United States v. Danny Roney

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 1 of 24 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-4556 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. DANNY T. RONEY, a/k/a Khalid Abdul Al-Mu’Min, a/k/a Danny Roney, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (3:08-cr-00252-CMC-1) Argued: September 12, 2025 Decided: August 14, 2025 Before AGEE, RICHARDSON, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee joins and in which Judge Berner joins except for Part II.B. Judge Berner wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. ARGUED: Kimberly Harvey Albro, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Winston David Holliday, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 2 of 24 RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge: Danny Roney was committed to a federal mental-health facility after being found not guilty by reason of insanity for mailing threats to his lawyer. Three years later, the district court conditionally discharged him under a court-prescribed regimen of psychiatric care. One condition of his discharge barred him from possessing weapons. So when Roney robbed a store at gunpoint, the district court revoked his conditional discharge. Roney contests the revocation of his conditional discharge under 18 U.S.C. § 4243. He argues that § 4243 permits revocation only when he violates conditions that are part of his “prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” Any conditions ancillary to his treatment regimen may not form the basis of a revocation. The Government—citing four favorable circuit courts—argues for the opposite interpretation, urging us to hold that the statute permits revocation based on violations of so-called “ancillary conditions.” We agree with Roney that a court may revoke his conditional discharge only for a failure to comply with the prescribed regimen. But this statutory limitation does not help Roney because the condition he violated was not ancillary to, but part of, the regimen prescribed to manage his mental illness. I. BACKGROUND A. Statutory Background Section 4243 governs the “[h]ospitalization of a person found not guilty only by reason of insanity.” It provides the steps necessary for initial commitment of such individuals to a medical facility (§ 4243(a)–(e)), their discharge from commitment (§ 4243(f)), and revocation of conditional discharge and recommitment (§ 4243(g)). 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 3 of 24 A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity may be committed to a medical facility for treatment. § 4243(e). In time, a district court may discharge 1 the patient with or without conditions. § 4243(f). For a conditional discharge, the director of the medical facility must notify the court when the director: determines that the person has recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that . . . his conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment . . . would no longer create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another. § 4243(f). The court then must hold a hearing “to determine whether [the person] should be released.” Id. After the hearing, if the court agrees with the director’s findings, the court shall: (A) order that [the person] be conditionally discharged under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment that has been prepared for him, that has been certified to the court as appropriate by the director of the facility in which he is committed, and that has been found by the court to be appropriate; and (B) order, as an explicit condition of release, that he comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment. Id. After discharge, the court may hold a hearing and “modify or eliminate the regimen” at any time. Id. It also may revoke conditional discharge and re-hospitalize a person. See § 4243(g). The court may begin the revocation process by ordering the person’s arrest when either: (1) the “director of a medical facility responsible for administering the Section 4243 uses both “discharge” and “release” to describe when a person leaves 1 the mental-health facility. We use the term “discharge” for consistency. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 4 of 24 regimen” notifies the court and the Attorney General of “any failure of the person to comply with the regimen,” or (2) there is “other probable cause to believe that the person has failed to comply with the prescribed regimen.” Id. The court then must hold a hearing to determine “whether the person should be remanded to a suitable facility on the ground that, in light of his failure to comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment, his continued release” would pose “a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.” Id. This is a two-step inquiry, in which the court must find that the person violated his regimen and separately find, in light of this violation, that he now poses a serious danger to other people and to their property. B. Factual And Procedural Background In 2009, Danny Roney was found not guilty by reason of insanity of mailing threats to his former defense lawyer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). 