Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0089-25 CHRISTOPHER T. PAPRZYCKI, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, and BURKE BROTHERS, INC., Respondents. ______________________________ Submitted October 6, 2026 – Decided October 27, 2026 Before Judges Gummer and DeAngelis. On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 365006. Christopher T. Paprzycki, self-represented appellant. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Fatima Abdelsalam, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM Christopher Paprzycki appeals from the July 30, 2025 denial of his unemployment-benefits claim appeal by the Board of Review. Based upon the applicable standard of review, we affirm. I. Paprzycki worked as a new car salesman at Burke Brothers from July 17, 2021 through September 28, 2023. In the summer of 2023, Paprzycki realized that he was having substance abuse issues. He stopped working on September 28, 2023, and entered a substance abuse rehabilitation program on October 23, 2023. From September 28, 2023 through October 23, 2023, Paprzycki was on temporary disability and his employer kept his position available. Thereafter, Paprzycki took medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) from October 23, 2023 through January 18, 2024. Paprzycki's FMLA leave ended on January 18, 2024, and his position remained open until his employment was terminated on January 29, 2024. Paprzycki did not contact his employer after January 18, 2024. Not hearing from Paprzycki, his employer, on January 30, 2024, sent a January 29, 2024 A-0089-25 2 termination letter by certified mail and regular mail to Paprzycki's last known address. Paprzycki filed an unemployment-benefits claim on February 4, 2024. On February 21, 2024, a Deputy of the Division of Unemployment issued a decision holding Paprzycki was disqualified for benefits on the ground that he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. Paprzycki appealed the Deputy's determination to the Appeal Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal conducted a telephonic hearing on June 27, 2024. Paprzycki and Monica Lupi, his employer's representative, testified before the Appeal Tribunal. Paprzycki testified that in 2023 he started to go through a "rough road" with problems at home and substance-abuse issues, which caused him to stop working on September 28, 2023. Paprzycki entered a rehabilitation program on October 23, 2023. Paprzycki explained that he initially took temporary disability and then FMLA leave after he had entered the rehabilitation facility. Paprzycki admitted that his employer had kept his position open for about a week after his FMLA leave ended. He testified he was having housing instability issues and did not have a cell phone, so he did not contact his employer after his FMLA leave was completed. A-0089-25 3 Lupi testified consistent with the timeline provided by Paprzycki. Lupi testified the employer understood Paprzycki was "going through hard times," had asked the rehabilitation facility to complete some FMLA paperwork, and had placed him on leave pursuant to the FMLA. Lupi noted that even though Paprzycki was not paying his portion of his health-insurance premium during his FMLA leave, the employer maintained his health insurance. Lupi further testified the employer understood Paprzycki's circumstances and sought to work with him but at the same time had business operations to maintain. Lupi maintained that after January 18, 2024, the employer and some of Paprzycki's co-workers attempted to reach him to discuss the situation. However, no one was able to contact Paprzycki. Lupi testified the termination letter was sent by certified mail and regular mail. The regular mail was not returned, but the certified mail was returned as unclaimed. Lupi further testified with respect to the contents of the termination letter and how it explained Paprzycki had exhausted his leave provided under state and federal law, as well as company policy. The termination letter further provided information regarding his date of termination and his COBRA eligibility. A-0089-25 4 On June 27, 2024, the Appeal Tribunal mailed its decision to the parties. The Appeal Tribunal held Paprzycki's failure to return to work or contact his employer after the expiration of his FMLA leave constituted job abandonment under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.11(a). The Appeal Tribunal further held that Paprzycki was disqualified for benefits as of January 14, 2024 under N.J.S.A. 43:21 -5(a), as Paprzycki had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work. Paprzycki filed a timely appeal with the Board. On July 30, 2025, the Board mailed its decision affirming the Appeal Tribunal's decision. The Board held that Paprzycki "was given a full and impartial hearing and a complete opportunity to offer any and all evidence, there is no valid ground for a further hearing. On the basis of the record below, we agree with the decision reached." On appeal, Paprzycki argues he was constructively discharged by his employer and the findings of fact made by the Board and by the Appeal Tribunal were erroneous and insufficient. Paprzycki further argues that they should have evaluated his claims under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(c) (voluntary leaving for health or medical reasons), rather than N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.11(a) (job abandonment). Paprzycki claims his inability to make phone calls while at the rehabilitation center and his personal issues after release from the program, without any A-0089-25 5 contact from his employer, demonstrated his employer failed to comply with the interactive process or conduct a hardship analysis. Thus, he claims he was wrongfully terminated. The Board asserts the facts established Paprzycki was not constructively discharged and that Paprzycki voluntarily failed to return to work after he had taken temporary disability leave, followed by FMLA leave. In addition, the Board contends the record reflects that after expiration of his FMLA leave, Paprzycki's employer kept his position open and maintained his health insurance and that Paprzycki did not make any effort to contact his employer after completing his inpatient rehabilitation program. As a result of Paprzycki's failure to contact his employer and return to work, the Board maintains Paprzycki had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work. II. Our review of agency determinations is deferential and quite limited, due in large part to its "technical expertise, its superior knowledge of the subject matter area, and its fact-finding role[.]" Messick v. Bd. of Rev., 420 N.J. Super. 