Full Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 26-1177 __________ LIBBY A. PROFITT, Appellant v. HARRISBURG CITY; CAPITAL REGION WATER; MUNICIPAL WATER AUTHORITY ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00279) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 15, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed November 4, 2026) ___________ OPINION* ___________ PER CURIAM * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Libby Profitt appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the District Court’s order dismissing her amended complaint. We will affirm. I. Profitt sued the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and a municipal water authority, Capital Region Water, over how she was being billed for water and a requirement that she either allow a third-party contractor to access her residence or be fined $515 for noncompliance. Profitt alleged that Capital Region Water’s billing practices, including fines, constituted a pattern of racketeering activity that violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act. She further alleged that because fees and penalties were imposed without adequate notice or hearing, the appellees violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. She also expressed “a constitutional and privacy concern” with the requirement that she permit a third-party organization to have access to her home. Lastly, she asserted that the appellees were unjustly enriched and requested declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court screened the amended complaint and, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, concluded that Profitt failed to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The District Court construed the amended complaint as bringing RICO Act claims and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against both Capital Region Water and Harrisburg. The District Court determined that Profitt failed to allege conduct that could be a pattern of racketeering activity. As to her § 1983 claims, it concluded that Profitt failed to assert how Capital Region Water violated her rights, failed to allege any action taken by Harrisburg, and did not present any “policy or custom” that would allow a § 2 1983 action to succeed against a municipal entity. ECF No. 24 at 3. The District Court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Profitt’s unjust enrichment state law claim. II. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Profitt’s complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In conducting that review, we accept the factual allegations in Profitt’s complaint as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to her. Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018). Because Profitt is proceeding pro se, we construe her filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, pro se litigants still “must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). We may summarily affirm if an appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. III. On appeal, Profitt raises several issues with the District Court’s decision. None of her arguments are persuasive. Profitt argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her RICO claims because it did not take her factual allegations of racketeering activity as true. However, even a liberal reading of Profitt’s amended complaint does not suggest that the appellees violated the civil RICO statute. She makes no factual allegations that could be construed as a pattern of racketeering activity—the basis for her assertion that the appellees violated 3 the RICO Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962; Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995). A pattern of racketeering activity consists of at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity1 within ten years of each other. Tabas, 47 F.3d at 1290; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). She alleged no such activity, much less a pattern of it. Profitt also argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her due process claims. First, she argues that the District Court erred by overlooking municipal entities’ liability for policies or practices that lead to constitutional violations. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (establishing that local governmental are liable under § 1983 for injuries resulting from a policy or custom); We agree with the District Court that Profitt did not state how Harrisburg was involved in the billing practices she alleged violated her due process, let alone that it had any policies or practices that did so. Second, she argues that the District Court should have evaluated her due process claim under the notice and hearing requirements established in Matthews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Profitt asserts that Capital Region Water billed her without 1 “The RICO statute … enumerates the offenses which constitute ‘racketeering activity,’ including crimes that have traditionally been associated with the transgressions of racketeers: murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, and dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The statutory enumeration is, however, expansive and goes on to include specific federal offenses which, although they may often be committed by those whom we would categorize as ‘racketeers,’ also fall into the category of common law or ‘garden variety’ fraud and which would, in the past, have been the subject of commercial litigation under state law. Among these broadly delineated federal offenses are mail fraud and wire fraud.” Tabas, 47 F.3d at 1290. 4 adequate notice or recourse. But Profitt attached to her initial complaint copies of a notice from Capital Region Water of the potential charge and a letter explaining how to get the charge reversed. She does not explain how these do not provide adequate notice or an opportunity to challenge the charge. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that she has not stated a claim. Profitt argues that the District Court failed to address her forced home access claim, which “implicates constitutional privacy and property rights.” To the extent that this allegation constituted a separate claim, the District Court specifically addressed her allegation under RICO and generally addressed it under its RICO Act, due process, and § 1983 analysis. Although the District Court did not specifically address her “privacy concerns,” Profitt did not explain her concerns below beyond this conclusory assertion, which was insufficient to state a claim. ECF No. 16 at 9. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring a complaint to include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). Thus, any error was harmless. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 5