Tower Crossing Condominium Association v. Affiliated FM Insurance Company
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-3167
JudgeBrennan
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-3167
TOWER CROSSING CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AFFILIATED FM INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-06228 — LaShonda A. Hunt, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 24, 2026 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and
KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Chief Judge. Tower Crossing Condominium As-
sociation sued its insurer, Affiliated FM Insurance Company,
over nonpayment of a claim for storm damage. The insurance
policy required a “signed and sworn” proof of loss and in-
cluded a two-year limitations period to file a lawsuit, ex-
tended only by agreement or while a proof of loss was being
considered. Although Tower Crossing submitted a $4.3
2 No. 25-3167
million proof of loss a day before the limitations period was
set to expire, it was not “sworn” to as the policy required. So,
the district court granted Affiliated FM’s motion for summary
judgment. We agree with the district court and affirm.
I
Tower Crossing manages a condominium complex in
Glenview, Illinois. Affiliated FM insured the complex under
an all-risk policy from May 1, 2018 to May 1, 2020.
For Affiliated FM to pay an insurance claim, the parties’
policy required that Tower Crossing submit a “signed and
sworn proof of loss to [Affiliated FM] within 90 days after the
loss, unless that time is extended in writing by [Affiliated
FM].” The proof of loss had to state Tower Crossing’s
“knowledge and belief” of five categories of information, in-
cluding the actual cash value and replacement value of each
item associated with the loss. The policy also included a limi-
tations period requiring all lawsuits to be initiated within two
years of the date the loss occurred, “extended by the number
of days between the date the proof of loss was filed until the
date the claim is denied in whole or in part.”
Tower Crossing claims that a storm damaged the roof of
the Glenview condominium complex on July 2, 2019. It sub-
mitted notice of the damage (which is not a proof of loss) to
Affiliated FM on August 21, 2019, kicking off two years of di-
alogue between the parties about the claim. A day before the
policy’s two-year limitations period was due to expire, Affili-
ated FM agreed to extend Tower Crossing’s deadline to bring
suit to October 2, 2021. The parties continued to investigate
and negotiate the claim.
No. 25-3167 3
Negotiations ultimately stalled. Two days before the ex-
tended limitations period lapsed, Tower Crossing’s Board-
President, Kenneth Freedman, signed and had notarized a
proof of loss which valued the replacement cost of the roofs
at $2,954,405.44—but he did not submit it. The next day,
Tower Crossing submitted a proof of loss with a $4,341,149.36
valuation. On October 29, 2021, Affiliated FM rejected the sub-
mitted proof of loss without making a final coverage decision
on the claim.
Tower Crossing then sued on November 19, 2021, alleging
breach of contract and bad faith. During discovery, Affiliated
FM noticed that Tower Crossing’s second drafted, first sub-
mitted proof of loss attached the exact same notary certificate,
dated September 30 and with an identically placed stamp, as
was affixed to the unsubmitted proof of loss. The contents of
the submitted proof of loss were therefore not “sworn” to in
front of a notary public. Rather, in his declaration, Kenneth
Freedman admitted that Tower Crossing “attached” his
“sworn signature” from the unsubmitted proof of loss to the
updated, submitted one.
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment. Affiliated FM argued that because the nota-
rized signature was transferred to the submitted proof of loss,
it was not properly “sworn” as the policy required, so the lim-
itations period was not tolled. Tower Crossing contended, in
relevant part, that it complied with the policy. The district
court granted Affiliated FM’s motion, finding that the lan-
guage in the policy required the insured to provide a “signed”
and “sworn” proof of loss to the company. The court ruled
that “sworn” requires an oath, and no such swearing under
oath occurred for the submitted proof of loss. So, the extended
4 No. 25-3167
limitations period expired on October 2, 2021, over a month
before Tower Crossing sued. Tower Crossing timely appeals
this decision.
II
We review de novo a district court’s decision on cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment. Polk v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 171
F.4th 1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 2026).
