Full Opinion

J-S33026-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 GARRY HERDLER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JENNIFER HERDLER : No. 903 EDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered February 20, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2019-06032 BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J. MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2026 Appellant, Garry Herdler (“Husband”), appeals from the order entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his pro se petition seeking to vacate the divorce decree that had been previously entered on November 5, 2025; and from the separate order finding him in contempt of the equitable distribution order and divorce decree, and directing him to pay $9,500.00 in attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. The trial court aptly summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of this matter and we adopt that opinion herein. (See Trial Court Opinion, 5/14/26, at 1-6). By way of background, Husband and Jennifer Herdler (“Wife”) were married on September 21, 1996, and are the parents of J-S33026-26 two children.1 The parties separated on March 26, 2017. On March 29, 2019, Husband filed a divorce complaint, asserting the marriage was irretrievably broken, and requesting equitable distribution of the marital property and shared physical and legal custody of the children. Wife subsequently moved to Chester County. On March 12, 2025, the court entered an order scheduling a two-day equitable distribution hearing for July 14, 2025 and July 15, 2025. The order provided that continuance requests must be filed with the court and accompanied by certificates of service, as well as emailed to the hearing officer. Further, absent an emergency, the court stated that continuance requests should be made no less than 48 hours prior to the hearing. On June 19, 2025, Wife filed a motion seeking a continuance and her request was granted. The court rescheduled the hearing for August 27, 2025 and August 28, 2025. On August 27, 2025, Husband and Wife appeared before a hearing officer for an equitable distribution hearing. At that time, Husband requested a continuance and the request was denied. Husband attempted to argue issues he had with Wife’s counsel, and other matters not appropriately before an equitable distribution hearing officer. When further questioned, Husband stated he would not participate in the hearing, both because of his issues with counsel, and because he had an important board meeting to attend. When ____________________________________________ 1 As of the date of this memorandum, both Children are emancipated and custody is not at issue in this appeal. -2- J-S33026-26 the hearing officer pointed out that Husband had not formally requested a continuance, Husband claimed he had done so, but the request was not of record. Finally, Husband marked and entered into evidence two exhibits before leaving the courtroom. The hearing then proceeded in his absence on August 27, 2025 and August 28, 2025. On October 14, 2025, the hearing officer filed a thorough report and recommendation; as well, the docket indicates that the order was emailed to Husband at his listed email address, gpherdler@hotmail.com, the same day. On October 31, 2025, Husband filed a document entitled “Emergency Petition for Special Relief to Obtain Court Order Sealing All Filings, Documents, and Testimony in Support Hearing (And Divorce Hearings); And Directing [Wife] to Cooperate as Required in the 12/19/24 Confidentiality Agreement (Court Approved),” requesting that the case be placed under seal. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim on November 3, 2025. As well, on November 3, 2025, Husband attempted to submit a filing to the prothonotary that was rejected because he had chosen an incorrect description for the filing and attempted to file it as an “Equitable Distribution Report.” On November 5, 2025, 22 days after the equitable distribution report was filed, the court entered a decree in divorce and accepted the hearing officer’s recommendation for division of the marital property and noted that no exceptions had been filed within the requisite 20-day period. On November 6, 2025, Husband untimely filed pro se exceptions to the -3- J-S33026-26 hearing officer’s report and recommendation. On that document he set forth his email address as jpherdler@hotmail.com. The filing also listed several dates on which he claimed he had attempted to file exceptions. On November 12, 2025, Husband filed a pro se emergency petition for special relief, seeking to stay enforcement of the equitable distribution order pending review of his exceptions and an upcoming short list conference scheduled for December 8, 2025. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim to the petition. On November 13, 2025, Husband pro se filed an emergency petition, asserting that Wife’s attorney was in contempt of a court order dated March 13, 2025.2 On December 8, 2025, Husband filed a pro se emergency petition to vacate the divorce decree and for leave to file exceptions nunc pro tunc, averring that the court had failed to mail the equitable distribution report to Husband’s updated address; that Husband’s stepfather had died suddenly, necessitating emergency travel; that the court had rejected his electronic filings and committed other alleged procedural irregularities; and premature issuance of a divorce decree while Husband’s exceptions remained unresolved. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim to Husband’s contempt petition. ____________________________________________ 2 Husband referred to a stipulation signed by the parties, and entered as a court order, relating to a confidentiality agreement as to financial and other sensitive information concerning Husband’s employment. The order provided that violating the confidentiality agreement would result in a finding of contempt of court. -4- J-S33026-26 On December 9, 2025, Husband filed an additional pro se petition, seeking vacatur of the divorce decree and leave to file exceptions nunc pro tunc, alleging extrinsic fraud, fatal defect, extraordinary cause, and hearing officer errors and omissions. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim. On January 22, 2026, Wife filed a petition for contempt and enforcement. Ultimately, the court consolidated all outstanding matters for a hearing. On February 18, 2026, the parties appeared before the court for a hearing, at which both Husband and Wife testified, and were each represented by counsel. Prior to testimony, Husband’s counsel represented to the court that Husband was seeking to vacate the divorce decree pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3332, not to open the decree. Husband asserted that the hearing officer’s refusal to grant him a continuance on August 27, 2025, constituted extrinsic fraud. In the alternative, Husband asserted that he had attempted to “submit” timely exceptions but that they were not accepted, and that this constituted either extrinsic fraud or a fatal defect of the record. On February 20, 2026, the court denied Husband’s pro se petition to vacate the divorce decree and declared that it lacked jurisdiction to review Husband’s petition for leave to file exceptions nunc pro tunc. As well, the court entered an order finding Husband in contempt of the November 5, 2025 divorce decree and equitable distribution award, finding Husband had willfully refused to comply with the decree. Thus, the court ordered Husband to comply with the divorce decree and equitable distribution award and pay -5- J-S33026-26 $9,500.00 to Wife within 10 days of the order as reimbursement for her attorney’s fees. On March 19, 2026, Husband timely filed a counseled notice of appeal from the court’s orders. On March 23, 2026, the court ordered Husband to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. On April 10, 2026, Husband timely complied. On appeal, Husband raises the following issues for review: The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in denying Husband’s petition to vacate the divorce decree based on extrinsic fraud and/or a fatal defect on the face of the record. The trial court erred/abused its discretion by violating Husband’s due process rights in not allowing him to testify regarding all the petitions pending before the court on February 18, 2026. The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in finding Husband in contempt of the equitable distribution order as Husband clearly demonstrated an inability to comply with the terms of the order. The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in ordering Husband to pay attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $9,500.00. (Husband’s Brief at 5). Initially, this Court has observed: We review an order denying a motion to open or vacate a divorce decree for an abuse of discretion. Danz v. Danz, 947 A.2d 750, 752 (Pa.Super. 2008). “Petitions to open the decree must be filed within 30 days. During this 30–day period, the court holds wide discretion to modify or rescind its decree.” Melton v. Melton, 831 A.2d 646, 651 (Pa.Super. 2003) (internal citations omitted). “The trial -6- J-S33026-26 court’s broad discretion is lost, however, if the court fails to act within 30 days. After this 30-day period, an order can only be opened or vacated if there is fraud or some other circumstance so grave or compelling as to constitute extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Section 3332 of the Domestic Relations Code governs motions to open or vacate divorce decrees and states that, after 30 days, a petitioner must allege extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or a fatal defect on the face of the record in order to obtain a vacatur of the divorce decree. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3332. Specifically, Section 3332 provides: A motion to open a decree of divorce or annulment may be made only within the period limited by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (relating to modification of orders) and not thereafter. The motion may lie where it is alleged that the decree was procured by intrinsic fraud or that there is new evidence relating to the cause of action which will sustain the attack upon its validity. A motion to vacate a decree or strike a judgment alleged to be void because of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or a fatal defect apparent upon the face of the record must be made within five years after entry of the final decree. Intrinsic fraud relates to a matter adjudicated by the judgment, including perjury and false testimony, whereas extrinsic fraud relates to matters collateral to the judgment which have the consequence of precluding a fair hearing or presentation of one side of the case. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3332. In this context, “extrinsic or collateral fraud” refers to “conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented a fair submission of the controversy.” Justice v. Justice, [612 A.2d 1354, 1358 (Pa.Super.] 1992) (citations omitted) (per curiam). “The fraud in such case is extrinsic or collateral to the question determined by the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Maldonado v. Maldonado, 340 A.3d 1049, 1052, appeal denied, ___ Pa. -7- J-S33026-26 ___, 352 A.3d 450 (2025) (emphasis in original omitted). As well, regarding findings of contempt, “In reviewing a trial court’s finding on a contempt petition, we are limited to determining whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. This Court must place great reliance on the sound discretion of the trial [court] when reviewing an order of contempt.” P.H.D. v. R.R.D., 56 A.3d 702, 706 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, [626 Pa. 678,] 94 A.3d 1010 [(2014)]. “To be in contempt, a party must have violated a court order, and the complaining party must satisfy that burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, the complainant must prove certain distinct elements: (1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree which he[, or she,] is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting the contemnor’s violation was volitional; and (3) that the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. [J.M. v. K.W., 164 A.3d 1260, 1264 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc)] (citations, quotation marks, and original brackets omitted). Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 57 (Pa.Super. 2023). After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Raymond McGarry, we conclude Husband’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. In his first issue, Husband argues that the court erred and abused its discretion by denying his petition to vacate the divorce decree. According to Husband, the hearing officer’s denial of his same-day request for a continuance prevented him from attending the equitable distribution hearing -8- J-S33026-26 and constituted extrinsic fraud. Husband alleges that he provided extensive testimony regarding his pro se attempts to timely file his exceptions to the equitable distribution report, and that Wife would not have been prejudiced by the filing of the exceptions nunc pro tunc. Here, the court explained that Husband did not file a request to open the divorce decree within 30 days, and that Husband sat on his rights at a time when the court had latitude to provide relief. (See Trial Court Opinion, 5/14/26, at 7-19). As a result, Husband was required by statute to show either extrinsic fraud, or a fatal defect on the record. (See id.) The court concluded that Husband had failed to show extrinsic fraud because Wife did nothing to prevent a fair submission of the controversy; rather, Husband’s own actions were to blame. (Id.) As well, there was no fatal defect on the face of the record. (Id.) Although Husband argued that the prothonotary’s rejection of his November 3, 2025 filing constituted such a defect, it was not clear what Husband attempted to file on November 3, 2025, despite the court’s attempts to have Husband clarify. (Id.) The court found Husband’s testimony incredible and the evidence he presented unconvincing that he had attempted to file exceptions. (Id.) Rather, the evidence suggested that on November 3, 2025, Husband had attempted to file exhibits. (Id.) As a result, Husband could not prove that he timely filed exceptions to the equitable distribution order, but for an improper rejection by the prothonotary. (Id.) Therefore, the court properly denied Husband’s petition to vacate the divorce decree. See Maldonado, supra. -9- J-S33026-26 In Husband’s second issue, he argues that the court erred and violated his due process rights by not allowing him to testify regarding all petitions pending before the court on February 18, 2026. The court explained that Husband did not preserve this issue for appeal, constituting waiver. Specifically, the trial court explained that Husband failed to seek the introduction of testimony or witnesses relevant to the various petitions. The record supports this conclusion. (See Trial Court Opinion at 19-20). See also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating issues cannot be raised for first time on appeal). Even if not waived, the issue lacks merit. Because the court ruled that the decree could not be vacated, it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of any other petitions, and it would have been improper to permit testimony on these subjects. (See Trial Court Opinion at 19-20).3 ____________________________________________ 3 As well, we note that Husband has arguably waived this issue for purposes of appeal based on deficient briefing. The Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appellant’s argument section “shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). See also Iron Age Corp. v. Dvorak, 880 A.2d 657, 665 (Pa.Super. 2005) (observing that this Court will not consider merits of argument which fails to cite relevant case or statutory authority); Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d 305 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 576 Pa. 712, 839 A.2d 352 (2003) (observing that failure to cite relevant legal authority constitutes waiver of claim on appeal). Here, Husband’s brief raises four claims in his statement of questions, but his argument section contains only two sections. As well, Father has failed to cite to relevant legal authority concerning the alleged due process violations. Nor has Husband identified the witnesses he was prevented from presenting at the February 18, 2026 hearing. Thus, Husband has arguably waived his due process claim for these reasons as well. - 10 - J-S33026-26 In Husband’s third issue and fourth issues combined, he argues that the court erred and abused its discretion in finding Husband in contempt of the equitable distribution order, as he had demonstrated an inability to comply with the terms of the order. Specifically, Husband references his testimony that if the order were carried out, he would be forced to file for bankruptcy, and further claims that the bank account referenced in the equitable distribution report was depleted by the time of the report. As well, Husband asserts the court erred by ordering him to pay attorney’s fees and costs of $9,500.00 as a result of the contempt. Nevertheless, the court explained that Husband’s testimony did not suggest an inability to pay but that he did not think it was the best use of his money. (See Trial Court Opinion at 22-25). The court detailed Husband’s history of objecting to and arguing with court orders and his “combative demeanor and his dismissive attitude” toward the equitable distribution order. (See id.) The court concluded: “The determination of contempt is fully supported by Husband’s testimony. Husband did not show that he had an inability to pay. He just didn’t agree with the order.” (Id. at 25). Thus, the court concluded that Husband had willfully failed to comply with the order, justifying the finding of contempt and imposition of attorney’s fees and costs. On this record and for the reasons outlined in the trial court’s opinion, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding Husband in contempt. See Rogowski, supra. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. Orders affirmed. - 11 - J-S33026-26 Date: 11/20/2026 - 12 -