupported by the record. We disagree. Ravichandran’s dissolution petition included questions as to whether he would like the court to issue a protection order or restraining order “as part of the final orders in the case.” Ravichandran answered “RESERVED,” therefore providing Sridhar with notice that he could seek a protection order in the dissolution proceedings. Additionally, the trial court specifically found that Sridhar had notice of the dissolution trial: Trial occurred in the matter on 11/4 and 11/5. Respondent appeared for part of the day on 11/4. Respondent was aware of the date of trial both by Court order emailed to the parties and via email to the parties. Respondent communicated with the Court and Petitioner’s counsel as to her reason for not appearing. Respondent appeared remotely during trial to present an emergency motion to stay the trial, which motion this court denied. Respondent had ample notice of these proceedings. Sridhar asserts that the finding that she was present at the trial is “contradicted by the records under GR 33 and is materially false.” According to Sridhar, she did not appear “due to documented medical emergency,” as she 7 No. 88915-0-I/8 was in the emergency room and “medically unable to attend.” Contrary to these claims, the record does not include GR 33 records, medical documentation, or evidence that she was unable to attend because of to a medical emergency.2 During her brief appearance at trial, Sridhar made no mention of an emergent medical issue or that she was in the emergency room. She merely requested additional time to obtain a letter from her medical provider to request accommodations and claimed that she could not speak coherently for longer periods of time. At that critical moment, she failed to give the court any indication that she was unable to attend the trial because of a medical emergency. Substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that Sridhar had actual knowledge of the trial proceedings. Had she attended the full trial, she would have had her opportunity to be heard on the issue of the DVPO. Her due process claims are, therefore, unavailing. Provisions of the DVPO The trial court issued the DVPO for five years, limited Sridhar to contact with her son only as provided in the final parenting plan, and ordered her to obtain a mental health evaluation and participate in state-certified domestic 2 Sridhar filed a RAP 9.10 motion to supplement the record to include GR 33 and medical documents that were never entered into the trial court docket. A commissioner of this court denied the motion to supplement because “an attempt to supplement the record with material beyond the trial court record is not appropriate under RAP 9.10.” Despite this ruling, Sridhar refers to these documents as numbered clerk’s papers. These documents are not part of the record on appeal and we do not consider them. 8 No. 88915-0-I/9 violence treatment. Sridhar asserts these provisions exceeded the court’s statutory authority or amount to an abuse of discretion. We disagree. Sridhar cites RCW 7.105.315(2)(a) in support of her claim that terms of the DVPO exceed the court’s statutory authority by imposing the DVPO for five years. Under RCW 7.105.315(2)(a), “[i]f a protection order restrains the respondent from contacting the respondent’s minor children, the restraint must be for a fixed period not to exceed one year.” But Sridhar fails to acknowledge that RCW 7.105.315(2)(a) specifically exempts DVPOs entered in dissolution proceedings: “This limitation is not applicable to protection orders issued under chapter 26.09, 26.26A, or 26.26B RCW.” Because the DVPO was entered under chapter 26.09 RCW, the one-year limitation does not apply. Similarly, Sridhar claims that RCW 7.105.310(4)(a) forbids the court from ordering her to undergo mental health evaluation and treatment. The statute states, “the court may not order the petitioner to obtain services including, but not limited to, drug testing, victim support services, a mental health assessment, or a psychological evaluation.” RCW 7.105.310(4)(a). But Sridhar is not the petitioner, she is the respondent to the dissolution petition and the DVPO. RCW 7.105.310(4)(a) does not preclude the court from ordering assessment or treatment for a respondent. The court did not exceed its authority by including these requirements in the DVPO. Finally, Sridhar contends the court entered the DVPO without an evidentiary basis and relied on findings of domestic violence, mental illness, and physical disability unsupported by evidence or contradicted by prior evaluations. 9 No. 88915-0-I/10 First, we note that findings in support of the DVPO do not reference physical disability. Therefore, Sridhar’s claim that the court relied on physical disability is unsupported by the record. As to her assertion that the trial court improperly relied on findings of domestic violence and mental illness, the court based its findings on the uncontested testimony provided by Ravichandran at trial. Sridhar did not rebut this testimony. While she contends that evidence of domestic violence and mental health issues had been contradicted by prior evaluations, the FCS evaluation and psychological evaluation occurred in 2023, two years before the trial, and do not account for the intervening years. Moreover, evidence presented at trial and described in the findings demonstrates ongoing issues and threats. For example, the findings of fact in the DVPO stating that Sridhar “targeted medical professionals, attorneys, evaluators, and friends of the Petitioner in order to intimidate them and to harass them from participating in this case or to cause harm to the Petitioner without regard to the harm to the child,” stems from events that occurred in 2024 and 2025.3 Therefore, testimony of recent abusive behaviors provides substantial evidence to support the trial 3 Sridhar also contends that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar relitigation of allegations previously adjudicated and rejected in the 2023-2024 DVPO proceedings. But the record does not include the prior DVPO petitions or reports of proceedings from those actions to discern any issues that were previously litigated. As the appellant, Sridhar has the burden of presenting a record for adequate review of her appeal. St. Hilaire v. Food Servs. of Am., Inc., 82 Wn. App. 343, 352, 917 P.2d 1114 (1996). “An insufficient record on appeal precludes review of the alleged errors.” Bulzomi v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522, 525, 864 P.2d 996 (1994). 10 No. 88915-0-I/11 court’s findings as to domestic violence and mental health issues and the resulting entry of the DVPO. The trial court acted within its discretion to enter a DVPO with the ordered conditions as part of the dissolution proceeding. Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that Sridhar had notice of the proceedings and posed a credible threat to the safety of Ravichandran, the child, and others associated with them. We conclude the court’s entry of the DVPO was not an abuse of discretion. Attorney Fees on Appeal Ravichandran requests attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.9(a) and RCW 7.105.310(1)(j). A prevailing party may recover attorney fees authorized by statute, equitable principles, or agreement. Sullivan v. Schuyler, 31 Wn. App. 2d 791, 814, 556 P.3d 157 (2024). If fees are available at trial, the prevailing party may recover fees on appeal. Sullivan, 31 Wn. App. 2d at 814. Under RCW 7.105.310(1)(j), the court has broad discretion to grant relief including an order that requires the respondent to a DVPO petition to pay reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing the action. We decline to exercise our discretion to impose fees on Sridhar under this statute. RAP 18.9(a) allows this court to order payment of fees by a party who files a frivolous appeal. “An appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues on which reasonable minds might differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal.” In re Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wn. 11 No. 88915-0-I/12 App. 634, 644, 316 P.3d 514 (2013). Any doubts as to whether the appeal is frivolous are resolved in favor of the appellant. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 644. Here, Sridhar raises due process issues related to a DVPO that limits her contact with her child. We cannot say that her due process concerns are frivolous. Therefore, we deny Ravichandran’s request for fees under RAP 18.9(a). Affirmed. WE CONCUR: 12