Bass v. United States

Case: 26-1912 Document: 23 Page: 1 Filed: 11/10/2026 NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ ROBERT C. BASS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee ______________________ 2026-1912 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:25-cv-01411-MRS, Judge Molly R. Silfen. ______________________ Decided: November 10, 2026 ______________________ ROBERT C. BASS, Brooklyn, NY, pro se. SEAN KELLY GRIFFIN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE. ______________________ Case: 26-1912 Document: 23 Page: 2 Filed: 11/10/2026 2 BASS v. US Before PROST and HUGHES, Circuit Judges, and PENNELL, District Judge. 1 PER CURIAM Robert C. Bass appeals a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) dismissing his amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because we agree with the Claims Court that Mr. Bass’s claims accrued in 2013 and are time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2501, we affirm the court’s dismissal. BACKGROUND This case arises from a forfeiture of $15,821,000 ob- tained by the government from a Swiss bank, Wegelin & Co. (“Wegelin”), for tax fraud. It is the latest of several at- tempts by Mr. Bass, in various jurisdictions, to obtain $3,500,000 from the seized funds. In 2012, Wegelin was charged with “conspiring with U.S. taxpayers to defraud the Internal Revenue Service, file false federal income tax returns, and evade federal in- come taxes.” App’x 70. 2 The resulting forfeiture funds were kept in a “seized-assets deposit account maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.” App’x 71. In 2013, the government posted a notice that anyone “assert- ing a legal interest in the Defendant Funds must file a pe- tition within sixty (60) days from the first day of publication of the notice.” App’x 71. 1 Honorable Rebecca L. Pennell, District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation. 2 “App’x” refers to the appendix included with Mr. Bass’s informal opening brief. Because the appendix is not Bates numbered, the appendix page numbers herein refer to the page number of the file submitted. Case: 26-1912 Document: 23 Page: 3 Filed: 11/10/2026 BASS v. US 3 About ten years later, Mr. Bass filed a petition alleging that he had deposited $3,500,000 at Wegelin and was therefore entitled to that amount from the seized funds. The Department of Justice denied the petition, explaining that Mr. Bass had not established that he qualified “as a victim, owner, or lienholder,” and subsequently denied his petition for reconsideration. App’x 71. Mr. Bass sought re- view of this decision in district court, arguing that the gov- ernment never published the notice of forfeiture on its website. See Bass v. United States, No. 24-1079, 2024 WL 5153976, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2024). The district court denied Mr. Bass’s petition. Id. Mr. Bass appealed and the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Mr. Bass had not es- tablished “that the government did not publish the notice or that its website was inaccessible to [him] at the relevant time.” Id. at *2. Undeterred, Mr. Bass then sued in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging an illegal exaction and a breach of con- tract. The government moved to dismiss on multiple grounds. App’x 72. Relevant to our decision, the govern- ment argued that Mr. Bass’s claims were time-barred un- der 28 U.S.C. § 2501, which requires that petitions be filed “within six years” after the relevant claim first accrues. App’x 72–73. The forfeiture of funds occurred in 2013. App’x 71. Mr. Bass filed his petition in the Court of Federal Claims in 2025. App’x 72. In response, Mr. Bass argued that the limitations pe- riod should be tolled or its accrual suspended because the government’s failure to provide notice prevented him from knowing that his property interests were at stake. App’x 76. The Claims Court disagreed, concluding that “Mr. Bass’s claims are time-barred, have already been decided by another court, and are actually directed against a pri- vate party.” App’x 70. Mr. Bass timely appealed to our court. We have juris- diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). Case: 26-1912 Document: 23 Page: 4 Filed: 11/10/2026 4 BASS v. US DISCUSSION On appeal, Mr. Bass argues that the Claims Court erred in several respects. He primarily contends that the court (1) incorrectly applied the accrual suspension rule; (2) failed to recognize that the Tucker Act provides juris- diction over illegal-exaction claims without a money-man- dating statute; (3) improperly applied issue preclusion; (4) erred in finding no privity of contract with the govern- ment; (5) failed to consider the government’s alleged ad- mission that www.forfeiture.gov