This case comes to us under diversity jurisdiction, so we
apply substantive law from the state of Illinois. See AFM Mat-
tress Co., LLC v. Motorists Com. Mut. Ins. Co., 37 F.4th 440, 443
(7th Cir. 2022) (applying Illinois law in a diversity case where
the parties agreed it controlled). Our goal “is to ascertain and
give effect to the intention of the parties, as expressed in the
policy language.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Columbia Ins. Grp., 972
F.3d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hobbs v. Hartford Ins. Co.
of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17 (2005)). “Undefined terms will
be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning,” and
courts should avoid interpretations that the average person
“cannot be expected to understand.” Sproull v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 2021 IL 126446, ¶ 19 (citation modified). Policies
are read as a whole, “giving effect to each provision,” and as-
suming that each “was intended to serve a purpose.” Acuity
v. M/I Homes of Chi., LLC, 2023 IL 129087, ¶ 31. If its language
is unambiguous, the policy will be applied as written. Rich v.
Principal Life Ins. Co., 226 Ill. 2d 359, 371 (2007). If its language
is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, “the court
must construe the policy in favor of the insured and against
the insurer that drafted the policy.” Sproull, 2021 IL 126446 at
¶ 19 (citation modified). That said, neither the parties’ disa-
greement about a term’s meaning nor the policy’s failure to
define that term renders the term ambiguous. See Founders Ins.
No. 25-3167 5
Co. v. Munoz, 237 Ill. 2d 424, 433 (2010); Nicor, Inc. v. Associated
Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs. Ltd., 223 Ill. 2d 407, 417 (2006). Courts
also “will not strain to find an ambiguity.” Rich, 226 Ill. 2d at
372.
Additionally, Illinois’s insurance code states that insur-
ance policy limitations provisions are “tolled from the date
proof of loss is filed, in whatever form is required by the policy,
until the date the claim is denied in whole or in part.” 215
ILCS 5/143.1 (emphasis added). Illinois law “requires the in-
sured to do more than merely present equivalent information
to that requested in the insurance policy.” Koclanakis v. Merri-
mack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 889 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1990). “Filing
of other information with an insurance company does not
start tolling the running of a policy’s one-year limitations pe-
riod if sworn proof of loss is required by the policy.” Vala v.
Pac. Ins. Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 968, 971 (1998).
III
We turn first to the plain language of the policy’s term
“sworn.” Dictionaries consistently define that term as requir-
ing some type of oath or formality. The district court relied
primarily on Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “swear”
as “to administer an oath to (a person)” or “to take an oath,”
and “sworn statement” as “a statement given under oath; an
affidavit.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1755, 1705 (12th ed.
2024). This reliance was reasonable, as the Illinois Supreme
Court considers Black’s Law Dictionary in determining the
ordinary meaning of undefined insurance policy terms. See
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Eljer Mfg., Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 301 (2001).
Tower Crossing asserts that a legal dictionary does not re-
flect an ordinary understanding of “sworn” and instead that
6 No. 25-3167
only a promise is required. In support, it cites non-legal dic-
tionaries, offering examples of varying tenses, which in-
clude—with some curious use of ellipses—that “‘swear’
means, among other things, ‘to assert as true’ or ‘to … prom-
ise emphatically or earnestly’” (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY) and that “swear” can be defined as “to promise
or say firmly that you are telling the truth … .” (citing
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY). Read in full—rather than in ex-
cerpts—the non-legal dictionaries reach the same result as
Black’s: “sworn” requires some type of oath. Dictionary.com
defines “sworn” as “having taken an oath.” 1 Cambridge Dic-
tionary defines it as “formally and officially stated as being
true.” 2 And, Merriam-Webster defines “swear” (“sworn” ap-
pearing as the past participle of “swear”) as “to utter or take
solemnly (an oath)” or “to assert as true or promise under
oath.” 3 Given these definitions, “sworn” may not require no-
tarization specifically, but the term unambiguously requires
an oath, of which notarization is one option.
Tower Crossing’s versions of the dictionary definitions do
not create ambiguity. It points to definitions in different
tenses and craftily excerpts quotes to avoid reference to an
oath. A term is not ambiguous “merely because the parties
can suggest creative possibilities for its meaning.” Nicor, Inc.,
223 Ill. 2d at 417. Thus, because the provision is not
1 Sworn, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.diction-
ary.com/browse/sworn (last visited Nov. 19, 2026).