2 Under § 4243, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina ordered Roney committed to a medical facility for treatment of his mental illness. In 2012, the district court ordered Roney’s conditional discharge from the facility under § 4243(f) based on the medical-facility director’s certification and regimen. In 2014 and 2016, the district court modified Roney’s discharge conditions. See § 4243(f). Then, just a few days after the court’s 2016 modification, Roney traveled from South Carolina to North Carolina, where he robbed a store at gunpoint. The U.S. Probation Office for the 2 Roney suffers from delusional disorder and antisocial personality disorder. His delusions sometimes make him act violently. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 5 of 24 District of South Carolina sought to revoke Roney’s conditional discharge. The petition explained that Roney violated his discharge conditions by: (1) committing new criminal conduct, (2) possessing a weapon, and (3) leaving South Carolina without permission. Only the second violation—for possessing a weapon—appears in Roney’s conditional- discharge order. The first and third were never imposed as conditions. Roney was arrested and indicted for the robbery in North Carolina. He ultimately pled guilty (without raising an insanity defense) and received a 120-month prison sentence, which was set to be completed in late September 2024. In the meantime, the district court in South Carolina postponed conditional-discharge revocation proceedings until the end of Roney’s prison sentence. In 2024, as the end of Roney’s prison term neared, the district court in South Carolina moved forward with conditional-discharge revocation proceedings. Roney contested the district court’s authority to do this. First, Roney rightly pointed out that two of the Government’s three cited reasons for revoking his discharge were absent from his conditional-discharge order. Second, he argued that the only condition he violated—which prohibited “possess[ing] a weapon of any kind”—was not part of his treatment regimen but was an “ancillary condition” that the court had no authority to impose. J.A. 40. 3 Third, 3 Roney also challenged three discharge conditions not relevant here as unlawful “ancillary conditions.” These conditions required Roney to (1) “be supervised by the [U.S. Probation Office] to ensure compliance with all conditions of release,” (2) “not have any written or verbal contact whatsoever with the victim of the instant [threat-making] offense or with any of the female guards mentioned in the letters [Roney had sent],” and (3) “abstain from alcohol and illegal drugs, and . . . comply with random urinalysis to monitor his use, if requested by the [U.S. Probation Office].” J.A. 40, 59. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 6 of 24 Roney argued that even if the court could impose the weapon-possession condition, it could not revoke his discharge for violating it, because § 4243(g) only authorizes revocation for a “failure to comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” § 4243(g). In response, the Government advocated for a broader reading of § 4243, giving district courts the power to both impose ancillary conditions and revoke conditional discharge in light of violations of those conditions. The district court agreed with the Government’s interpretation, holding that it could place ancillary conditions on conditional discharge and revoke discharge based on their violation. After the hearing, the court revoked Roney’s conditional discharge, concluding that (1) Roney “failed to comply with his treatment regimen, including conditions reasonably related thereto” by carrying a firearm during the 2016 robbery, and (2) Roney’s “conditional release would pose a substantial risk of bodily injury to another” based on his commission of the robbery and subsequent violent and erratic conduct in prison. J.A. 192–93. Roney timely appealed. II. DISCUSSION A. A Court May Revoke Conditional Discharge Only Based On A Failure To Comply With The Regimen Of Care or Treatment Roney’s appeal presents a statutory-interpretation question, which we review de novo. United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2004). The question is whether the court’s power to revoke conditional discharge under § 4243 is limited to situations where a person violates his “prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” Or, put differently, may the court revoke conditional discharge based 6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 7 of 24 on a violation of a condition ancillary to the regimen? 4 This Court has never addressed the question. 5 Today we hold that § 4243(g) permits revocation only based on a failure to comply with the treatment regimen. 1. Text and context We interpret statutes according to their ordinary meaning at the time of enactment. Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 277 (2018). This, of course, means that we look first at the text itself. Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 457 (2022). And to understand that text, we also look at the statutory context. United States v. Smith, 919 F.3d 825, 837 (4th Cir. 2019). The plain meaning of § 4243(g)’s text, and the provision’s 4 Roney did not contest the validity of his discharge conditions when the district court imposed them in 2016. But the Government has not suggested that by failing to appeal the conditions back then, Roney has forfeited his right to challenge revocation of his conditional discharge now. “By making no such argument in its brief, the government has forfeited any such forfeiture argument.” United States v. Newby, 91 F.4th 196, 200 n.