Rosene v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims JOSHUA R. ROSENE, Plaintiff, No. 25-cv-1871 v. Filed: September 3, 2026 THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. Jason E. Perry, Law Office of Jason Perry, Wellington, FL, for Plaintiff. Reta E. Bezak of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for Defendant. With her on the briefs were Douglas K. Mickle, Patricia M. McCarthy, and Brett A. Shumate of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., and Lieutenant Addison Osborne of the United States Coast Guard. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff Joshua R. Rosene entered a Reserve Officer Candidate Indoctrination course at the Leadership Development Center (LDC) of the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), a military service of Defendant the United States. 1 If Plaintiff had successfully graduated from the five-week course, he would have been commissioned as an officer in the Coast Guard Reserve on July 10, 2024. 1 The Coast Guard is “a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times.” 14 U.S.C. § 101. The Coast Guard is “a service in the Department of Homeland Security, except when operating as a service in the Navy.” 14 U.S.C. § 103(a). The Coast Guard transfers to the Navy during times of war, if Congress or the President directs a transfer. 14 U.S.C. § 103(b).  However, Plaintiff never completed the LDC course. On July 6, 2024, a course leader received reports that Plaintiff had used a racial slur and also had demeaned another trainee based on a purported disability. On July 8, 2024—two days before the training course ended—an LDC official suspended Plaintiff from the course. An investigator with the Coast Guard interviewed 10 Officer Candidates (OCs) in the course, including Plaintiff, and two course leaders. Only one OC reported hearing Plaintiff utter a racial slur. In contrast, six OCs reported hearing Plaintiff use derogatory language about another OC’s purported disability. The OCs alleged that multiple OCs had confronted Plaintiff about his behavior because it interfered with the environment of the course. On July 24, 2024, after reviewing this comprehensive investigation, an LDC official determined that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate the allegation that Plaintiff uttered a racial slur. However, the official determined that the evidence substantiated the allegation that Plaintiff had made derogatory comments about another trainee, amounting to harassment. Based on the finding of harassment, the official began the process to disenroll Plaintiff from the LDC course. While LDC officials identified Plaintiff’s prior arrests as a possible reason to disenroll and discharge Plaintiff, they proceeded to disenroll him from the training course based on the above-referenced harassment. On September 5, 2024, the LDC disenrolled Plaintiff from the training course. On September 12, 2024, the Coast Guard separated Plaintiff from the service, with his last date of active duty service listed as July 12, 2024. Subsequently, Plaintiff repeatedly challenged his disenrollment and suspension. On February 19, 2025, the Coast Guard denied Plaintiff’s administrative appeal. On July 24, 2025, the Coast Guard again defended the investigation, disenrollment, and separation in a written statement after receiving congressional correspondence regarding Plaintiff’s separation. 2  Plaintiff seeks another review of his case in this Court. Here, Plaintiff argues (i) that the Coast Guard’s actions were arbitrary and capricious because the Coast Guard offered inconsistent explanations for the disenrollment and separation, (ii) that the record does not contain substantial evidence of harassment, (iii) that the scope of the investigation improperly expanded, (iv) that the evidence uncovered in the investigation does not meet the Coast Guard’s definition of harassment, (v) that the Coast Guard denied Plaintiff an opportunity to respond, and (vi) that Plaintiff remains entitled to active duty pay. Plaintiff and Defendant have each moved for judgment on the administrative record. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Corrected Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (ECF No. 15). The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Cross- Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (ECF No. 16). After thoroughly reviewing the record, the Court holds that the Coast Guard’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious, that any procedural errors were harmless, and that Plaintiff is not entitled to continued active duty pay. BACKGROUND I. Commencement of the Investigation into Plaintiff’s Behavior Plaintiff entered the Coast Guard training program on June 5, 2024. AR 42. 2 On July 6, 2024, Assistant Course Chief C.R. 3 filed a “Report of Harassment, Hate, Bullying, Hazing, 2 Citations to the AR refer to the Corrected Administrative Record (ECF No. 11). Citations throughout this Memorandum and Order correspond to the ECF-assigned page numbers, which do not always correspond to the pagination within the document. 