In re Mabel F. CA2/3

Filed 10/29/26 In re Mabel F. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE In re MABEL F., et al., Persons Coming B334142 Under the Juvenile Court Law. _____________________________________ (Los Angeles County LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03150) DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JANE F., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Commissioner. Affirmed. Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.  Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Principal Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ In this consolidated appeal, Jane F. (mother) challenges a jurisdiction and disposition order entered December 4, 2023, and a May 28, 2024 order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction and awarding Ferdinand F. (father) sole legal and physical custody of the couple’s two children. Mother contends the jurisdictional findings and removal order were not supported by substantial evidence, and the juvenile court abused its discretion by entering a disposition order that limited mother to monitored visits and allowed her older daughter to decline conjoint counseling. Mother also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating its jurisdiction in May 2024, awarding father sole legal custody, and requiring that mother’s future visits with the children be monitored. We find no error, and thus we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Detention; petition. Mother and father have two children together: Mabel F. (born in May 2008) and Fiona F. (born in November 2010). In August 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that mother appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol when she picked up 12-year-old Fiona from school. Mother’s speech was slurred, her movements were erratic, and she appeared disoriented. Mother subsequently acknowledged having used 2 cocaine that day and said she was addicted to fentanyl. A police officer called to the school recalled arresting mother a year earlier for driving under the influence of cocaine. Fifteen-year-old Mabel said mother often moved erratically, babbled, and was verbally aggressive. A month earlier, Fiona had found small bags of pills and powders hidden in an article of clothing; at other times, Mabel found small empty bags near where mother sat. Mabel believed mother used cocaine and fentanyl and drove with Fiona while she was high. Mabel sometimes felt afraid at home when mother was “stomping and screaming.” She said if she could change anything in her life, she would want her parents to divorce and her mother to get help. Mabel reported that in 2021, mother put her finger on Mabel’s anus for 30 seconds when she was high. Mabel did not know why mother did that and it did not happen again. Mother used to tell Mabel she was stupid and pathetic, but that stopped when a social worker interviewed the family a year earlier. Mabel had considered suicide in the past, usually when mother was “being weird,” and had intentionally hurt herself by jabbing a blunt object into her thighs and arms. Father said mother was bitten by a tick as a child and had begun having symptoms of Lyme disease four or five years earlier. Mother used to take prescription opiates, but when that no longer helped she began self-medicating with cocaine. Father had never addressed mother’s drug use because he did not think she was a risk to the children. Father said he used to use cocaine at parties, most recently a year earlier. He was willing to drug test. A social worker visited the family home, describing it as unkempt and having an overpowering smell of urine. Father 3 slept in one bedroom, the girls shared a second bedroom, and mother slept on a mattress in the living room. On August 31, 2023, Mabel reported recent self-harm and suicidal thoughts during a visit to urgent care. On September 1, 2023, father enrolled himself in an inpatient drug rehabilitation program, explaining that he knew he could not produce a clean drug test. He admitted using opiates laced with fentanyl, then fentanyl pills, and then snorting fentanyl. DCFS filed a petition in September 2023 alleging that mother had a history of substance abuse and currently abused cocaine, opiates, and fentanyl (count b-1); father had a history of substance abuse and currently abused fentanyl (count b-2); mother sexually abused Mabel (counts b-3, d-1, j-1); and mother emotionally abused Mabel by making disparaging remarks about her, causing Mabel to experience depression, anxiety disorder, trauma, suicidal ideation, and self-harming behavior (count c-1). On September 18, 2023, the children were detained and placed in foster care. II. Jurisdiction and disposition. Father completed a 30-day inpatient addiction treatment program on September 30, 2023, during which he underwent detoxification and rehabilitation. In October 2023, he enrolled in an intensive outpatient program, and he tested negative for all drugs in October and November 2023. On October 30, the juvenile court released the children to father. Mother enrolled in therapy in mid-October 2023 and completed two sessions by the end of the month. She tested negative for drugs in October and November 2023. On November 30, she enrolled in drug treatment. 4  The juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction hearing on December 4, 2023. Mother’s physician, Dr. Mary Raleigh, testified that she had treated mother for Lyme disease and chronic pain since 2016. According to Dr. Raleigh, Lyme disease can cause psychiatric symptoms, tics, nausea, hallucinations, pain, and insomnia. Dr. Raleigh prescribed mother a variety of antibiotics to treat the Lyme disease and Oxycontin for pain. In July 2023, Dr. Raleigh stopped prescribing Oxycontin after mother disclosed she was seeing a therapist for opiate dependence. Dr. Raleigh never prescribed mother fentanyl. Mother’s counsel argued that DCFS had not met its burden to prove any of the allegations of the petition. Alternatively, counsel requested that the children be placed with the parents under DCFS supervision or that mother be permitted unmonitored visits. Father’s counsel asked that the allegations as to him be stricken and that any disposition order be narrowly tailored. Minor’s counsel acknowledged that mother was suffering from a serious disease that caused her chronic pain, but argued that mother’s choice to self-medicate with cocaine and fentanyl posed a serious safety risk to the children. Counsel asked the court to order the children to remain placed