Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Nat'l. Waste Managers

Anne Arundel County, Maryland, et al. v. National Waste Managers, Inc., No. 1371, September Term, 2024 HEADNOTES CIVIL LAW – ATTORNEYS’ FEES – BAD FAITH A finding of bad faith requires a probe into the party’s intent, which is “more often than not provable only by inference from the surrounding circumstances[.]” Johnson v. Spireon, 266 Md. App. 198, 240 (2025) (quoting Talley v. Talley, 317 Md. 428, 438 (1989)); Charles v. Charles, 265 Md. App. 631, 665-66 (2025) (upholding the circuit court’s award of attorneys’ fees to wife, where the court reviewed the history of the case and found husband’s bad faith in bringing and maintaining his claims). Here, the surrounding circumstances include the history of the parties’ dispute, extending 30 years. CIVIL LAW – ATTORNEYS’ FEES – BAD FAITH The circuit court determined that the County acted in bad faith by sending certain letters to the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”), which the County knew would cause MDE to terminate National’s permit application to operate a rubble landfill. The circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the County had no legal basis to defend against the ensuing action brought by National. CIVIL LAW – ATTORNEYS’ FEES – SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION The circuit court was not clearly erroneous in finding a lack of substantial justification in the County’s defense that letters it sent to the MDE stating National was not in compliance with the access condition constituted “advice” rather than a rescission of the special exception. The Anne Arundel County Code clearly states that rescission of a special exception is a matter to be addressed by the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals (“Board”) and the County admitted the access condition was a matter for the Board. Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No. C-02-CV-20-002291 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 1371 September Term, 2024 ______________________________________ ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND, ET AL. v. NATIONAL WASTE MANAGERS, INC. ______________________________________ Berger, Leahy, Zarnoch, Robert A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Leahy, J. ______________________________________ Filed: July 30, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.30 13:46:02 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  This appeal concerns the award of attorneys’ fees in litigation that began a decade before the new millennium. Twenty-five years ago, we declared that the “protracted history of this case arises from the tireless efforts of National Waste Managers, Inc.” (“National”), the appellee, “to establish and operate a rubble landfill in Odenton (the ‘Landfill’), and the equally persistent opposition of Anne Arundel County (the ‘County’)” appellant, to those efforts. Nat’l Waste Managers, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 135 Md. App. 585, 587 (2000) (“National IV”). Today, we resolve the eighth appeal of some variation in the litigation. In January 2024, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ordered the County to pay National’s attorneys’ fees, holding that the County defended the underlying action without any legal basis which would provide a colorable or meritorious defense. On appeal, the County challenges this fee award. The County presents four questions for our review,1 which boil down to one: Did the circuit court err in awarding National $491,984.35 in attorneys’ fees? 1 The County’s original questions presented are as follows: I. Did the Circuit Court err when it concluded that the County lacked substantial justification for the defense? II. Did the Circuit Court err when it considered the entire 30-year history of the parties as the basis for sanctions under Md. Rule 1-341? III. Did the Circuit Court err when it concluded that the County was a necessary party to the litigation? IV. Was the award of attorney’s fees under Md. Rule 1-341 an abuse of discretion by the Circuit Court?  We hold that the circuit court did not err. The court reasonably concluded that the County acted in bad faith and lacked substantial justification in its defense of the underlying case, and the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding National $491,984.35 in attorneys’ fees. We therefore affirm. BACKGROUND Since 1995, we have written at least six opinions summarizing the contentious history of the development of this Landfill.2 Here, we will focus “on the facts pertinent to the issues before us, gleaned primarily from the record and earlier appellate opinions.” National IV, 135 Md. App. at 590. History of the Parties In 1988, National sought a landfill permit from the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”) and a special exception and variances from the County to operate the Landfill. The Landfill would comprise: [A]pproximately 108 acres of land located near the intersection of Routes 3 and 424, in Odenton, Maryland. Of the 108 acres subject to the special exception request, only 35 acres of previously cleared property was proposed 2 Due to the