3 Defendant submitted a redacted version of the AR, so that witnesses and most individuals involved in the investigation are identified only by their initials. ECF No. 11. In the cross-Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record, the parties refer to people by their initials, as identified in the AR, and have not otherwise objected to the use of initials. See, e.g., Pl. MJAR at 7; Def. MJAR at 7. 3 Misconduct, or Other Disruptive Behaviors” concerning Plaintiff. AR 99. Assistant Course Chief C.R. “was made aware of a series of incidents involving [Officer Candidate (OC)] Rosene,” earlier that day. Id. The alleged behavior, which Assistant Course Chief C.R. learned of “from direct witnesses,” included several comments from Rosene directed at OC K, another member of Plaintiff’s training class: “[w]hy are we listening to this re*tard,” “K is an undiagnosed autistic,” and “[w]hat a re*tard.” Id. Assistant Course Chief C.R.’s report stated that Plaintiffs “was confronted multiple times by various OCs . . . and demanded to stop. The behavior continued and may have even intensified.” Id. Assistant Course Chief C.R.’s report stated that Plaintiff had allegedly engaged in other disruptive behaviors. Id. The report noted that “OC Rosene recently commented on the swim test failure for two black OCs.” Id. Plaintiff “was heard stating out-loud to another OC that ‘it is funny that the two that failed the swim test are n[****]rs.’” Id. Finally, Plaintiff’s behavior toward his wife raised concerns among other OCs and Assistant Course Chief C.R.: OC Rosene has been overheard by multiple OCs yelling at his wife most nights on the phone, calling her ‘stupid’ and ‘dumb’[] and berating her verbally. As soon as he would hang up the phone, he would continue his rant about his spouse to other OCs in his vicinity. OC Rosene also may have disclosed to another OC that he is in thousands of dollars of sports gambling debt. The report to [Assistant Course Chief C.R.] raised serious concern about use of alcohol and judgment as well as bullying and racism. Id. On July 8, 2024, the LDC, which ran Plaintiff’s course, convened a “single-officer, standard investigation” into whether Plaintiff “engaged in prohibited language.” AR 97. The LDC charged Investigating Officer N.T. with the investigation and directed N.T. to consult with Judge Advocate A.M., of Coast Guard Legal Service Command, “before beginning the investigation and during it if you need assistance.” Id. Investigating Officer N.T. was specifically charged with 4 determining “whether OC Rosene made a hate incident, and used prohibited language towards OC K.” Id. On July 8, 2024, the same date the LDC began the investigation into Plaintiff’s comments, the Coast Guard suspended Plaintiff from his training program: Due to an ongoing investigation, you are being suspended in training from Reserve Officer Candidate Indoctrination. You are being advised that Reserve Officer Candidate Indoctrination is required for commission in the U.S. Coast Guard Reserves. AR 82. Plaintiff signed the form informing him of his suspension and initialed his acknowledgement.” Id. II. Investigating Officer N.T.’s Investigation Investigating Officer N.T. interviewed ten OCs, including Plaintiff. AR 46–47. N.T. also interviewed Course Chief A.M. and procured a written statement from Assistant Course Chief C.R. AR 47. On July 9, 2024, at the time of Plaintiff’s interview, N.T. presented Plaintiff with a form informing him of his Miranda rights and his rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. AR 84–85 (form signed at 4:17 p.m.); see also AR 64 (interview beginning at 4:17 p.m.). The form informed Plaintiff that he was under investigation for “making racially charged comments regarding two Officer Candidates and of making comments regarding an Officer Candidate’s alleged disability, which are contrary to our core values.” AR 84. Plaintiff signed his initials next to each of five statements informing him of his rights, including his right to remain silent and his right to consult with an attorney before answering any questions. AR 85. Plaintiff checked a box expressing his “desire to make a statement and/or answer any questions.” Id. Plaintiff also signed his name on the form informing him of his rights. Id. 5  In his July 9, 2024, interview with N.T., Plaintiff “categorically denied” that he had uttered a racial slur and claimed that “that word is not in my vocabulary.” AR 64. Plaintiff stated that he had never said that OC K had a disability: “he said he had heard several other people who mentioned “[OC K] may have a mental disability, but he never disparaged him.” Id. Plaintiff stated that he has an autistic brother and “might have said something like ‘yeah that’s a symptom” when other OCs brought up OC K’s alleged disability. Id. Plaintiff named seven other OCs who, he alleged, had previously said that OC K had a disability. Id. On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff also sent a letter to N.T., in which Plaintiff accused his roommate, OC W, of making the accusation that began the investigation, and suggested that OC W himself might have engaged in harassing behavior. AR 68. Plaintiff stated that OC W described himself as “quite good at reporting possible infractions