with father and to permit mother monitored visits. On December 4, 2023, the juvenile court sustained the (b) and (c) counts of the petition with minor amendments and dismissed the (d) and (j) counts. The court found there were no reasonable ways to protect the children without removing them from mother, and ordered that they remain with father under a family maintenance plan. Both parents were ordered to complete full drug and alcohol programs and participate in individual 5 counseling. Mother was permitted monitored visits with the children, and she was ordered to participate in conjoint counseling with Mabel if Mabel agreed. Mother timely appealed from the disposition order. III. Six-month review hearing. In May 2024, DCFS reported that Mabel and Fiona were thriving in father’s care. Father had enrolled in an outpatient addiction treatment program in October 2023 and was expected to graduate from the program in early June 2024. According to his counselor, father had demonstrated a sincere desire to remain clean and sober, had a sponsor through Narcotics Anonymous, and had consistently tested negative for all drugs since October 2023. Father had been participating in weekly individual therapy. Mabel had been participating in individual therapy, reported great improvement in her self-esteem, and was excelling in school. Fiona had discontinued therapy, but was happy at home and was doing well academically. Both girls said they felt safe at home with father. Mother had not completed any of the elements of her case plan. She missed many drug tests between November 2023 and May 2024, including five tests in March and May 2024, and she tested positive for cocaine in December 2023 and January 2024. When asked about her positive drug test in December, mother admitted using cocaine at a party. Mother had not provided DCFS with proof of participation in individual counseling or drug treatment. Mother had regular visits with Fiona, but Mabel refused visits and conjoint counseling after mother appeared to be under the influence in November 2023. The juvenile court held a six-month review hearing on May 28, 2024. Mother testified that she had attended 15 virtual 6 therapy sessions with a licensed clinical social worker and was continuing to see Dr. Raleigh for her various medical issues. Mother had been hospitalized several times and claimed she had missed drug tests and was not able to participate in a drug rehabilitation program because of her medical issues. She acknowledged testing positive for cocaine twice due to “poor decision making,” but said she had not used any illegal substances since January. Mother’s counsel asked that the children be returned to both parents or that mother be granted unmonitored overnight visits. Father’s counsel asked that father be given sole legal and physical custody, and mother be permitted monitored visits. Minors’ counsel noted that Fiona wished to have unmonitored visits with mother, but counsel urged that visits should remain monitored since mother had not established her sobriety. Counsel for DCFS concurred and asked that father be given sole legal and physical custody. The juvenile court found there was no need for continued jurisdiction and awarded father sole legal and physical custody. Mother was permitted twice-weekly visits, to remain monitored because of mother’s failure to fully comply with the case plan. Mother timely appealed from the May 28, 2024 order. 7  APPEAL FROM DISPOSITION ORDER Mother contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Alternatively, she contends the juvenile court erred by removing the children from her custody, allowing Mabel to decide whether conjoint counseling would occur, and limiting mother to monitored visits. For the reasons that follow, we find no error. I. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) provides that a child is within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction if, among other things, “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] [t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.” We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. “ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) 1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 8  “ ‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence.” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.) In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence unless those findings serve as the basis for dispositional orders that are challenged on appeal or could prejudice the parent. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276; In re A.T. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 1284, 1289–1290; In re Jayden A. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1334, 1343– 1345.) Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support count b-1 of the petition, which alleges that the children were endangered by mother’s abuse of cocaine, opiates, and fentanyl. The contention lacks merit. Mother admitted in August 2023 that she was addicted to fentanyl and had used cocaine before attempting to pick Fiona up from school on August 25. Mother previously had been arrested for driving under the influence of cocaine, and Mabel reported that mother sometimes drove while high with Fiona in the car, most recently in August 2023. The family home was unkempt and reeked of urine, and Mabel reported that she sometimes felt scared at home because mother screamed and threatened the family. Mabel also reported that mother had once touched her inappropriately while she was high. There thus was abundant evidence that mother had a substance abuse problem that placed the children at risk of harm. 9  Mother contends that although she had abused substances in the past, she had been admitted into a substance abuse and mental health treatment program and had been sober since September 2023. But there was limited evidence of mother’s sobriety: Although mother claimed to have stopped using drugs, her enrollment in drug rehabilitation was very recent, and at the time of the jurisdiction hearing she had only five clean drug tests and had missed one test. In any event, “[i]t is the nature of addiction that one must be ‘clean’ for a much longer period than 120 days to show real reform” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531, fn. 9), and “short and recent periods of sobriety are often not enough to counter a long-standing pattern of use and relapse” (In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1277). (See also In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [recent sobriety “reflects ‘changing,’ not changed, circumstances”].)2 On this record, therefore, the juvenile court was not required to conclude that mother was sober and did not pose a risk to her children. Mother also contends, citing In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 766, that drug use will support a jurisdictional finding only if there is substantial evidence that a medical professional has diagnosed the parent as having a current substance abuse problem, or the parent has a substance abuse problem as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). But our Supreme Court disapproved Drake M. in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 532, 2 Indeed, mother tested positive for cocaine on December 6, just two days after the jurisdiction hearing. She then missed the next three tests and then tested positive for cocaine on January 12, 2024. 