Webster, R. v. Wentzel, B.

J-A18036-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 RACHEL WEBSTER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : BRANDON J. WENTZEL : : Appellant : No. 1404 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Order Entered September 25, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at No(s): LT-24-001979 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J. MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: October 30, 2026 Brandon J. Wentzel (“Wentzel”) appeals from the order which denied his petition to open the second default judgment obtained against him by Rachel Webster (“Webster”). We affirm. The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter as follows: [In October 2024, Webster purchased the real property located at 397 1/2 Bailey Avenue in Pittsburgh (“the property”). She then initiated proceedings in the magisterial district court to evict Wentzel, a tenant under an oral lease with the prior owner who refused to vacate the property.] The underlying judgment from the [magisterial district court] awarded [Webster] possession of [the property], $3,600 in rental arrears, and $228.95 in costs. [The instant matter arises from a [summary] appeal, filed in [the trial] court [by Wentzel] on December 26, 2024.] On January 16, 2025, [in response to Wentzel’s appeal, Webster] filed a complaint in the instant action, requesting an amount not more than $35,000 together with attorneys’ fees, cost of suit, and possession. The amount due [to Webster from Wentzel] as of the filing date of the complaint was $4,500.00. J-A18036-26 On April 25, 2025, [the] preliminary objections filed by [Wentzel, but not verified by him,] were overruled [by a prior jurist]. Per court order, [Wentzel] had until May 25, 2025[,] to file an answer. [The trial court also scheduled the matter for an arbitration hearing in June 2025.] When [Wentzel failed to file an answer to the complaint], [Webster] properly entered a default judgment against [him] on May 29, 2025[,] in the amount of $8,100.00. Despite having a default judgment entered against him appearing on the docket and despite having not filed an answer to the complaint, [Wentzel] nevertheless appeared at the [previously scheduled] arbitration hearing. [Webster], having received a default judgment, did not attend - as such a hearing became a nullity with the entry of the default judgment. As a result, [the trial] court, in error, proceeded, at the request of [Wentzel], to enter a . . . non-jury verdict on behalf of [Wentzel] on June 6, 2025, thereby issuing a non-suit against [Webster]. This court notes that [Wentzel]’s counsel had knowledge of the default [judgment] at least as of June 2, 2025, but did not reveal this situation to [the trial] court, and allowed [the trial] court to proceed in ignorance of that [default judgment]. This apparent lack of candor with [the trial] court resulted in the parties and th[e] court undertaking unnecessary actions, which otherwise could have been averted had [Wentzel] simply filed a petition to open after having been provided notice of the default judgment. The entry of the procedurally improper . . . non-jury verdict forced [Webster] to file a motion for post-trial relief. On August 4, 2025, [the trial] court granted the motion for post-trial relief, vacating the June 5, 2025 non-jury verdict. Concomitantly, th[e] court opened the default judgment against [Wentzel]. Th[e] court ordered [Wentzel] to file an answer within twenty days of its August 4th order. This court specifically waived any further notice requirement. Moreover, given what had already transpired, [the trial] court had every expectation that a prompt answer would be forthcoming from [Wentzel]. Yet, that is not what happened. On August 26, 2025 - the deadline for [Wentzel] to file his answer having expired - [Webster] entered another default judgment against [Wentzel]. On August 28, 2025, two days after that, [Wentzel filed an] answer [and new matter. Notably, the -2- J-A18036-26 answer and new matter was signed and verified by Wentzel’s counsel, with no verification signed by Wentzel himself.] Eight days following, on September 5, 2025, [Wentzel] filed the instant petition to open judgment. [Wentzel attached to the petition a verification signed by himself for the statements made in the petition.] [Wentzel]’s refusal to comply with rules and directives has been notable. [Wentzel] has been delinquent and/or deficient in his supersedeas payments. [Wentzel]’s January 2025 payment was four days late; the March and May payments [were] each two days late; the June payment [was] twenty[-]two days late; the July payment [was] six days late; and no payments [were] made in August 2025. Thus, the failure to file a timely answer, not once but twice, is viewed by th[e] court within the context of the way [Wentzel] has conducted himself throughout this case. [Wentzel then came] before [the trial court], again, requesting that a default judgment be opened. Whether [the court elected] do so [was] a question of [its] judicial discretion, which is subject to three predicates having first been established: (1) the petition to open has