Full Opinion

TATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT NO. 2026 CA 0444 JOHN BROOKS, FATHER OF MADISON BROOKS jQ5 VERSUS C. B., LLC D/B/ A C." GIE' S BAR, DARIN P. ADAMS, ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, JOHN LANDRY, DEF INSURANCE COMPANY, BARTENDER NO. I, BARTENDER NO. 2, BARTENDER NO. 3, BARTENDER NO. 4, ANDY GLENECK, ALEX SCHEXNAYDER, LANDON REES, JACKSON ROBICHAUX, XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY, XXX INSURANCE COMPANY, KAIVON WASHINGTON, DESMOND CARTER, CASEN CARVER, EVERETT LEE, JAMES HAYWARD, JR., SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY LYFT, INC. & STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY Consolidated with ASHLEY BAUSTET, MOTHER OF MADISON BROOKS VERSUS C.B., LLC D/B/ A REGGIE' S BAR, 242 INVESTMENTS, LLC, DARIN P. ADAMS, JOHN LANDRY, ANDY GLENECK, ALEX SCHEXNAYDER, LANDON REES, JACKSON ROBICHAUX, ZACHARY BOTT, KAYDEN DYKES, NOAH FREDERICK JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, DEF INSURANCE COMPANY, GHI INSURANCE COMPANY, XYZ INSURANCE Judgment Rendered: NOV0 b 2026 On Appeal from the 19th Judicial District Court Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana Trial Court No. 738084 c/ w Trial Court No. 742919 The Honorable Tiffany Foxworth-Roberts, Judge Presiding David I. Courcelle Attorneys for Plaintiff -1 st Appellant, Scott C. Stansbury John Brooks, Father of Bernard A. Dupuy Madison Brooks Metairie, Louisiana Kerry J. Miller Attorneys for Plaintiff 2 - nd Appellant, Danielle C. Teutonico Ashley Baustert, Mother of Monica L. Bergeron Madison Brooks Brennan F. O' Keefe Daniel J. Dysart New Orleans, Louisiana Steven W. Usdin Attorneys for Defendant -Appellee Stephen R. Klaffky James River Insurance Company Laura M. Blockmann New Orleans, Louisiana Matthew L. Mann Attorneys for Defendant -Appellee Kirk D. Pfefferle USAA Casualty Insurance Company Adrienne D. Rachel Stetson S. Aubrey Beau E. Ackal Gabrielle E. Miller Baton Rouge, Louisiana William C. Helm Attorneys for Defendant -Appellee Brittney M. Reed 242 Investments, LLC Colton J. Hilgenkamp Baton Rouge, Louisiana Matthew W. Bailey Attorneys for Defendants -Appellees Katherine M. Cook C. B., LLC d/ b/ a Reggie' s Bar, Darin Catherine A. Rutherford -Kidder P. Adams & John Landry Baton Rouge, Louisiana Shelby S. Talley Attorneys for Defendant -Appellee Arita M.L. Bohannan Andrew Gleneck Caitlyn L. Mayer Landis Silva Prestigiacomo Kenner, Louisiana Joseph J. Long Attorney for Defendant -Appellee Baton Rouge, Louisiana Casen Carver 2 Robert T. Garrity, Jr. Attorneys for Defendants -Appellees Pierre W. Mouledoux Landon Rees & Everett Lee Harahan,, Louisiana Felix " Andy" DeJean, IV Attorney for Defendant -Appellee Baton Rouge, Louisiana Alex Schexnayder Jackson Robichaux In proper person -Defendant -Appellee Baton Rouge, Louisiana 11011111 3 WOLFE, J. In this consolidated appeal, Appellants, John Brooks, father of Madison Brooks, and Ashley Baustert, mother of Madison Brooks, appeal a summary judgment in favor of Appellee, USAA Casualty Insurance Company (" USAA"), and dismissing all of the Appellants' claims against USAA with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment. Tragically, in the early morning hours of January 15, 2023, Madison Brooks, who was nineteen years old at the time, was struck and killed by a vehicle on Burbank Drive in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The evening before, on January 14, 2023, she had visited a bar owned by C. B., LLC d/ b/ a Reggie' s Bar (" Reggie' s Bar"), which was located near the Louisiana State University campus. Despite being under the legal age to drink in Louisiana, Appellants maintain that managers, bartenders, and employees of Reggie' s Bar served Madison numerous drinks until she left the bar after 1: 00 a.m. in the morning. Appellants allege that Madison was visibly intoxicated and fell down at least four times in front of Reggie' s Bar employees. Madison left Reggie' s Bar in a vehicle with four individuals who had also been patrons of the bar, Kaivon Washington, Desmond Carter, Casen Carver, and Everett Lee. After leaving Reggie' s Bar, Appellants assert that Washington and Carter sexually assaulted Madison in the back seat of the car, which was recorded by Carver on his cell phone. Appellants claim that Madison was then let out of the vehicle on a dark, busy street and was fatally struck by a different vehicle on Burbank Drive. Washington, Carter, Carver, and Lee were all charged criminally in the death of Madison. 0 A wrongful death and survival suit was originally filed by John Brooks on September 15, 2023. Ashley Baustert filed a separate lawsuit on January 16, 2024.' Shortly thereafter, the East Baton Rouge District Attorney' s Office filed a Motion to Stay Discovery in Civil Matters in Accordance with La. C. C.P. art. 1426. 