10 538–556, which held that while a professional diagnosis or satisfaction of the DSM criteria for a substance use disorder can be relevant to ascertaining the existence of substance abuse for purposes of section 300, subdivision (b), the statute does not require such proof. Instead, “ ‘substance abuse’ ” for purposes of dependency jurisdiction “bears its ordinary meaning of excessive use of drugs or alcohol” and “may be established without a professional medical diagnosis of current substance abuse or satisfaction of the pertinent DSM criteria.” (In re N.R., at pp. 555–556, italics added.) Here, there unquestionably was substantial evidence that mother abused substances within the ordinary meaning of the term. Having concluded that substantial evidence supported count b-1 of the petition, we need not consider whether substantial evidence supported the petition’s other allegations. As noted above, where a juvenile court finds multiple bases for jurisdiction, a reviewing court need not consider whether all are supported by the evidence unless the additional findings serve as the basis for dispositional orders that are challenged on appeal or could prejudice the parent. Here, mother does not identify any ways in which the b-3 or c-1 counts of the petition served as a basis for the dispositional orders or otherwise prejudiced her. We therefore need not consider whether substantial evidence supported them. II. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s order removing the children from mother. Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides that a child shall not be taken from a parent’s physical custody unless the juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that there would be a substantial danger to the child’s physical or emotional well- 11 being if placed with the parent, and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removing the child from the parent’s physical custody. “A removal order is proper if based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a potential detriment to the child if he or she remains with the parent. (In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52, 60.) ‘The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.’ [Citation.] The court may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169– 170.) We review a dispositional order removing a child from a parent for substantial evidence, “ ‘ “keeping in mind that the trial court was required to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.” ’ (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.)” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960.) In applying this standard of review, “ ‘the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.] We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Ibid.) Mother contends that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s removal order because she had been sober since September 2023, and thus the children were no longer at 12 risk of harm based on her conduct. Not so. As discussed in the prior section, mother’s drug use unquestionably placed the children at risk of harm: There was evidence that mother had touched Mabel sexually while high and had driven with Fiona in the car while under the influence of cocaine. Further, even if mother had been sober for three months, as she claimed, the juvenile court was not required to conclude that her long- standing addiction to cocaine and opiates did not continue to place the children at risk of harm. There thus was substantial evidence that the children could not be protected without removing them from mother’s physical custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Mother contends that DCFS could have protected the children without removing them from her custody by providing her with enhancement services and ordering DCFS to make frequent unannounced visits. But unannounced home visits would not have ensured the children’s safety when DCFS was not in the home. (See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“Unannounced visits can only assess the situation and [a parent’s] sobriety at the time of the visit”].) The juvenile court did not err in so concluding. III. Mother forfeited her challenge to the conjoint counseling order. Mother contends the order for conjoint counseling between mother and Mabel was an impermissible delegation of the juvenile court’s authority over visitation. Mother did not raise this objection below, thus forfeiting it. (See, e.g., In re H.D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 814, 817 [“ ‘Forfeiture . . . applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the 13 proceedings’ ”]; In re P.L. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 406, 409 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court’ ”].) In any event, Mabel is no longer a minor, and thus mother’s challenge to the conjoint counseling order is moot. (See In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 13; In re D.B. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 592, 603, fn. 5.) IV. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by restricting mother to monitored visits. The juvenile court has broad discretion in ordering visitation between dependent children and their parents. (In re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557; Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1162–1163.) In making visitation orders, the court is guided by the principle that “[v]isitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138.) Equally important, however, is the statutory dictate that “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Thus, visitation orders necessarily involve “a balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation. The court may, of course, impose any other conditions or requirements to further define the right to visitation in light of the particular circumstances of the case before it.