Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0789-25 NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RIBHI M. ALKHARRUBI, a/k/a RIHBHI M. KHARRUBI, Defendant-Appellant. Submitted September 30, 2026 – Decided November 2, 2026 Before Judges Currier and Jacobs. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. DC-005723- 08. Ribhi M. Alkharrubi, self-represented appellant. Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM Defendant Ribhi M. Alkharrubi appeals from the trial court's order denying the motion to vacate a 2008 default judgment. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in determining defendant was properly served with the complaint and in denying reconsideration of that order, we affirm. Plaintiff filed a complaint in this collection matter in 2008 and served defendant by regular and certified mail. The regular mail was not returned; the certified mail was returned marked as "unclaimed." Default judgment was entered in May 2008. In 2025, plaintiff placed a levy on defendant's bank account for the judgment. Thereafter, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment, asserting service of the 2008 complaint was defective because the certified-mail image of the envelope filed with the court did not display defendant's name or address and because the court case jacket stated "Return-Service name blocked unclmd." In opposing the motion, plaintiff contended service of the complaint was proper, and defendant still resided at the address used for the regular and certified mail. On September 12, 2025, the trial court denied defendant's motion. In its written order, the court found defendant failed to demonstrate excusable neglect and a meritorious defense required under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate the default judgment. The court referenced the notations on the certified mail envelope A-0789-25 2 indicating service was attempted on three separate dates in March 2008 and stated: "One cannot avoid service by refusing to accept the certified mail envelope." The trial court rejected defendant's claim the enforcement of the debt was time-barred, finding the judgment remained valid for twenty years and could thereafter be renewed for an additional twenty years. Defendant moved for reconsideration, reiterating service was defective and the court misunderstood the statute of limitations argument. On October 10, 2025, the trial court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration. The court found no basis to disturb its previous order and found the summons and complaint sent by regular mail were not returned to the court. Accordingly, the court presumed service to be valid. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in: finding service was proper; determining there was no demonstration of excusable neglect or meritorious defense; and denying reconsideration. We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion to vacate default judgment under Rule 4:50-1 for an abuse of discretion. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Curcio, 444 N.J. Super. 94, 105 (App. Div. 2016). "The trial court's determination . . . warrants substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. A-0789-25 3 Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). An abuse of discretion occurs "when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (citation omitted). The controlling issue is whether defendant was properly served with the complaint in 2008. Rule 6:2-3 is the governing rule regarding effective service within the Law Division, Special Civil Part. The 2008 version of Rule 6:2-3 states: Consistent with due process of law, service by mail pursuant to this rule shall have the same effect as personal service, and the simultaneous mailing shall constitute effective service unless the mail is returned to the court by the postal service with a marking indicating it has not been delivered, such as "Moved, Left No Address," "Attempted—Addressee Not Known," "No Such Number/Street," "Insufficient Address," "Not Deliverable as Addressed—Unable to Forward," or the court has other reason to believe that service was not effected. However, if the certified mail is returned to the court marked "unclaimed" or "refused," service is effective provided that the ordinary mail has not been returned. [R. 6:2-3(d)(4).] Here, the trial court found the post office attempted service of the complaint and summons to defendant by certified mail on three separate occasions. Plaintiff also sent the summons and complaint to defendant by A-0789-25 4 regular mail to the address where defendant remained living at the time of the motion determinations. The record includes a copy of the printout from the court indicating the certified mail went unclaimed. The summons and complaint sent by regular mail were not returned to the court. This establishes sufficient proof of proper service. Defendant has not established service was invalid other than unsupported arguments. We have found that "uncorroborated testimony of the defendant alone is not sufficient" to reject the validity of the return of process. Goldfarb v. Roeger, 54 N.J. Super. 85, 90 (App. Div. 1959). The certified mail was unclaimed but the regular mail was not returned. The court's determination that plaintiff had not satisfied the requisites of Rule 4:50-1 to vacate the 2008 final judgment is supported by the evidence in the record. Accordingly, the subsequent order denying reconsideration was also appropriate. To the extent we have not commented on them specifically, all other points defendant raises on appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-0789-25 5