12 due to the pending criminal cases. After a contradictory hearing held on April 22, 2024, the trial court orally granted the motion to stay discovery. The Appellants maintain that at the time of the underlying events Landon Rees, USAA' s insured, was a manager and/ or bartender at Reggie' s Bar. Both Appellants make allegations that the bartenders, managers, and other employees breached a duty to refrain from serving alcohol to Madison, an underage patron who was visibly intoxicated, and to ensure her safety given her inebriated state. USAA issued a homeowner' s policy and an umbrella policy that included Rees as an insured. USAA moved for summary judgment, asserting that the business pursuits exclusion in each policy applied; there was no coverage for the allegations made by Appellants; and it should be dismissed with prejudice. Attached as exhibits to the motion are John Brooks' s petition and first supplemental and amending petition; Ashley Baustert' s petition; USAA' s homeowner' s policy; and USAA' s 3 umbrella policy. I Each parent of Madison Brooks filed separate lawsuits that have been consolidated by the trial court for all purposes. See John Brooks, Father of Madison Brooks v. C.B., LLC, et al., 19th Judicial District Court, Docket No. 738084 and Ashley Baustert, Mother of Madison Brooks, v. C.B., LLC, et al., 19th Judicial District Court, Docket No. 742919. 2 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1426. 1 provides, in pertinent part, " Upon motion of the district attorney in a criminal proceeding, a court having jurisdiction over any related pending civil action or proceeding may, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown after a contradictory hearing with all parties in the civil action, stay all or a portion of discovery sought in such civil action or proceeding." 3 On January 17, 2024, John Brooks also filed a second supplemental and amending petition. USAA filed its motion for summary judgment on April 7, 2025. However, no party attached the second supplemental and amending petition to either the motion for summary judgment or opposition thereto. Additionally, no party referenced the second supplemental and amending petition as an exhibit. Under La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 2), we may consider only those documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment or referenced thereto as I Both Appellants opposed the motion for summary judgment and attached an affidavit of attorney Monica L. Bergeron explaining that there had been no opportunity for discovery given the trial court' s stay. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of USAA in both consolidated cases, dismissing Appellants' claims against USAA with prejudice. This judgment was reduced to writing and signed on October 14, 2025. Both John Brooks and Ashley Baustert filed devolutive appeals from that judgment. This court has consolidated those appeals. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in ( 1) granting USAA' s motion for summary judgment with prejudice; ( 2) determining that there could be no coverage under the policies; and ( 3) finding that all claims in the petitions were excluded by the business pursuits exclusion in both the homeowner' s and umbrella policies. Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in finding that disposition of USAA' s motion for summary judgment was ripe for determination in light of the fact that discovery in this matter is stayed due to the pending criminal cases. LAW AND DISCUSSION Motion for Summary JudgMent A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant. Murphy v. Savannah, . 2018- 0991 ( La. 5/ 8/ 19), 282 So. 3d 1034, 1038. The summary judgment procedure is favored and is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil actions. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(2). After an an exhibit. S& P Investments, LLC v. Nguyen, 2020- 0602 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 1/ 25/ 21), 319 So. 3d 864, 867; Go -Graphics of New Orleans, LLC v. Regional Transit Authority, 2025- 0255 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 12/ 22/ 25), 430 So. 3d 552, 556 n. l, writ denied, 2026- 00103 ( La. 4/ 09/ 26), 429 So. 3d 726. Therefore, we may not consider on appeal the second supplemental and amending petition filed by John Brooks. opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C.P. art. 966( A)( 3). If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, he is not required to negate all essential elements of the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense; instead, the mover must point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C.P. art. 9660)( 1). A genuine issue of material fact is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Higgins v. Williams Energy Partner, L.P., 2017- 1662 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 10/ 19), 280 So. 3d 195, 203, writ denied, 2019- 00722 ( La. 9/ 06/ 19), 278 So3d 371. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria governing the trial court' s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Bonano v. Docar Sales, Inc., 2024- 0195 ( La. App. I st Cir. 10/ 22/ 24), 405 So. 3d 886, 891, writ denied, 2025- 00011 ( La. 4/ 1/ 25), 4.04 So. 3d 653. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Succession of Hickman v. State Through Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College, 2016- 1069 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 12/ 17), 217 So. 3d 1240, 1244. 7 Interpretation of Insurance Policy The interpretation of an insurance policy usually involves a legal question that can be resolved properly within the framework of a motion for summary judgment. Ellis v. Circle L Trucking, L.L.C., 2021- 0457 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 30/ 21), 340 So. 3d 985, 989. An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules of contractual interpretation. Boudreaux v. Coco, 2021- 1009 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 28/ 22), 342 So. 3d 354, 359. Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. La. C. C. art. 2045. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent. La. C. C. art. 2046. When determining whether a policy affords coverage for an incident, the insured bears the burden of proving the incident falls within the policy' s terms. Miller v. Superior Shipyard and Fabrication, Inc., 2001- 2683 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 8/ 02), 836 So. 2d 200, 203. However, an insurer has the burden of proving that a loss falls within a policy exclusion. Savoie v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 2020- 0584 La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 9/ 21), 322 So. 3d 1264, 1266. Additionally, in determining whether an exclusion applies to preclude coverage, courts are guided by the well- recognized rule that an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy must be strictly construed against the insurer, and any ambiguity in the exclusion is construed in favor of the insured. See Id. at 1266- 1267. Nonetheless, an insurance policy, including its exclusions, should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or strained manner so as to enlarge or to restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd conclusion. Id. at 1267. Subject to the above rules of interpretation, insurance companies have the right to limit coverage in any manner they desire, so long as the limitations do not conflict with statutory provisions or public policy. Myers v. Welch, 2017- 0063 ( La. M A- FP. 1st Cir. 10/ 25/ 17), 233 So. 3d 49, 55, writ denied, 2017- 2165 ( La. 3/ 9/ 18), 238 So.3d 454. A summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage under an insurance policy may be rendered when there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed facts shown by the evidence supporting the motion, under which coverage could be afforded. Boudreaux, 342 So. 3d at 360. USAA sought summary judgment on the basis that an exclusion applies in each policy to preclude coverage for Appellants' claims. Accordingly, USAA bore the burden of proof both as the moving party seeking summary judgment and as the insurer seeking to avoid coverage through summary judgment. See Boudreaux, 342 So. 3d at 362. Thus, the initial question before this court is whether USAA established that the exclusions contained in the policies apply based upon a set of facts which are not genuinely in dispute to exclude coverage for Appellants' claims. The Business Pursuits Exclusions In its motion for summary judgment, USAA relied on the business pursuits exclusion in both the homeowner' s policy and the personal umbrella policy. The homeowner' s policy provides: 1. Coverage Personal Liability and Coverage F — Medical E— Payments to Others do not apply to " bodily injury" or " property damage": b. (1) Arising out of or in connection with a " business" engaged in by any " insured". This exclusion applies but is not limited to an act or omission regardless of its nature or circumstance, involving a service or duty rendered, promised, owed, or implied to be provided because of the nature of the " business." The homeowner' s policy defines " business" as " any full or part-time activity arising out of or related to any trade, profession or occupation of any ' insured'." The personal umbrella policy provides: G. This insurance does not apply to bodily injury, property damage or personal injury: 0 5. Arising out of any business or business property of any insured. does not apply to the extent that liability This exclusion ( G. 5.) coverage is provided by underlying insurance and is not excluded elsewhere in this policy. The personal umbrella policy defines " business" as " any full or part-time activity arising out of or related to any trade, profession or occupation of any ' insured'." USAA maintains that these exclusions preclude coverage because the claims against Rees are that he served alcohol to Madison, who was under the legal age, over -served her, and failed to render assistance after she became intoxicated. USAA further claims that his actions are alleged to have occurred while he was working as either a bartender or manager for Reggie' s Bar. Appellants contend that the allegations also include the independent and/or personal liability of Rees for serving alcohol to a minor. Applicable Law The applicable law herein is found in La. C. C. arts. 2315 and 2316, which pertinently provide that every person is responsible for the damages caused by his negligence. Criminal statute La. R.S. 14: 93. 