Full Opinion

26CA1000 Treto v ICAO 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 26CA1000 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 1672-2026 Raul Treto, Petitioner, v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondent. ORDER AFFIRMED Division II Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Tow, C.J. and Harris, J., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Raul Treto, Pro Se No Appearance for Respondent ¶1 Raul Treto appeals the denial of his unemployment benefits claim. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 Treto worked as a building inspector for the Colorado State Department of Local Affairs (Employer) until his discharge in December 2025. Shortly thereafter, a deputy for the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied Treto’s claim for unemployment benefits. Treto appealed that decision to the Division, which scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding the reasons for Treto’s job separation. ¶3 After the hearing, the hearing officer found that Treto had used Employer’s vehicle for work and that Treto had driven over the speed limit on multiple occasions. At times, Treto had driven “upwards of [ninety] miles per hour.” The hearing officer determined that Employer discharged Treto for speeding on the job. The hearing officer concluded that Treto was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for failing to meet “established job performance or other defined standards” under section 8-73- 108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S. 2026. Finally, the hearing officer found that 1 Treto was at fault for his employment separation because he exercised control over the circumstances leading to his discharge. ¶4 Treto appealed to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel). The Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s factual findings and legal conclusions. It also determined that the factual findings supported disqualification under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VII). Subsection (5)(e)(VII) disqualifies any claimant discharged for violating a statute, “which [violation] resulted or could have resulted in serious damage to the employer’s property or interests or could have endangered the life of the worker or other persons.” II. Standard of Review and Legal Principles ¶5 Under section 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2026, we may not disturb factual findings that are “supported by substantial evidence” and may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings do not support its decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is “probative, credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory 2 testimony or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶6 The disqualifying provisions of section 8-73-108(5)(e) “must be read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide benefits to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their own.” Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo. App. 1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the hearing officer’s findings may support a disqualification under that subsection, a claimant may still be entitled to benefits if the totality of the circumstances establishes that his job separation occurred through no fault of his own. Id. In this context, “fault” requires a volitional act or “the exercise of some control or choice by the claimant in the circumstances resulting in the separation such that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the separation.” Id. A claimant’s responsibility or “fault” for his job separation is an ultimate legal conclusion based on the findings of evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19. III. Analysis ¶7 Though the Panel found that Treto was disqualified under two subsections of 8-73-108(5)(e), we only address its determination under subsection (5)(e)(VII) — disqualification for violating a statute 3 and potentially endangering lives. Because we affirm on this basis, we need not address the Panel’s determination of disqualification under subsection (5)(e)(XX). See Tilley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Colo. App. 1996) (affirming disqualification under one subsection and declining to address the Panel’s determination that another subsection also applied). ¶8 The Panel found that Employer discharged Treto for speeding on public roadways. Substantial evidence supports this finding. It is undisputed that Treto exceeded the speed limit on multiple occasions while driving to and from job sites in Employer’s vehicle. Treto testified to this fact during the hearing. He further testified that he received a speeding ticket in February 2025 and that his speed sometimes exceeded ninety miles per hour. Additionally, in written submissions to the Division and in testimony at the hearing, Treto acknowledged that Employer discharged him for this conduct. ¶9 Substantial evidence also supports the Panel’s finding that, by speeding in excess of ninety miles an hour, Treto violated a statute. Though the Panel did not expressly identify the statute violated, we take judicial notice of section 42-4-1101(8)(b), C.R.S. 2026, which establishes a maximum speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour 4 on public roads.1 See § 2-5-118(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026 (requiring that “[t]he courts of this state” take judicial notice of Colorado’s official statutes). Treto does not dispute that he used public roads when driving to job sites throughout the state or that he drove in excess of ninety miles an hour. Treto does not challenge — and we perceive no reversible error in — the Panel’s determination that speeding, especially over ninety miles an hour, could endanger Treto’s and others’ lives. Thus, the Panel did not err in finding that, by driving in excess of ninety miles an hour on public roads, Treto violated a statute and potentially endangered lives. Nor do we perceive an error in the hearing officer’s finding, which the Panel affirmed, that Treto exercised control over the circumstances leading to his discharge and was therefore at fault and not otherwise entitled to benefits. 1 Section 42-4-1101(8)(b), C.R.S. 2026, specifically states that “[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of this section, no person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed in excess of a maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour.” Title 42’s definitions section makes clear that the term “highway” includes all public roads. § 42-1-102(43), C.R.S. 2026 (“‘Highway’ means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.”). 5 ¶ 10 Treto makes two arguments for setting aside the Panel’s order. First, he argues that certain factual allegations were untrue — namely, that he (1) harassed a woman while on the job, and (2) drove up to 100 miles per hour on a dirt road near a lake. But the hearing officer did not make any factual findings that Treto engaged in harassment, nor did he make any findings specifically related to Treto’s driving on a dirt road. ¶ 11 Second, Treto asserts that a GPS tracker in his company car misreported data regarding his speed and that Employer knew this. This argument provides no basis for disturbing the hearing officer’s findings. Treto did not raise these issues with the hearing officer or Panel, and we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in briefing to this court. See Debalco Enters., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 32 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2001) (declining to address issues that were not raised in the administrative proceedings and therefore not preserved for appellate review). And in any event, the accuracy of the GPS tracker data is irrelevant in light of Treto’s admission that he drove well over the speed limit. As discussed, substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s findings, and we may not disturb them. See § 8-74-107(4). 6 IV. Disposition ¶ 12 We affirm the Panel’s order. CHIEF JUDGE TOW and JUDGE HARRIS concur. 7