Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3203-24 N.A., Petitioner-Appellant, v. DIVISION OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Respondent-Respondent. ___________________________ Submitted September 23, 2026 – Decided October 21, 2026 Before Judges Mayer and Zazzali-Hogan. On appeal from the Department of Human Services, Division of Developmental Disabilities, Docket No. HDD 04862-24. Michael Confusione argued the cause for appellant (Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys; Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the brief). Barkha Patel, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Barkha Patel, on the brief). PER CURIAM Petitioner, N.A.'s mother (the mother), challenges a decision by the Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD) to keep her developmentally disabled adult son, N.A.,1 in a specific facility despite the mother's request for a transfer. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted summary disposition in favor of the DDD, which was adopted in the final agency decision with one minor modification. After reviewing the record in light of the governing legal principles, we affirm the DDD's decision. I. We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record. N.A. is thirty-six years old and has severe autism. He was declared incapacitated in 2007 when he reached the age of eighteen, and the mother became his guardian. He receives services that include long-term placement through the State's programs managed by the DDD. N.A. lived at Woodbine Developmental Center (WDC), which is a long- term residential placement, between 2010 and 2023. In mid-September 2023, 1 We use initials to maintain the confidentiality of the proceedings. R. 1:38(f). A-3203-24 2 N.A. was treated at Cape Regional Hospital (Cape Regional) multiple times, primarily to address severely decayed teeth and associated pain. Because N.A. was extremely agitated, the hospital needed to use four-point restraints. He was eventually admitted to Cape Regional for dental surgery. On September 18, 2023, the mother wrote the DDD an email stating that N.A. "must not under any circumstances be returned to [WDC]," and that an "emergency placement must be found NOW!" She claimed WDC abused and neglected N.A. The mother also requested that he be transferred to Ancora State Hospital (Ancora), a psychiatric facility. The mother's main concern was N.A.'s safety at WDC. After receiving this email, DDD's Assistant Commissioner spoke to the mother on the telephone the next morning, September 19, 2023. He memorialized this call in an e-mail to DDD's attorney, acknowledging that the mother had reiterated her continued dissatisfaction with WDC and her desire to admit N.A. to Ancora. The Assistant Commissioner explained that because N.A. was not "portraying a psychiatric issue," he could not be transferred to Ancora. He further informed the mother there were five potential developmental centers in the State where N.A. could be placed including Vineland Developmental A-3203-24 3 Center (VDC). He added that if N.A. had a psychiatric issue and VDC could not handle it, VDC would pursue a crisis evaluation. Although the Assistant Commissioner recommended VDC, he expressed concern that VDC was not the best placement for N.A. because he was recovering from an extremely painful dental procedure. The Assistant Commissioner believed WDC remained the better option post-surgery. To transfer N.A. only to have him wake up in a new facility with new staff would create additional stress for N.A., who did not adapt well to change. According to the Assistant Commissioner, the mother ultimately agreed to N.A. being placed at VDC and was instructed to complete consent forms for the transfer to occur. After speaking with the mother, the Assistant Commissioner sent an email to Sheilla Hoffler, who was the CEO of VDC, asking her to contact him regarding an emergent placement for a WDC resident. They eventually spoke about N.A.'s transfer. The Assistant Commissioner also contacted the CEO of WDC. On the afternoon of September 20, 2023, VDC's CEO sent a detailed explanation of the onboarding process, which stated N.A. would be discharged from Cape Regional on September 21, 2023; the clinical assessments would A-3203-24 4 begin at VDC after receipt of the executed authorization for medical care form; WDC would provide N.A. medications to VDC that day; and an admissions meeting with the mother would occur on September 21, 2023, at 11:00 a.m. at VDC. Due to redactions in this email, it was unclear to whom it was sent although the Assistant Commissioner responded and thanked her. There were additional emails reflecting transfer discussions among the various stakeholders. Shortly after this email was sent, Sherry Johnson of WDC advised she hand delivered the consent package to N.A.'s mother and advised that the packet needed to be completed prior to N.A.'s arrival at VDC on September 21, 2023. On September 21, 2023, a social worker with the Department of Human Services (DHS) confirmed