abundance of appeals in this case, we will refer to each as “National” followed by its sequential numbering “I-IX.” The appeals are as follows: Halle Companies v. Crofton Civic Ass’n, 339 Md. 131 (1995) (National I); Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Nat’l Waste Managers, No. 810, Sept. Term 1997 (Md. App. Mar. 25, 1998) (National II), cert. denied, 350 Md. 275 (1998); Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Nat’l Waste Managers, No. 96, Sept. Term 1998 (Md. App. Sept. 29, 1998) (National III), cert. denied, 352 Md. 336 (1998); Nat’l Waste Managers v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 135 Md. App. 585 (2000) (National IV); Nat’l Waste Managers v. Forks of the Patuxent Improvement Ass’n, 453 Md. 423 (2017) (National V); Nat’l Waste Managers, Inc., Chesapeake Terrace v. Forks of the Patuxent Improvement Ass’n, No. 1327, Sept. Term 2019, 2020 WL 5870525 (Md. App. Oct. 2, 2020) (National VI); Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Nat’l Waste Managers, No. 0565, Sept. Term 2021, 2022 WL 17494630 (Md. App. Dec. 8, 2022) (National VII), cert. denied, 483 Md. 270 (2023). 2  for sand and gravel extraction. [National] also sought approval for rubble landfill operations to be conducted at that same location on approximately 482 acres (including the 108 acres for the sand and gravel landfill). Of the 482 acres, only 150 acres of previously cleared property was contemplated for landfill use, to be accomplished through the sequential filling of a number of small cells on the property. National I, 339 Md. at 134-35.3 The 482-acre parcel4 was located in a Rural-Agricultural zone where the operations were “permitted by special exception” under Anne Arundel County Code (“County Code”), Title 18 (Zoning), section 18-4-106. National V, 453 Md. at 426-27.5 Nevertheless, National’s application for a special exception was denied by the County. National I, 339 Md. at 135. National appealed to the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals (“Board”),6 which 3 In National IV we explained that, “National, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Halle Companies (‘Halle’), was formerly known as Chesapeake Terrace, Inc. (‘Chesapeake’). We shall refer to Halle, Chesapeake, and National collectively as ‘National.’” 135 Md. App. at 587 n.2. 4 National owned the 482-acre parcel. See National II, slip op. at 1. 5 In 2014, the County Council of Anne Arundel County passed Bill No. 21-14, removing rubble landfills as a special exception use in Anne Arundel County by repealing § 18-4-106 of the County Code. County Council of Anne Arundel County, Md. 21-14, 2014 Leg. Sess. (2014) (enacted), https://perma.cc/JND7-5K4X. The County recently published a Comprehensive Update of Article 18, describing proposed amendments to the County Code. Zoning Code Comprehensive Update, Anne Arundel County Maryland, https://perma.cc/7ND9-M5JR. Currently, County Code § 18-11-130 describes the compliance requirements for rubble landfills. 6 In National I, the Supreme Court of Maryland explained: [Under] the Express Powers Act, Md. Code (1957, 1994 Repl. Vol.), Art. 25A, § 5(U), each county is authorized to create a board of appeals. Anne Arundel County, by its charter, created the Board of Appeals as an independent unit of county government and vested the Board with the power (Continued) 3 held 16 administrative hearings over the course of 17 months. Id. Evidence presented at these hearings described the subject property as a gravel quarry in disuse: [T]he site was within a resource extraction area on the master plan of the County, was the subject of an existing special exception granted for a sand and gravel operation, and … had been mined off and on for 40 years. The site was likened to a moonscape, and photographs of the site showed debris, deep ravines, and erosion on the property. … Illegal dumping, target shooting, and hunting regularly occurred on the property. Id. National suggested that the site should be accessed from Conway Road, rather than Patuxent Road, to alleviate traffic and wetlands concerns raised by the County and neighbors. Id. at 136. National claimed this would provide a “shorter access route, … affect fewer people overall, and … direct the traffic further from the Patuxent River.” Id. Board’s 1993 Memorandum Opinion On December 23, 1993, following three months of deliberation and an onsite visit, the Board issued a 38-page opinion and order granting the special exception subject to seven conditions. Mem. Op., Halle Companies/Chesapeake Terrace, Case Nos. BA 120-90S, 26-91S, 27-91V (Dec. 23, 1993), hereinafter “1993 Memorandum Opinion.” The opinion summarized the evidence presented at the 16 hearings. An engineer named J.A. Chisholm assessed the impact of the two alternative access to hear de novo all appeals authorized by the Express Powers Act. Anne Arundel County provides for initial action upon a special exception or variance request by an administrative hearing officer. Thereafter, appeal may be taken from the decision of the hearing officer to the Board of Appeals. Anne Arundel County Charter § 603 mandates that “[a]ll decisions by the County Board of Appeals shall be made after notice and hearing de novo upon the issues before said Board.” National I, 339 Md. at 139-40. 