* (4th Cir. 2024). Therefore, we exercise our discretion to answer the question of whether a court may revoke conditional discharge only based on a treatment-regimen violation. This question is distinct from asking whether a court may impose ancillary conditions in the first place. And to the extent Roney challenges certain conditions as invalid independent of his conditional-discharge revocation, Roney is too late. See United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 115, 117–18 (4th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). Any challenge to the pure imposition of conditions needed to occur when the court imposed them. So we do not review Roney’s challenge to other conditions. And we do not directly review the district court’s power under § 4243(f) to initially impose the condition prohibiting Roney from possessing a weapon. But interpreting § 4243(g) in this timely challenge to Roney’s discharge revocation requires us to consider the statutory context, Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989), which includes § 4243(f). 5 The Government argues that we are bound to hold § 4243 permits ancillary conditions under this Court’s precedent in United States v. Perkins, 67 F.4th 583 (4th Cir. 2023). Not so. In Perkins, we did not consider the validity of ancillary conditions under § 4243, and our holding did not rely on their validity. Any allusions to ancillary conditions in the Perkins opinion are dicta. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 8 of 24 context within the broader Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, indicate that courts may revoke conditional discharge only based on a failure to comply with the “prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” Under § 4243(g), the court may order a conditionally discharged person arrested and begin revocation proceedings if the person’s medical director notifies the court of “any failure of the person to comply with the regimen” or if there is “other probable cause to believe that the person has failed to comply with the prescribed regimen.” Then, again invoking the regimen, the statute permits revoking conditional discharge only “on the ground that, in light of his failure to comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment, his continued release” would pose a substantial risk of harm. Id. (emphasis added). The plain text of § 4243(g) is clear: Regimen noncompliance is a statutory prerequisite to revocation. The statute repeats that requirement at each stage of the revocation process. Probable cause, the revocation hearing, and remand all turn on a failure to comply with “the prescribed regimen.” We presume that Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there,” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992), and we “ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face,” Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997). Section 4243(g) does not permit revocation based on a “failure to comply with any condition.” Nor does it trigger revocation based on a “failure to comply with the prescribed regimen or any other condition imposed by the court.” It demands a “failure to comply with the prescribed regimen.” 8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 9 of 24 The language of § 4243(f), § 4243(g)’s next-door neighbor, supports this interpretation. It authorizes conditional discharge “under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment,” requires the court to order compliance with that regimen “as an explicit condition of release,” and permits the court to “modify or eliminate the regimen” at “any time.” 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f). It does not mention conditions beyond “the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” Section 4243(g) then uses the same term—“the prescribed regimen”—to define the revocation trigger. And if there were any doubt, the broader Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which contains § 4243(g), 6 supports reading § 4243(g) to limit revocation to the textually specified failure to comply with the prescribed regimen. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 4243, 98 Stat. 1976, 2059–61 (1984). In § 3583 of the Act, which governs supervised release after criminal incarceration, Congress permits revocation when the defendant violates “a condition of supervised release.” § 3583(e), 98 Stat. 1976, 1999–2000 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)). This corresponds to § 3583(d)—the equivalent of § 4243(f), governing discharge-condition imposition—directing that district courts impose certain mandatory release “conditions” and permitting the court to impose “any other condition [of supervised release] it considers to be appropriate” provided no exceptions apply. 6 This single bill encompassed both the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (which included 18 U.S.C. § 3565 and § 3583, governing revocation of probation and supervised release, respectively), and the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (which included § 4243, the provision at issue here). See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, 1987–2040, 2057–68 (1984) (citing to the Sentencing Reform Act and the Insanity Defense Reform Act, respectively). 9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 10 of 24 Similarly, § 3565, governing revocation of probation after a criminal conviction, permits revocation “[i]f the defendant violates a condition of probation at any time.” § 3565(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 1995. And § 3563 grants a court the authority to impose both mandatory and optional “conditions” on probation. So these provisions revolve around imposition of conditions and revocation based on conditions. In contrast, § 4243(g)’s text authorizes revocation only after regimen violations, not simply condition violations. 