Amelio v. Amelio

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Amelio v. Amelio ANASTASIA R. AMELIO v. CARMINE P. AMELIO (AC 48133) Moll, Suarez and Westbrook, Js. Syllabus The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dis- solved, appealed from the trial court’s judgments granting two motions for contempt filed by the plaintiff. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly held him in contempt for violating the parties’ separation agreement by failing to pay the plaintiff $300 per month for their children’s expenses. Held: This court declined to review the defendant’s claims on appeal, as they were inadequately briefed. Argued April 28—officially released September 22, 2026 Procedural History Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury and tried to the court, Winslow, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation agreement; thereafter, the court, Laskos, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, and the defendant appealed to this court; subsequently, the court, Vizcar- rondo, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, and the defendant filed an amended appeal. Affirmed. Carmine P. Amelio, self-represented, the appellant (defendant). Anastasia R. Amelio, self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff). Opinion SUAREZ, J. The self-represented defendant, Carmine P. Amelio, appeals from the judgments of the trial court granting two postjudgment motions for contempt filed by the self-represented plaintiff, Anastasia R. Amelio. On appeal, the defendant raises a multitude of claims regarding the court’s decisions to find him in contempt for (1) violating the parties’ separation agreement by  Amelio v. Amelio failing to pay the plaintiff $300 per month for their children’s expenses and (2) violating the parties’ joint custody arrangement as to the driving rights of the par- ties’ seventeen and one-half year old son. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are rel- evant to this appeal. The parties were married on July 4, 2004, and have two issue of the marriage. Following the subsequent breakdown of the parties’ marriage, the parties entered into a separation agreement that the court, Winslow, J., incorporated into its judgment of dissolution. The court found that the parties’ marriage had broken down irretrievably, found that the parties’ separation agreement was fair and equitable, and, on June 26, 2013, rendered judgment dissolving the par- ties’ marriage. Pursuant to the separation agreement, the parties agreed that “[m]ajor decisions, which shall be defined as those key issues affecting each child’s health, growth and development; course of study; extent of travel away from home, including participation on sports travel team(s); choice of camp; major medical treatment; les- sons; psychotherapy, psychoanalysis or like treatment; part or full-time employment; purchase or operation of a motor vehicle; [e]specially hazardous sports or activi- ties; religious upbringing; non-emergency health care; significant changes in social environment; and decisions relating to actual or potential litigation involving a child directly or as a beneficiary, other than custody, shall be considered in depth and agreed to between the parties. Neither party shall make any major decisions regarding either minor child without the other party’s express con- sent or pursuant to further [c]ourt order. The [parties] specifically recognize that the privileges conferred by a joint custody arrangement shall not be exercised for the purpose of frustrating, denying or controlling, in any manner, the lifestyle of the other [party].” The parties further agreed that “[d]ay-to-day deci- sions of a routine nature, including but not limited to  Amelio v. Amelio bedtime, homework, health care, and day-to-day school, religious, social and athletic activities customary for a child of his or her age and maturity, and general rules of conduct, such as prohibited activities, curfews, and household obligations, shall be made by the [party] with whom the children are actually then staying. The [parties] shall cooperate and establish a mutually agreeable policy regarding such day-to-day decisions, but the primary responsibility for routine decisions shall rest with the [party] with whom the children are then staying.” Moreover, the parties agreed that “no child support shall be payable from one party to the other” but that the defendant was obligated to “pay to the [plaintiff] the sum of [$300] per month as his contribution towards clothing, grooming expenses, school related expenses including lunches, birthday parties and school trips, summer camps, etc. incurred on behalf of the minor children. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this paragraph shall create a right in the [defendant] to seek reimbursement for any such items he purchases on behalf of the children.” On November 17, 2023, the plaintiff filed a postjudg- ment motion for contempt (November 2023 contempt motion). The plaintiff alleged therein that the defen- dant had “not paid his ‘kid expense payments’ of $300 per month . . . for September 2023, October 2023, and November 2023 for a total amount owed of $900.” The court ordered the parties to appear for a resolution plan date1 on December 15, 2023. Over the next several months, the court granted several continuances of that date. In April 2024, the defendant filed a request for a con- tinuance and, alternatively, requested a “remote hearing 1 See Practice Book § 25-50A (“[t]he Pathways approach shall be fol- lowed and shall include: (a) [a] resolution plan date, which shall be assigned in dissolution of marriage . . . cases . . . to meet with a family relations counselor to identify: (1) all matters where the parties agree; (2) how likely the parties are to reach an agreement on any disputed issues; and (3) the resources needed to resolve the case”).  