Full Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 26-1579 ___________ FAITH RASHIDIASL, Appellant v. UPPER DUBLIN SCHOOL DISTRICT ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-05950) District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on October 27, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: October 30, 2026) ____________________________________ ___________ OPINION* ___________ PER CURIAM Faith Rashidiasl appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing her amended com- plaint. We will affirm. I. Rashidiasl sued her former employer, the Upper Dublin School District, and their coun- sel. Rashidiasl, who was a substitute van driver, alleged that after she reported safety con- cerns, the Upper Dublin School District retaliated against her by pressuring her to quit, removing her from assignments, inconsistently giving assignments, and denying her train- ing opportunities. Rashidiasl brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court dismissed Rashidiasl’s initial complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) without prejudice, granting her leave to amend. Ra- shidiasl then filed an amended complaint. The District Court again dismissed Rashidiasl’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), this * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 time without prejudice because she had failed to address the flaws in her complaint that the court had explained in its previous order. Rashidiasl appealed. II. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Rashidiasl’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim is ple- nary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In conducting that review, we accept the factual allegations in Rashidiasl’s amended complaint as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to her. Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018). We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discre- tion. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 376 (3d Cir. 2020). Because Rashidiasl is proceeding pro se, we construe her filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, pro se litigants still “must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). We may summarily affirm if an appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. III. Rashidiasl raises several arguments on appeal. All lack merit. First, Rashidiasl states that the District Court used the wrong standard for failure to state a claim when it screened her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). If a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, § 1915 requires the district court to dismiss a 3 complaint that fails to state a claim. To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain suf- ficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is the standard that the District Court used. Second, Rashidiasl asserts that the District Court erred in dismissing her case with prej- udice without leave to amend. But in dismissing her original complaint, the District Court correctly identified its flaws and gave her leave to file an amended complaint. Because her amended complaint did not correct the flaws in her first complaint, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing her complaint without further leave to amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002) (the District Court must provide leave to amend unless doing so would be futile). Third, Rashidiasl asserts that the District Court did not construe her complaint liberally and erred in handling her IFP status. She makes no argument in support of either assertion. So we will not consider them further. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that “we have consistently refused to 4 consider ill-developed arguments or those not properly raised and discussed in the appellate briefing”).1 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Rashidiasl’s motions for counsel, motion to seal or protect personal information and request for oral argument are denied.2 1 Rashidiasl also states that she did not have docket access or access to relevant documents, she did not receive a “pro se packet,” and the clerk’s office was not helpful in navigating these issues. But in light of Rashidiasl’s continued litigation of her case at the District Court (i.e., filing an amended complaint in response to the initial dismissal of her case) and without specific examples in her brief, it is unclear how she was prejudiced. 2 With regard to the motion to seal or protect personal information, as the Clerk order ex- plained, the only document on the docket containing personal information is her motion to proceed IFP, to which the public does not have access. The Clerk directed Rashidiasl to identify other documents she wanted sealed, but she did not respond. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 106.1, 113.12. 5