been promptly filed; (2) a legitimate explanation exists for delay that prompted default judgment; and (3) a meritorious defense is averred. . . . Here, the petition to open [was] timely, as it was filed nine days after [Webster’s] entry of [the second] default [judgment]. Therefore, th[e] court [was] not concerned with whether a legitimate explanation exists for the delay that prompted default judgment. From th[e] court’s discernment, there is no legitimate explanation. Indeed, the only seeming “explanation” for having suffered two separate defaults following court orders is that the delay is somehow intentional. This is even more remarkable since [Wentzel] is represented by counsel in this case. Thus, [the trial court] focus[ed] on the element of a whether a “meritorious defense” [had] been averred. Regardless of the apparent dilatory conduct exhibited by [Wentzel] and his lawyer, [the court was] obliged to open the default judgment if this element [had] been met. However, [the court found] it to be absent. . . . In his answer, [Wentzel claimed that Webster] is not the current owner of the property; rather, it is the Estate of Donald E. Plummer [(“Estate”)], with whom [Wentzel] had an oral, month- -3- J-A18036-26 to-month lease. [Wentzel] asserts that [Donald E. Plummer (“decedent”)] bequeathed to [Wentzel] the right to purchase the [property] for a sum certain. Though [Wentzel] does not identify what that sum is, he avers that he is ready, willing, and able to purchase the property. Notably, though [Wentzel] represents a right to the property by bequest, he does not attach any will, writing or testamentary document to his answer, which potentially runs afoul of Pa.R.C.P. 1019(i). If what [Wentzel] is positing is an oral bequest, then this answer is woefully deficient in this respect as well. For a meritorious defense on such a consequential issue, one would expect a litigant to set forth requisite facts (the who, what, when and where) of the “bequest.” Looked at in the light most favorable to [Wentzel], the proposed answer would not survive preliminary objections. Therefore, [the court could not] conclude the alleged “bequest” to be a meritorious defense as plead by [Wentzel]. Moreover, [Wentzel] aver[red] that [the] orphan’s court has jurisdiction over this matter. This averment is puzzling since, if that is true, why has [Wentzel] not directed this court to any ongoing litigation in orphan’s court or attached any document[] filed by [Wentzel] in orphan’s court? This observation is not simply rhetorical; it strikes at the heart of [Wentzel]’s supposed “meritorious defenses.” [Wentzel] does not attach any probate documents or any facts or evidence to indicate that these claims are pending before the orphan’s court or even that they will or could be. Additionally, these same “meritorious defenses” mirror the preliminary objections filed by [Wentzel] which were overruled by [this court]. Lastly, the answer filed by [Wentzel] is not even verified by [him]. [Wentzel], contrary to Pa.R.C.P. 1024, has submitted a verification signed by his counsel, not by himself. This is particularly concerning to this court since [Wentzel]’s averment of a “bequest” of the subject property is a specific factual averment that [Wentzel], and only [Wentzel], must know. There is no basis or excuse for [Wentzel] to have submitted an unverified answer. For this reason, too, should preliminary objections be filed to it, the answer would be stricken by this court. Accordingly, [the court was] constrained to conclude that [Wentzel] failed to meet the “meritorious defense” requirement to -4- J-A18036-26 successfully open a properly filed default judgment. The defenses asserted by [Wentzel] lack[ed] merit, [were] unsupported by any facts or documents, [were] contrary to law, and [were] not buttressed by a verification signed by [Wentzel]. [On September 25, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying the petition to open the second default judgment. Wentzel filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trialcourt complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.] Trial Court Order, 9/25/25, at 1-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted, emphasis in original). Wentzel raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court erred by denying [Webster’s] petition to open because it did not raise a meritorious defense pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 237.3. 