321, 325 (App. Div. 2011). We "will not overturn a final decision of an administrative agency absent a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence, or that it violated A-0089-25 6 legislative policies expressed or implicit in the act governing the agency." Renan Realty Corp. v. State, Dep't of Cmty. Affs., Bureau of Hous. Insp., 182 N.J. Super. 415, 419 (App. Div. 1981). Furthermore, in reviewing findings of fact made during an unemployment-benefits proceeding, "the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Rev., 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). Where the Board's determination is supported by substantial credible evidence, we may not substitute our conclusions for the agency's determinations, even if we would have reached a different result. Ibid. III. The Appeal Tribunal's decision rested on its review of N.J.A.C. 12:17- 9.11(a) and N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.11(a) provides as follows: An employee who is absent from work for five or more consecutive work days and without good cause fails to notify the employer of the reasons for his or her absence shall be considered to have abandoned his or her employment. Such job abandonment shall subject the employee to disqualification for benefits for voluntarily leaving work without good cause attributable to such work. For purposes of this section good cause means any situation over which the claimant did not have A-0089-25 7 control and which was so compelling as to prevent the employee from notifying the employer of the absence. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (a) For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment, which may include employment for the federal government, and has earned in employment at least ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate, as determined in each case. Here, the Appeal Tribunal determined Paprzycki voluntarily abandoned his employment. The hearing record supports the Appeal Tribunal's findings. Paprzycki did not dispute that, after his release from the rehabilitation center, he made no efforts to contact his employer in person or by phone. Paprzycki's claim that he no longer had a cell phone is unavailing as Paprzycki provided no testimony showing he made any effort to contact his employer. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. Moreover, the decision is fully supported by the record developed by the Appeal Tribunal. A-0089-25 8 In addition, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding of constructive discharge. To the contrary, the record shows that Paprzycki 's employer granted Paprzycki FMLA leave after contacting the rehabilitation center, and continued to pay Paprzycki's health-insurance premiums during the leave, even though Paprzycki was responsible for those premiums. The Board's decision is supported by substantial credible evidence. Finally, we reject Paprzycki's argument that the Board should have considered his claim under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(c), which addresses employee absence due to illness or mental condition. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(c) states: Notwithstanding (b) above, an individual who has been absent because of a personal illness or physical and/or mental condition shall not be subject to disqualification for voluntarily leaving work if the individual has made a reasonable effort to preserve his or her employment, but has still been terminated by the employer. A reasonable effort is evidenced by the employee's notification to the employer, requesting a leave of absence or having taken other steps to protect his or her employment. [Ibid.] We consider the totality of circumstances, including whether the claimant engaged in voluntary acts resulting in the absence, whether he actively tried to keep the job, and the length of the absence. Haley v. Bd. of Rev., 245 N.J. 511, 523 (2021). Further, we do not treat an employee absent because of illness as A-0089-25 9 having voluntarily left work if he took steps reasonably calculated to preserve his employment. DeLorenzo v. Bd. of Rev., 54 N.J. 361, 364 (1969). In his merits brief, Paprzycki references and purportedly quotes from a January 18, 2024 letter from the rehabilitation facility to the employer stating he had been "discharged successfully" from the facility that day and would continue with outpatient treatment. Nothing in the record indicates Paprzycki had submitted a copy of that letter to the Appeal Tribunal or Board or testified about it at the hearing. See J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 138 n.6 (2021) (finding "our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available" (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009))). Moreover, that letter does not demonstrate Paprzycki made an effort to contact his employer or otherwise preserve his employment after his FMLA leave ended on January 18, 2024. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's June 30, 2025 decision affirming the Appeal Tribunal's denial of Paprzycki's application for unemployment benefits. Affirmed. A-0089-25 10