2 Sworn, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cam-
bridge.org/us/dictionary/english/sworn (last visited Nov. 19, 2026).
3 Swear, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/swear (last visited Nov. 19, 2026).
No. 25-3167 7
ambiguous, we need not construe the policy strictly against
the insurer. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17.
Further, the policy required a proof of loss that is both
“signed” and “sworn.” The surplusage canon counsels that
“[i]f possible, every word and every provision is to be given
effect … . None should needlessly be given an interpretation
that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no con-
sequence.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012). Illinois
reads insurance policies the same way, giving “effect to each
provision” and assuming that each “was intended to serve a
purpose.” Acuity, 2023 IL 129087 at ¶ 31. Tower Crossing’s
reading would leave the term “sworn” adding little to noth-
ing to the term “signed,” because a signature shows that the
insured adopts the statement. See Melena v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 135, 150 (2006) (“[A] party to an agreement is
charged with knowledge of and assent to the agreement
signed.”); cf. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 542 (1991) (explaining that a signature “cer-
tifies … that the signer has read the document” and “is satis-
fied that the document is well-grounded” in both law and
fact). To give effect to both parts of the provision, then,
“sworn” must add something to “signed.” The dictionaries
referenced above show that “sworn” adds an oath.
Tower Crossing offers three main arguments differing
from this reading. First, it claims that a notary simply certifies
a signature, not the contents of a document. So, the inverse of
the superfluity point above is true and notarization adds
nothing to “signed.”
Illinois law defines a notarial act as including “taking an
acknowledgement, administering an oath, or affirmation,
8 No. 25-3167
taking a verification on oath, or affirmation, witnessing or at-
testing a signature, certifying or attesting a copy, and noting
a protest of a negotiable instrument.” 5 ILCS 312/1-104. This
definition is not confined to verification of a physical signa-
ture. The notary certificate on the proofs of loss here reads
“subscribed and sworn before me,” an example of a notarial
act enumerated in the quoted notary statute. A verification
upon oath or affirmation is “a declaration that a statement is
true made by a person upon oath or affirmation.” 5 ILCS
312/6-101(c). In taking that verification, a notary must confirm
that the person appearing before them “is the person whose
true signature is on the statement verified.” 5 ILCS 312/6-
102(b). The resulting certificate then records the notary’s sig-
nature and date, as of “the time of” the notarial act. 5 ILCS
312/6-103(a), (c). An oath therefore attaches only to the partic-
ular statement presented to a notary on a singular occasion.
Here, that statement is the $2.9 million proof of loss Freed-
man attested to on September 30, 2021. The statement would
not include a subsequent document, different in amount and
created later. If a signature need be notarized on only one doc-
ument—and the signature page could be transferred from
document to document—new documents would not need to
be notarized. That would be contrary to the Illinois rules gov-
erning notarization.
Second, Tower Crossing contends that because Affiliated
FM had already investigated its claim before submitting the
proof of loss, the oath would serve no purpose anyway. Gen-
erally, a proof of loss functions to “afford the insurer an ade-
quate opportunity to investigate, to prevent fraud and impo-
sition upon it, and to form an intelligent estimate of its rights
and liabilities before it is obliged to pay.” 13 JORDAN R. PLITT
No. 25-3167 9
ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 186:22 (3d ed. 2026). So, alt-
hough some of the purposes of a proof of loss were served
even without an oath, the oath’s objective is to prevent fraud
by binding the insured to this specific statement. Whether Af-
filiated FM actually needed or used the information does not
change what the policy required.
Third, Tower Crossing argues that Freedman “could have
typed or written” that the document was true and correct, and
that there “simply is no difference” between doing that and
consenting to an already-typed form. Tower Crossing points
to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2) and 735 ILCS 5/1-109 for support. These
statutes, though, give certain declarations the same effect “as
though subscribed and sworn to under oath,” confirming that
“sworn” ordinarily requires an oath. 735 ILCS 5/1-109. In any
event, nothing of this sort happened here. Freedman simply
allowed reuse of a page attesting to a different valuation. We
therefore need not decide whether such a declaration would
satisfy the policy.