Amelio v. Amelio pursuant [to his] request [pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and] medical issues.” The court denied the continuance but granted the defendant’s request to appear remotely. Also in April 2024, the defendant filed a motion for modification seek- ing to eliminate his monthly $300 contribution nunc pro tunc effective August 2023. The court scheduled a resolution plan date on the defendant’s motion for modification for May 24, 2024, but the defendant filed a request for a continuance, which the court granted. The court held a hearing on the November 2023 con- tempt motion on June 25, 2024. At the hearing, the defendant requested that the court state its oath of office to ensure that he “can have that confidence that we’re gonna have a fair and impartial hearing.” The court denied the request. The defendant then orally requested another continuance so that the court could rule on his motion for modification. The court also denied that request. The plaintiff testified at the June 25, 2024 hearing that the defendant made a partial payment of his owed monthly contributions in January 2024, which covered his monthly payment obligations through November 2023. The plaintiff then testified that, since that time, the defendant had failed to pay any of his contribution amounts owed and that he was seven months in arrears on his payments. The defendant testified that he did not “have the ability to pay . . . .” At the conclusion of the hearing, the court kept the evidence open and ordered the defendant to file a financial affidavit. On August 1, 2024, the plaintiff filed another post- judgment motion for contempt (August 2024 contempt motion), alleging that the defendant violated the disso- lution judgment by, inter alia, withholding their son’s driver’s license, thereby limiting their son’s ability to drive while he was in the plaintiff’s physical custody. On September 3, 2024, the court granted the November 2023 contempt motion. The court found the plaintiff’s  Amelio v. Amelio testimony to be credible and did not credit the defen- dant’s testimony that he could not pay the plaintiff. The court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $2100 by October 4, 2024, representing the payments owed between December 2023 and July 2024, with inter- est accruing at the rate of 8 percent per annum. The defendant filed a motion for clarification and a motion to reargue/reconsider, both of which the court denied. Thereafter, the defendant timely appealed to this court. On December 19, 2024, the court, Vizcarrondo, J., held a hearing on the August 2024 contempt motion. At the hearing, the defendant again requested that the court state its oath of office “[f]or the purposes of impar- tiality and clarity . . . .” The court denied the request. During the hearing, the defendant iterated his request to continue the hearing on the August 2024 contempt motion until there was a ruling on his motion for modi- fication. The court denied that request, stating that the defendant’s motion for modification “has nothing to do with historically what we’re [talking] about here. If [the motion for modification is] granted, it will be granted going forward.” The court further stated: “[The plain- tiff] has the right to file a contempt action, sir. She has the right. You have an agreement. She believes it’s not being complied with . . . .” After hearing from both parties, the court granted the August 2024 contempt motion, finding that the defen- dant “violated the parties’ joint custody arrangement” and that he “has imposed, unilaterally, a list of significant prohibitions on [the ability of the parties’ son] to drive a motor vehicle.” The court noted that “[t]he defendant testified stridently that he has every right as a father to impose restrictions on his minor child, regardless of whether the state of Connecticut has granted [the parties’ son] an unrestricted driver’s license, which it has. . . . For her part, the plaintiff agreed that as a recently licensed driver, certain limitations on [the ability of the parties’ son] to drive are reasonable, but she objects  Amelio v. Amelio to the universal imposition of such restrictions during her parenting time without her input and consent.” The court determined that the parties’ separation agreement clearly and unambiguously required that the parties mutually agree on whether their son could operate a motor vehicle during his minority. The court stated that the parties “agreed that he should, [and] he therefore obtained a license . . . .” The court determined that, because the parties’ son was a “duly licensed driver under Connecticut law,” his operation of a motor vehicle was “relegated to an ongoing ‘day-to-day decision of a routine nature’ ” and stated that the parties’ agreement “expressly provides that each has authority to establish ‘general rules of conduct,’ to include ‘prohibited activi- ties’ for their son’s protection.” The court concluded that, “[i]n dictating the terms and conditions under which [the parties’ son] may drive, including during the plaintiff’s parenting time, the defendant has acted wilfully to suppress the plaintiff’s parenting authority in violation of the joint custody arrangement. He is adjudicated in contempt by clear and convincing evidence.” The court further concluded that, even if the driving privileges of the parties’ son remained a “major decision subject to mutual consent, the defendant has wilfully violated the agreement’s good faith provision.” The court found that, in contravention of their joint custody arrangement, “[i]n this case, the defendant has made clear that it is his way or the high- way. . . . [T]his court finds that the defendant is wilfully and unreasonably . . . ‘frustrating and controlling the lifestyle of the other parent.’ For that independent rea- son, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant is in wilful contempt of the joint parenting arrangement.” The defendant subsequently filed an amended appeal to include the court’s granting of the August 2024 contempt motion. We begin by setting forth the following legal prin- ciples. “[T]he court’s authority to impose civil contempt penalties arises not from statutory provisions but from  Amelio v. Amelio the common law. . . . The penalties which may be imposed . . . arise from the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders. In Connecticut, the court has the authority in civil contempt to impose on the contemnor either incarceration or a fine or both.” (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Jacob-Dick v. Dick, 231 Conn. App. 404, 415, 333 A.3d 210 (2025). “To consti- tute contempt, it is not enough that a party has merely violated a court order; the violation must be wilful. . . . It is the burden of the party seeking an order of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive to the alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful noncompliance with that directive. . . . [T]he trial court’s determination that the violation was wilful [is governed by] the abuse of discre- tion standard. . . . We review the factual findings that underlie a court’s contempt determination pursuant to the clearly erroneous standard.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 411–12. We now turn to the issues raised on appeal. I The defendant first claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff’s November 2023 contempt motion. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court (1) improperly failed to conduct an ability to pay hearing with a jury in violation of his rights pursuant to the seventh amendment to the United States constitution; (2) violated his due process rights by intentionally delay- ing and refusing to hear his motion for modification; (3) fraudulently mischaracterized a voluntary $300 monthly payment as child support; (4) violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying his requests for reasonable accommodations; and (5) “fail[ed] to provide adequate findings and conclusions and [engaged in] dismissive and disparaging conduct towards [the defendant] [in viola- tion of] principles of fairness and impartiality.” Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the defendant’s appellate briefs, we conclude that we cannot properly  Amelio v. Amelio address this claim on appeal because it is inadequately briefed, and, thus, we decline to review it. “We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy- sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. . . . In addition, briefing is inadequate when it is not only short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorga- nized.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alterio v. Spak, 237 Conn. App. 84, 90, 349 A.3d 614 (2026). Moreover, “[t]he parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited. . . . [A]ssignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn. App. 619, 635, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 888 A.2d 92 (2005), and cert. denied, 276 Conn. 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005). “We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonetheless, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. Cleary, 229 Conn. App. 15, 36, 326 A.3d 1109 (2024).  Amelio v. Amelio In the present case, the defendant first argues that, in granting the November 2023 contempt motion, the court improperly failed to conduct a jury trial on his ability to pay in violation of his seventh amendment rights. The defendant devotes less than one page of analysis to this claim in his principal appellate brief. “Although the number of pages devoted to an argument in a brief is not necessarily determinative, relative sparsity weighs in favor of concluding that the argument has been inad- equately briefed.” State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 726, 138 A.3d 868 (2016). This is especially so with respect to constitutional claims, “which are often analytically complex.” Id.; see also Estate of Rock v. University of Connecticut, 323 Conn. 26, 33, 144 A.3d 420 (2016) (“[c]laims are . . . inadequately briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The defendant cites to two federal decisions in support of his seventh amendment claim: Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 180 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2011), and Jarkesy v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 34 F.4th 446 (5th Cir. 2022), aff’d, 603 U.S. 109, 144 S. Ct. 2117, 219 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2024). The defendant, however, did not engage in any meaningful analysis of how those authorities apply to the present case.2 “[F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. . . . The 2 The limited arguments presented by the defendant in support of this claim are difficult to understand, conclusory, and/or incorrect. See, e.g., Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc., 234 Conn. App. 581, 593–94, 344 A.3d 208, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 926, 345 A.3d 811 (2025) (“[i]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The defendant baldly asserts that “[t]he contempt sanctions imposed without an ability to pay hearing or jury trial contravene [Jarkesy v. Securities & Exchange Commission, supra, 34 F.4th 446], which mandates jury trials for punitive civil contempt.” The defendant’s reliance on Jarkesy, however, is misplaced, as that case concerned the issue of whether the right to a jury trial applied to  Amelio v. Amelio parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hadji v. Snow, 232 Conn. App. 829, 858, 339 A.3d 1168, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 958 (2025). Similarly, the defendant refers to certain guidelines from the United States Department of Justice that he alleges the court violated, without explaining what those guidelines specifically provide and without engaging in any meaningful analysis of how the court allegedly violated those guidelines.3 Likewise, the defendant’s briefing of his argument that the court violated his due process rights by delay- ing and/or refusing to hear his motion for modification is wholly deficient. The defendant asserts that the court intentionally delayed and/or refused “to hear [his] timely motion for modification,” but he does not provide any legal authority or analysis to support his claim on appeal. The defendant has not offered any reason as to why the court could not have ruled on the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, particularly as the record reveals that the defendant himself requested a continuance of the hearing on his motion for modification, which the court granted. As this court has previously stated, “[i]t was incumbent on the [defendant] to provide a meaningful analysis of his claim[s] . . . and to include citations to relevant legal authority and an application of that law to the facts in the present case. . . . [I]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission seeking civil penalties under securities statutes. Id., 453–54. In even more cursory fashion, the defendant cites to Turner v. Rogers, supra, 564 U.S. 431, without offering any analysis concerning that case at all. In any event, Turner did not address the right to a jury trial at all and is thus inapposite to the defendant’s claim. 3 Although the defendant asserts that the Department of Justice guide- lines “prohibit incarceration absent [a] wilfulness determination,” he does not claim that he was wrongfully incarcerated by the court, and, furthermore, the court in the present case did find that the defendant wilfully failed to pay the plaintiff the ordered amounts.  Amelio v. Amelio the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc., 234 Conn. App. 581, 593–94, 344 A.3d 208, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 926, 345 A.3d 811 (2025). With respect to the defendant’s claim that the court “fraudulently mischaracterize[d] a voluntary $300 monthly payment as child support to obtain Title IV-D funding,” he has failed to cite to any such mischarac- terization in the record. Finally, the defendant has not cited to any applicable legal authorities or conducted any analysis in support of his argument. See, e.g., C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 631, 273 A.3d 271 (2022) (brief containing minimal relevant citation to record or applicable legal authorities was inadequately briefed). We therefore decline to review it. Next, the defendant argues that the court improperly denied him reasonable accommodations under the Ameri- cans with Disabilities Act, “despite documented history and limitations . . . .” Apart from his bare assertion that he had a “documented medical history,” however, the defendant does not identify any specific accommoda- tion request that was denied to him by the court, much less provide an explanation as to why such a request was denied improperly. To the contrary, the record reveals that the court did grant the defendant’s request for a remote hearing in light of his request under the Ameri- cans with Disabilities Act. Because it is unclear exactly which of the court’s rulings the defendant is challenging, we are unable to review his claim. Lastly, the defendant’s claim that the court violated the principles of fairness and impartiality by failing to pro- vide adequate findings and conclusions and in its “dismis- sive and disparaging conduct towards [the defendant]” is similarly deficient. In support of his claim, the defendant asserts that the court “[e]xhibit[ed] clear judicial bias through improper conduct.” The only specific conduct mentioned in his brief, however, is the court’s refusal to restate its judicial oath and its “[d]isparagement of [the  Amelio v. Amelio defendant] for attending a family burial and denial of [Americans with Disabilities Act] accommodations . . . .”4 The defendant fails to provide any citation supporting his proposition that the court was obligated to restate its judicial oath upon his request, and he does not provide any legal analysis as to his claim on appeal. Accordingly, “the sparsity and lack of substantive argument cause [his] brief to be inadequate for us to conduct any meaningful review of this claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. Cleary, supra, 229 Conn. App. 37. For the foregoing reasons, we decline to review the defendant’s first claim as it is inadequately briefed. II The defendant’s second claim is that the court improp- erly granted the August 2024 contempt motion. Specifi- cally, the defendant argues5 that the court (1) violated his fundamental right to direct his minor child’s upbring- ing; (2) improperly denied his motion for a continuance and improperly refused to restate its judicial oath; (3) should have been disqualified from presiding over the proceedings; (4) improperly ignored his parental rights over his son’s driving privileges pursuant to statute; (5) violated his due process rights; (6) exhibited bias and improperly refused to follow its own calendar; (7) improperly overrode his fundamental parental rights in violation of his constitutional rights; (8) improperly excluded critical evidence concerning child safety; and (9) exhibited judicial bias and denied the defendant a fair hearing due to procedural irregularities. We conclude that this claim, too, is inadequately briefed, and we therefore decline to address it. The defendant first argues that the court, in denying the August 2024 contempt motion, violated his fundamental 4 Our review of the record does not reveal any disparaging statements made by the trial court toward the defendant for attending a funeral, nor does the defendant cite to any specific statements made by the court concerning this issue. 