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) We review an order setting visitation terms for abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb the order unless the trial court made an arbitrary, capricious, or 14 patently absurd determination. (In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.) Mother contends the juvenile court erred by requiring her visits to be monitored because she was no longer using opiates or cocaine. But as we have said, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that mother’s longstanding addiction continued to place the children at risk of harm. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion by ordering that mother’s visits would remain monitored until mother could establish her sobriety through additional drug treatment and testing. APPEAL FROM SIX-MONTH REVIEW ORDER Mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating its jurisdiction in May 2024, awarding father sole legal custody of the children, and permitting her only monitored visits. We find no abuse of discretion. I. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating jurisdiction at the six-month review hearing. A juvenile court may terminate its jurisdiction if juvenile court services no longer are necessary to protect the child from risk of harm. (In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 624; Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 304.) In deciding whether to terminate jurisdiction, the relevant “question is whether juvenile court services and ongoing supervision [are] necessary to protect the child from harm.” (In re D.B., at p. 624.) If the child is safe, “then services and supervision [are] unnecessary and the juvenile court [can] close the case.” (Ibid.) We review the relevant order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) 15  Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating jurisdiction because father continued to pose a risk to the children in view of his history of serious substance abuse and domestic violence with mother. But mother did not make this argument below, instead arguing that the children should be placed with both parents. The argument therefore is forfeited. (See In re H.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 817; In re P.L., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 409.) On the merits, as DCFS notes, father entered and completed an in-patient drug rehabilitation program in September 2023. He thereafter enrolled in a six-month outpatient program, where he consistently tested negative for all drugs. Father’s counselor reported that father demonstrated a sincere desire to remain clean and sober, had a sponsor through Narcotics Anonymous, and was expected to graduate from the program in early June 2024. Father attended individual counseling weekly and had enrolled both girls in therapy. The girls were thriving in his care and said they felt safe at home. The juvenile court therefore was entitled to conclude that father’s past drug use did not pose a current risk to the children. Mother also contends father posed a risk to the children because of an unaddressed history of domestic violence with mother. But while mother claimed she was the victim of domestic violence by father, Mabel, Fiona, and father all identified mother as the aggressor in the single reported incident of domestic violence in 2022. In any event, by the time jurisdiction was terminated, the parents had separated and did not intend to reconcile. For all of these reasons, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that by May 2024, juvenile court 16 jurisdiction and supervision were no longer necessary to protect the children. The juvenile court therefore did not err by terminating its jurisdiction. II. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by awarding father sole legal custody and denying mother’s request for unmonitored visits. “ ‘When the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, section 362.4 authorizes it to make custody and visitation orders that will be transferred to an existing family court file and remain in effect until modified or terminated by the superior court.’ ” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 203; § 362.4.) We review the juvenile court’s decision to issue a custody order pursuant to section 362.4 for an abuse of discretion “and may not disturb the order unless the court ‘ “ ‘exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Bridget A. v. Superior Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 300.) The family law presumption favoring joint custody does not apply to juvenile court custody orders entered upon termination of jurisdiction. (In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206; In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711–713.) Instead, “ ‘[w]hen making a custody determination in any dependency case, the court’s focus and primary consideration must always be the best interests of the child. [Citations.] Furthermore, the court is not restrained by “any preferences or presumptions.” [Citation.] Thus, for example, a finding that neither parent poses any danger to the child does not mean that both are equally entitled to half custody, since joint physical custody may not be in the child’s best interests for a variety of reasons.’ ” (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102–103.) 17  Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by awarding father sole legal custody and allowing her only monitored visits because she was sober and had made significant progress in her treatment goals. But mother tested positive for cocaine in December 2023 and January 2024 and missed nine drug tests between January and May 2024, including the five drug tests immediately before the May 2024 review hearing. Further, mother had not completed a drug program and had not provided DCFS with proof that she had enrolled in individual counseling. On this record, the juvenile court was well within its discretion in concluding that permitting mother joint legal custody and unmonitored visits with the children was not in their best interests. 18  DISPOSITION The December 4, 2023 and May 28, 2024 orders are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ASHWORTH, J.* We concur: ADAMS, P. J. HANASONO, J. * Retired Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 19