7 This contrast matters: When Congress includes particular language in one provision and different language in another, courts presume the difference is intentional. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (“It is well settled that where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85, 94 (2023). Congress knows how to specify which actions trigger revocation proceedings. In the supervised-release and probation statutes, it expressly based revocation on condition violations. In § 4243, it didn’t. Instead, it connected revocation to violations of the prescribed regimen. See United States v. Crape, 603 F.3d 1237, 1246 (11th Cir. 2010). Read as a whole and in context, § 4243(g) ties revocation to failures to comply with the 7 Supervision of a person conditionally discharged under § 4243 is limited “to the degree required by the regimen of care or treatment ordered by the court as a condition of release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3603(8)(A) (emphasis added). But that supervising officer must also “report any violation of the conditions of release.” § 3603(8)(B) (emphasis added). Both of these provisions were added by Congress in 1992. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 701(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4514 (1992). Thus, they do not shed much light on the meaning of the earlier enacted § 4243(g). Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 4243, 98 Stat. 1976, 2059–61 (1984). 10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 11 of 24 regimen and to nothing else. And when Congress provides specific instructions—here, for when a court may revoke conditional discharge—courts must follow them. Statutory instructions are not mere suggestions or invitations for judicial innovation. 8 2. The Government’s counterarguments fail Despite the clear statutory text, most of the circuits 9 to consider this issue have interpreted § 4243 (or its “sister statutes,” 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246 and 4248) 10 to permit 8 In United States v. Volungus, the First Circuit noted that Congress could have spoken even more expressly by saying that compliance with the regimen is the sole condition of discharge. 134 F.4th 637, 646 (1st Cir. 2025). True enough. “But when we interpret a statute, we cannot allow the perfect to be the enemy of the merely excellent.” Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 328 (2011). Congress need not negate every unmentioned alternative when the operative provision affirmatively identifies the violation that permits revocation. Section 4243(g) does that work by tying arrest, hearing, and remand to failure to comply with the prescribed regimen. 9 The First, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted the broad reading of § 4243’s language, recognizing ancillary conditions. See United States v. Volungus, 134 F.4th 637 (1st Cir. 2025) (permitting imposition of ancillary conditions under § 4248 and discussing revocation); United States v. Jain, 174 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 1999) (permitting the imposition of ancillary conditions under § 4243); United States v. Franklin, 435 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2006) (permitting revocation based on ancillary-condition violations under § 4246, and relying on the power to impose such conditions in reaching its holding); United States v. Phelps, 283 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting imposition of ancillary conditions under § 4243 and stating such conditions may trigger revocation). Only the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the narrow reading, permitting the imposition of only regimen conditions and revocation based on only regimen violations. Crape, 603 F.3d at 1244. 10 We refer to § 4243, § 4246, and § 4248 as “sister statutes” because they should be interpreted together, or more formally, “in pari materia.” Sections 4243 and 4246 are certainly in pari materia, as they are intimately affiliated with each other, use identical language, provide for civil commitment of insane defendants, and were passed together as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. And there are reasons to cautiously read § 4248 in pari materia with § 4243 and § 4246, even though § 4248 was passed decades later. Section 4248, passed in 2006 as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, uses the same language as § 4243 (Continued) 11 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 12 of 24 revocation of conditional discharge based on ancillary-condition violations (or to at least permit imposition of ancillary conditions in the first place). But that reading is incorrect. The broader reading rests mainly on § 4243(f)(2)(B)’s use of the indefinite article “an.” Because the statute requires compliance with the regimen as “an explicit condition of release”—not “the” condition of release—those courts reason that Congress left room for other conditions. United States v. Jain, 174 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1999). And since the statute does not expressly prohibit the imposition of ancillary conditions—indeed, the text implies their existence—the statute must permit it. Id. These courts (either directly or by implication) then leverage that conclusion to find that § 4243(g) permits (or at least does not prohibit) revocation for failure to comply with ancillary conditions: “[T]he authority to