11 makes it unlawful to sell alcohol to any person under twenty-one years of age. Appellants further assert that a personal duty arises from La. R.S. 26: 90, 26: 286( A), and 26: 931. 4 We also note that La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1 limits the liability of any seller of alcohol or social host who serves alcohol to a person over the age for the lawful purchase thereof, which is twenty-one years old. La. R. S. 9: 2800. 1( B) and ( C); La. R.S. 14: 93. 11. USAA does not contest that Rees had a duty to refrain from selling alcohol to a person under the age of twenty- one. Instead, USAA maintains that the allegations are that Rees served Madison while he was a bartender and/or manager, not in any 4 These statutes pertain to permit regulations for the sale of alcohol and prohibited acts by sellers of alcohol. We also note that Ashley Baustert cites to La. R.S. 26: 9331, which does not exist. We assume this is a typographical error and is referring to La. R.S. 26: 931. 10 personal capacity. The narrow issue before this court is whether the business pursuits exclusions in the insurance policies apply under the circumstances of this case. Analysis of the Business Pursuits Exclusions USAA asserts that its homeowner' s policy was not intended to cover commercial risks. " The business pursuits exclusion, like other exclusions in a homeowner' s policy, is drafted to exclude risks that should be covered by a different policy. A commercial policy should cover commercial risks, not a homeowner' s policy." Richard v. Milazzo, 2001- 2233 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 08/ 02), 831 So. 2d 1055, 1058. The definition of business and the business pursuits exclusion must involve both continuity of activity and monetary gain. Id. at 1058- 1059 ( citation omitted). The purpose of the " business pursuits" exclusion in a homeowner' s policy is to lower rates by removing coverage which is not essential to the purchasers and which would require specialized rating and underwriting. The terms, " business pursuits" and " course of employment," serve different purposes in these separate contexts and are not analogous in the circumstances. Jackson v. Frisard, 1996- 0547 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 20/ 96), 685 So. 2d 622, 630, writ denied, 1997- 0193 ( La. 3/ 14/ 97), 689 So. 2d 1386, and writ denied, 1997- 0201 La. 3/ 14/ 97), 689 So. 2d 1387 ( quoting LeBlanc v. Broussard, 396 So. 2d 535, 536 5 La. App. 3d Cir. 1981)). This court reviewed the applicability of a business pursuits exclusion in a homeowner' s policy in Jim Carey Distributing Co., Inc. v. Zinna, 589 So. 2d 526 La. App. 1st Cir. 1991). In Jim Carey, the employer filed an action against its officer manager and her homeowner' s insurance company pertaining to the embezzlement of funds from the business. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the exclusion of property damage " arising out of business or 5 Both of these cases also contained an exception to the business pursuits exclusion, which required further analysis as to whether the activity was ordinarily incident to non -business pursuits. That exception is not present in the policies at issue herein. 11 professional pursuits of any insured person..." precluded coverage for the actions of the office manager. Id. at 528- 529. This court determined that the duties of the office manager included the receipt and safeguarding of funds. Id. at 529. While she was in the course and scope of her employment, the office manager embezzled funds from her employer. " But for this employment ( the business pursuits) these acts of theft could not have occurred." Id. This court held that the business pursuits exclusion applied to preclude coverage as "[ t]here could not be a more clear showing that the loss in question arouse of [the office manager' s] business pursuit[.]" Id. Appellants maintain that Jim Carey is distinguishable because the duties owed in the present case were for Rees not to serve alcohol to an under -age person, not to over -serve her, and not to increase the peril to an intoxicated person. They argue that he had those duties even if he had not been working at the time. Appellants aver that the duty pursuant to La. R. S. 14: 93. 