to the chain of command, which might result in disciplinary action.” Id. Plaintiff wrote that “[a] self-proclaimed whistleblower may believe he or she will acquire greater respect from their seniors by reporting and/or gain a sense of power by manipulating situations without regard to the harm of the individual.” Id. According to N.T.’s investigation, OC W was the only witness who reported hearing Plaintiff use “the N word” firsthand. AR 48, 54. According to N.T.’s interview notes, OC W stated that “OC Rosene implied that [two OCs] didn’t pass the swim test because they were black.” AR 54. N.T. then asked OC W about Plaintiff’s utterance of a racial slur: I asked if he witnessed OC Rosene using the N word and he said “Yes.” In their barracks room OC Rosene was talking about OC D and OC B and their failure in the swim test: “It’s no surprise that the two people that failed the swim test were n****rs.” OC W said that when he said “were n****rs” OC Rosene said it under his breath, and he didn’t say it with hatred or intent. Id. OC W alleged that another roommate, OC Kl, was in the barracks room when Plaintiff allegedly used a racial slur. AR 48. However, OC Kl did “not recall OC Rosene ever using the N 6 word, nor does he recall any conversation regarding their black shipmates, the swim test or other OCs who were not meeting the standard.” AR 48, 57. In contrast, six OCs told N.T. that they heard Plaintiff refer to OC K as disabled or otherwise demean OC K. AR 49. OC M told N.T. that on June 14, 2024, “OC M heard OC Rosene use the words ‘retard’ and ‘autistic’ to refer to OC K.” AR 49, 52. In particular, “OC M said it was evident that it wasn’t just a comment, people joke around yes but this was a more directed comment at OC K.” AR 52. Five OCs “said they heard OC Rosene make fun of OC D at a dinner in Mystic, CT on or about” July 4, 2024. AR 49. OC W stated that “OC Rosene was drinking heavily” and said “‘OC K is retarded,’ [and] ‘OC K has the ‘tism.’” AR 54. OC S stated that “OC Rosene had been throwing back drinks (his shipmates had to cut him off because he had duty the next day) and started to make comments about OC K being retarded.” AR 56. OC B said that “[w]hile everyone there might have had two beers over the course of dinner, OC Rosene had like six” and recounted a similar story as other attendees: At dinner OC Rosene made repeated comments about OC K saying he should not be in the program because he does not meet the medical standard. OC B said that OC Rosene said: he “has the ‘tism,” “It’s obvious.” OC Rosene said this over and over repeating that he “has the ‘tism” and generally degrading OC K’s character. AR 58. OC R “recounted that there was a group of guys out at a restaurant and OC Rosene made some derogatory comments about OC K regarding his mental capacity.” AR 62. OC T “said that comments were made by OC Rosene against OC K,” so that another OC said “‘[t]his needs to stop’” and the dinner attendees then cut Plaintiff off from drinking. AR 63. N.T. did not interview OC K, the target of the alleged harassment. See AR 46–47 (listing witnesses interviewed). According to her investigation, none of the OCs who heard Plaintiff make derogatory comments said that they told OC K about the comments. AR 48. 7  During the investigation, Course Chief A.M. “brought three website articles to [N.T.’s] attention, two of which showed that OC Rosene was arrested on multiple occasions, one time was for impersonating a police officer. The third website listed a debt collection case against OC Rosene.” AR 50. N.T. included a copy of an online article, dated September 1, 2015, in the investigation exhibits, which stated that a “Joshua R. Rosene” was arrested in Prince William County, Virginia, for impersonating a police officer. AR 70–71. N.T. included a copy of a page from “arrests.org,” which stated that a “Joshua Robert Rosene” was arrested in Virginia on December 19, 2022, on charges of obstruction of justice and resisting arrest. AR 76. N.T. also included a printout of a website recording a debt collection lawsuit against Joshua Rosene in a Virginia state court, which was filed on March 4, 2022. AR 79. The AR also includes a copy of a criminal history generated by the Department of Homeland Security on July 10, 2024, which has no apparent link to Plaintiff or the investigation into his conduct. AR 37. The criminal history covers the arrests in Florida of a “Joshua John Rankin-Rosenberg.” AR 38. The criminal record displays several charges, including possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and tampering with physical evidence, arising from a May 10, 2017, arrest. AR 38–40. This criminal history is for someone with a different name than Plaintiff, whose arrest took place in a different state than Plaintiff’s alleged arrests. Compare AR 38 (arrest of Joshua John Rankin-Rosenberg in Florida), with AR 76 (arrest of Joshua Robert Rosene in Virginia). The criminal history was not included as an attachment or enclosure in N.T.’s investigative report. See AR 50–51. Similarly, none of the other documents that the Coast Guard created during its investigation reference the criminal history of Joshua John Rankin-Rosenberg or