2. Whether the trial court erred by denying [Webster’s] petition to open because it did not raise a meritorious defense for failing to include a verification to the proposed answer attached to the petition to open. Wentzel’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). As Wentzel’s issues are interrelated, we will address them together. Both of Wentzel’s issues present a challenge to the trial court’s denial of his petition to open the second default judgment on the basis that he failed to plead a meritorious defense. Our standard of review from the denial of a petition to open a default judgment is as follows: A petition to open a default judgment is addressed to the equitable powers of the court and the trial court has discretion to grant or deny such a petition. . . . The court’s refusal to open a default judgment will not be reversed on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment; rather it occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or when the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, -5- J-A18036-26 prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will. Moreover, this Court must determine whether there are equitable considerations that weigh in favor of opening the default judgment and allowing the defendant to defend the case on the merits. Where the equities warrant opening a default judgment, this Court will not hesitate to find an abuse of discretion. Scalla v. KWS, Inc., 240 A.3d 131, 135-36 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Generally, where a default judgment has been entered against a defendant, a trial court will open the default judgment if the defendant has: (1) promptly filed a petition to open the default judgment; (2) provided a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading; and (3) pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations contained in the complaint. See US Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 994-95 (Pa. Super. 2009). However, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3 provides that if a petition for relief from a default judgment “is filed within ten days after the entry of a default judgment on the docket, the [trial] court shall open the judgment if . . . the proposed answer states a meritorious defense.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.3(b)(2). Accordingly, where, as herein, the defendant petitions to open the judgment during the requisite ten-day period set forth in Rule 237.3(b)(2), it need not provide an excuse for its late filing, but rather, simply set forth a meritorious defense in its proposed answer. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.3(b)(2); see also Attix v. Lehman, 925 A.2d 864, 867 (Pa. Super. 2007). -6- J-A18036-26 Rule 237.3(a) requires that the petition to open a default judgment set forth all grounds for relief in a single petition and have attached thereto “a copy of the complaint, preliminary objections, [or] answer which the petitioner seeks leave to file.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.3(a). Additionally, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure require verification of the petition to open the default judgment and the proposed pleading where the petition or pleading contains allegations of fact which do not appear of record. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.3 (providing that “[a] petition or an answer containing an allegation of fact which does not appear of record shall be verified”); see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024(a) (providing that “[e]very pleading containing an averment of fact not appearing of record in the action or containing a denial of fact shall state that the averment or denial is true upon the signer’s personal knowledge or information and belief and shall be verified”).1 ____________________________________________ 1 Notably, in relation to a pleading, Rule 1024 permits a verification to be signed by someone other than the party filing the pleading in limited circumstances, such as where the filing party is “outside the jurisdiction of the court and the verification . . . [cannot] be obtained within the time allowed for filing the pleading.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024(c). Under these narrow circumstances, “the verification may be made by any person having sufficient knowledge or information and belief and shall set forth the source of the person’s information as to matters not stated upon his or her own knowledge and the reason why the verification is not made by a party.” Id. (emphasis added). Notably, “counsel may verify only in those cases in which the conditions delineated in Rule 1024 are present.” Monroe Contract Corp. v. Harrison Square, Inc., 405 A.2d 954, 958 (Pa. Super. 1979) (emphasis in original). -7- J-A18036-26 This Court has granted relief to petitioners whose petitions to open a default judgment were non-compliant with Rule 237.3. See Smith v. Morrell Beer Distribs., Inc., 29 A.3d 23, 26 (Pa. Super. 2011) (recognizing that the purpose of Rule 237.3 is to ease the burden of parties who move promptly for relief from default judgments and noting that courts should not be astute in enforcing technicalities to defeat apparently meritorious claims). For example, where the petitioner has filed a timely petition to open a default judgment but has failed to attach a verified copy of the proposed answer, courts may still grant relief in certain circumstances. See Stauffer v. Hevener, 881 A.2d 868 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that where the petitioner filed a petition to open/strike a default judgment, but attached only the first page of the proposed answer, which had been filed of record on the day that the default judgment was entered, the failure to attach the answer to the petition to open was excused); see also Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424, 