11 was independent of his employment. They claim that the duty does not derive from his employment -specific duty owed to his employer not to serve alcohol to minors. Appellants rely on Spears v. Bradford, 94- 0892 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 3/ 95), 652 So. 2d 628, 632 ( citations omitted), where this court stated, "[ c] learly, an adult has a duty not to purchase alcohol for or furnish alcohol to a minor. Further, under La.] C. C. arts. 2315 and 2316, the sellers or servers of alcohol also have a duty to avoid performing an affirmative act which increases the peril to an intoxicated person." Under -age drinking took place at a house party in Spears. This court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendant homeowner and her insurer based on the evidence that the defendant did not actually serve alcohol to the minors at issue. Id. at 632- 633. We find Spears distinguishable as that case did not address the applicability of the business pursuits exclusion or an individual working as a bartender and/or manager at a business establishment. As stated earlier, USAA does not contest that 12 Rees had a duty to refrain from selling alcohol to a person under the age of twenty- one. Appellants also rely on Zaunbrecher v. Succession of David, 2015- 769 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 12/ 9/ 15), 181 So. 3d 885, 889, writ denied sub nom. Zaunbrecher v. David, 2016- 0049 (La. 2/ 26/ 16), 187 So. 3d 1002, where the court addressed whether three tribal casino employees could be found personally liable for an automobile accident that occurred after a patron was served alcohol and required to leave the premises. Before the court was a declinatory exception raising the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the sovereign immunity of the tribe. The tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity, as did tribal officers acting in their official capacities within the course and scope of their authority. Zaunbrecher, 181 So.3d at 887. The court had to decide if the individual defendants could be held liable acting in their personal or individual capacity for wrongful actions taken " under color of [state] law[.]" Id. (citing Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F. 3d 1104, 1112 ( 9th Cir. 2015) ( uq otin Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 30995 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 1985)). 6 The court in Zaunbrecher decided that a trier of fact could determine that the defendant employees owed personal duties to the individual who was killed by the intoxicated patron. Zaunbrecher, 181 So. 3d at 889. Therefore, sovereign immunity did not bar the suit against the tribal casino employees in their individual capacities. Id.' 6 Zaunbrecher and the cases cited therein pertain to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and whether a person is acting " under the color of state law." Sovereign immunity is provided for persons who are state actors in their official capacities, but not in their individual capacities. See Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana, Cypress Bayou Casino, 2024- 1287 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 7/ 31/ 25), 2025 WL 2166291, at * 7 ( unpublished). There are no allegations that Rees is a state actor in this matter or that he is entitled to sovereign immunity. Therefore, we do not find these cases applicable. The issue before this court is whether the business pursuits exclusions apply. 7 We note that the three employees subsequently were dismissed upon a motion for summary judgment based on the statutory immunity provided in La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1. Alcohol had been provided to a patron " over the age for the lawful purchase thereof." Therefore, the bartender and two security guards were found to have immunity for the accident caused by the patron. Zaunbrecher v. Martin, 2017- 932 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 3/ 21/ 18), 242 So. 3d 712, 732. 13 The present case does not include Rees " acting under color of state law" to the extent that his official capacity and individual capacity would differ. The court in Zaunbrecher did not address whether a person has different capacities in relation to a business pursuits exclusion in an insurance policy. We decline to extend Zaunbrecher and those cases cited therein to a business pursuits exclusion and an Therefore, Zaunbrecher is employee' s liability under an insurance policy. distinguishable from the facts of the case before us. Neither Spears nor Zaunbrecher interpret the business pursuits exclusion in an insurance policy. After reviewing numerous cases interpreting that exclusion, we find no case, and Appellants have cited to no case, that separates a personal duty from one owed while in a business pursuit in relation to the exclusion in an insurance policy. Other Cases Interpreting the Business Pursuits Exclusion Shortly after Jim Carey was decided, this court also addressed the business pursuits exclusion in MVG v. Lucas, 590 So. 2d 1322 ( La. App. I st Cir. 1991). The defendant ran an in-home daycare. A child in her care was sexually molested by defendant' s adult son. The plaintiff alleged failure to supervise, failure to ensure the child' s safety, and failure to keep her adult son away from the child. Defendant' s homeowner' s insurer moved for summary judgment based on the business pursuits exclusion contained in the insurance policy. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury " arising out of business pursuits of an insured[.]" Id. at 1324. The policy also provided an exception to the exclusion if the activity was " ordinarily incidental to non -business pursuits." Id. This court held that the business pursuits exclusion precluded coverage. See Id. We determined that the defendant operated a daycare for compensation. Her business was babysitting. Her job entailed supervising the minor child. She was alleged to have improperly supervised the minor child, which was pursuant to defendant' s business. Id. 14 MVG also distinguished, Jackson v. Lajaunie, 270 So.2d 859 ( La. 1972), which is relied upon by Appellants in the present case. MVG, 590 So.2d at 1324 n.2. In Lajaunie, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a practical joke of shooting a pistol at a gas station customer did not fall within the business pursuits exclusion. Lajaunie, 270 So. 2d at 863. The practical joke was incidental to a non -business pursuit, which was an exception to the exclusion. Both parties in the present case rely on Frisard, 685 So. 2d 622, which addressed the issue of horseplay and the business pursuits exclusion. In Frisard, the plaintiff, a state trooper, was attending a training session at the State Police Training Academy. The plaintiff was injured by defendant during the training when he was struck on the back. Defendant' s homeowner' s insurer asserted that the business pursuits exclusion precluded coverage. This court stated: In order to determine whether the exception ( for activities which are ordinarily incident to non -business pursuits) to the business pursuits exclusion applies, the inquiry should not be whether the insured was engaged in a business pursuit at the time of the accident, but rather whether the particular activity engaged in at the time of the accident was nevertheless one ordinarily incident to non -business pursuits. Frisard, 685 So. 2d at 631. This court determined that the training maneuvers practiced at the session did not require the employee to strike plaintiffs back. Id. Instead, the impulsive action of defendant striking plaintiff was ordinarily incident to non -business pursuits. Therefore, the business pursuits exclusion did not preclude coverage. Id. Frisard, which involved horseplay, is distinguishable from the present case for the same reason as Lajaunie, which pertained to a practical joke. The actions of the insureds in both cases were not in furtherance of the business, i.e., trade, profession, or occupation, at the time of the accident. Although Frisard found that coverage applied under the facts of that case, this court cautioned that isolating ordinary functions would render the business 15 pursuits exclusion meaningless. I. at 630. This court cited to LeBlanc, 396 So. 2d 535, wherein the Third Circuit found the defendant was engaged in a business pursuit while driving his tractor to a field where he was to cut hay for a price as part of his partnership' s business activities. The defendant' s homeowner' s policy did not provide coverage for injuries resulting from a tractor -automobile collision which occurred while the defendant was driving the tractor from his home to the field. The court concluded defendant was driving the tractor in pursuit of a business undertaking and that the activity was not " ordinarily incident to non -business pursuits." Id. at 537. The defendant in LeBlanc, attempted to analogize " business pursuits" with the general rule in workers' compensation cases that an accident befalling an employee while he is going to and from work does not occur in the course of his employment, contending that until he reached the field and began cutting grass he was not engaged in a business pursuit. However, as noted above, the court stated, t]he terms, ' business pursuits' and ' course of employment,' serve different purposes in these separate contexts and are not analogous in the circumstances." Id. at 536 ( citation omitted). Frisard specifically cautioned: The business pursuit exclusion is intended to apply to all activities that are involved in furtherance of any business, employment, trade, occupation or profession. There are relatively few functions, such as walking, opening and closing doors, bending or standing that a person performs in a business that cannot be viewed in isolation as nonbusiness activity. One cannot perform normal work without engaging in such functions or activities, and to treat these activities in isolation as incidental to nonbusiness activity would render this exclusion meaningless. Frisard, 685 So.2d at 630 ( citipg Appelman' s Insurance Law and Practice (Berdal ed.), Vol. 7A, § 450 1. 10, pp. 276- 279). Similar to this Court' s opinion in MVG, the Third Circuit in Latour v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2018- 395 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 12/ 28/ 18), 262 So. 3d 1088, addressed 16 an in-home daycare and the application of the business pursuits exclusion in a homeowner' s policy. A fifteen -month old was bitten during nap time possibly by one of the other daycare attendees or the homeowner' s grandchild who was there that day. The parents sued the operator of the daycare and her homeowner' s insurer. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment based on the business pursuits exclusion. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury " arising out of the past or present business activities of an insured person." Id. at 1091. The court found that the risk sued upon was for failure to supervise the minor child. The risk that the minor child would be injured was the exact risk that the insurer excluded from coverage for operating a daycare. Id. at 1092. Latour relied on the Fifth and Fourth Circuit cases of Elorza v. Massey, 2000- 313 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 3/ 14/ 01), 783 So. 2d 453, and Felder v. Despinasse, 564 So.2d 1331 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), as well as MVG. Elorza involved a child injured at an in-home daycare while playing on a trampoline. The business pursuits exclusion was held to preclude coverage since the daycare children were allowed to play on the trampoline. The incident occurred while the daycare owner was performing the function of operating as a daycare. The injured child was only at the home because it was a daycare. Elorza, 783 So. 2d at 456. The negligence of the daycare owner did not render the business pursuits exclusion inoperable. Id. Felder involved a child who broke his arm at an in-home daycare. The homeowner' s insurer moved for summary judgment based on the business pursuits exclusion. The court determined that the child would not have broken his arm at the homeowner' s home had he not been placed there because it operated as a daycare. Felder, 564 So. 2d at 1332. Therefore, the business pursuits exclusion precluded coverage. The business pursuits exclusion was analyzed under a different set of circumstances by the Second Circuit in Stills v. Mims, 42, 799 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 12/ 5/ 07), 973 So. 2d 118. A tenant brought an action against her landlord, the 17 landlord' s landscaping business, and the landlord' s homeowner' s insurer. A tree fell on the home the tenant was renting. While the landlord was removing the tree, a branch fell and injured the tenant' s son. The homeowner' s insurer filed a motion for summary judgment based on the business pursuits exclusion. The tenant argued that the claim did not arise from any business pursuits of the landlord but on his personal liability and involved an activity that was ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits. Id. at 119- 120. The court held that "[ t]he business pursuits exclusion is intended to apply in this type of incident. [ The landlord] would not have removed the limb but for it having fallen on his rental property. Moreover, he acted at his tenant' s request." Id. at 123. The court further stated, "[ t]he fact that [ the landlord' s] personal actions resulted in the injury to [ the tenant' s son] does not preclude application of the business pursuits exclusion." Id. Application of the business pursuits exclusion depends on the purpose of the activity at the time of the accident. Id. ( citing LeBlanc, 396 So. 2d 535). Because the facts and circumstances of the case showed that the damages claim arose from the rental of the property, coverage was precluded under the business pursuits exclusion as it pertains to the rental or holding for rental of a premises by the insured. Stills, 973 So. 2d at 123- 124. The facts and circumstances of the present case are that the damage claims resulted from the trade, business, or occupation of Rees. The allegations are that Rees was a bartender and/ or manager on the night in question. Appellants contend that he served drinks to Madison, who was under age to legally drink. The also aver that Rees noticed Madison was intoxicated, observed her fall, and failed to render aid. All of the allegations arise out of his activities as a bartender and/ or manager, which was his occupation, trade, or business. He would not have encountered Madison had she not been in Reggie' s Bar and but for his trade, business, or occupation. The purpose of his activity at the time of the events alleged was for his 18 trade, business, or occupation.. Therefore, based on the above cited -case law, coverage is precluded under the business pursuits exclusion. Cases relied upon by Appellants are Distinguishable Appellants cite to no cases that have held the business pursuits exclusion inapplicable in circumstances similar to the present case. The cases relied upon by Appellants do not pertain to the business pursuits exclusion of an insurance policy. Appellants argue that " liability may be imposed against an individual for violation of a personal duty owed to another even though he may have been acting within the course and scope of his employment at the given time." However, this court is not determining whether Rees was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of these events for purposes of vicarious liability.' We are determining whether his actions arise out of a business pursuit as defined by the USAA policy. Appellants argument is similar to the one rejected by the court in LeBlanc finding that "business pursuits" and " course of employment" serve different purposes. LeBlanc, 396 So. 2d at 5