Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1912 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ Brad Carman, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Iowa Western Community College, Defendant–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, The Honorable Margaret Reyes, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Molly M. Hamilton (argued) of Hamilton Law Firm, P.C., Clive, attorney for appellant. Heidi A. Guttau (argued) of Baird Holm LLP, Omaha, Nebraska, attorney for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ. Opinion by Tabor, C.J. 1 TABOR, Chief Judge. Brad Carman appeals the grant of Iowa Western Community College’s pre-answer motion to dismiss his claims for wrongful termination and a statutory whistleblower violation. He argues that (1) his petition met the notice pleading standards, (2) his common-law claim is not federally preempted, and (3) Iowa law allows him to plead in the alternative that he was and was not a state employee. Because Carman’s petition cited regulations that did not establish a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy, and because he only pleaded that he was not a state employee, the district court was correct to dismiss his claims. We affirm. I. Facts and Prior Proceedings Carman started working as an instructor in the college’s commercial driver’s license (CDL) program in March 2022. 1 The college fired him in February 2025, alleging “inefficiency, incompetence or negligence in the performance of his duties . . . .” Carman denies any performance issues and alleges that college staff forged his signature on a performance improvement plan. He maintains that he was fired because he reported the college’s alleged violations of state and federal standards controlling its status as a third-party tester for CDL applicants. Carman asserts that a new student joined his CDL class in November 2024. The student lacked a valid learner’s permit needed to participate in the on-the-road driving proctored by an instructor. To complete the written and skills test for a CDL, the student needed a minimum number of classroom and “drive time” hours. The driving hours are required by state and federal regulations. The hours are recorded in the Training Provider 1 We take these facts from Carman’s petition. 2 Registry database. When Carman learned the student did not have a permit and could not drive with an instructor, he removed the student from the registry so another instructor would not reach “the false assumption that the student had completed the necessary pre-qualifications for skills instruction.” Because the student needed extra time to complete the curriculum, he was reassigned to another instructor after the initial session with Carman. Under Iowa’s third-party tester requirements, once students complete classroom and road instruction with one instructor, they must be reassigned to another instructor for their testing. 2 Carman reminded college administrator Toni Scheffler of this requirement. But, according to Carman, Scheffler did not reassign the student to a different instructor. Carman reported this potential violation to William Bartelson, a CDL auditor for the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT). After Carman’s report, the DOT performed an audit of the college’s CDL program, including registry reporting by Scheffler. Carman also alleges that before the audit, he voiced concerns to administrative employees at the college “regarding a lack of focus on providing quality education and producing qualified and safe drivers from the CDL [program] and compliance with the State of Iowa ‘third party tester’ standards.” 2 Carman started the student’s classroom and road instruction, but because the student joined the class late, he could not complete the full curriculum before the end of the session. He was then reassigned to a second instructor for a different session to complete the curriculum. Because the second instructor completed the student’s classroom and road instruction, he could not oversee the student’s testing requirement. Thus, for the testing, the student should have been assigned to an instructor who was not Carman or the second instructor. 3 After Carman was fired, he sued for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. He also alleged a violation of Iowa’s whistleblower statute under Iowa Code section 70A.28 (2025). 3 The college moved to dismiss, alleging (1) Carman’s petition failed to state a claim upon which any relief may be granted and (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. For the second ground, the college argued that the federal Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) preempted Carman’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. Carman appeals. II. Scope and Standard of Review We review the district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for correction of errors at law. Young v. HealthPort Techs., Inc., 877 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Iowa 2016). “In our review, we accept as true the petition’s well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.” Koester v. Eyerly-Ball Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 14 N.W.3d 723, 727–28 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). “We will affirm a district court ruling that granted a motion to dismiss when the petition’s allegations, taken as true, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014). III. Analysis Carman asks us to reinstate both his common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and his statutory whistleblower claim. We will address each of his arguments in turn. 3 Carman’s petition sought punitive damages, but he does not reprise that claim on appeal. 4 A. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy To pursue a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, an employee must establish four elements: (1) there exists a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy that protects the employee’s conduct; (2) the employee’s discharge would undermine that policy; (3) the employee engaged in the protected conduct, which was the reason for the discharge; and (4) the employer had no overriding business justification for the discharge. Carver-Kimm v. Reynolds, 992 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Iowa 2023). Elements one and two invoke legal questions for the court to decide. Brodie v. Foxhoven, 21 N.W.3d 380, 390 (Iowa 2025). Carman alleged in his petition that he reported the college to the DOT for possible state and federal regulatory violations relating to the CDL third- party tester requirements. He argued that violations of the regulations promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration were likewise violations of Iowa Administrative Code rule 761-607.30(321) (2025). Carman also alleged his report to the DOT “was protected from retaliation based upon school policy.” Carman added that his report “was protected based on public policy because the third-party tester standards are mostly self-governing and without protections violations of the agreement would go unreported.” In its motion to dismiss, the college argued that (1) Carman failed to plead a clearly defined, well-recognized public policy and (2) his claims were barred by the “exclusive” path and remedy required for public employees to pursue whistleblower claims set forth in Iowa Code section 70A.29 or were preempted by federal law. In dismissing Carman’s wrongful termination claim, the district court agreed with the college, finding that the statutes and regulations Carman 5 cited—while setting out various CDL requirements—failed to provide a “declaration of [a] public policy” meant to “assure the health, safety, and welfare” of the public. See Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751, 