429 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that where the petitioner failed to attach a copy of the proposed answer to the petition to open, the court could look to the averments of the petition to open to see whether those averments satisfied the substantive pleading requirements for relief); Himmelreich v. Hostetter Farm Supply, 703 A.2d 478, 479 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding that “looking exclusively at the answer attached to a petition to open a default judgment when deciding if there is a meritorious defense would be an ‘overly strict -8- J-A18036-26 interpretation of Rule 237.3’” where the proposed answer asserted only a general defense, but the petition set forth a specific defense). Where a petitioner has filed a timely petition to open the default judgment and a verified answer, but did not verify the petition to open, this Court must determine “whether the petition contained allegations of fact which do not appear of record.” See Penn-Delco Sch. Dist. v. Bell Atl.-Pa, Inc., 745 A.2d 14, 18 (Pa. Super. 1999). A verification under Rule 206.3 is not needed for allegations relating to facts already appearing in the record or for conclusions of law. See id. However, if there are averments of fact in the unverified petition which do not already appear in the record, this Court must determine whether those unverified facts amount to a “material defect.” Id. The assertion of unverified facts “may be excused where it is inconsequential and not prejudicial” upon examination of “the function of the allegation within the context of [the petition to open].” Id. (finding that a single unverified assertion that did not otherwise appear in the record could be excused where the assertion was mere surplusage, immaterial, and the opposing party was not prejudiced). However, where the unverified allegations are “material, and would prejudice [the plaintiff] if they were considered by the court,” they cannot be regarded as “mere surplusage.” Scalla, 240 A.3d at 143. The failure to verify a petition to open is not a material defect where the petitioner has filed a verified answer to the complaint in which the petitioner asserts meritorious defenses. See Penn-Delco, 745 A.2d at 18; see also -9- J-A18036-26 Boatin, 955 A.2d at 429 (holding that, where the petitioner filed a timely petition to open, but failed to verify the petition and also failed to attach a verified copy of the proposed answer to the petition to open, relief would not be foreclosed where the unverified allegations of fact alleged in support of the meritorious defenses appeared elsewhere in the record). With respect to the requirement that the petitioner plead a meritorious defense, this Court will review the petition to open and the proposed answer to the complaint to determine whether the petitioner sufficiently asserted a meritorious defense. See Smith, 29 A.3d at 26. While the petitioner does not have to prove every element of the meritorious defense, it must plead a defense which, if proved at trial, would justify relief. See id. at 26. The mere assertion in a petition to open a default judgment that one has a meritorious defense is insufficient. See Penn-Delco, 745 A.2d at 19. Similarly, conclusions of law, general assertions of a viable defense, and challenges to the plaintiff’s proof are insufficient to set forth a meritorious defense. See Smith, 29 A.3d at 28 (finding defendant failed to “set forth a meritorious defense supported by verified allegations of fact” where the petition to open contained only “conclusions of law and challenges to [plaintiff’s] proof”); see also Castings Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Klein, 663 A.2d 220, 224 (Pa. Super. 1995) (finding defendant’s summary denial of any wrongdoing insufficient to establish a meritorious defense). Instead, the petitioner “must set forth the defense in precise, specific and clear terms,” and the meritorious defense must - 10 - J-A18036-26 be “supported by verified allegations of fact.” Smith, 29 A.3d at 28; see also Sines v. Packer, 463 A.2d 475, 477 (Pa. Super. 1983) (holding that where the petitioner “merely stated a conclusion of law[, s]uch a statement is not a sufficient averment of a meritorious defense . . . since it does not set forth any facts upon which the alleged meritorious defense is based” (emphasis in original)); Ecumenical Enters., Inc. v. NADCO Constr., Inc., 385 A.2d 392, 395 (Pa. Super. 