Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-2830 _____________________________ VICTOR PARKER, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. J. Lee Marsh, Judge. June 29, 2021 ROWE, J. Victor Parker appeals the trial court’s order barring him from future pro se filings in his lower court case number. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm. After a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder in 2005, Parker was convicted and sentenced to a life sentence. This Court affirmed his direct appeal in 2007. See Parker v. State, 957 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (unpublished table decision). Over the next thirteen years, Parker filed fourteen postconviction motions collaterally attacking his judgment and sentence. He did not obtain relief in response to any of his motions. And before filing the postconviction motion at issue in this appeal, the trial court twice warned Parker that future frivolous filings could result in the court barring him from filing future pro se filings. Even so, Parker persisted and filed yet another motion last year, seeking a downward departure from his then-thirteen-year- old sentence. The trial court denied relief and directed Parker to show cause why he should not be barred from filing pro se pleadings. In the show cause order, the trial court described each of Parker’s fourteen postconviction filings, and attached to the order each of those filings and the trial court’s orders denying relief as to each. Parker’s response to the show cause order gave the trial court no reason to withhold sanctions and so the trial court issued the order on appeal barring Parker from future pro se filings in his lower court case number. We review the trial court’s order for an abuse of discretion and find none. See Bivins v. State, 35 So. 3d 67, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). The trial court followed the correct procedure. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(n). And the court complied with the requirements of State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999), by issuing a show cause order that provided Parker an opportunity to explain why sanctions might not be appropriate. The record demonstrates the frivolous nature of Parker’s repeated, meritless attacks on his judgment and sentence. And thus, the trial court did not err in imposing the sanction. The trial court’s order barring Parker from future pro se filings was well within its discretion. And it also furthers the right of access to courts because it permits the court to “to devote [ ] finite resources to the consideration of legitimate claims of persons who have not abused the process.” See Attwood v. Singletary, 661 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 1995). Frivolous postconviction motions draw limited judicial resources and “serve[ ] no purpose other than to delay resolution of meritorious claims brought by others.” See Hall v. State, 94 So. 3d 655, 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). And as explained in Judge Wetherell’s concurring opinion in Ferris v. State, 100 So. 3d 142, (Fla. 1st DCA 2012): courts do not exist simply to give prisoners something to do while they serve their sentences, and there comes a point in every criminal case that the defendant needs to 2 accept the finality of his judgment and sentence and just do his time. Besides affirming the trial court’s order, this Court notes that this appeal is Parker’s eighth postconviction appeal or petition filed in this Court in which he has received no relief. See Parker v. State, 990 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (unpublished table decision); Parker v. State, 21 So. 3d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (mem.); Parker v. State, 90 So. 3d 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (unpublished table decision); Parker v. State, 111 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (unpublished table decision); Parker v. State, 146 So. 3d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (unpublished table decision); Parker v. State, 244 So. 3d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (unpublished table decision); Parker v. State, 302 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (unpublished table decision). In the opinion disposing of his last postconviction appeal, this Court warned Parker that future pro se filings “may result in the imposition of sanctions, including a prohibition against any further pro se filings in this Court and a referral to the appropriate institution for disciplinary procedures.” See Parker, 302 So. 3d 964, 964–65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (mem.). We find that this appeal is frivolous. Therefore, by separate order, the Court has ordered Parker to show cause why he should not be barred from future pro se filings in this Court related to Leon County Circuit Court Case Number 2003-CF-2444. AFFIRMED. ROBERTS and JAY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Victor Parker, pro se, Appellant. 3 Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 4