Ruxandra Isacescu v. Hudson County Department of Family Services, Etc.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA-4003-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4003-24
RUXANDRA ISACESCU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HUDSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
FAMILY SERVICES,
WELFARE DIVISION,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________
Argued October 15, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026
Before Judges Mayer and Zazzali-Hogan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-1253-25.
Ruxandra Isacescu, appellant, argued the cause on
appellant's behalf.
Reana Garcia, Deputy County Counsel, argued the
cause for respondent (Alberico De Pierro, Hudson
County Counsel, attorney; Reana Garcia, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Ruxandra Isacescu appeals from the trial court's order granting a
motion to dismiss filed by defendant Hudson County Department of Family
Services Welfare Division (County). The court found plaintiff failed to timely
file a notice of claim within ninety days under the Tort Claims Act (TCA),
N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3, and that no extraordinary circumstances existed to
warrant an exception to that rule. We affirm. 1
Plaintiff seeks $66,000 from the County for denial of welfare benefits
between 2014 and 2024. She ultimately received benefits in December 2024
and claims the County's award in December 2024 demonstrates her entitlement
to benefits for the prior ten years. Her alleged damages include loss of her home,
physical injuries and psychological injuries.
In its decision, the trial court explained the ninety-day requirement to file
notice under the TCA and noted that plaintiff asserted that extraordinary
circumstances justified the delay in filing her complaint. Plaintiff
misunderstood the trial court's decision. The trial court held plaintiff failed to
1
In her papers, plaintiff includes the July 3, 2025 order denying her motion for
default judgment although she does not address it in her brief. That claim is
therefore waived on appeal.
A-4003-24
2
file any notice of claim as required under the TCA, let alone file a claim within
ninety days. Therefore, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss.
I.
As a threshold issue, plaintiff's appeal is procedurally defective. The
notice of appeal was not filed within forty-five days of the trial court's July 3,
2025 decision. R. 2:4-1(a). Plaintiff's complaint should have been filed on
August 17, 2025. Instead, plaintiff filed her complaint on August 26, 2025.
Additionally, plaintiff fails to provide any citations to the record. R. 2:6-
8. Such omissions also violate Rule 2:6-9 because it is not the responsibility of
appellate courts to "peruse evidence" or review the record independently; that is
the plaintiff's duty. See Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 474-75
(App. Div. 2008).
Further, plaintiff's brief and appendix are deficient because they include
the judge's memorandum of decision but not the dismissal order as required by
Rule 2:6-1(a).
Plaintiff also improperly includes new information and additional facts in
her appellate brief that were not presented to the trial court and therefore , we
are not required to consider that information. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J.
1, 20 (2009) (stating "[f]or sound jurisprudential reasons, with few exceptions
A-4003-24
3
our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly
presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is
available.") (internal quotations omitted); Fuhrman v. Mailander, 466 N.J.
Super. 572, 596 (App. Div. 2021) (stating "appellate courts generally decline to
address arguments not raised in the trial court."). For example, in her appellate
brief, plaintiff asserts for the first time that the County discriminated against her
because "[a]ll [her] case workers were black or black-Latinos while [she is]
white."
Although we could require plaintiff to file an updated brief and appendix
to correct the deficiencies or dismiss the appeal, we will nonetheless address the
merits of plaintiff's arguments.
II.
We review a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted" de novo, and we "owe[] no deference to the
trial court's legal conclusions." Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley,
Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019). "The standard
traditionally utilized by courts to determine whether to dismiss a pleading . . . is
a generous one." Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451 (2013).
Accordingly, "[a] plaintiff is entitled to a liberal interpretation and given the
A-4003-24
4
benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn." State, Dep't
of Treasury ex rel. McCormac v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 387 N.J. Super.
469, 478 (App. Div. 2006).
When evaluating a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, "our inquiry is limited to
examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint."
Green, 215 N.J. at 451 (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "At this preliminary stage of the litigation the [c]ourt
is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained
in the complaint." Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746. Rather, "the test for
determining the adequacy of a pleading [is] whether a cause of action is
'suggested' by the facts." Ibid. (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). To that end, courts must "search[] the complaint in
depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action
may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim" and grant the
"opportunity . . . to amend if necessary." Ibid. (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel
Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). Notwithstanding
this liberal standard, "the essential facts supporting [the] cause of action must
be presented in order for the claim to survive," and "conclusory allegations are
A-4003-24
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insufficient in that regard." Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188,
193 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 768).
The TCA requires a litigant to notify a public entity of the intent to sue
for damages within ninety days of the date the cause of action accrued. N.J.S.A.
59:8-8. If timely notice is not provided, a litigant may, at the discretion of the
court, be permitted to file a late notice within one year of the accrual of the claim
if the public entity "has not been substantially prejudiced" and the plaintiff
demonstrates "sufficient reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances" for
missing the filing deadline. N.J.S.A. 59:8-9.
