People v. Heinzel CA4/1

Filed 10/20/26 P. v. Heinzel CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D087052 Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN299323) KATHERINE HEINZEL, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniel F. Link, Judge. Affirmed. Starting Over, Inc., and Anyse R. Smith for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Anastasia Sagorsky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  Katherine Heinzel appeals from an order denying her Penal Code1 section 1203.4b petition for expungement of a conviction for gross vehicular manslaughter and related crimes. She contends that (1) the trial court erred by ruling that the victims had a right to testify at the expungement hearing, and (2) the court abused its discretion by failing to consider her evidence or meaningfully apply the expungement statute. We affirm the order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Underlying Offenses The appellate record does not include a reporter’s transcript of the underlying criminal trial. We therefore summarize the offenses based on the facts set forth in the probation report and our unpublished opinion on direct appeal in People v. Heinzel (Jan. 16, 2018, D071276) [nonpub. opn.] (Heinzel). Heinzel was a police officer and traffic accident investigator for the Newport Beach Police Department for 8 to 9 years starting in 1986. On November 19, 2011, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Heinzel was driving northbound on Interstate 15 at a high rate of speed, later estimated to be at least 91 miles per hour. In a vehicle in front of her, Davionne Kelly was driving northbound with passengers Kris W. and Brian M. at about 70 miles per hour. Heinzel struck the back of Kelly’s car, causing both vehicles to lose control, break through a guardrail, and crash down an embankment. Kelly sustained serious injuries and died at the scene. His two passengers survived. Brian sustained life-threatening injuries, including punctured lungs, a fractured collarbone, and brain bleeding. Kris sprained his wrist and ankle and sustained a laceration to his head that required 17 stitches and left a scar. (Heinzel, supra, D071276.) 1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2  Kris exited Kelly’s vehicle and climbed up the embankment. After he pulled Heinzel from her burning vehicle, she took off running towards the freeway. Other motorists kept her at the scene until officers arrived. She smelled of alcohol and appeared drunk. A sample of Heinzel’s blood taken nearly two hours after the accident showed a 0.125 percent blood alcohol content. Another sample taken nearly an hour later showed a 0.09 percent blood alcohol content. A prosecution expert testified that her blood alcohol content at the time of the crash was between 0.13 and 0.15 percent. (Heinzel, supra, D071276.) In August 2016, a jury convicted Heinzel of gross vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)) and two counts of driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subds. (a) & (b)) and found true enhancement allegations that she caused great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and caused great bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558).2 The court sentenced her to eight years eight months in state prison. B. Petition for Expungement In July 2025, after serving her sentence, Heinzel filed a petition for expungement of her convictions under section 1203.4b based on her successful participation in the California Conservation Camp Program (fire camp) as an incarcerated individual hand crew member. She attached her own declaration as well as supporting letters and certificates attesting to her 2 This was Heinzel’s second trial on the charges. The first trial also resulted in convictions, but we reversed the judgment for instructional error. (People v. Heinzel (July 8, 2014, D063503) [nonpub. opn.].) 3 rehabilitation, sobriety, employment, and participation in fire camp and other volunteer activities. The People filed a written opposition to the petition. The opposition did not contest Heinzel’s eligibility for relief under section 1203.4b but argued that granting relief would not be in the interest of justice. The People argued that Heinzel’s conduct “was dangerously careless, caused death and permanent injury to her victims, and inflicted long-lasting harm to the surviving victims and their families.” The People further argued that, as a former police officer and traffic accident investigator, Heinzel “had a uniquely personal experience regarding the dangerous consequences of driving under the influence” and “had training and experience in the dangers of driving drunk and driving fast.” The People also noted that Heinzel “did not offer any help to her victims” at the scene, she “chose to run away from the collision,” and “[o]ther motorists had to take efforts to keep” her from leaving. Finally, the People represented that the victims’ families were “adamantly opposed” to Heinzel’s request. The court held a hearing on the request. At the beginning of the hearing, defense counsel asked for a sidebar “concerning the issue of the certification.” (See § 1203.4b, subd. (b)(2)-(3) [requiring certification that defendant successfully participated in fire camp].) The court declined the request and responded: “I’m not as concerned about that. As a heads up, I have to give thanks to my clerk who is hounding fire camp to -- she’s using every contact she has to get certifications because we want them. But in my mind, the certification, I don’t think there’s any argument that she completed it. So I’m not as worried about that as I am the contents of what happened and whether it should be granted.” Following this exchange, neither party 4 mentioned the certification again and the prosecutor did not contest Heinzel’s successful completion of fire camp. Defense counsel also objected to allowing the victims’ family members to make statements in opposition to the expungement request at the hearing. She argued that the “ ‘right to be heard’ section” applies only to “post-release proceedings,” and not to “a post-conviction proceeding for civil disabilities.” The trial court overruled the objection and ruled that “under the Victim’s Rights Act, they absolutely have the right to be here” and “their voices are very much allowed to be heard.”3 Before hearing arguments, the court addressed defense counsel as follows: “We are here for a motion to expunge . . . under Penal Code section 1203.4b. Your client has gone to prison; she completed fire camp; and ultimately, under the discretion of the court, you’re looking for