4 points National proposed. 1993 Memorandum Opinion at 2. Chisholm testified that truck trips per day would average 20 and reach a maximum of 60. Id. A traffic and transportation planner “assumed 300 trucks a day” would visit the site, but noted this was “probably a high assumption” and that from “a traffic engineering viewpoint, the Conway Road access is the best alternative.” Id. at 8-9. One neighbor who opposed the Landfill (a “protestant”) testified that “Conway Road is a country road which is narrow with very small shoulders and is rutted by excessive truck traffic.” Id. at 16-17. Another protestant argued that “there is too much truck traffic on the road already” and submitted photographs “showing flooding and … bad turns on Conway Road.” Id. at 15. A “representative of the Greater Crofton Council” also raised traffic, health, safety, and welfare concerns, arguing there was “no urgent need” for the Landfill “because there are many sand and gravel operations already.” Id. at 16. Chisolm explained the community needed the rubble landfill because “18,000 dwelling units [were] proposed to be built within 10 to 15 miles of the site.” Id. at 5. A hydrogeologist testified that the Landfill was to be “located 240 feet from the closest residence” and would affect only “1 to 6 shallow wells,” because most nearby wells “obtain … water from below the clay layer.” Id. at 6-7. Another engineer explained that because this is a rubble landfill, there should be “no problem with leachate,” as leachate occurs from the degradation of water and waste. Id. at 7-8. Even so, a protestant argued that the Landfill “should be double-lined” and there should be “a plan … to handle any leachate,” highlighting a study showing carcinogens in rubble landfills in Maryland. Id. at 14. Kevin Dooley, a zoning analyst with the Office of Planning and Zoning, identified 5 National’s two variance requests: “one, a variance of 760 feet to the 1,000 foot setback from a residence or institutional building, and two, a variance of 100 feet from the required 100 foot setback to deposit fill.” Id. at 17-18. Dooley stated that “the special exception can comply with all the standards except for filling within 100 feet of the property line.” Id. at 18. Dooley did not support National’s requests because “of the close proximity of the work area to the residences[.]” Id. He also noted that with “the amount of additional truck traffic proposed, the roads would need to be improved with shoulders[,]” which was impossible, because the roads were too narrow. Id. Some of the conditions imposed by the Board responded to concerns raised by the protestants. For example, Conway Road, and not Patuxent Road, was “to be used as the entrance to the” Landfill, and “road improvements on Conway Road from Route 3 to Patuxent Road” had to “be constructed before” Landfill operations could begin. Id. at 34-35. Recognizing that National may be unable to “obtain the right-of-way from the private property owners” to improve the roadway, the Board encouraged National “to use their best efforts to obtain such rights-of-way to construct the eight foot shoulders.” Id. at 30. One condition that would later become the focus of much litigation was the condition that “access obtained to the site from Conway Road shall be through a fee-simple right-of-way, not through an easement.” Id. at 35. The Board noted that because “the land [was] cratered … up to the property line” from mining, the setback variances would allow National “to fill in those areas so that the dangerous and eroding conditions no longer exist.” Id. at 33. The Board concluded in its 1993 Memorandum Opinion that National was “capable of meeting all of the performance 6 standards” required by law, had “met [its] burden of showing the necessity” for the variances, and that the operations “will be no more objectionable with regard to noise, fumes, vibration, or light to nearby properties than operations in permitted uses.” Id. at 27, 30. One member of the Board dissented, mostly based on traffic concerns. Id. at 39-44. Judicial Review Several community associations and the County sought judicial review of the Board’s December 1993 decision in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. National I, 339 Md. at 137-38; National IV, 135 Md. App. at 590-91. The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision, but the Supreme Court then granted certiorari and upheld the Board’s decision in July 1995. National I, 339 Md. at 145-46, 148-49. While these judicial-review proceedings were pending, a bill was introduced before the County Council that included the Landfill in the County’s Solid Waste Management Plan (“SWMP”). Subsequently, the legislation was amended to omit any reference to the Landfill. … Because the Landfill was not included in the County’s SWMP in May 1994, MDE suspended its consideration of National’s permit application, pending receipt from the County of a written statement … advising that the proposed Landfill satisfied the applicable County zoning and land use requirements, and was in conformity with the County’s SWMP. National IV, 135 Md. App. at 590-91. The County refused “to send a statement of conformance to MDE,” so National filed a seven-count complaint against the County. Id. at 591-92. In the first count: National sought a writ of mandamus requiring the County to include the Landfill in its SWMP. … The third count sought a declaratory judgment that: (1) National is entitled to have the Landfill included in the SWMP; (2) National is entitled to delivery of the Statement of Conformance to MDE; and (3) the County acted unlawfully in failing to include the Landfill in the 1994 amendments to the SWMP. 7 Id. at 591-92. 