revoke a conditional release for non-compliance with a prescribed regimen of care or treatment does not imply the absence of authority to sanction violations of other conditions of release that are properly imposed.” United States v. Franklin, 435 F.3d 885, 890 (8th Cir. 2006). So this must mean that in these Circuits, district courts may impose whatever conditions they wish, so long as they do not violate the Constitution or other law, right? No. Indeed, all the courts that have adopted this interpretation have also held that “any additional conditions imposed must be related to the mental illness.” United States v. Phelps, 283 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Jain, 174 F.3d at 898; Franklin, 435 and § 4246 to govern civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 142 (2010) (recognizing all three provisions as part of the same statutory scheme). 12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 13 of 24 F.3d at 889; Volungus, 134 F.4th at 648. “[B]ut there is no discernible textual basis for that limitation” in § 4243. Crape, 603 F.3d at 1244. These courts read the word “an” to infer additional authority but then divine the limiting principle—relation to mental illness—from statutory purpose rather than from the text. This simultaneously hyper- textual and atextual interpretation is not the best reading of § 4243. But the real problem is not the existence or non-existence of ancillary conditions in the statutory scheme. The problem is that the text of § 4243(g) permits revocation only for the “failure to comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” It does not mention revocation based on any other conditions. So even if one interpreted the “an” in § 4243(f)(2)(B) to permit imposing ancillary conditions, the text of § 4243(g) does not permit commencement of revocation proceedings based on ancillary condition violations. To avoid this plain reading of § 4243(g), the Government would need us to adopt one of two strained readings of the provision. We decline to do so. Reading one—the easiest to dismiss—requires concluding that § 4243(g) governs the revocation of conditional discharge based on any imposed condition. This reading depends on a finding that Congress simply forgot to mention ancillary conditions, or at least to leave room for their implication, when it drafted § 4243(g). So when the statute triggers revocation based on the failure “to comply with the prescribed regimen,” a court would read in the words “or has violated any other condition of release.” But this does not work, because courts should “ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.” Bates, 522 U.S. at 29; Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 14 of 24 (2009). And there is no extraordinary reason to do otherwise here, like an obvious scrivener’s error. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). “It is not for us to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think is necessary to achieve what we think Congress really intended.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010). Reading two relies on similar logic: If § 4243(g) does not mention ancillary conditions, then, just as the power to impose ancillary conditions is implied, the power to revoke discharge based on violations of ancillary conditions is also implied—since the statute does not prohibit it, it’s permitted. But this interpretation also has problems. Unlike § 4243(f)(2)(B), which at least contains the word “an” as a potential hook to imply ancillary conditions, § 4243(g) contains no equivalent language suggesting that revocation of discharge may be triggered by anything other than the failure to comply with the regimen. And since § 4243(g) does not contain language to suggest it applies to ancillary conditions, this would mean that it does not govern revocation based on these conditions at all. So what then would govern revocation if § 4243(g) does not? The statute gives no answer. That silence is hard to square with the rest of § 4243, a provision that otherwise provides detailed procedural instructions, and with the broader Comprehensive Crime Control Act, an Act that otherwise does not leave the revocation process to the court’s unfettered 14 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 15 of 24 discretion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (revocation of probation); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)–(h) (revocation of supervised release). 11 Trying another tack, the Government urges us to adopt a broad reading of § 4243 because most other circuits to consider the issue have taken that approach, because it is “reasonable,” and because courts “should be allowed” to use ancillary conditions to keep the public safe. Response Br. at 11. But counting noses and deciding what is reasonable cannot overcome the text’s plain meaning. 12 A court’s job is to identify the best reading of a statute, not to rubber stamp what somebody else views as a reasonable reading. Cf. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024). Likewise, we may not amend a statute’s text to better serve some perceived purpose, even when that purpose is to protect the public. See Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406, 410 (2024); id. at 429 (Alito, J., 11 The probation and supervised-release statutes do not leave unstated the procedures for imposition of conditions or revocation. Congress used the same language— “as an explicit condition of release”—in the probation statute, supervised-release statute, and conditional-discharge statutes. But it mentions the power to impose optional conditions only in the former two. This omission suggests that the word “an” didn’t imply the existence of optional conditions in those statutory schemes. If “an” carried the weight the Government argues it does—not only providing for the imposition of ancillary conditions but also revocation based on their violation—then Congress would not have needed to lay out requirements surrounding optional conditions and their revocation as it did in the supervised-release and probation statutes. 