5 For the purpose of clarity, we address these arguments in a slightly different order than they are set forth in the defendant’s principal appellate brief.  Amelio v. Amelio right to direct his minor child’s upbringing.6Apart from his bald assertion that the court violated his rights, how- ever, the defendant has not engaged in any meaningful analysis of this claim and why the court’s decision was erroneous. The defendant cites to Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000), but does not provide any analysis of how that case applies to the present one.7 The defendant also asserts, in conclusory fashion, that the court improperly denied his motion for a continuance with regard to the hearing on the August 2024 contempt motion in violation of his due process rights.8 The defen- dant’s briefing to this court, however, does not address the basis for the court’s denial of his motion for a continu- ance. Although the defendant argued that his motion for modification should be ruled on before the court’s hearing on the August 2024 contempt motion, the court rejected this assertion, stating that the defendant’s motion for 6 The defendant similarly asserts that the court’s “findings of con- tempt for a parenting disagreement violated due process” and that the court improperly “over[rode] [the defendant’s] fundamental parental rights without mutual consent, violating constitutional protections.” (Emphasis omitted.) We conclude that these arguments, which con- sist of less than one page each of analysis, are merely repetitive of his assertion that his fundamental rights to direct his minor child’s upbringing were violated and are also inadequately briefed. See C. B. v. S. B., supra, 211 Conn. App. 630 (“briefing is inadequate when it is not only short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 7 Even if this claim had been adequately briefed, we note that the court’s ruling on the driving privileges of the parties’ minor son merely reflected its interpretation of the parties’ separation agreement. Fur- thermore, this court previously has stated with respect to a parent’s constitutional right to make reasoned decisions about the welfare of their minor children that cases such as Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 U.S. 57, “shed no light on custody disputes between parents because each parent has an equal and undiminished constitutional right to make reasoned decisions about the welfare of his or her minor children.” (Emphasis omitted.) Kennedy v. Kennedy, 114 Conn. App. 143, 153 n.8, 968 A.2d 1002, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 918, 973 A.2d 1275 (2009). 8 In support of his second claim, the defendant again argues that the court improperly refused to restate its judicial oath. In part I of this opinion, we have rejected the defendant’s contention, and we need not revisit that issue here.  Amelio v. Amelio modification “has nothing to do with historically what we’re [talking] about here. If [the motion for modifica- tion is] granted, it will be granted going forward.” The court further stated: “[The plaintiff] has the right to file a contempt action, sir. She has the right. You have an agreement. She believes it’s not being complied with . . . .” Thus, by failing to address the dispositive bases for the court’s denial of the defendant’s request for a continuance, his brief is inadequate for us to conduct any meaningful review of this claim.9 See, e.g., Sicignano v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 692, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024) (concluding that, by failing to address dispositive bases for court’s conclusions, plaintiff’s brief was inadequate), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 908, 330 A.3d 881 (2025). Apart from labeling the court’s ruling denying his request for a continuance as “misconduct,” he has not provided any analysis of this argument, and, therefore, we decline to review it. Likewise, the defendant argues that the court improp- erly ignored his parental rights over his son’s driving privileges pursuant to statute, but he has not provided any analysis of this claim. The defendant relies on Gen- eral Statutes § 14-36 (c), but that statutory provision concerns the right of a person who is sixteen or seventeen years of age to obtain a youth instruction permit.10 The defendant also asserts that the court did not apply what he refers to as “safety factors” that this court allegedly applied in In re Tayquon H., 76 Conn. App. 693, 821 A.2d 796 (2003), but, upon our review, that decision 9 Although the defendant asserts that the proceedings on the August 2024 contempt motion were “[r]ushed” and that he had inadequate time to prepare a defense, again, the defendant has not pointed to any specific exhibits that he was not able to access before the hearing, and he has not pointed to any arguments that he purportedly required more time to prepare to articulate to the court. 10 At the December 19, 2024 hearing before the court, the defendant did not dispute that he allowed the parties’ minor son to obtain a youth instruction permit. The defendant stated: “[The plaintiff] stated that I purposely held back his permit. She’s stating that I wouldn’t allow [the parties’ minor child] to drive. Those are all lies, Your Honor.”  