was inoperable in 2013; (6) erred by declining to permit jurisdictional discovery; and (7) failed to address his assertion that the Wegelin plea agreement contained an unconstitutional condition. Ap- pellant’s Informal Br. 1–9; Informal Reply Br. 2–13. Be- cause we conclude that Mr. Bass’s claims are time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2501, the timeliness issue is dispositive of this appeal. We therefore address only that issue and do not reach Mr. Bass’s remaining arguments. We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of sub- ject-matter jurisdiction de novo. E.g., Jacobson v. United States, 179 F.4th 940, 944 (Fed. Cir. 2026). In doing so, we accept as true all undisputed facts alleged in Mr. Bass’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See, e.g., Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Section 2501 provides that “[e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. This time limit is “jurisdictional,” John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008), “strictly construed,” and “may not be waived or tolled,” FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A claim accrues “when all the events have occurred that fix the alleged liability of the government and entitle the claimant to institute an action,” and, in the case of a Case: 26-1912 Document: 23 Page: 5 Filed: 11/10/2026 BASS v. US 5 breach of contract, “a cause of action accrues when the breach occurs.” Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Ingrum v. United States, 560 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). This court has recognized, however, an accrual suspen- sion rule, under which “the accrual of a claim against the United States is suspended, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2501, until the claimant knew or should have known that the claim existed.” Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc); see Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1317–20. To obtain the benefit of that rule, Mr. Bass must “either show that [the government] has concealed its acts with the result that [he] was unaware of their exist- ence, or [he] must show that [his] injury was inherently un- knowable at the accrual date.” Welcker v. United States, 752 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (cleaned up). The “concealed or inherently unknowable” formulation has been used interchangeably with the “knew or should have known” formulation and includes “an intrinsic reasonable- ness component.” Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1320 (cleaned up). The rule is “strictly and narrowly applied.” Welcker, 752 F.2d at 1580. And the rule “is distinct from the ques- tion whether equitable tolling is available under” § 2501, a doctrine that is unavailable in any event. Young v. United States, 529 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Mar- tinez, 333 F.3d at 1319); see FloorPro, 680 F.3d at 1380–81. In support of his accrual-suspension argument, Mr. Bass principally relies on Holmes. Appellant’s Informal Br. 1–2, 5; Informal Reply Br. 3–6. In Holmes, we held that a former civilian employee of the Navy was entitled to the benefit of the rule because he filed his complaint “within six years of when he reasonably should have known of the alleged breach,” due to several misleading statements made by the Navy regarding its compliance with settle- ment agreements. Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1322. We held that the plaintiff in Holmes did not act “unreasonably” in not Case: 26-1912 Document: 23 Page: 6 Filed: 11/10/2026 6 BASS v. US “doublechecking the Navy’s contract performance” after the Navy promised to expunge his record of prior employ- ment terminations. Id. at 1321. Thus, the plaintiff did not know nor reasonably should have known of the breach. By contrast, in Ingrum, we held that a takings claim was not inherently unknowable where the government’s excavation of fill from the plaintiff’s real property was “an open and notorious activity.” Ingrum, 560 F.3d at 1316–17. There, the plaintiff could have visited his land at any point and easily discovered the excavation, but did not. Id. The plaintiff, therefore, “knew enough . . . to make an inquiry and discover the facts underlying his takings claim.” Id. The facts of Mr. Bass’s case are more like Ingrum than Holmes. The government’s alleged breach occurred in 2013. His amended complaint acknowledges that the gov- ernment’s alleged wrongdoings occurred in 2013. See App’x 6–10. The forfeiture notice was entered by the district court in 2013. App’x 6, 75. Mr. Bass’s claimed funds were in possession of the government starting in 2013. App’x 75–76. Yet, Mr. Bass did not file this action until August 2025, more than twelve years afterward. App’x 