Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4003-24 RUXANDRA ISACESCU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, WELFARE DIVISION, Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ Argued October 15, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026 Before Judges Mayer and Zazzali-Hogan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-1253-25. Ruxandra Isacescu, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf. Reana Garcia, Deputy County Counsel, argued the cause for respondent (Alberico De Pierro, Hudson County Counsel, attorney; Reana Garcia, on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff Ruxandra Isacescu appeals from the trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Hudson County Department of Family Services Welfare Division (County). The court found plaintiff failed to timely file a notice of claim within ninety days under the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3, and that no extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant an exception to that rule. We affirm. 1 Plaintiff seeks $66,000 from the County for denial of welfare benefits between 2014 and 2024. She ultimately received benefits in December 2024 and claims the County's award in December 2024 demonstrates her entitlement to benefits for the prior ten years. Her alleged damages include loss of her home, physical injuries and psychological injuries. In its decision, the trial court explained the ninety-day requirement to file notice under the TCA and noted that plaintiff asserted that extraordinary circumstances justified the delay in filing her complaint. Plaintiff misunderstood the trial court's decision. The trial court held plaintiff failed to 1 In her papers, plaintiff includes the July 3, 2025 order denying her motion for default judgment although she does not address it in her brief. That claim is therefore waived on appeal. A-4003-24 2 file any notice of claim as required under the TCA, let alone file a claim within ninety days. Therefore, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. I. As a threshold issue, plaintiff's appeal is procedurally defective. The notice of appeal was not filed within forty-five days of the trial court's July 3, 2025 decision. R. 2:4-1(a). Plaintiff's complaint should have been filed on August 17, 2025. Instead, plaintiff filed her complaint on August 26, 2025. Additionally, plaintiff fails to provide any citations to the record. R. 2:6- 8. Such omissions also violate Rule 2:6-9 because it is not the responsibility of appellate courts to "peruse evidence" or review the record independently; that is the plaintiff's duty. See Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 474-75 (App. Div. 2008). Further, plaintiff's brief and appendix are deficient because they include the judge's memorandum of decision but not the dismissal order as required by Rule 2:6-1(a). Plaintiff also improperly includes new information and additional facts in her appellate brief that were not presented to the trial court and therefore , we are not required to consider that information. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (stating "[f]or sound jurisprudential reasons, with few exceptions A-4003-24 3 our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available.") (internal quotations omitted); Fuhrman v. Mailander, 466 N.J. Super. 572, 596 (App. Div. 2021) (stating "appellate courts generally decline to address arguments not raised in the trial court."). For example, in her appellate brief, plaintiff asserts for the first time that the County discriminated against her because "[a]ll [her] case workers were black or black-Latinos while [she is] white." Although we could require plaintiff to file an updated brief and appendix to correct the deficiencies or dismiss the appeal, we will nonetheless address the merits of plaintiff's arguments. II. We review a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" de novo, and we "owe[] no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019). "The standard traditionally utilized by courts to determine whether to dismiss a pleading . . . is a generous one." Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451 (2013). Accordingly, "[a] plaintiff is entitled to a liberal interpretation and given the A-4003-24 4 benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn." State, Dep't of Treasury ex rel. McCormac v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 469, 478 (App. Div. 2006). When evaluating a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, "our inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint." Green, 215 N.J. at 451 (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "At this preliminary stage of the litigation the [c]ourt is not concerned with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint." Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746. Rather, "the test for determining the adequacy of a pleading [is] whether a cause of action is 'suggested' by the facts." Ibid. (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). To that end, courts must "search[] the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim" and grant the "opportunity . . . to amend if necessary." Ibid. (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). Notwithstanding this liberal standard, "the essential facts supporting [the] cause of action must be presented in order for the claim to survive," and "conclusory allegations are A-4003-24 5 insufficient in that regard." Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188, 193 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 768). The TCA requires a litigant to notify a public entity of the intent to sue for damages within ninety days of the date the cause of action accrued. N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. If timely notice is not provided, a litigant may, at the discretion of the court, be permitted to file a late notice within one year of the accrual of the claim if the public entity "has not been substantially prejudiced" and the plaintiff demonstrates "sufficient reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances" for missing the filing deadline. N.J.S.A. 59:8-9. This determination requires "a fact-sensitive analysis of the specific case," McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 478 (2011) (citing N.J.S.A. 59:8-9), and consideration of the circumstances "on a case-by-case basis." O'Donnell v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 236 N.J. 335, 347 (2019) (citing Rogers v. Cape May County Office of Pub. Def., 208 N.J. 414, 428 (2011)). "The 'extraordinary circumstances' language was added by amendment in 1994 . . . to 'raise the bar for the filing of late notice from a "fairly permissive standard" to a "more demanding" one.'" Leidy v. Cnty. of Ocean, 398 N.J. Super. 449, 456 (App. Div. 2008) (citations omitted) (quoting Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 118 (2000) (quoting Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 625 (1999))). A-4003-24 6 It is well-settled that, [a]scertaining the timeliness of a [TCA] notice requires a simple, three-step sequential analysis that never changes. The first step is to determine when the cause of action accrued in accordance with N.J.S.A. 59:8-1. . . . Once the date of accrual is ascertained, one can proceed to the second step, which "is to determine whether a notice of claim was filed within ninety days" as required by N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. "If not, the third task is to decide whether extraordinary circumstances exist justifying a late notice" under N.J.S.A. 59:8-9. [McNellis-Wallace v. Hoffman, 464 N.J. Super. 409, 416 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 118-19).] III. Here, plaintiff's cause of action accrued in 2014 when plaintiff was allegedly denied benefits. Plaintiff, however, contends she did not discover the injury until December 2024 when she received first received benefits. Giving plaintiff every favorable inference, we apply the discovery rule and the continuing tort doctrine to determine the accrual date for plaintiff's cause of action. See, e.g., Ben Elazar v. Marietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 134-35 (2017) (stating "when the discovery rule tolls the accrual date, the ninety-day period within which the injured party must file a notice of claim against a public entity is likewise delayed until the injured party learns of the injury or of the A-4003-24 7 third party's responsibility for that injury");2 Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 144 N.J. 84, 99 (1996) (stating that pursuant to the continuing tort doctrine, "when a court finds that a continuing [tort] has been committed, it implicitly holds that the defendant is committing a new tort, including a new breach of duty, each day, triggering a new statute of limitations."). For purposes of our opinion, we accept plaintiff's argument that the accrual date for her claim was December 2024, notwithstanding that she has the burden of proving the precise date she received notice she was eligible for benefits to commence the ninety-day time period. Even giving plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and deeming December 31, 2024, as the latest possible accrual date, the ninety-day period expired on March 31, 2025. Although plaintiff filed her complaint on March 31, 2025, the filing of a complaint is not a notice of tort claim and cannot be substituted as such. A notice of tort claim must be filed with the appropriate governmental agency under N.J.S.A. 58:8-7, which states: "A claim for damage or injury arising under this act against the State shall be filed either with (1) the Attorney General or (2) the department or agency involved in the alleged 2 Plaintiff would ultimately not prevail under the discovery rule because she knew the County was responsible for denying the claim. A-4003-24 8 wrongful act or omission. A claim for injury or damages arising under this act against a local public entity shall be filed with that entity." Plaintiff may be conflating a notice of a claim under the TCA and the filing of a tort complaint against a public entity. A complaint filed in Superior Court, however, is not a substitute for a notice of claim under the TCA. See Cnty. of Hudson v. State, Dep't of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 23 (2011). Plaintiff never filed any notice of claim with the County. Even after the trial court noted that deficiency in its July 3, 2025 written decision, plaintiff nonetheless chose not to request the court's permission to file a late notice of claim within one year of the alleged injury under N.J.S.A. 58:8-9. If the cause of action accrued on December 31, 2024, as plaintiff asserts, the one-year extension for filing a late notice of claim expired on December 31, 2025. Plaintiff's claims that she was homeless and faced financial difficulties do not constitute extraordinary circumstances to enlarge the time for filing a notice of claim. Some examples of extraordinary circumstances were cited in O'Donnell and included not being aware a doctor who treated a patient at a private hospital was actually a state employee and promptly serving notice on the proper party upon learning of an error. See O'Donnell, 236 N.J. at 352. Courts must review the totality of the circumstances when making that determination. Ibid. A-4003-24 9 In reviewing plaintiff's complaint liberally and providing her every favorable inference, her complaint fails to meet the requirements under the TCA and, therefore, the judge properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice under Rule 4:6-2(e). Affirmed. A-4003-24 10