the arrests listed therein. See AR. 8  III. Administrative Action After the Investigation On July 24, 2024, Captain Robert P. Hill of the LDC sent a memorandum (Final Action Memo) to Rear Admiral Jeffrey K. Randall of the Coast Guard Force Readiness Command (Force Readiness Command) concerning the investigation into Plaintiff. AR 44. The Final Action Memo stated that the report of harassment toward OC K was “substantiated,” while the report of a racial slur was “unsubstantiated.” Id. Captain Hill wrote that although OC W alleged that Plaintiff had used a racial slur, “[n]o other member could verify the potential hate incident comments, and the statements were not consistent; therefore, there was not enough evidence to reach the threshold of substantiation for the alleged hate incident.” Id. However, the reports of harassment toward OC K were substantiated because “[s]ix OCs all corroborated that OC Rosene made several inappropriate comments regarding another OC on both 14 June and 04 July calling [] him ‘retard’ and ‘autistic.’” AR 45. Captain Hill also wrote that the Coast Guard had “confirmed OC Rosene had 3 arrests including impersonating an officer, assault/brandishing, and DUI.” Id. 4 Captain Hill found that Plaintiff engaged in “harassing behavior” and may have engaged in “non-disclosure of arrests.” Id. As a result, Captain Hill concluded “I intend to disenroll OC Rosene, and he will be [Permanent Change of Station]ed back to [Coast Guard Recruiting Command] for disposition.” Id. On August 5, 2024, Captain Hill submitted a discharge recommendation for Plaintiff, which recommended that Plaintiff “be separated from the Coast Guard with an honorable discharge 4 The AR does not include the underlying Coast Guard Investigative Service report that Captain Hill used to establish Plaintiff’s prior arrests. See AR 45. Captain Hill does not reference or attach the Florida arrest report for Joshua John Rankin-Rosenberg, which is included in the AR and has no apparent link to the investigation. See AR 45. In addition, the arrest report for Joshua John Rankin-Rosenberg does not include the crimes of impersonating a police officer, driving under the influence, or brandishing a weapon, so Captain Hill could not have mistakenly relied upon Joshua John Rankin-Rosenberg’s arrest record for his report. See AR 38–40. 9 by reason of convenience of the government due to erroneous enlistment.” AR 34. Captain Hill notified Plaintiff of the recommendation of the same day and informed Plaintiff of his rights to consult with an attorney submit a rebuttal to the discharge recommendation. AR 35. On September 5, 2024, LDC Instructor K.H. informed Plaintiff of his disenrollment from the LDC “after an erroneous enlistment and an investigation determined you had made prohibited comments.” AR 43. A Record of Disenrollment Form (DD Form 785) stated that Plaintiff was disenrolled from training “due to an erroneous enlistment.” AR 42. The form noted that if training had been completed successfully, Plaintiff would have commissioned on July 10, 2024. Id. On September 12, 2024, the Coast Guard generated a Separation Authorization, which separated Plaintiff from the Coast Guard at the “Convenience of the Government,” due to a “[f]ailure to complete commissioning or warrant program.” AR 41. The effective date of the Separation Authorization was listed as July 12, 2024. Id. IV. Plaintiff’s Appeal and Congressional Correspondence On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff appealed the determination of harassing behavior to Force Readiness Command. AR 14. Plaintiff appealed “on the basis that the convening authority incorrectly applied policy or disregarded/inappropriately weighed facts. It is also submitted based upon procedural error and non-compliance with mandatory policy requirements.” Id. Plaintiff argued that the procedure followed during the investigation violated COMDTINST 5350.6, which is entitled “Harassing Behavior Prevention, Response, and Accountability.” Id.; see also COMDTINST 5350.6 (Feb. 2023). Plaintiff alleged that the selection of Investigative Officer N.T. to complete the investigation violated a policy that the investigating officer must not have a relationship with the alleged perpetrator or witnesses because N.T. was an instructor at the LDC who knew the witnesses prior to the investigation. AR 15–16. As in his interview during the 10 investigation, Plaintiff stated that his brother is autistic, so that he would not make derogatory comments about anyone due to their suspected autism. AR 19. On February 19, 2025, a Force Readiness Command official, Jennifer Sinclair, denied Plaintiff’s appeal. AR 9. Sinclair wrote that she evaluated the appeal “based on whether the convening authority incorrectly applied policy, inappropriately weighed facts, and/or failed to consider evidence.” Id. Sinclair wrote that she upheld the investigation with the following explanation: After careful consideration of your appeal, the underlying investigation, and the convening authority’s final action memorandum, and in consultation with legal counsel, I find the convening authority properly adhered to all applicable policies and directives and appropriately