Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3833-24 GABRIEL H. GARCIA, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, and CAR CARE CENTER OF NEWARK LLC, Respondents. ___________________________ Submitted October 14, 2026 – Decided November 16, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek. On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 374867. Gabriel H. Garcia, self-represented appellant. Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ashleigh B. Shelton, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM Petitioner Gabriel H. Garcia appeals from a June 25, 2025 final agency decision of the Board of Review (Board), affirming the Appeal Tribunal's finding he was properly disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he left his employment at respondent Car Care Center of Newark, LLC (Car Care) voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the work. We affirm. I. The record before the Board demonstrates Garcia had worked as a manager for Car Care from March 2022 through May 8, 2024. He was responsible for supervising staff, opening and closing the shop, serving customers, and overseeing day-to-day operations. Garcia testified his job duties required him to arrive by 7:45 a.m. so the business could open at 8:00 a.m. On May 8, 2024, Garcia arrived approximately thirty minutes late to work. At approximately 8:15 a.m., his supervisor, Edgar Calle, confronted him about his tardiness. Garcia explained to Calle he was late because he needed to make sure his children arrived at school on time. Garcia had not notified Calle that A-3833-24 2 he was going to be late as required under Car Care's policy because, even though he was aware of the policy, "he thought his coworkers would cover him." A heated interaction between Garcia and Calle ensued. Calle rejected Garcia's reason for being late as unjustifiable and stated, "that's your problem. That’s your business. You know if you don’t want to work here and be responsible here, you don't have to be here." Garcia specifically asked Calle, "are you like, telling me not to come back, or you're telling me to leave and not come back," to which Calle responded "you could do whatever you want. I don't care. I can replace you in a heartbeat." Garcia testified he felt insulted and unappreciated by Calle's statement but he admitted his employer did not say he was terminated or fired. After the verbal altercation with Calle, Garcia decided to step outside the building and was crying while talking to a family member on the phone. Garcia then returned inside to discuss the issue again, but Calle said, "not right now." Calle directed Garcia to go home and stated he did not need him for the rest of the day. Because Calle did not want to speak to him, Garcia left work and did not complete his shift, believing he would be able to return and continue working once things cooled down. A-3833-24 3 Although he was scheduled to work the next day, he did not return to Car Care until two days later. When he did return to Car Care, Calle informed Garcia he was no longer needed and handed him his paycheck. Garcia asserts there had been no prior warnings, write-ups, or progressive discipline. Garcia also stated he would have come back to work if his employer had apologized. Based on Calle's statement that Garcia "was no longer needed," Garcia understood he had been terminated. On May 12, 2024, Garcia filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. A deputy at the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance disqualified Garcia from receipt of benefits because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work. Garcia appealed the determination to the Appeal Tribunal. After hearing Garcia's testimony at the October 31, 2024 Appeal Tribunal telephonic hearing, the appeals examiner affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits, finding Garcia voluntarily left his position without good cause attributable to the work. Garcia further appealed to the Board. On June 25, 2025, the Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision. On appeal, Garcia argues the Board erred in denying unemployment benefits based on misapplication of the law; he was denied procedural due process because his A-3833-24 4 employer did not appear at the hearing; and evidence demonstrating his availability to return to work and his job search efforts was overlooked. The Board argues for affirmance. We consider the parties' positions, in light of applicable law. II. The scope of review of an administrative agency's final determination is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). The agency's decision may not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or inconsistent with applicable law. Ibid. "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). "[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Ibid. We "must . . . give due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility." Logan v. Bd. of Rev., 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997). The New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law (UCL) provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits: A-3833-24 5 For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment . . . . [N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).] The primary objective of the UCL is to provide income to the worker who is out of work through no fault of his own. Brady, 152 N.J. at 212. Accordingly, an individual who has "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" is disqualified from benefits under the UCL. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). "'[G]ood cause attributable to such work' means a reason directly related to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). Employees must "do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Domenico v. Bd. of Rev., 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287-88 (App. Div. 1983). A claimant who leaves work for personal reasons is subject to disqualification from receipt of unemployment benefits under the UCL, even if the reasons are understandable. Morgan v. Bd. of Rev., 77 N.J. Super. 209, 214 (App. Div. 1962). Here, the Board's decision to uphold the Appeal Tribunal's denial of unemployment benefits was grounded in the record. According to Garcia's own testimony, he arrived late to work on May 8, 2024, and was confronted by his A-3833-24 6 employer about his tardiness. Garcia testified he was insulted and decided on his own volition to leave work for the rest of the day. Garcia then decided not to show up for his scheduled shift the next day, even though work was available for him. Garcia admitted that Calle never said he was fired or terminated, and that it was his decision not to show up for work the next day. Thus, on this record, Garcia has not met the standard to obtain unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because his reason for leaving work was not connected to the job itself but, instead was admittedly for personal reasons—being insulted by his employer’s attitude or reaction to his undisputed tardiness. He then failed to maintain his employment by appearing for his next scheduled shift. "A claimant has the 'responsibility to do whatever is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.'" Brady, 152 N.J. at 214 (quoting Heulitt v. Bd. of Rev., 300 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997)). Although Garcia argues whether he intended to voluntarily resign is relevant, our decisional law is unsupportive in this instance. See, Haley v. Board of Review, 245 N.J. 511, 520-23 (2021) (providing guidance on how the Board should conduct the "fact-sensitive analysis" of whether termination was voluntary under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)—which does not include evaluation of intent.). Garcia never received a termination letter from his employer, and he A-3833-24 7 admits his employer never expressly stated he was fired or terminated. Garcia also agreed his job was still available on May 9, and he would have returned if his employer had apologized. Yet, he did not report to work for his next shift. Garcia's belief he was terminated does not qualify as a voluntary resignation with good cause as Garcia's decision to leave was not due to "ordinary common sense and prudence" and, thus, cannot be considered reasonable. Domenico, 192 N.J. Super. at 288. Because Garcia did not proffer any facts to show his refusal to complete his May 8 shift or appear for work during his next scheduled shift was reasonable, his "intent" was irrelevant. Although Garcia claims the lack of employer participation deprived him of a full and fair hearing because the record is incomplete, Garcia cites no legal authority that requires an employer to participate in an unemployment benefit hearing requested by the employee. Because the employer did not participate, the decision was predicated solely on the unrebutted evidence presented by Garcia. That the decision was made based on Garcia's testimony alone, without any conflicting evidence from the employer, is not tantamount to an incomplete hearing. Garcia was given the opportunity to fully explain his position at the hearing. Thus, we reject his contention he was not permitted to "fully explore A-3833-24 8 his repeated attempts to preserve his employment and his understanding that he had been fired." Based on the sufficient credible evidence in the record, the Board's denial of unemployment benefits was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Affirmed. A-3833-24 9