the mother would be arriving at VDC around 10:15 a.m., and N.A. would arrive around 10:45 a.m. The same day, the mother executed various documents consenting to N.A.'s medical care at VDC. She also posted a message on social media criticizing WDC and praising VDC. In her post, the mother wrote she was "extremely impressed" with VDC and was encouraged that "we finally have a bright ray of hope" because VDC was "thriving and strong," while WDC was "horrifically deficient." She shared this post with the Assistant Commissioner. A-3203-24 5 Two weeks later, the mother emailed individuals at the DHS, which oversees the DDD, stating she never requested a transfer to VDC; she did not want N.A. at VDC; and N.A. should be returned to WDC as soon as possible. She added, "[n]ow that his decayed teeth have been extracted his behaviors are more manageable." The mother sent a similar email to the Assistant Commissioner. In an October 26, 2023 letter, the Chief of Staff of DDD advised the mother that her concerns and request to transfer N.A. had been reviewed, but the transfer request was denied. The letter also informed the mother of her right to appeal the denial decision. On or around November 17, 2023, the mother appealed to the DDD. The matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) in March 2024. Procedural History On December 20, 2024, the DDD filed a motion for summary decision, which the mother opposed. The DDD argued it has the exclusive authority to make placement decisions and must assess the best interest of the patient as well as the facilities at issue. In opposition, the mother relied on a self-serving certification and her own testimony that she never consented to N.A.'s transfer to VDC and had advised three people that she did not want N.A. transferred to VDC. However, the A-3203-24 6 mother submitted no corroborating evidence or certifications from those three people. The mother also expressed concerns about the gender and age demographics at WDC versus VDC. Addressing the consent issue, the DDD explained the forms a guardian signs authorize consent to DDD's services, but the parent is not entitled to control a child's specific placement, treatment or provider. The DDD also emphasized the options were explained to the mother, and knowing the options she consented to N.A.'s transfer to VDC. Regarding the mother's request that N.A. be sent to Ancora, the DDD explained that it "does not have authority to commit clients involuntarily to a psychiatric hospital."2 The DDD determined it was best to place N.A. in another developmental center, which was deemed the least restrictive setting. The DDD further argued it should be afforded deference absent an arbitrary and capricious decision. After citing the general summary judgment standard, the ALJ noted the Uniform Administrative Procedural Rules including the rule governing summary decision, are designed to "achieve just results, simplicity in procedure, 2 Commitment proceedings are governed by a different statutory and regulatory scheme. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1 to -27 and Rule 4:74-7. An action for commitment to treatment "shall be commenced either through a screening service referral or upon independent application for a temporary court order." R. 4:74-7(b). A-3203-24 7 fairness in administration and the elimination of unjust expense and delay. " N.J.A.C. 1.1-1.3(a). Citing In re Civil Commitment of U.C., 423 N.J. Super. 601, 610 (App. Div. 2012), the ALJ agreed that the DDD had exclusive authority to place N.A., and no other agency or the court could override such a decision. While there may have been some issues of fact, the ALJ concluded those facts were not material to disposition of the DDD's motion. The ALJ found the transfer denial was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious because (1) it was in N.A.'s best interest to remain at VDC, and (2) the ALJ had no authority to override the DDD's denial of the request. The ALJ further suggested it would be "prudent" for the DDD to address the mother's current placement concerns to ensure placement was appropriate although the mother did not seek that relief in her appeal. The Deputy Commissioner of the DHS adopted the ALJ's finding that the denial of the transfer was not arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law. The Deputy Commissioner emphasized that the Assistant Commissioner had submitted a sworn affidavit detailing his conversation with the mother; referring to several potential placements; analyzing what was best for N.A.; and recommending VDC was the best placement for N.A. The Deputy Commissioner also enumerated some factual disputes but explained none of A-3203-24 8 them related to any material facts. The Deputy Commissioner relied on In re Civil Commitment of U.C. for the same reasons as the ALJ. However, the Deputy Commissioner stated the ALJ's suggestion that the DDD review N.A.'s placement at VDC was not properly before the OAL for decision. II. The scope of our review is limited. As a general matter, an agency decision will be upheld unless "'there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record. '" Russo v. Board of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)). Our review is limited to determining: (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. [Monmouth Cnty. Prosecutor's Off. v. Off. of Att'y Gen., Dep't of L. & Pub. Safety, 480 N.J. Super. 