Puleo, R. v. Meltzer, P.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket308 EDA 2026
JudgeBeck
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-A21004-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
RICHARD J. PULEO, LORRAINE PULEO, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AND LEWISBERRY PARTNERS, LLC : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 308 EDA 2026
PETER E. MELTZER, AND WEBER, :
GALLAGHER, SIMPSON, STAPLETON, :
FIRES & NEWBY, LLP :
Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s):
2025-08429-TT
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and NEUMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2026
Richard J. Puleo (“Puleo”), Lorraine Puleo, and Lewisberry Partners, LLC
(“Lewisberry”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal from the order entered by the
Chester County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”) sustaining the
preliminary objections of Peter E. Meltzer (“Meltzer”) and his law firm, Weber,
Gallagher, Simpson, Stapleton, Fires & Newby, LLP (“law firm”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) and dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. Because we
conclude that the issues Plaintiffs raise on appeal either lack merit or are
waived, we affirm.
On September 5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants
in which Plaintiffs alleged that Meltzer made defamatory statements about
Puleo. The alleged defamatory statements occurred in 2025 while Meltzer and
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his law firm were representing U.S. Bank Trust N.A. (“U.S. Bank”) in a
mortgage foreclosure action in York County against Plaintiffs relating to
multiple properties owned by Plaintiffs. The litigation was contentious, as
Plaintiffs filed numerous counterclaims and complaints against U.S. Bank and
Defendants in response to the mortgage foreclosure action. Eventually,
during the mortgage foreclosure action, Plaintiffs’ attorneys were no longer
able to represent them and Puleo, who is a licensed attorney, began
representing himself and the other plaintiffs.
In the matter underlying this appeal, Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that
the following statement Meltzer made in a motion for sanctions against
Plaintiffs during the mortgage foreclosure action was defamatory:
It is indeed no surprise that the prior … law firms who were
representing [Puleo], (both of whom may have fired him, or at
least refused to represent him any further because of nonpayment
of fees), wanted nothing to do with his totally absurd claims. What
is clear however is that neither firm is representing him any
further, and apparently, no other firm would represent him either,
which is why he is now acting pro se.
Complaint, 9/5/2025, ¶ 9.1
____________________________________________
1 In the complaint, Plaintiffs alleged Meltzer made two other defamatory
statements regarding Puleo during the mortgage foreclosure proceedings.
See Complaint, 9/5/2025, ¶¶ 20, 28. Plaintiffs, however, do not reference
either of these statements in their brief before this Court and have
consequently abandoned any claims relating to them on appeal. See
generally Plaintiffs’ Brief at 2-16. We therefore do not address them in this
decision.
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On October 30, 2025, Defendants filed preliminary objections in which
they asserted that the statement at issue was subject to judicial privilege and
could not serve as the basis of a defamation action. Plaintiffs filed a timely
response. On December 11, 2025, the trial court sustained Defendants’
preliminary objections and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This
timely appeal followed.
Plaintiffs present the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred in
sustaining [Defendants’] preliminary objections and dismissing
[Plaintiffs’] defamation complaint with prejudice based upon
judicial privilege where the alleged defamatory statements were
not pertinent and/or material to the underlying proceeding[?]
2. Whether the trial court abuse[d] its discretion and/or erred in
applying absolute judicial privilege to knowingly false statements
made by [Meltzer] when the statements were unrelated to any
issue pending before the court[?]
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred in
dismissing the complaint with prejudice where [Plaintiffs]
sufficiently pled facts establishing that [Meltzer]’s statements fell
outside the scope of protected advocacy[?]
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or committed
an error of law by failing to permit [Plaintiffs’] an opportunity to
amend their complaint, contrary to Pennsylvania law favoring
liberal amendment[?]
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or committed
an error of law violating [Plaintiffs’] due process rights by failing
to provide notice of the grounds for dismissal or a reasoned
explanation sufficient to allow [Plaintiffs] the opportunity to
respond and therefore such failure necessitated [Plaintiffs’] filing
this appeal[?]
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Plaintiffs’ Brief at 2-3.
Our standard of review of a trial court’s grant of preliminary objections
is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Caltagirone v. Cephalon,
Inc., 190 A.3d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2018). “Preliminary objections in the
nature of a demurrer require the court to resolve the issues solely on the basis
of the pleadings; no testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may
be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the demurrer.” Id.