7 After cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court held that National was “entitled to partial summary judgment on count 1, mandamus[] ordering that the [National] project be included” in the SWMP, and that “National was entitled to a declaration that the County had violated State law by failing to include the … Landfill in the SWMP.” Id. at 592. The County appealed. While the appeal in National II was pending, the County filed multiple unsuccessful motions to stay enforcement of the circuit court’s judgment, and National filed a petition for contempt against the County. National IV, 135 Md. App. at 593-94. In August 1997, the circuit court found the County in contempt. Id. at 594-95. The court fined the County $250,000, with the option to purge the contempt if the County (among other things) “provide[s] within five days … its written statement to MDE that the Landfill meets all applicable county zoning and land use requirements and is in conformity with the County’s SWMP.” Id. at 594 (internal marks omitted). A few days later, the County sent a statement of conformance to MDE: Pursuant to the enclosed judicial order, the Anne Arundel County Department of Public Works informs you that the Landfill meets all applicable County zoning and land use requirements and is in conformity with the County SWMP. Id. at 595 (internal marks omitted). In response, the circuit court “issued [an] amended contempt order,” deleting the paragraph that ordered the County to issue this statement. Id. 7 “Count 3 also included a request for the Statement of Conformance, National did not ask for relief pursuant to that count in its summary judgment motion.” National IV, 135 Md. App. at 600. 8 at 596. The County noted yet another appeal, this time challenging the “findings of contempt in both the original and amended contempt orders.” Id.; see generally National III. In November 1997, with its two appeals still pending, the County “advis[ed] MDE that the special exception had expired,” effectively withdrawing the written statement it had issued to MDE to escape contempt fines. National IV, 135 Md. App. at 596-97. In March 1998, we issued our opinion in National II, affirming the circuit court’s summary judgment ruling that National was entitled to relief. Six months after that, we issued our opinion in National III, affirming “the finding of contempt embodied in the original and amended contempt orders.” National IV, 135 Md. App. at 600. In our opinion affirming the contempt orders, we explained: Although the County believed that the Landfill did not conform to the County’s zoning and land use requirements, that contention was disposed of when [the Supreme Court] decided [National I]. The [National I] Court upheld the decision of the [Board] to grant special exception and variance requests for [National’s] Landfill. … Because the landfill satisfied all of the criteria set by the County, [the County] did not have the discretion to delete the Landfill from the SWMP. National III, slip op. at 15. Despite our affirmance, we vacated the purge provision from the contempt orders with instructions to the circuit court about how to amend the purge provision. National IV, 135 Md. App. at 600. Having finally prevailed on Count 1 of its complaint, National “moved for partial summary judgment as to Count 3(b) …, seeking” (1) “a declaratory judgment that the County acted unlawfully by refusing to issue a written Statement of Conformance to MDE pursuant to E[nvironment] A[rticle] § 9-210” and (2) “an injunction directing the County” 9 issue such a statement. Id. National then amended its complaint to add an eighth count and new averments. Id. at 601. Once its new complaint became operative, National moved to have the circuit court enter a new contempt purge condition and for two injunctions: one requiring the County place the Landfill in its SWMP; and the other directing the County to withdraw its letter notifying MDE that National’s special exception had expired. Id. The circuit court denied this motion, id. at 601, so National appealed. Id. at 602, 614. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s denial and remanded the case. Id. at 614. The Court held that National’s special exception did not expire because the two-year period set forth in County Code, Art. 28, § 12-107(a) “was tolled during the entire course of the litigation in this case.”8 Id. at 604-05, 614. Indeed, if the County’s litigation did not toll the expiration of these special exceptions, then “a developer facing a time-related condition could almost always be thwarted in its efforts by the inevitable delay resulting from litigation, regardless of the merits; the right to proceed would necessarily expire 8 In 1998, § 12-107 of the County Code provided: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or subsection (c) of this section, approval of a special exception is rescinded by operation of law if: (1) action to implement the use is not begun within one year after the decision of the approving authority; and (2) the use is not completed and in operation within two years after the decision. National IV, 135 Md. App. at 599. This provision is no longer in the Zoning Ordinance. The current provision that addresses the method for rescission, suspension or modification of a special exception is County Code § 18-16-404 and the provision providing for the time period after which special exceptions are void is County Code § 18-16-405. 10 before a court could rule otherwise.” Id. at 608. The Supreme Court refused to accept the County’s contrary arguments, which would have “elevate[d] gamesmanship to new heights.” Id. In June 2001, having now lost four consecutive appeals, the County sent a letter advising MDE that the Landfill is “in conformance with the County Solid Waste Plan” and: meets all applicable county zoning and land use requirements subject to the performance of the conditions required by the special exception approval, including, but not limited to, fee simple ownership of access to the site from Conway Road. As of this writing, the County has not been provided with evidence that the required access has been obtained by [National]. The Board then granted a two-year extension to the special exception, reasoning that “National had to begin the process nearly over again” because of the “delay occasioned by the litigation[.]” National V, 453 Md. at 430 (internal marks omitted). The Board granted two more extensions, but it denied National’s fourth extension request, so National appealed again, and MDE again halted its review of the permit application. Id. at 431-35, 437. In the fifth appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Board to “address and resolve … what impact, if any, the requested two-year extension … would have on the character of the neighborhood, the appropriate use or development of adjacent property, or the public welfare.” Id. at 446. The Court reasoned that the Board should have evaluated the effect of temporal variances, not the prolonged disagreement among the parties. Id. at 445-46. On remand, the Board held a hearing and “issued a supplemental decision granting the temporal variance application[,]” but this decision did not survive judicial review. 11 National VI, 2020 WL 5870525, at *3. We explained in National VI that the Board had not addressed what impact the extension would have on the property, the neighborhood, or the public, as the Supreme Court had directed. Id. at *4-5. In August 2020, while our decision in National VI was pending, the County Executive wrote a letter to MDE that backtracked on the County’s earlier approvals: On behalf of the citizens of Anne Arundel County, thank you for allowing my office the opportunity to provide comments on the Phase III Permit Application for … [the] Landfill … The proposed project has, in point of fact, not satisfied all applicable county zoning and land use requirements because the applicant has not acquired access to the site as required by a special exception that is now more than 26 years old. (Emphasis in original). The County Attorney then wrote to MDE reiterating the County’s position that, notwithstanding the many court pronouncements to the contrary, the Landfill “still does not meet all applicable County zoning requirements.” Based on this representation, the County Attorney “request[ed] that, at a minimum, MDE follow State law and cease processing this permit application.” Going yet further, the County Attorney argued that because of the Landfill’s “continued failure to satisfy the zoning condition regarding access, the application should be denied.” 9 MDE denied National’s permit application, citing the letters as the “basis for halting the process.” National VII, 2022 WL 17494630, at *3. In response, National hired a large national law firm, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP (“Quinn Emanuel”), which sent a letter to the County countering the legal 9 The County has repeatedly stated it has no intention of selling National the land required by the special exception as an access way from Conway Road to the Landfill. 