12 It is also not clear that reading the text to prohibit revocation based on ancillary conditions is unreasonable. Yes, it might seem unreasonable that “the only way [an acquitted person’s] conditional release can be revoked is if he didn’t follow” his regimen, because it “seems to . . . overlook the possibility that the [regimen wasn’t] adequate.” Crape, 603 F.3d at 1240–41 (internal quotation marks removed). But the law already accounts for inadequate treatment regimens. If the regimen is not working, then it should be modified, which the court has the power to do “at any time.” § 4243(f) (emphasis added). And if the person recovers from his mental illness and continues to commit bad acts, then he may be prosecuted just like any other criminal. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 16 of 24 concurring). Ultimately, the Government’s arguments fail to grapple with the flaws in the broad approach taken by other courts—most critically, that they expand the text of § 4243(g) to permit revocation for violating conditions beyond the treatment regimen. 13 B. The No-Weapons Condition Was Part Of Roney’s Prescribed Regimen Holding that § 4243(g) reaches only regimen violations does not decide this case— it only sharpens the question. If the no-weapons condition was part of Roney’s prescribed regimen, then violating it would support revocation. If the condition was merely ancillary, then it would not. We conclude that, on this record, the no-weapons condition was part of his prescribed regimen. We begin with the plain meaning of the phrase “prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” The statute does not define these terms, 13 Were there any doubt, we might turn to the “presumption of constitutionality” to reinforce reading § 4243(g) to permit revocation based only on violations of the prescribed regimen. See United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 463 n.6 (2019) (describing the “presumption of constitutionality,” the narrow form of constitutional avoidance, as one “[o]f long lineage,” which “holds that courts should, if possible, interpret ambiguous statutes to avoid rendering them unconstitutional”). Civil commitment of an insanity acquittee is not punishment; “[a]s he was not convicted, he may not be punished.” Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983). Its constitutional justification instead rests on the conjunction of mental illness and dangerousness: Commitment serves “to treat the individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.” Id. at 368. It may not continue based on dangerousness alone once the requisite mental illness is absent. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77–83 (1992). And a nondangerous person, without more, may not be “constitutionally confine[d]” if he “is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself” or with the help of responsible loved ones. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). Reading § 4243(g) to permit revocation of conditional discharge in light of ancillary condition violations would seemingly allow courts to re-hospitalize insanity acquittees without a finding of mental illness. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77–83. But given the clear text of § 4243(g), we need not resolve this issue. 16 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4556 Doc: 38 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 17 of 24 so we seek their ordinary meaning at the time of enactment. The phrase contains two distinct requirements. “Prescribed” describes how the regimen becomes legally operative. “Regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment” describes the regimen’s substance and purpose. Start with “prescribed.” Under § 4243(f), the facility director prepares a regimen for the acquittee and certifies that it is appropriate for that purpose. The court must then find the regimen appropriate and expressly order the acquittee to comply with it as a condition of discharge. § 4243(f). A regimen is therefore “prescribed” when it has been prepared for the acquittee, certified as appropriate by the facility director, found appropriate by the court, and ordered as a condition of release. Id. “Regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment,” in turn, limits what may be prescribed. The ordinary meaning of “regimen” is broad enough to include a structured course of living designed to preserve or restore health. 14 And “medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment” is not confined to medication 14 A regimen is “[t]he regulation of such matters as have an influence on the preservation or restoration of health; a particular course of diet, exercise, or mode of living, prescribed or adopted for this end.” Regimen, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Dictionaries “require careful use and healthy skepticism.” United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 370 n.4 (4th Cir. 2020); see also Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); Davidson v. United