(citation omitted).
Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the
legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering preliminary
objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings
are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the
dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in
which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable
to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If
any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it
should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary
objections.
This Court will reverse the trial court’s decision regarding
preliminary objections only where there has been an error of law
or abuse of discretion.
Godlove v. Humes, 303 A.3d 477, 481 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations omitted).
In their first three issues, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in
granting Defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissing Plaintiffs’
complaint with prejudice as the allegedly defamatory statement was not
subject to judicial privilege. See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 10-15. Plaintiffs contend
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that Meltzer’s statement was not privileged because it was not relevant or
material to the underlying mortgage foreclosure action. See id.
“All communications pertinent to any stage of a judicial proceeding are
accorded an absolute privilege which cannot be destroyed by abuse. Thus,
statements by a party, a witness, counsel, or a judge cannot be the basis of
a defamation action whether they occur in the pleadings or in open court.”
Greenberg v. McGraw, 161 A.3d 976, 981 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted).
The reasons for the absolute privilege are well recognized. A
judge must be free to administer the law without fear of
consequences. This independence would be impaired were he to
be in daily apprehension of defamation suits. The privilege is also
extended to parties to afford freedom of access to the courts, to
witnesses to encourage their complete and unintimidated
testimony in court, and to counsel to enable him to best represent
his client’s interests. Likewise, the privilege exists because the
courts have other internal sanctions against defamatory
statements, such as perjury or contempt proceedings.
Binder v. Triangle Pub., Inc., 275 A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. 1971).
This privilege, however, applies only to “those communications [that]
are issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings and [that] are pertinent
and material to the redress or relief sought.” Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351,
355 (Pa. 1986) (citation omitted). Thus, where allegedly defamatory
statements made “in pleadings or in the trial or argument of a case are
pertinent, relevant[,] and material to any issue in a civil suit, there is no civil
liability for making any of them.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, this
Court has stated that “the privilege extends not only to communications made
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in open court, but also encompasses pleadings and even less formal
communications such as preliminary conferences and correspondence
between counsel in furtherance of a client’s interest.” Greenberg, 161 A.3d
at 982 (citation omitted).
In concluding that Meltzer’s statements were privileged, the trial court
explained:
It is clear from the face of the complaint that [Meltzer]’s
statements are entitled to the full protection of the judicial
privilege. [Plaintiffs] argue in their response to the preliminary
objections that the statements were not pertinent and material to
the relief sought. Each of [Meltzer]’s statements either suggested
or averred that [Puleo] had failed to satisfy some financial
obligation. These statements were made in the course of a
mortgage foreclosure action. The statements are well within the
bounds of pertinence to their proceedings. When read within the
context of the documents in which they appear, [Meltzer]’s
statements obviously are meant to point out the frivolity of
[Puleo]’s strategy of litigation in the mortgage foreclosure
proceedings. In a mortgage foreclosure proceeding, an
institutional plaintiff’s counsel alerting the presiding judge to the
mortgagor defendant’s attempts to frustrate the progression of
the suit with frivolous and vexatious filings is, unfortunately, not
an uncommon sight. Such information assists judges when
considering, e.g., a motion to compel a party’s compliance with a
court order. The statements alleged to be defamatory were made
(1) in a motion for sanctions, (2) in an emergency motion to
compel compliance with a court order, and (3) in open court
during a hearing upon a motion for appointment of a receiver.
Absolute privilege attaches to these statements because they
were relevant to the question of whether the court in those cases
should impose constraints on [Puleo] in order to compel his
compliance with the judicial process. Nothing in the complaint
dissuades the court from its position that [Plaintiffs’] defamation
action is completely barred by the judicial privilege.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/2026, at 9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
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In support of their argument, Plaintiffs rely on our Supreme Court’s
decisions in Post and Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67 (Pa. 2004). See
Plaintiffs’ Brief at 12-14. In Post, the plaintiff and defendant were opposing
counsel in ongoing litigation. Post, 507 A.2d at 352. The defendant sent a
letter to plaintiff detailing alleged acts of misconduct by the plaintiff and sent
copies of the letter to the trial court judge, plaintiff’s client, and the
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Id. at 352-53. The
Supreme Court held that the communication was not protected by judicial
privilege, reasoning that the challenged communication must bear a
relationship to the proceedings to be privileged. Id. at 355-56.