12 and factual claims made by the County and demanding that the County retract the letters and “issue corrective letters instructing MDE to resume its Phase III review.” Quinn Emanuel and the County exchanged letters, but they failed to reach an agreement. In December 2020, National filed a new complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County and MDE. This complaint sought: (1) “a judgment declaring that its proposed development” of the Landfill is “in compliance with applicable zoning and land use regulations”; (2) “an injunction directing the County to issue a statement” to MDE confirming that the Landfill is in compliance; and (3) “an injunction directing MDE to continue its Phase III review” of National’s permit application to operate the Landfill. National separately filed a petition for a writ of mandamus ordering that: (1) the County Executive, the County Attorney, the County Planning and Zoning Officer, and the Chief of the County’s Solid Waste Operations, Land & Materials Administration “promptly issue a written statement confirming that the … Landfill ‘[m]eets all applicable County zoning and land use requirements’ under Section 9-210(a)(3) of the Environment Article and … retract its recent letters stating to the contrary”; and (2) the Chief of the County’s Solid Waste Operations, Land & Materials Administration and MDE “promptly resume reviewing [National’s] solid waste permit application.”10 Of special relevance to this, the eighth appeal, National’s mandamus petition sought 10 MDE responded with a motion to dismiss the petition and complaint. National responded to MDE’s motion. On May 25, 2021, the circuit court denied MDE’s motion to dismiss and ordered MDE to “continue its phase III review of [National’s] permit application to operate the . . . Landfill[.]” 13 an award of attorneys’ fees. National recounted that “[f]or almost three decades, [National] has sought to develop the … Landfill in the face of substantial bad-faith conduct by the County to interfere with [National’s] application for a refuse disposal permit from MDE.” After decades of litigation, just as National “was nearing the end of the MDE permit review process, the County … took action to halt MDE’s review by asserting, wrongfully, that the … Landfill was not compliant with local zoning and land use regulations.” National alleged that the County had not even warned it of the County’s new legal position: “the County did not even inform [National] that it would be taking this position with MDE— instead, [National] only learned of the County’s bad-faith conduct from MDE.” National argued that “the County’s position that the access road condition must be satisfied before the … Landfill can be considered compliant is unsupported by a plain reading of the special exception, inconsistent with the prior decisions of Maryland courts and actions of MDE, and inconsistent with prior position statements of the County.” National moved for summary judgment on its mandamus petition, arguing that the County “failed to perform its nondiscretionary ministerial duty by refusing to certify the Landfill’s compliance to MDE, as required by” Maryland Code, Environment Article (2014 Rep. Vol.) (“EN”) § 9-210. 11 National explained that these 2020 actions of the 11 Section 9-210 was last amended in 1998. At that time, the General Assembly amended EN § 9-210(b) to require that MDE stop processing a permit application until the County has provided MDE with a written statement that the refuse disposal system meets all applicable County zoning and land use requirements and is in conformity with the County’s solid waste plan. H.B. 1024, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998), https://perma.cc/6U5H-SEET. 14 County Executive and the County Attorney were the same actions for which the County was held in contempt 23 years earlier. And National contended that the County’s obstinate refusal to comply with decades of court orders “threaten[ed] to undermine [National’s] due process rights under the law and subvert the enormous resources [National] has invested over a period of decades.” The County cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that an “intervening change in circumstance” rendered “the condition of the special exception impossible to achieve”—the County had acquired all of the properties that could grant the Landfill access to Conway Road, and the County refused to sell them to National. In addition, there were “several other properties owned by third parties that the access route must also cross, including the WB&A Trail which was acquired by Anne Arundel County” and “cannot be conveyed to [National] in fee-simple.” Therefore, the County argued, a writ of mandamus “would change nothing.” Consequently, despite decades of court orders to the contrary, the County claimed that the Landfill was not in compliance with local zoning. Perhaps as a backup, the County also argued that its letters did not demand anything of MDE, but merely apprised MDE of certain facts. After a hearing in April 2021, the circuit court granted National’s motion for summary judgment in part, denied the County’s cross-motion, and denied MDE’s motion to dismiss. The court voided the County’s 2020 letters and ordered MDE to continue Phase III review of National’s permit application. The circuit court held that the County “overstepped the bounds of [its] authority” by sending the 2020 letters, violating the due process rights of National. The court declared that under the County Code, the “County 15 has no authority to unilaterally decide that [National] no longer has a right to develop the property without a proper hearing by the Board” and pointed out that the County admitted “that they were not aware of any cases or statutes that allowed [the County] to send the letters to MDE.” The County appealed, again. The Underlying Case National Moved for Attorneys’ Fees With the 2021 appeal pending, National moved for an award of attorneys’ fees in the circuit court. National claimed “the County staked out a legal position … without any legal support” and “engaged in ‘bad-faith’ litigation … that lacked ‘substantial justification.’” National argued the “County’s tactics preceding and during this litigation are consistent with a pattern of meritless obstruction dating back 30 years” and the 2020 “letters were (and should be) the final straw.” National pointed out that “just as MDE was nearing the end of its review,” the County “urged MDE to outright deny the application” in its letters, citing a lack of satisfaction of the condition of fee-simple access as grounds, forcing National “to litigate once more.” And National claimed that the County’s argument “that the letters were mere advice and not legally binding” at the summary judgment hearing contradicted its other arguments and revealed that the County knew its position was frivolous. National’s fee application explained that given the long history of the case, National “needed to hire expert litigators … to handle a vast factual and legal record on a compressed timeframe.” To accomplish this, National’s litigation team of eight lawyers had spent a combined 1,655.7 hours on the case: 16  one partner, one senior associate, and two junior associates, as well as another senior associate who was brought on to assist[.] … [T]hese attorneys billed 1,512.70 hours at rates ranging from $425 to $1,200 per hour. Quinn Emanuel also incurred costs of $5,271. In addition, the Quinn Emanuel team was assisted by local counsel, Adam Van Grack and Theodore Kiviat at Longman & Van Grack, who ensured compliance with local Maryland rules and procedure, and collectively billed 95.2 hours at the rate of $375. Quinn Emanuel was also assisted by Susanne K. Henley at Henley & Henley, who has provided counsel to [National] since it first sought approval for the … Landfill and who billed 47.8 hours at the rate of $295 per hour.12 National argued the time expended was reasonable because “Quinn Emanuel had to dedicate a lean but appropriately staffed team to digest an extensive record, work through various legal theories and statutory regimes, respond to myriad legal arguments and lines of cases raised by the County and MDE, and do so on an accelerated timetable.” Finally, National claimed that Quinn Emanuel’s rates—ranging from $425 to $1,200—were reasonable and comparable to those of similar premier law firms in the Washington, D.C. legal market. Similarly, National claimed Longman & Van Grack’s and Henley’s fees were reasonable because they were commensurate with the rates charged by comparable Maryland lawyers. In support of its total request, National included invoices detailing the attorneys’ fees. National asserted that despite its efforts to “bring the litigation to a close as swiftly and efficiently as possible” it still incurred $1,288,349.70 in attorneys’ fees and costs. National noted that its “request for Quinn Emanuel fees only include[d] fees 12 incurred starting from the preparation of the petition and complaint, going forward” and that its “invoices also reflect limited work on related, non-litigation issues such as [National’s] ongoing matters before the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals.” National pointed out that any “billing entries that included non-litigation issues … h[ad] been removed from [National’s] attorneys’ fees request.” 17  In opposition to National’s fee application, the County advanced four arguments: (1) the County had a “colorable basis” for its positions, because the County’s ownership of nearby land made complying with the variance conditions impossible, especially because National had initiated the suit and the governing law was “underdeveloped and unexplored”; (2) the County’s letters preceded the court proceeding, so they could not be the subject of sanctions; (3) even though the County was “not aware of any cases or statutes that allowed the County Executive or the County Attorney to send the letters to MDE” because the County Planning and Zoning Officer reports to the County Executive, the letter was reasonable in context; and (4) the amount of fees was “inherently unreasonable” for a case that lasted four months and was expedited. For these reasons, the County asked the court to find the requested attorneys’ fees “unreasonable” and “deny them outright, or in the alternative, discount them significantly” to at most, 300 hours at the “Anne Arundel County prevailing legal rate of $295 for a total of $88,500.” In the alternative, the County asked the circuit court to stay the fee proceedings until the resolution of the pending appeal. National’s motion for attorneys’ fees was stayed pending the resolution of the appeal. In December 2022, we affirmed the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment in National’s favor. National VII, 2022 WL 17494630, at *5. We agreed that the 2020 letters were “attempts to rescind or modify the 2001 zoning approval letter.” Id. at *4. We noted that the “County’s reference to the 2020 letters as ‘notifications’ [was] contrary to the unmistakable tenor of the letters, which clearly requested that MDE stop processing the permit or deny the permit outright