1978) (en banc) (holding that the petitioner also “must set forth the facts on which the [meritorious] defense is based”). Wentzel argues that in his proposed answer and new matter, he asserted meritorious defenses by claiming: (2) “that Webster lacks standing and is not the true owner of the property in question;” (2) he “repeatedly denie[d] Webster’s factual averments, which itself constitutes a defense to the claims;” (3) “the property in question is subject to the Estate . . ., not Webster, and that any right to terminate the lease resides with the Estate, not Webster;” (4) “Webster fraudulently received title to the property in question;” and (5) “Wentzel also denie[d] that there was any landlord-tenant relationship between himself and Webster.” Wentzel’s Brief at 11-12. Wentzel insists that, if proven at trial, these defenses “would absolutely entitle him to relief.” Id. at 12. According to Wentzel, the trial court applied “a heightened pleading standard” to his defenses and did “not sufficiently address the merits of any of [his] defenses.” Id. Wentzel asserts that he was not required to plead facts which would conclusively establish his defenses, - 11 - J-A18036-26 but rather he was only required to plead facts which “could grant a defendant relief.” Id. at 13. On this basis, Wentzel argues that the trial court misapplied the standards for the assertion of a meritorious defense and erroneously ruled that his averments failed for lack of specificity. See id. Wentzel also faults the trial court for pointing out that certain of his defenses were previously raised as preliminary objections, which were overruled by a prior jurist. According to Wentzel, the fact that certain of his defenses were unsuccessfully asserted as preliminary objections “is irrelevant to whether a defense is meritorious.” Id. With respect to Wentzel’s failure to personally verify the proposed answer and new matter to the complaint, he points out that he attached a personal verification to his petition to open, and he attached a copy of the proposed answer and new matter to the petition to open. According to Wentzel, “when [he] verified the petition to open, he was plainly verifying all of its contents, including the answer and new matter attached as an exhibit.” Wentzel’s Brief at 15 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). On this basis, he claims that “the trial court abused its discretion in holding that the answer and new matter was ‘unverified’” by Wentzel. Id. (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Wentzel further notes that the proposed answer and new matter contained a verification page signed by his counsel. Wentzel submits that “the attorney verification included with the answer and new matter may comply - 12 - J-A18036-26 [with] Pa.R.C.P. 1024(c), which allows ‘any person’ having sufficient knowledge of information and belief, to verify a pleading if a party is outside the jurisdiction of the court and the verification cannot be obtained within the time permitted to file.” Wentzel’s Brief at 16 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Finally, Wentzel argues that even if his personal verification to the petition to open does not attach to the proposed answer and new matter, the denial of his petition based on this technical defect is manifestly unreasonable. The trial court considered Wentzel’s issues and determined that they lacked merit. The court reasoned: . . . [T]he proposed pleading [Wentzel] sought to file did not comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Nor did the pleading contain a meritorious defense because it simply reiterated the argument, already overruled by another jurist at the preliminary objection stage, that [Webster] could not be considered the proper owner of the premises and did not have the capacity to sue [Wentzel] to evict him. Notably, as well, despite referencing the bequest of the premises, [Wentzel] declined to quote from, re- produce, or attach any written document to substantiate his assertion. Therefore, [Wentzel] premised his relief upon an unverified pleading that contained already rejected legal arguments. . . . [Wentzel] asserts that the prior adjudication of his preliminary objections cannot be dispositive of the merit of his defenses raised in his proposed answer. Finally[, Wentzel] submits that [the trial court] should have ignored the lack of personal verification since the [proposed answer] was executed by his attorney, which [Wentzel] claims is a permissible act under the Rules . . .. . . . To the extent [Wentzel] voiced any defense to the eviction, he premised it upon a contention that certain provisions of his former landlord’s last will and testament accorded him certain rights to the premises. What is or is not in that testamentary document is the focus of [Wentzel]’s defense. - 13 - J-A18036-26 Therefore, [the trial court does] not see how [its] analysis of whether a meritorious defense has been asserted can ignore [Wentzel]’s failure to attach the signed writing that would confirm the validity of his assertions. . . . In seeking relief from a default judgment, the party should come into court with a pleading that can be properly filed that day in the event the judgment is removed. Beyond the glaring absence of necessary attachments/exhibits, the substance of that supposed meritorious defense had been rejected by the court upon ruling on [Wentzel]’s preliminary objections. [Wentzel] raised two specific legal objections to the complaint: that [Webster] lacked the capacity to sue him (i.e., that she did not own the premises); and that the orphan’s court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter since the disposition of this case hinged upon the contents of a testamentary document. In other words, [Wentzel] complained that the last will and testament served to convey the property to him, thus insulating him from eviction. In ruling