The letter did not state or argue any legal position, and it did not
request any ruling or action by the court. Nor did the
communication request that anything contained in it should even
be considered by the court. The letter was clearly not a part of
the judicial proceedings to which it made reference, and merely
forwarding a copy of the letter to the court did not make it a part
of those proceedings. Likewise, forwarding copies of the letter to
plaintiff's alleged client … and to the Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not render the letter a part of
the trial proceedings, and transmittal of those copies would not
logically have been expected to affect the course of trial.
Id. at 356. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the “defendant published
the letter to persons who would have had no direct interest in either of the
proceedings which might have ensued” and consequently, “[p]ublication of
the letter to such persons was, therefore, not privileged.” Id. at 357.
In Bochetto, our Supreme Court held that the defendant faxing a
complaint that alleged legal malpractice against the plaintiff to a reporter at a
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daily legal news publication was not protected by the privilege. Bochetto,
860 A.2d at 70, 72-73. The Court explained that the defendant’s act of
sending the complaint to the reporter “was an extrajudicial act that occurred
outside of the regular course of the judicial proceedings and was not relevant
in any way to those proceedings.” Id. at 73.
Post and Bochetto are readily distinguishable from the instant matter.
In this case, Meltzer made the statement at issue in a motion for sanctions
against Puleo in which Meltzer expressly asserted that he was entitled to
sanctions because, inter alia, Puleo raised a litany of frivolous claims against
Meltzer, his law firm, and other parties to the action in response to the filing
of the mortgage foreclosure action. Complaint, 9/5/2025, ¶ 9, Ex. E at n.1.
It was Meltzer’s express contention that Puleo was not acting in a legally
professional or financially appropriate manner in the mortgage foreclosure
action, that Puleo’s inability to retain counsel supported his assertions that
Puleo was not acting appropriately, and that Defendants were entitled to
sanctions as a consequence. See id. Thus, Meltzer made the alleged
defamatory statement in a pleading before a court to further the exact legal
argument he was making in that pleading. See id.
Although made in a complaint, the allegedly defamatory statement in
Bochetto was published outside the confines of the courtroom as it was sent
to a reporter at a news publication. See Bochetto, 860 A.2d at 70. Likewise,
the allegedly defamatory statements in Post occurred in a letter, not a
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pleading, that the defendant not only sent to the trial court, but also to the
plaintiff’s client and the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. See Post, 507 A.2d at 352-53. In both Bochetto and Post,
the publication of the statements to third parties not directly involved in those
cases served no purpose that would logically have been expected to affect the
course of those cases. See id. at 356. In contrast, in the case at bar, Meltzer
made the allegedly defamatory statement about Puleo solely to the trial court
in a motion to support his argument that he was entitled to sanctions against
Puleo. We therefore find Puleo’s reliance on Bochetto and Post unavailing.
We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s determination that
Meltzer made the allegedly defamatory statement against Puleo during the
regular course of the judicial proceedings, that the statement was relevant to
the motion for sanctions Meltzer filed before the trial court in the mortgage
foreclosure action, and it was thus protected by judicial privilege. As such,
the statement cannot serve as the basis of a defamation action.
In their fourth and fifth issues, Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by
failing to provide them with an opportunity to amend their complaint and by
failing to provide them with notice of the grounds for dismissal of their
complaint or an explanation for the dismissal sufficient to allow them to
respond. See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 3. Plaintiffs, however, include no argument
in support or analysis of these two issues in their appellate brief. See id. at
10-15.
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Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued … followed by such discussion and citation of
authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). “The failure to
develop an adequate argument in an appellate brief may result in waiver of
the claim under [Rule] 2119.” Llaurado v. Garcia-Zapata, 223 A.3d 247,
257-58 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This Court
“shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record
to find evidence to support an argument; instead, we will deem [the] issue to
be waived.” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have waived their fourth and fifth issues.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the trial court’s decision
to sustain Defendants’ preliminary objections and dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint
with prejudice.
Order affirmed.
Date: 11/16/2026
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