This determination requires "a fact-sensitive analysis of the specific case,"
McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 478 (2011) (citing N.J.S.A. 59:8-9), and
consideration of the circumstances "on a case-by-case basis." O'Donnell v. New
Jersey Tpk. Auth., 236 N.J. 335, 347 (2019) (citing Rogers v. Cape May County
Office of Pub. Def., 208 N.J. 414, 428 (2011)). "The 'extraordinary
circumstances' language was added by amendment in 1994 . . . to 'raise the bar
for the filing of late notice from a "fairly permissive standard" to a "more
demanding" one.'" Leidy v. Cnty. of Ocean, 398 N.J. Super. 449, 456 (App.
Div. 2008) (citations omitted) (quoting Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111,
118 (2000) (quoting Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 625 (1999))).
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It is well-settled that,
[a]scertaining the timeliness of a [TCA] notice requires
a simple, three-step sequential analysis that never
changes. The first step is to determine when the cause
of action accrued in accordance with N.J.S.A. 59:8-1.
. . . Once the date of accrual is ascertained, one can
proceed to the second step, which "is to determine
whether a notice of claim was filed within ninety days"
as required by N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. "If not, the third task is
to decide whether extraordinary circumstances exist
justifying a late notice" under N.J.S.A. 59:8-9.
[McNellis-Wallace v. Hoffman, 464 N.J. Super. 409,
416 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at
118-19).]
III.
Here, plaintiff's cause of action accrued in 2014 when plaintiff was
allegedly denied benefits. Plaintiff, however, contends she did not discover the
injury until December 2024 when she received first received benefits.
Giving plaintiff every favorable inference, we apply the discovery rule
and the continuing tort doctrine to determine the accrual date for plaintiff's cause
of action. See, e.g., Ben Elazar v. Marietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 134-35
(2017) (stating "when the discovery rule tolls the accrual date, the ninety-day
period within which the injured party must file a notice of claim against a public
entity is likewise delayed until the injured party learns of the injury or of the
A-4003-24
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third party's responsibility for that injury");2 Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd.
of Educ., 144 N.J. 84, 99 (1996) (stating that pursuant to the continuing tort
doctrine, "when a court finds that a continuing [tort] has been committed, it
implicitly holds that the defendant is committing a new tort, including a new
breach of duty, each day, triggering a new statute of limitations."). For purposes
of our opinion, we accept plaintiff's argument that the accrual date for her claim
was December 2024, notwithstanding that she has the burden of proving the
precise date she received notice she was eligible for benefits to commence the
ninety-day time period.
Even giving plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and
deeming December 31, 2024, as the latest possible accrual date, the ninety-day
period expired on March 31, 2025. Although plaintiff filed her complaint on
March 31, 2025, the filing of a complaint is not a notice of tort claim and cannot
be substituted as such. A notice of tort claim must be filed with the appropriate
governmental agency under N.J.S.A. 58:8-7, which states: "A claim for damage
or injury arising under this act against the State shall be filed either with (1) the
Attorney General or (2) the department or agency involved in the alleged
2
Plaintiff would ultimately not prevail under the discovery rule because she
knew the County was responsible for denying the claim.
A-4003-24
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wrongful act or omission. A claim for injury or damages arising under this act
against a local public entity shall be filed with that entity."
Plaintiff may be conflating a notice of a claim under the TCA and the
filing of a tort complaint against a public entity. A complaint filed in Superior
Court, however, is not a substitute for a notice of claim under the TCA. See
Cnty. of Hudson v. State, Dep't of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 23 (2011).
Plaintiff never filed any notice of claim with the County. Even after the
trial court noted that deficiency in its July 3, 2025 written decision, plaintiff
nonetheless chose not to request the court's permission to file a late notice of
claim within one year of the alleged injury under N.J.S.A. 58:8-9. If the cause
of action accrued on December 31, 2024, as plaintiff asserts, the one-year
extension for filing a late notice of claim expired on December 31, 2025.
Plaintiff's claims that she was homeless and faced financial difficulties do not
constitute extraordinary circumstances to enlarge the time for filing a notice of
claim. Some examples of extraordinary circumstances were cited in O'Donnell
and included not being aware a doctor who treated a patient at a private hospital
was actually a state employee and promptly serving notice on the proper party
upon learning of an error. See O'Donnell, 236 N.J. at 352. Courts must review
the totality of the circumstances when making that determination. Ibid.
A-4003-24
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In reviewing plaintiff's complaint liberally and providing her every
favorable inference, her complaint fails to meet the requirements under the TCA
and, therefore, the judge properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice under
Rule 4:6-2(e).
Affirmed.
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