upon the merit of the proposed answer, which raised these same arguments, [the trial court] cannot pretend that the ruling on the preliminary objections never happened. [Wentzel]’s answer is contrary to the law of the case. Principles of coordinate jurisdiction as well as judicial efficiency militate against [the court] opening a default judgment simply to allow [Wentzel] to make legal arguments already found to be invalid. Allowing the answer to be filed, would . . . only have resulted in a motion for judgment on the pleadings being filed and a consequent ruling in favor of [Webster]. Essentially, [Wentzel] complains that [the trial court] did not allow him a few more weeks of fruitless litigation. **** . . . It would have been manifestly unreasonable of [the trial court] to have opened the judgment to give license to [Wentzel] to pursue his quixotic theories. [Wentzel]’s assertion that his former landlord’s last will and testament contained a bequest to him of the premises is little more than an “unsubstantiated statement of personal belief,” which according to [the trial] court does not provide grounds to remove a judgment. Moreover, because of his failure to comply with [verification requirements], [Wentzel]’s proffered responsive pleading is a nullity and cannot serve as a basis upon which to grant his relief. - 14 - J-A18036-26 Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/26, at unnumbered 2-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Based upon our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court in reaching its determination that Wentzel failed to plead a meritorious defense. At the outset, we note that Wentzel filed his proposed answer and new matter two days after the entry of the second default judgment. See Answer and New Matter, 8/28/25. However, he did not verify that pleading. He then filed a petition to open, to which he did attach a personal verification. See Petition to Open, 9/5/25. Looking first at the petition to open, we note that Wentzel did not assert any defenses in that document. The petition, which consists of one and one- half pages, provides a brief procedural history of the matter and states merely that “[a]attached to the within petition is the answer and new matter to plaintiff’s complaint, the same was also filed on August 28, 2025. . . . The same sets forth meritorious defenses.” Id. at unnumbered 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). As Wentzel asserted no defenses in his petition to open, we must look to the proposed answer and new matter to determine whether he asserted any meritorious defenses therein. Turning to the proposed answer and new matter, we note that Wentzel did attempt to raise defenses in that pleading. However, as noted above, Wentzel did not provide a personal verification for the proposed answer and new matter. Although a verification by Wentzel’s counsel was attached to the - 15 - J-A18036-26 proposed pleading, the verification did not comply with the specific requirements of Rule 1024. As explained above, Rule 1024 permits a verification to be signed by someone other than the party filing the pleading in limited circumstances, such as where the filing party is “outside the jurisdiction of the court and the verification . . . [cannot] be obtained within the time allowed for filing the pleading.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024(c). Under these narrow circumstances, “the verification may be made by any person having sufficient knowledge or information and belief and shall set forth the source of the person’s information as to matters not stated upon his or her own knowledge and the reason why the verification is not made by a party.” Id. (emphasis added). Importantly, “counsel may verify only in those cases in which the conditions delineated in Rule 1024 are present.” Monroe, 405 A.2d at 958 (emphasis in original). Here, Wentzel has not argued that he was outside the jurisdiction of the trial court, or that he could not execute the verification within the ten-day period to promptly file a petition to open a default judgment pursuant to Rule 237.3(b)(2). Indeed, Wentzel executed a verification for the petition to open a few days later, within the same ten-day period. Moreover, the verification executed by Wentzel’s counsel does not meet the requirements set forth in Rule 1024. The verification states that “[t]he undersigned, aver [sic] that the statements of fact contained in the attached document are true and correct to the best of their [sic] information, knowledge - 16 - J-A18036-26 and belief . . ..” Proposed Answer and New Matter, 8/28/25, at unnumbered 4, 8/28/25. The verification does not state whether counsel has sufficient knowledge or information and belief for each of the facts asserted in the answer and new matter, or the source for any facts of which counsel did not have sufficient knowledge or information and belief. Most notably, the verification fails to state the reason why it was not being made by Wentzel, as the party filing the answer and new matter. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024(c); see also Monroe, 405 A.2d at 958. As there is no indication that the conditions delineated in Rule 1024 were present, and the verification by counsel is unquestionably deficient, we deem the answer and new matter to be unverified.2 Despite the fact that the answer and new matter was unverified, we may still consider any defense asserted therein if it is based on facts already appearing elsewhere in the record. See Boatin, 955 A.2d at 429 (excusing the absence of a verification executed by the petitioner (defendant Salgas, Inc.) where the “record reveals that the allegations that form the basis of the meritorious defense stated in [the] petition [to open] are either allegations of ____________________________________________ 2 We additionally reject Wentzel’s claim that his personal verification attached to the petition to open should be considered by this Court as a verification of the proposed answer and new matter. Initially, we note that Wentzel filed the unverified answer and new matter one week prior to his execution of the verification for the petition to open. Moreover, the verification he executed for the petition to open expressly limited its application to “the statements made” in “the PETITION TO OPEN JUDGEMEBT [sic].” See Petition to Open, 9/5/25, at unnumbered 11 (emphasis in original). - 17 - J-A18036-26 fact in [plaintiff] Boatin’s complaint against [co-defendant] Miller or in Miller’s answer”); see also Smith, 29 A.3d at 28; Penn-Delco, 745 A.2d at 18. In the new matter section of the proposed answer to the complaint, Wentzel averred the following defenses: (1) “th[e trial] court does not have jurisdiction over this case [because] the orphans’ court has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter;” (2) “[Webster] does not have standing;” (3) “[Webster] is not to [sic] real party interest [sic], as [she] fraudulently received the illusionary title she claims now;” and (4) “the Estate . . . is the true owner of the real [property].” ].” Proposed Answer and New Matter, 8/28/25, at unnumbered 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Elsewhere in this proposed pleading, Wentzel generally averred: (1) “the real property is part of and subject to the Estate;” (2) “upon his passing, [decedent] bequeathed to [Wentzel] the right to purchase the real property for a sum certain;” and (3) “the Estate . . . is the lessor and [the lease] terminates in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of [the decedent].” Id. at unnumbered 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Initially, we note that Wentzel’s purported defenses largely consist of conclusions of law, as well as general assertions of a viable defense, and challenges to Webster’s proof, which are insufficient to set forth a meritorious defense. See Smith, 29 A.3d at 28. To the extent that these conclusory assertions include unverified facts, none of those facts appear elsewhere in - 18 - J-A18036-26 the record (i.e., in Webster’s verified complaint). See Boatin, 955 A.2d at 429; see also Penn-Delco, 745 A.2d at 18. Further, in looking at the function of these averments within the context of the petition to open, these unverified allegations are material and would prejudice Webster if they were considered by the trial court. See Penn-Delco, 745 A.2d at 18. Additionally, the allegations do not withstand scrutiny, as Wentzel did not set forth any of these purported defenses in precise, specific, and clear terms. See Smith, 29 A.3d at 28. Notably, Wentzel failed to attach copies of – or even quote from - the documents upon which many of his assertions are based (i.e., the decedent’s will, documents filed in the orphans’ court pertaining to the decedent’s Estate, a copy of the current title to the property naming the Estate as owner, etc.), in violation of Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(i), which requires that when any claim or defense is based upon a writing, the pleader shall attach a copy of the writing or explain why the writing is not accessible to the pleader. To the extent that Wentzel claimed that Webster acted “fraudulently,” he did not set forth any facts to support this bald assertion. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(b) (providing that “[a]verments of fraud . . . shall be averred with particularity”). Moreover, several of Wentzel’s assertions are directly refuted by the factual averments set forth in Webster’s verified complaint, and its attached documents. See Complaint, 1/16/25, at unnumbered 1-2. Thus, under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching its determination that Wentzel failed to - 19 - J-A18036-26 plead a meritorious defense. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Wentzel’s petition to open the second default judgment obtained by Webster, albeit on slightly different grounds.3 Order affirmed. DATE: 10/30/2026 ____________________________________________ 3 See Layton-Herron v. Litke, 352 A.3d 510, 520 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2026) (holding that, as an appellate court, we may affirm the judgment of the lower court where it is correct on any legal ground or theory disclosed by the record, regardless of the reason or theory adopted by the trial court). - 20 -