considered all available relevant facts surrounding the harassing behavior. Id. On June 19, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a message to a Congressman, Representative John McGuire, III, through an online portal on Representative McGuire’s site. AR 7–8. Plaintiff wrote that he “was summarily disenrolled and kicked out of the [United States Coast Guard] under the former Administration’s vague and woke [Anti-Harassment and Hate Incident] policy and denied my commission [with] no due process.” AR 8. On July 24, 2025, in response to a June 20, 2025, communication from Representative McGuire, the Coast Guard sent Representative McGuire a letter and wrote that Plaintiff’s actions constituted “unwelcome verbal conduct that has the effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance.” AR 5. The Coast Guard’s response stated that “[t]he initial claims of fraudulent enlistment were investigated and found to be unsupported.” AR 5. The AR contains no further information concerning the Congressman’s inquiry into Plaintiff’s separation. See AR. 11  PROCEDURAL HISTORY On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. ECF No. 1 (Complaint). On February 6, 2026, Defendant filed the Administrative Record with the Court. ECF No. 9. On February 11, 2026, the Court entered a Scheduling Order, setting a briefing schedule for cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record, as well as the filing of a corrected administrative record. ECF No. 10 at 1. On February 13, 2026, Defendant filed a Corrected Administrative Record. ECF No. 11 (AR). On March 16, 2026, Plaintiff filed his original Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. ECF No. 13. On March 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike and Refile Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record, along with his Corrected Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. ECF Nos. 14 (Motion to Strike and Refile); 15 (Pl. MJAR). On March 23, 2026, the Court struck Plaintiff’s original Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and granted leave for Plaintiff to file his Corrected Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. Minute Order dated Mar. 23, 2026. On April 16, 2026, Defendant filed its Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and Response to Plaintiff’s MJAR. ECF No. 16 (Def. MJAR) (collectively, with Pl. MJAR, the cross-MJARs). On April 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed his Reply in support of his MJAR and Response to Defendant’s MJAR. ECF No. 17 (Pl. Reply). On May 14, 2026, Defendant filed its Reply in support of its MJAR. ECF No. 18 (Def. Reply). On June 5, 2026, the Court scheduled an in-person oral argument on the cross-MJARs at the Court of Federal Claims in Washington, D.C., for July 15, 2026. Minute Order dated June 5, 2026. Subsequently, Plaintiff’s counsel requested via email with the Court and Defendant’s Counsel that the Court forgo oral argument due to travel considerations. Email from Jason Perry 12 (June 8, 2026, 1:12 p.m. EDT). Accordingly, on consent of the movant, the Court canceled oral argument on July 13, 2026. Minute Order dated July 13, 2026. The cross-MJARs are fully briefed and ripe for review. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS Military pay cases at the Court of Federal Claims are resolved under Rule 52.1(c), which allows Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record. Rules 52.1(c), App. K. ¶ 4. A Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record provides an expedited trial on a “paper record, allowing fact-finding by the trial court.” Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referencing Rule 56.1, which was replaced by Rule 52.1(c)); see Rule 52.1(c). Unlike at summary judgment, genuine disputes of material fact do not preclude the Court from granting a motion for judgment on the administrative record. Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1357. In military pay cases, “judicial review . . . is conducted under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA).” 5 Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Under this standard, the Court must determine whether the military’s decision “is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence.” Barnick v. United States, 591 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see Porter v. United States, 163 F.3d 1304, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The plaintiff must show such a violation of this standard by “cogent and clearly convincing evidence.” Stine v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 776, 791 (2010), aff’d, 417 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Kirwin v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 497, 503 (1991)). 5 Although Plaintiff does not challenge the decision of a military correction board in this case, each party cites cases that challenged a correction board’s decision for the legal standard that applies here. Pl. MJAR at 13; Def. MJAR at 10. Neither party disputes that the arbitrary and capricious standard that applies to the review of a military corrections board’s decision also applies in this case. See Pl. MJAR at 13; Def. MJAR at 10. 