33, 40 (App. Div. 2024), certif. denied, 260 N.J. 449 (2025) (quoting Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014)).] A-3203-24 9 "When an agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28 (citations omitted). "On the other hand, [appellate courts] are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue." In re Hearn, 417 N.J. Super. 289, 298 (App. Div. 2010) (citing In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). "On such issues, our standard of review is plenary." Ibid. We stress that "[the appellate court's] review is not 'perfunctory,' nor is [the court's] 'function . . . merely [to] rubberstamp an agency's decision[.]'" Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 239 (App. Div. 2019) (omission in original) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 2010)). Rather, we are "constrained to engage in a 'careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings.'" Ibid. (quoting Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000)). The New Jersey Administrative Code is intended to "establish standards for the composition and operation of the Division of Developmental Disabilities' Human Rights Committees (HRC[s]), as well as those in agencies under contract with or regulated by the Division." N.J.A.C. 10:41A-1.1. A-3203-24 10 III. The mother's appeal focuses on three issues: whether she was entitled to a hearing; whether she consented to the transfer to VDC; and whether the ALJ and agency final decisions denying N.A.'s transfer back to WDC were arbitrary and capricious. As a threshold issue, the mother was not entitled to a hearing. See J.E. ex rel. G.E. v. State, 131 N.J. 552, 562 (1993) (stating a hearing regarding placement of DDD client is "not required either by statute or as a matter of constitutional right"). The mother's argument regarding her consent to transfer N.A. also fails. Despite insisting that she did not consent to transfer N.A. to VDC, the mother failed to proffer any evidence except her own self-serving recollection of events. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the record is replete with evidence that the mother did consent. The mother signed various consent forms and went to VDC to facilitate N.A.'s transfer and, therefore, understood the situation. The record lacks any communications evidencing the mother's refusal to transfer her son to VDC, rendering summary disposition on this issue proper.3 3 The mother downplays the pivotal fact that she requested N.A.'s transfer from WDC in the first instance and insisted that he not be returned to that facility. A-3203-24 11 Even if we accepted the mother's argument that she did not consent to N.A.'s transfer, her argument fails as a matter of law. A recipient of DDD services has some rights. See J.E., 131 N.J. at 565. However, those rights are not unbridled. "[T]he Legislature has delegated exclusive authority to the DDD to determine the appropriate placement of a developmentally disabled person eligible for services. Therefore, a trial court . . . lacks authority to override the DDD's determination of an appropriate placement for that person." U.C., 423 N.J. Super. at 603-04 (emphasis added); see also N.J.S.A. 30:6D-27 (recognizing the DDD's duty to provide the most appropriate services if available). "[T]he decision as to the type and availability of services that any DDD client receives is . . . allocated to the Commissioner." Rosen v. N.J. Div. of Dev. Disab., 256 N.J. Super. 629, 641 (App. Div. 1992). This is because the "DDD is faced with the daunting and unenviable task of attempting to provide for a large number of clients with inadequate funding for placement for all those in need of services." J.D. ex rel. D.D.H. v. N.J. Div. of Dev. Disab., 329 N.J. Super. 516, 522 (App. Div. 2000). Additionally, she selected VDC despite the DDD's recommendation that N.A. remain in WDC. A-3203-24 12 Here, we are unpersuaded by the mother's factual and legal arguments that N.A. should have been transferred back to WDC because the mother failed to demonstrate the agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious. The ALJ recited a detailed timeline of events; provided an analysis of the potentially available facilities; and then gave a recommendation regarding the facility placement in N.A.'s best interest. The ALJ also cited legal support establishing the DDD's authority to make placement decisions, and those decisions cannot be modified by the courts absent findings that the decisions are arbitrary and capricious. Affording substantial deference to the DDD's expertise and superior knowledge in the placement of developmentally disabled individuals, we affirm. A-3203-24 13