dismissal. I’ve had an opportunity to read your papers. I looked at all the positive character letters that have been filed on behalf of your client.” The court then heard arguments from counsel. Defense counsel acknowledged that the facts of the case were tragic and serious but argued that Heinzel’s petition should be granted based on her positive conduct during incarceration, successful completion of service in fire camp, and 3 The trial court was referring to the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (Marsy’s Law), which expanded the rights of crime victims, including by establishing constitutional rights for victims to be notified and present at public criminal proceedings (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(b)(7)) and “to be heard” in any proceeding “involving a post-arrest release decision, plea, sentencing, post-conviction release decision, or any proceeding in which a right of the victim is at issue” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(b)(8)). The term “victim” as used in Marsy’s Law includes the direct victim’s immediate family members. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(e).) 5 subsequent conduct and rehabilitation, including completion of parole without a single violation, long-term sobriety, and community service. The prosecutor did not contest Heinzel’s eligibility for relief under section 1203.4b or her successful completion of fire camp and did not dispute the evidence of her rehabilitation. She nevertheless argued that expungement was not in the interest of justice because of the serious nature of Heinzel’s conduct, including that she was a former police officer and traffic accident investigator. According to the prosecutor, Heinzel knew the dangerous consequences of driving drunk based on her training and experience, yet “she still chose to get behind the wheel of her vehicle and caused a collision that ultimately killed a 20-year old man who was coming home from hanging out with his friends and severely and permanently injured two other young males.” The prosecutor also asserted that Heinzel “callously walked away from the crime scene.” After arguments of counsel, the court heard oral statements from the decedent Kelly’s mother and his younger brother and surviving victim Kris. Kelly’s mother told the court that Heinzel “chose to drive drunk and caused the death of my oldest son who was only 20 years old,” she “served only three years on a nine-year sentence for good behavior and [was] sent to fire camp,” she “was an ex-police officer and a DUI crime scene investigator who ha[d] arrested over 100 people for drunk driving,” and she had “destroyed my son’s future, devastated our family and left a wound that will never fully heal.” Kelly’s brother also spoke about the devastating loss of his older brother. Surviving victim Kris told the court about the lasting psychological effects of the accident, including that he could not drive at night and was paranoid about being in a car with people. 6  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled from the bench and denied the petition. The court acknowledged that it had discretion to grant the expungement request but explained “it has to make sense.” The court noted that the victims and their families had been through two trials and wanted to “forget about this” but “unfortunately, this brings up old memories.” The court stated “it was a pleasure to have the victim’s mother and family here in my courtroom today” and described them as “a family of survivors” who were “unbelievably impressive.” The court ultimately ruled as follows: “So while I do have the discretion, I do lean heavily on how the victims still feel about what’s going on. And every victim feels differently. But typically, in this case, it doesn’t make sense to grant -- well, while I have the discretion, I don’t feel I would be properly using my discretion to grant your request at this time. And respectfully, your request is denied.” DISCUSSION I For the first time on appeal, the People contest Heinzel’s eligibility for relief under section 1203.4b on the ground that she did not submit the required certification that she successfully completed fire camp. The People did not make this argument in their written opposition to Heinzel’s petition or at the hearing and never contested her eligibility for section 1203.4b relief in the trial court. Even when defense counsel brought up the certification issue and wished to address it at the hearing—and the trial court responded that it was not concerned about the issue and did not believe there was any question regarding Heinzel’s eligibility—the prosecutor remained silent and did not object or disagree. Moreover, the trial court’s comments reflect that the court clerk was having difficulty obtaining fire camp certifications. If the People wished to contest Heinzel’s successful completion of fire camp or the 7 certification issue, the proper time to do so was in the trial court when the issue could be litigated and any defect remedied. Accordingly, we conclude that the People’s eligibility argument is forfeited. (See People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852 [forfeiture rule for issues raised for first time on appeal applies to “both the People and the defendant”].) II On the merits, Heinzel contends that the trial court erred in permitting the victims to give statements at the hearing because a section 1203.4b hearing is not a “sentencing” or “post-conviction release” proceeding under Marsy’s Law. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(8).) In response, the People do not dispute the premise of Heinzel’s constitutional argument but contend that the trial court nevertheless had “broad discretion” to allow the victims to give statements as part of its statutory authority to control the conduct of the proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure section 128. In reply, Heinzel likewise does not contest that the trial court had discretionary authority to allow the victims to give statements but asserts that the court erred by treating their participation as constitutionally mandated under Marsy’s Law. We need not resolve this constitutional question because Heinzel has failed to demonstrate how she was prejudiced by any misapprehension by the trial court. Heinzel makes no argument that the trial court would not have allowed the victims to be heard but for its allegedly mistaken belief that it was constitutionally required under Marsy’s Law. Nor does Heinzel contend that it would have been improper or an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the victims to be heard in the exercise of its statutory or inherent authority to control the proceedings. At a minimum, the victims had a right to be present at the proceeding. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(b)(7) [victims’ right “to be present” at all public proceedings “at which the defendant and the 8 prosecutor are entitled to be present”].) Based on our review of the record, we conclude there is no reasonable probability the trial court would have prevented the victims from giving statements even if allowing them to do so was not mandated by Marsy’s Law. Furthermore, even if the victims had not given statements directly, the prosecutor still would have conveyed the substance of their comments and sentiments to the court. Accordingly, even assuming any error, Heinzel cannot meet her burden of demonstrating prejudice from the trial court’s allegedly mistaken belief that allowing the victims to make statements was constitutionally required. (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1005, 1012 [normal prejudice standard for state constitutional error is reasonable probability standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].) III Heinzel also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the victims’ statements without “meaningfully engaging the statutory factors governing relief” under section 1203.4b. According to Heinzel, the trial court denied her petition based solely on the victims’ views and failed to consider or address her successful participation in fire camp and other evidence of rehabilitation. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion. Penal Code section 1203.4b authorizes the court to expunge a criminal conviction upon the defendant’s release from custody after successful participation in fire camp as an individual hand crew member. With certain exceptions not relevant here, if the defendant meets the eligibility requirements and petitions for relief, “the court, in its discretion and in the interest of justice” may set aside the guilty verdict and dismiss the charges, relieving the defendant from all penalties and disabilities of the conviction 9 other than revocation or suspension of driving privileges. (Pen. Code, § 1203.4b, subd. (c)(1); Veh. Code, § 13555.) We review a trial court’s discretionary ruling denying a petition for expungement for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Woodward (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 379, 399 (Woodward).) Under this deferential standard, our review is limited. We will uphold the trial court’s discretionary choice so long as it is not arbitrary, capricious or wholly unreasonable. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.) Other than the discretionary “interest of justice” standard, section 1203.4b does not specify what factors the court should or may consider in exercising its discretion to grant or deny relief. However, another related expungement statute with the identical “interest of justice” standard (§ 1203.4, subd. (a)(1)) has been construed to permit the trial court to “consider any relevant information.” (People v. McLernon (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 569, 576–577.) We agree with Heinzel that this holding applies equally to section 1203.4b. The record nevertheless does not support Heinzel’s argument that the trial court failed to meaningfully apply the statute or consider her successful participation in fire camp or other evidence of rehabilitation. The court acknowledged at the beginning of the hearing that Heinzel had completed fire camp and was eligible for relief under section 1203.4b and told defense counsel it had “read your papers” and “looked at all the positive character letters that have been filed on behalf of your client.” “We presume the trial court engaged in the appropriate analysis to determine whether granting [Heinzel]’s requested relief was in the interest of justice, and nothing in the appellate record rebuts this presumption.” (Woodward, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.) Nothing in the statute required the court to state 10 reasons for the denial or say anything more about Heinzel’s evidence in making its ruling. (Cf. id. at pp. 399–400 [rejecting claim that trial court did not give “due consideration” to defendant’s expungement request where minute order “stated that the trial court read and considered [his] motion” and denied it].) “Presuming the order is correct, and indulging all intendments and presumptions to support the order on matters as to which the record is silent, [Heinzel] has failed to satisfy [her] burden to affirmatively show error by the trial court.” (Id. at p. 400.) Heinzel focuses on the fact that the trial court in its final ruling only referred to the victims’ statements and did not specifically mention anything about her evidence. But a trial court is “not required to mention every arguably pertinent item of evidence before it, let alone explain in minute detail its view of each item.” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 565.) The mere fact that the trial court did not refer to Heinzel’s evidence in its final ruling does not establish that the court failed to consider it. (Ibid. [claim that trial court “ ‘disregarded’ ” evidence was not supported by court’s “failure to refer [to it] in its statement of decision”].) Absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, we must presume that the court considered all the evidence and properly applied the law. (See, e.g., Jones v. Solgen Construction, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1192; McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1103; Evid. Code, § 664.) Finally, the court’s substantive ruling was not arbitrary, capricious or wholly unreasonable given the seriousness of the crimes, Heinzel’s knowledge of the dangers of driving drunk based on her training and experience as a police officer and traffic accident investigator, her attempts to leave the scene of the accident without rendering or summoning aid, and the lasting 11 impact on the victims. Although Heinzel has a commendable record of rehabilitation, participation in fire camp, community service, and sobriety since her conviction, the aggravating facts of the offense are still relevant and the expungement decision is committed to the discretion of the trial court. It is not our proper function to second-guess the trial court’s decision or reweigh the relevant factors. Accordingly, we conclude that Heinzel has not met her burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. BUCHANAN, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: KELETY, J. CASTILLO, J. 12