Gabriel H. Garcia v. Board of Review
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketA-3833-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3833-24
GABRIEL H. GARCIA,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT, and CAR
CARE CENTER OF NEWARK
LLC,
Respondents.
___________________________
Submitted October 14, 2026 – Decided November 16, 2026
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of
Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and
Workforce Development, Docket No. 374867.
Gabriel H. Garcia, self-represented appellant.
Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Board of Review (Janet Greenberg Cohen,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ashleigh B.
Shelton, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Gabriel H. Garcia appeals from a June 25, 2025 final agency
decision of the Board of Review (Board), affirming the Appeal Tribunal's
finding he was properly disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he left his employment at respondent
Car Care Center of Newark, LLC (Car Care) voluntarily and without good cause
attributable to the work. We affirm.
I.
The record before the Board demonstrates Garcia had worked as a
manager for Car Care from March 2022 through May 8, 2024. He was
responsible for supervising staff, opening and closing the shop, serving
customers, and overseeing day-to-day operations. Garcia testified his job duties
required him to arrive by 7:45 a.m. so the business could open at 8:00 a.m.
On May 8, 2024, Garcia arrived approximately thirty minutes late to work.
At approximately 8:15 a.m., his supervisor, Edgar Calle, confronted him about
his tardiness. Garcia explained to Calle he was late because he needed to make
sure his children arrived at school on time. Garcia had not notified Calle that
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he was going to be late as required under Car Care's policy because, even though
he was aware of the policy, "he thought his coworkers would cover him."
A heated interaction between Garcia and Calle ensued. Calle rejected
Garcia's reason for being late as unjustifiable and stated, "that's your problem.
That’s your business. You know if you don’t want to work here and be
responsible here, you don't have to be here." Garcia specifically asked Calle,
"are you like, telling me not to come back, or you're telling me to leave and not
come back," to which Calle responded "you could do whatever you want. I don't
care. I can replace you in a heartbeat." Garcia testified he felt insulted and
unappreciated by Calle's statement but he admitted his employer did not say he
was terminated or fired.
After the verbal altercation with Calle, Garcia decided to step outside the
building and was crying while talking to a family member on the phone. Garcia
then returned inside to discuss the issue again, but Calle said, "not right now."
Calle directed Garcia to go home and stated he did not need him for the rest of
the day. Because Calle did not want to speak to him, Garcia left work and did
not complete his shift, believing he would be able to return and continue working
once things cooled down.
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Although he was scheduled to work the next day, he did not return to Car
Care until two days later. When he did return to Car Care, Calle informed Garcia
he was no longer needed and handed him his paycheck. Garcia asserts there had
been no prior warnings, write-ups, or progressive discipline. Garcia also stated
he would have come back to work if his employer had apologized. Based on
Calle's statement that Garcia "was no longer needed," Garcia understood he had
been terminated.
On May 12, 2024, Garcia filed a claim for unemployment compensation
benefits. A deputy at the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance
disqualified Garcia from receipt of benefits because he left work voluntarily
without good cause attributable to his work. Garcia appealed the determination
to the Appeal Tribunal.
After hearing Garcia's testimony at the October 31, 2024 Appeal Tribunal
telephonic hearing, the appeals examiner affirmed the denial of unemployment
benefits, finding Garcia voluntarily left his position without good cause
attributable to the work. Garcia further appealed to the Board.
On June 25, 2025, the Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision. On
appeal, Garcia argues the Board erred in denying unemployment benefits based
on misapplication of the law; he was denied procedural due process because his
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employer did not appear at the hearing; and evidence demonstrating his
availability to return to work and his job search efforts was overlooked. The
Board argues for affirmance. We consider the parties' positions, in light of
applicable law.
II.
The scope of review of an administrative agency's final determination is
limited. Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). The agency's decision
may not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or
inconsistent with applicable law. Ibid. "If the Board's factual findings are
supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'"
Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). "[I]n reviewing the
factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is
not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original
determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could
reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Ibid. We "must . . . give due regard
to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility."
Logan v. Bd. of Rev., 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997).
The New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law (UCL) provides that
an individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
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For the week in which the individual has left work
voluntarily without good cause attributable to such
work, and for each week thereafter until the individual
becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in
employment . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).]
The primary objective of the UCL is to provide income to the worker who
is out of work through no fault of his own. Brady, 152 N.J. at 212. Accordingly,
an individual who has "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to
such work" is disqualified from benefits under the UCL. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
"'[G]ood cause attributable to such work' means a reason directly related to the
individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no
choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). Employees must
"do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Domenico
v. Bd. of Rev., 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287-88 (App. Div. 1983). A claimant who
leaves work for personal reasons is subject to disqualification from receipt of
unemployment benefits under the UCL, even if the reasons are understandable.
Morgan v. Bd. of Rev., 77 N.J. Super. 209, 214 (App. Div. 1962).
Here, the Board's decision to uphold the Appeal Tribunal's denial of
unemployment benefits was grounded in the record. According to Garcia's own
testimony, he arrived late to work on May 8, 2024, and was confronted by his
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employer about his tardiness. Garcia testified he was insulted and decided on
his own volition to leave work for the rest of the day. Garcia then decided not
to show up for his scheduled shift the next day, even though work was available
for him. Garcia admitted that Calle never said he was fired or terminated, and
that it was his decision not to show up for work the next day.
Thus, on this record, Garcia has not met the standard to obtain
unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because his reason for leaving
work was not connected to the job itself but, instead was admittedly for personal
reasons—being insulted by his employer’s attitude or reaction to his undisputed
tardiness. He then failed to maintain his employment by appearing for his next
scheduled shift. "A claimant has the 'responsibility to do whatever is necessary
and reasonable in order to remain employed.'" Brady, 152 N.J. at 214 (quoting
Heulitt v. Bd. of Rev., 300 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997)).
Although Garcia argues whether he intended to voluntarily resign is
relevant, our decisional law is unsupportive in this instance. See, Haley v. Board
of Review, 245 N.J. 511, 520-23 (2021) (providing guidance on how the Board
should conduct the "fact-sensitive analysis" of whether termination was
voluntary under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)—which does not include evaluation of
intent.). Garcia never received a termination letter from his employer, and he
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admits his employer never expressly stated he was fired or terminated. Garcia
also agreed his job was still available on May 9, and he would have returned if
his employer had apologized. Yet, he did not report to work for his next shift.
Garcia's belief he was terminated does not qualify as a voluntary resignation
with good cause as Garcia's decision to leave was not due to "ordinary common
sense and prudence" and, thus, cannot be considered reasonable. Domenico,
192 N.J. Super. at 288. Because Garcia did not proffer any facts to show his
refusal to complete his May 8 shift or appear for work during his next scheduled
shift was reasonable, his "intent" was irrelevant.
Although Garcia claims the lack of employer participation deprived him
of a full and fair hearing because the record is incomplete, Garcia cites no legal
authority that requires an employer to participate in an unemployment benefit
hearing requested by the employee. Because the employer did not participate,
the decision was predicated solely on the unrebutted evidence presented by
Garcia. That the decision was made based on Garcia's testimony alone, without
any conflicting evidence from the employer, is not tantamount to an incomplete
hearing. Garcia was given the opportunity to fully explain his position at the
hearing. Thus, we reject his contention he was not permitted to "fully explore
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his repeated attempts to preserve his employment and his understanding that he
had been fired."
Based on the sufficient credible evidence in the record, the Board's denial
of unemployment benefits was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
Affirmed.
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