765 (Iowa 2009). On appeal, Carman alleges that it was enough that the college knew from his petition that he was “bringing a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim.” 1. Notice Pleading Standard Carman focuses on Iowa’s liberal notice pleading standards. And he insists that the college had fair notice of his common-law claim. See U.S. Bank v. Barbour, 770 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Iowa 2009) (“The ‘fair notice’ requirement is met if a petition informs the defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claim’s general nature.”). At oral argument, Carman maintained that “imperfect pleadings” are allowed and should not have prompted the dismissal of his petition. But the district court did not dismiss Carman’s petition because it was “imperfect” or failed to allege facts to support the elements of his claim. The court dismissed because the petition showed no legal right of recovery. “[W]hether a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy exists is a question of law for the court to decide. When that question is decided adversely to the plaintiff, a dismissal may be appropriate.” Koester, 14 N.W.3d at 734 (citation omitted). That is the case here. Carman believes that because he is not required to allege ultimate facts to support all elements of the claim, the court cannot dismiss based on its finding that one of the elements has not been met. But Carman’s claim was not dismissed for what he didn’t plead, it was dismissed for what he did plead. 6 Because notice pleading is not the issue, we must decide whether the district court was correct in its legal conclusion that the regulations cited by Carman do not establish a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy. 2. Public Policy Standard Constitutions and statutes are the primary sources for courts trying to identify a clearly defined and well recognized public policy. See Jasper, 764 N.W.2d at 762 (reiterating that “the tort of wrongful discharge should exist in Iowa only as a narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine”). But courts may also look to administrative regulations when they are adopted “pursuant to a delegation of authority in a statute that seeks to further a public policy.” Id. at 764. The supreme court explained: To support the tort, an administrative regulation must state a clear and well-defined public policy that protects an activity in the same way as a statute must state a clear and well-defined public policy to support the tort. See Lloyd [v. Drake Univ.], 686 N.W.2d [225,] 228 [(Iowa 2004)] (requiring “the existence of a clearly defined public policy that protects an activity”). Thus, the administrative regulation must not only relate to public health, safety, or welfare, but the regulation must also express a substantial public policy in a way that furthers a specific legislative expression of the policy. Id. Carman’s petition cites 49 C.F.R. § 383.75 and Iowa Administrative Code 761-607.30(321). Section 383.75 mandates what states must do if they choose to authorize third-party testers to administer skills tests for CDL applicants. Iowa Code section 321.187 implements those federal third-party tester standards. In turn, Iowa Administrative Code 761-607.30(321) is the DOT’s regulation implementing section 321.187. The closest any of these sources come to setting forth a public policy is the purpose and scope statement in 49 C.F.R. § 383.1(a), which states: “The purpose of this part is 7 to help reduce or prevent truck and bus accidents, fatalities, and injuries by requiring drivers to have a single commercial motor vehicle driver’s license and by disqualifying drivers who operate commercial motor vehicles in an unsafe manner.” That general purpose and scope statement, without more, is not enough to show that the Iowa legislature intended the third-party testing standards to serve as a well-recognized public policy. While the regulations cited by Carman may contribute to highway safety, their purpose is too general to satisfy the “clearly defined” requirement of the common law wrongful discharge tort. Compare Brodie, 21 N.W.3d at 392 (agreeing with the district court that the statutes relied on by the plaintiffs “are essentially statements of legislative and departmental purpose and are not specific enough to support a wrongful-discharge claim.”), with Dorshkind v. Oak Park Place of Dubuque II, L.L.C., 835 N.W.2d 293, 304–05 (Iowa 2013) (finding detailed legislative findings on the importance of assisted living standards satisfied the first element of the public-policy exception). Because the regulations cited by Carman to support his claim do not expressly or impliedly set forth public policy, the district court was correct to dismiss his wrongful discharge claim because there is no set of facts under which relief can be granted. B. Whistleblower Claim Under Iowa Code Section 70A.28 Carman also challenges the dismissal of his claim that he was terminated in violation of Iowa Code section 70A.28, the statute that protects state employees from retaliation for disclosure of certain information to public officials or law enforcement. 8 The district court provided two reasons for dismissing Carman’s whistleblower claim. First, the court noted that section 70A.28 “governs a state employee and, in his petition, Carman admits that he is not a state employee and further admits that [the college] is not a state agency.” The district court added that section 70A.28(2) “only allows civil suits to be brought against an individual, not an entity such as [the college].” On appeal, Carman contends that he is entitled to plead alternative theories of recovery. 4 Our case law supports that contention. See Weaver Constr. Co. v. Farmers Nat’l Bank, 115 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Iowa 1962). Carman also made that argument in his resistance to the college’s motion to dismiss. But the district court never ruled on the issue of Carman pleading in the alternative. A party must “request a ruling from the district court to preserve error for appeal on an issue presented but not decided.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 539 (Iowa 2002). Doing so would provide the district court “an opportunity to address its failure to rule on the issue either by making a ruling or refusing to do so.” Id. Because the district court did not rule on the alternative pleading issue, and Carman did not call the court’s attention to that failure to rule, the issue has not been preserved. So we limit our analysis to whether the district court properly applied the standard for dismissing a petition for failure to state a claim. We find that it did. 4 Carmen argues he was specific in pleading an allegation that “he was not a state employee and that the [college] is not a state agency under his common law wrongful discharge count” but that alternatively, because he did not incorporate those facts in his statutory wrongful discharge claim, it can survive. 9 In dismissing the whistleblower count, the district court relied on the factual allegations Carman made earlier in the petition. For the wrongful termination count, Carman asserted that he was not a state employee. Because section 70A.28 only applies to state employees, the district court ruled that Carman could not recover under that section. While Carman’s whistleblower claim did not incorporate the factual assertion that he was not a state employee from the common law section of the petition, Carman also did not explicitly plead that he was a state employee. In other words, the whistleblower count was silent on his employment status. Given this omission, the district court correctly determined that Carman failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. AFFIRMED. 10