Ultimately, Freedman swore only to a proof of loss valu-
ing the cost at about $2.9 million. That signature and notary
page were later attached to a different proof of loss, worth
about $1.4 million more, which Freedman did not again
“swear” to. Even assuming Freedman approved the reattach-
ment, as his declaration states, approving that is not an oath
to the new statement. Tower Crossing thus failed to file a
proof of loss in the form required by the policy, so tolling did
not begin. The extended limitations period expired on Octo-
ber 2, 2021, and Tower Crossing’s November 19, 2021 action
is time-barred.
10 No. 25-3167
IV
In the alternative, Tower Crossing argues that its substan-
tial compliance with the proof of loss requirement was
enough to toll the limitations provision. Yet, as the statute pro-
vides, insurance policy limitations periods are tolled from the
date a proof of loss is submitted “in whatever form is required
by the policy,” until the date it is denied in whole or in part.
215 ILCS 5/143.1. That statute requires the policy’s specific
form for a proof of loss to begin tolling. Here, that form is one
that is both “signed and sworn,” so this argument does not
follow.
Further, Illinois law “requires the insured to do more than
merely present equivalent information to that requested in
the insurance policy.” Koclanakis, 889 F.2d at 675. There, the
policy “explicitly required [the insured] to submit a signed,
sworn statement” of loss and detailed inventory. Id. at 675–76.
The insured “instead tendered an unsworn notice of loss, an
uncertified balance sheet, and a receipt[,]” and the court
found that because it was not “in the required form, [the in-
sured could not] find solace” in the tolling statute. Id. Alt-
hough Koclanakis involved more defects than just the missing
oath, its reasoning applies here. Whether the submission was
functionally “equivalent” does not matter if it did not comply
with the required form. Id. at 675. So, where the “sworn” re-
quirement is not met, there is no tolling.
Tower Crossing also treats the proof of loss requirement
as a condition precedent to coverage, claiming that Illinois ap-
plies substantial compliance to such conditions. But whether
a proof of loss condition is satisfied for purposes of coverage
is a different question than whether a proof of loss was sub-
mitted in the policy’s required form to start tolling. See Trinity
No. 25-3167 11
Bible Baptist Church v. Fed. Kemper Ins. Co., 219 Ill. App. 3d 156,
159–60 (1991). Substantial compliance may answer the first
question. But the text of 215 ILCS 5/143.1 controls the second
question, on which this case turns. Whether Tower Crossing
substantially complied with a condition of coverage does not
matter here.
Finally, the authorities Tower Crossing cites for the prop-
osition that the “substantial compliance doctrine is firmly
established” in Illinois insurance policy interpretation are dis-
tinguishable. The Illinois Supreme Court cases it cites apply-
ing substantial compliance to proofs of loss all date from 1861
to 1935, predating 215 ILCS 5/143.1 and its “in whatever form
is required” language. Apart from McDonald v. Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 251 Ill. App. 3d 354 (1993), none of the more re-
cent cases on which Tower Crossing relies involve a proof of
loss or this statute. Tower Crossing’s best case, McDonald,
noted that sufficiently detailed, “good faith” estimates are the
functional equivalent of a proof of loss for tolling purposes
when “no particular form[ is] required by the policy[.]” Id. at
356–57. Here, a “particular form” is required. Additionally,
there, a proof of loss was required only upon request of the
insurer, and the insurer made no such request. Id. at 357. The
policy here required that a proof of loss be submitted without
a request from Affiliated FM. We need not consider whether
Tower Crossing’s submission was equivalent; we ask only
whether it was in the form the policy required.
V
Tower Crossing did not submit a “sworn” proof of loss as
required by the policy, and substantial compliance does not
trigger tolling of the applicable limitations period. The limita-
tions period thus expired on October 2, 2021, so the
12 No. 25-3167
November 19, 2021 suit was untimely. For these reasons, we
AFFIRM the district court.