13  The Court considers whether the “agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion.” Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Still, this Court does not serve as a “super correction board.” Van Cleave v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 674, 678 (2006) (quoting Skinner v. United States, 594 F.2d 824, 830 (Ct. Cl. 1979)). “[T]he standard of review does not require a reweighing of the evidence, but a determination whether the conclusion being reviewed is supported by substantial evidence.” Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Strand v. United States, 951 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). That is, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the military because “responsibility for determining who is fit or unfit to serve in the armed services is not a judicial province.” Stine, 92 Fed. Cl. at 791 (quoting Heisig, 719 F.2d at 1156). The Court is restricted to evaluating whether the military has done its duty in examining all relevant evidence and making reasoned determinations. See id. If the military “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise,” then the Court must overturn the military’s decision. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Adams v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 628, 654 (2014). Similarly, the military must explain inconsistencies in its reasoning when it reaches contradictory conclusions based on the same evidence. Draper v. United States, 163 Fed. Cl. 284, 292–93 (2022) (“While 14 the Government’s argument is certainly plausible, ‘an agency cannot simply adopt inconsistent positions without presenting some reasoned analysis.’” (quoting Quinton v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 118, 129 (2005))). However, the Court will “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974); Viernes v. United States, No. 25-117, 2026 WL 2236972, at *8 (Fed. Cl. July 31, 2026). In military pay cases, the Court applies the “strong, but rebuttable, presumption that administrators of the military, like other public officers, discharge their duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.” Doe v. United States, 132 F.3d 1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979)). “Judicial deference must be ‘at its apogee’ in matters pertaining to the military and national defense.” Voge v. United States, 844 F.2d 776, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)); see Kelly v. United States, 179 Fed. Cl. 313, 322 (2026). The Court “may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but instead must confine itself to ensuring that the agency remained ‘within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking.’” Sharpe v. United States, 935 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 773 (2019)). Even if a plaintiff identifies an error in the military’s reasoning, though, the plaintiff must still establish that the error was not harmless. Christian v. United States, 337 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“This court and its predecessor court have applied the harmless error analysis to military back pay cases.”); see Kelly, 179 Fed. Cl. at 322. DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that the Coast Guard’s disenrollment and separation decisions were arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, and unsupported by substantial evidence based on five 15 arguments. Pl. MJAR at 14. Plaintiff also argues that the Coast Guard “did not lawfully discharge” him, so “he therefore remains entitled to pay and allowances under the Military Pay Act.” Id. at 22. Defendant argues that the disenrollment and separation decisions were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Def. MJAR at 12. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is ineligible for pay and allowances under the Military Pay Act. Def. MJAR at 19. I. Disenrollment and Separation Decisions Plaintiff makes five arguments against the Coast Guard’s disenrollment and separation decisions based on offensive remarks about another OC. Pl. MJAR at 14–22. First, Plaintiff argues that the decisions were arbitrary and capricious because “the Coast Guard never maintained a consistent explanation” of what the investigation revealed and why it justified Plaintiff’s disenrollment. Id. at 15. Second, Plaintiff argues that the investigation “overstates the evidence” and “did not account for contrary evidence.” Id. at 17. Third, Plaintiff argues that N.T.’s investigation 6 improperly exceeded its authorized scope. Id. at 18–19. Fourth, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he Coast Guard did not apply the governing harassment standard to the facts in the record.” Id. at 19. Fifth, Plaintiff argues that the Coast Guard never provided him “any meaningful opportunity to respond” to the accusations against him. Id. at 21. Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s arguments. Def. MJAR at 12. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot identify prejudicial error in the Coast Guard’s inconsistent explanations. Id. at 17. Defendant argues that the Coast Guard properly weighed conflicting evidence in the record and 6 Unlike in his administrative appeal to Force Readiness Command, see AR 15–16, Plaintiff does not argue in this case that N.T. was improperly appointed to investigate the alleged harassing remarks. See Pl. MJAR at 18–19. 16 reached a decision based on substantial evidence. Id. at 16. Defendant contends that “Mr. Rosene’s argument that the convening order limited the scope of the investigation is unfounded.” Id. at 15. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s comments about OC K qualified as harassment under Coast Guard policy. Id. at 14. Finally, Defendant argues that the Coast Guard provided Plaintiff with the procedural rights to which he was entitled, such as the opportunity to submit a written statement and to consult with an attorney. Id. at 19. A. Allegedly Inconsistent Explanations for Disenrollment Plaintiff argues that the Coast Guard’s disenrollment decision was arbitrary because “the Coast Guard never maintained a consistent explanation of what it found, why those findings mattered, and how they justified the specific personnel action imposed.” Pl. MJAR at 15. Plaintiff contends that there is no “coherent path from the investigation the Coast Guard authorized to the disposition it ultimately imposed” because Captain Hill’s Final Action Memo cited harassment as the reason for disenrollment, but later paperwork cited erroneous enlistment in addition to harassment. Id. (“An agency acts arbitrarily when it does not articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”). Defendant asserts that the Coast Guard considered erroneous enlistment but ultimately did not make a determination on that basis, so Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that any mention of erroneous enlistment prejudiced him. Def. MJAR at 17; Def. Reply at 10–11. Military agencies act in an arbitrary and capricious manner if they “simply adopt inconsistent positions without presenting some reasoned analysis.” Draper, 163 Fed. Cl. at 292 (quoting Quinton, 64 Fed. Cl. at 129). In Draper, the Secretary of the Air Force had taken two contradictory positions on the same servicemember’s performance based on the same evidence: the Secretary of the Air Force decided that the servicemember, a colonel, was eligible for 17 promotion to brigadier general for good performance but also decided that the servicemember could be retired and demoted to lieutenant colonel for unsatisfactory performance. Id. Where the “conclusions somewhat conflict,” the agency had to provide “reasoned analysis and explanation” for why the same evidence could lead to seemingly contradictory results in two different decisions. Id. In Plaintiff’s case, in contrast, the Coast Guard did not make the same seemingly contradictory decisions, and any conflict is explained in the record. The references to “erroneous enlistment” in documents related to Plaintiff’s disenrollment from the LDC do not render the Coast Guard’s actions arbitrary for inconsistency. See AR 43 (listing “erroneous enlistment” and “prohibited comments” as reason for disenrollment). During the course of her investigation, N.T. learned of Plaintiff’s prior arrests and the alleged debt collection lawsuit against Plaintiff. AR 50. After the investigation, Captain Hill of the LDC wrote that “there may be non-disclosure of arrests in OC Rosene’s [Reserve Officer Candidate Indoctrination] application package.” AR 45. Captain Hill’s memo is clear that he planned to disenroll Plaintiff due to the harassment. Id. Captain Hill was clear that his only finding was that “OC Rosene did engage in harassing behavior.” Id. In contrast, Captain Hill wrote that “there may be” non-disclosure problems that could lead to erroneous enlistment; the conditional language indicates that Captain Hill suggested an additional basis on which the Coast Guard might discharge Plaintiff. Id. Unlike in Draper, where there were conflicting decisions because the agency stated that a servicemember both deserved a promotion and a demotion, here the possibility of an erroneous enlistment due to a criminal record was, at most, an additional reason to remove Plaintiff from the Coast Guard, which did not conflict with the finding that Plaintiff’s behavior at LDC constituted harassment. See Draper, 163 Fed. Cl. at 292; AR 45. 18  The Coast Guard consistently maintained that harassment was a basis for Plaintiff’s disenrollment, and that this disenrollment justified the separation decision as it caused Plaintiff’s “[f]ailure to complete commissioning or warrant program.” AR 41. Plaintiff failed to complete his commissioning program because the LDC suspended and then disenrolled Plaintiff from the commissioning program. See AR 43 (disenrolling Plaintiff due to “prohibited comments” and suspected “erroneous enlistment”), 82. The LDC suspended Plaintiff “[d]ue to an ongoing investigation.” AR 82. Allegations of harassment and hate speech sparked that investigation. AR 97. After that investigation, the LDC determined that “[t]he alleged harassing behavior is substantiated.” AR 44 (emphasis in original). The LDC determined that the harassment allegation was substantiated because Plaintiff made prohibited comments: “OC Rosene made