3. Unlike in Holmes, we cannot agree that Mr. Bass acted reasonably, even drawing all inferences in his favor. Mr. Bass alleges that www.forfeiture.gov was inoperable in 2013, the forfeiture notices were “stored offline in archives” until April 2022, and the government failed to provide di- rect notice. Appellant’s Informal Br. 4–5, 8; Informal Reply Br. 3–5. He also argues that he could not have known that his specific funds were part of the forfeiture until he ob- tained unredacted documents in 2024. Appellant’s Infor- mal Br. 7–8; Informal Reply Br. 6. Even assuming these allegations are true, Mr. Bass has not shown that the gov- ernment concealed its acts or that his injury was inher- ently unknowable because he could have, and reasonably should have, known of his claim no later than 2013. Case: 26-1912 Document: 23 Page: 7 Filed: 11/10/2026 BASS v. US 7 As the Claims Court correctly observed, the forfeiture was widely publicized. The government announced We- gelin’s plea and sentencing in a press release, and national newspapers—including The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal—reported that Wegelin had agreed to pay $74 million in connection with its plea. App’x 77–78; see also Appellee’s Informal Br. 12–13. Where the govern- ment’s actions are “open and notorious,” a plaintiff is on notice as to his possible injury and the limitations period begins to run. See Ingrum, 560 F.3d at 1316–17. Mr. Bass allegedly held an account at the very bank whose prosecu- tion, guilty plea, and agreement to pay substantial funds were the subject of that nationwide reporting. That pub- licity gave Mr. Bass everything he needed to inquire whether his deposits were among the forfeited proceeds. Any reasonable account holder with millions of dollars in a Wegelin account would immediately investigate as to the state of the funds. And, in fact, Mr. Bass claims that he had a “direct contact with the IRS-CID lead investigator in January 2012.” Informal Reply Br. 4. In addition, Mr. Bass would have discovered the loss of his funds—and with them, the facts underlying his claims—simply by checking his bank account. As the Claims Court explained, Mr. Bass “could have checked his bank account at any time between the 2013 forfeiture and 2025 and discovered that his deposits were missing, with or without an official notice in 2013.” App’x 77. Mr. Bass responds that even discovering “a zero balance” would not have apprised him of the claim because he could not have known that his funds were taken as “part of a government forfeiture.” Informal Reply Br. 5–6. But a reasonable holder of a $3,500,000 account who discovered an unex- plained zero balance would immediately investigate the cause rather than, as Mr. Bass’s argument suggests, do nothing. And, if this account holder had done even the most min- imal investigation, the answer was readily available in Case: 26-1912 Document: 23 Page: 8 Filed: 11/10/2026 8 BASS v. US 2013—including from the wide publicity of the Wegelin case and from the orders of forfeiture. Having apparently failed to make any inquiry at all, Mr. Bass cannot rely on the accrual suspension rule under these circumstances. Nor do Mr. Bass’s alternative accrual theories change the analysis. He argues that his claims accrued in Decem- ber 2023, when the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section denied his remission petition, or in 2024, when he obtained unredacted sentencing documents. Informal Re- ply Br. 6. But neither the government’s denial of remission nor Mr. Bass’s later receipt of additional documents altered the date on which all of the events fixing the government’s alleged liability occurred—2013. In sum, Mr. Bass’s claims accrued in 2013, when the district court entered the orders of forfeiture and the gov- ernment took possession of the funds he claims. Even as- suming www.forfeiture.gov was inaccessible for however long Mr. Bass says it was, his injury was neither concealed nor inherently unknowable despite the alleged inaccessi- bility. The forfeiture was publicly reported, and Mr. Bass could have discovered the loss of his deposits by the sim- plest of inquiries at any point during the limitations period. His claims are therefore time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2501 and the Claims Court correctly determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. The court’s decision must be affirmed. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the Court of Federal Claims to dismiss Mr. Bass’s claims as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Because we resolve Case: 26-1912 Document: 23 Page: 9 Filed: 11/10/2026 BASS v. US 9 this appeal on the timeliness issue, we do not reach Mr. Bass’s remaining arguments. AFFIRMED COSTS No costs.