Amelio v. Amelio does not refer to any such “factors”11 and, moreover, that case concerned whether a maternal grandmother had standing to contest an order of temporary custody involving her grandchild. The defendant makes several arguments in support of his second claim concerning judicial bias and/or miscon- duct, all of which are inadequately briefed. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the court, Vizcarrondo, J., should have been disqualified from presiding over the contempt hearings in the present case because of his “prior removal by marshals . . . .” The sole support offered by the defendant with respect to this argument is his attachment to his principal appellate brief of an article purportedly discussing Judge Vizcarrondo, which the defendant had attached as an exhibit to a June 13, 2025 request titled “Request for Judicial Notice of Judicial Misconduct.” That request was denied by the court, and the court’s ruling thereon is not at issue in the pres- ent appeal. The defendant also has not explained in his brief the relevance of his allegations of prior judicial misconduct to the proceedings relating to the August 2024 contempt motion. Accordingly, this argument is inadequately briefed, and we decline to address it. Furthermore, the defendant repeatedly argues that the court exhibited bias by misrepresenting the defen- dant’s testimony concerning the age of the parties’ minor child. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the court misstated the age of the parties’ son as seventeen and one-half years old. The defendant asserts that he has “the authority to impose ‘driving rules’ on a sixteen year old” and that the judge “twisted” his testimony. The defendant does not cite to any evidence in the record to support his claim that the parties’ son was sixteen years 11 This court’s decision in In re Tayquon H., supra, 76 Conn. App. 693, does refer to General Statutes § 45a-604 (5), which enumerates the rights and responsibilities of a guardian of a minor. See id., 698. To the extent that the defendant, although unartfully, intended to refer to this statute, the defendant has not explained how that statute is applicable to the present case, how the court’s ruling violated that statute, or provided any other pertinent analysis of that provision.  Amelio v. Amelio old at the time of the contempt hearings. To the contrary, the plaintiff’s testimony that the parties’ son was sev- enteen years old and turned eighteen years old in May 2025 supported the court’s finding that, as of December 2024, his age was seventeen and one-half years old. Nor does the record indicate that the court mischaracterized the defendant’s testimony, during which the following colloquy occurred: “The Court: Is [the parties’ son] sixteen or seventeen? “[The Defendant]: He’s seventeen and a half. “The Court: He’s seventeen and a half. Does he have . . . a restricted license, or does he have a full license? “[The Defendant]: He has a home where there’s rules. . . . “The Court: I understand. “[The Defendant]: Are you . . . going to allow your sixteen year old to drive anywhere he wants and you have no say in it? “The Court: He’s seventeen and a half. He’s not six- teen, sir. “[The Defendant]: No, that doesn’t matter. “The Court: He’s seventeen and a half. “[The Defendant]: He’s under eighteen. Your Honor, I don’t appreciate how you’re spinning this.” The defendant’s brief does not explain how the court exhibited judicial misconduct by stating that the parties’ son was seventeen and one-half years old, particularly when the defendant did not dispute that fact during the December 2024 hearing. Because the defendant on appeal provides conclusory statements without any relevant citations to legal authorities or legal analysis to support his assertion, we decline to review it. Finally, the defendant asserts that the court excluded “critical evidence concerning child safety,” but he has  Amelio v. Amelio not provided any meaningful analysis of this claim. The defendant argues that the court ignored certain “tragic events,” including an alleged fatal crash involving a six- teen year old child and an accident involving the parties’ daughter. At the December 2024 hearing, however, the defendant did provide extensive testimony concerning these incidents and how, in light of them, he wanted to restrict his son’s driving privileges. The court recognized the defendant’s concerns as genuine but nevertheless rejected his claim. On appeal, the defendant’s brief does not cite to any legal principles that the court improperly failed to follow with respect to its consideration of the evidence that the defendant had offered concerning prior accidents involv- ing minor children, nor does his brief explain, by way of citations to case law or analysis, how the court’s ruling on the August 2024 contempt motion was improper. We conclude that the defendant’s mere assertion that the court “ignored” his concerns is not supported by the record before us and constitutes a mere invitation to reweigh the evidence and testimony presented, which we decline to do on appeal. See, e.g., Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App. 306, 331, 285 A.3d 59 (2022) (“[t]his court will not reweigh the evidence or resolve questions of credibility” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903, 287 A.3d 601 (2023). Although we recognize that the defendant is self-rep- resented, “the solicitous treatment we afford a self-rep- resented party does not allow us to address a claim on his behalf when he has failed to brief that claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stanley v. Scott, 222 Conn. App. 301, 306, 304 A.3d 892 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 945, 308 A.3d 34 (2024). The defendant’s brief simply is inadequate for us to conduct any meaningful review of his claims, and we thus decline to review them. The judgments are affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.