Mary Ann Bender v. Village of Mariemont

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0187p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ MARY ANN BENDER, │ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ │ v. > No. 25-3540 │ │ VILLAGE OF MARIEMONT, OHIO, │ Defendant, │ │ │ NICHOLAS PITTSLEY and PAUL RENNIE, Police Officers │ for the Village of Mariemont, Ohio, │ Defendants-Appellants. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. No. 1:23-cv-00051—Douglas Russell Cole, District Judge. Argued: March 19, 2026 Decided and Filed: June 30, 2026 Before: MOORE, THAPAR, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Katherine L. Barbiere, SCHROEDER, MAUNDRELL, BARBIERE & POWERS, Mason, Ohio, for Appellants. Stephen E. Imm, FINNEY LAW FIRM, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Katherine L. Barbiere, SCHROEDER, MAUNDRELL, BARBIERE & POWERS, Mason, Ohio, for Appellants. Stephen E. Imm, Matthew S. Okiishi, FINNEY LAW FIRM, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MATHIS, J., concurred. THAPAR, J. (pp. 29–32), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Mary Ann Bender was the primary caregiver for her friend Rita Cole. While caring for Cole, Bender resided in Cole’s condominium (“the condo”) with her. After Cole died, ownership of the condo transferred to Cole’s living trust, of which Bender became trustee. Bender remained in the condo for approximately one month after Cole’s death because Bender was ill and needed time to remove belongings that she had moved into the condo while caring for Cole. Cole’s nephew, Kevin Surette, contacted the police and asked them to accompany him to the condo to evict Bender. Kevin Surette showed Officers Nicholas Pittsley and Paul Rennie (“the Officers”) a copy of a superseded version of Cole’s will, which the Officers took only a cursory glance at, that named Kevin Surette as a beneficiary but did not mention the condo. The Officers accompanied Kevin Surette to the condo and, according to Bender, told Bender that she had ten minutes to leave the condo, threatened to arrest her, pushed her out the door, and took her key. Bender sued the Officers, among others, alleging that their active participation in the eviction constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the Officers’ motion, and the Officers now appeal the district court’s order. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying summary judgment. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts Mary Ann Bender and Rita Cole were “best friend[s] for over 20 years.” R. 27 (Bender Dep. at 21:18–23) (Page ID #306). For the last five years of Cole’s life, Bender was her primary caregiver because Bender “was the only one willing to” care for her. Id. at 22:20–22 (Page ID #307). During that time, Bender moved into Cole’s condo in Cincinnati because Cole “couldn’t be left alone.” Id. at 26:4–8 (Page ID #311). Bender also owned her own home, and she and Cole “went back and forth” between Bender’s home and the condo before Cole became unable to  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 3 do so, but Bender and Cole always spent nights at Cole’s condo. Id. at 26:12–25 (Page ID #311). Bender moved clothing and other belongings into the condo to make it easier to care for Cole while residing there. Id. at 33:4–12 (Page ID #318). Cole died on April 8, 2022. Id. at 78:3–5 (Page ID #363). Before Cole died, she executed several estate-planning documents. Cole created a living trust in 2013, R. 41-11 (Living Trust Agreement at 1) (Page ID #1163), and amended it in 2014, R. 41-11 (First Am. to Living Trust at 2) (Page ID #1176). The amendment named Kevin Surette as one of several trust beneficiaries and Robert Surette as trustee upon Cole’s death. Id. at 1 (Page ID #1175). Bender was named as the successor trustee, id., and in 2016 Robert Surette indicated that he was unable to serve as trustee and “request[ed] that Mary Bender . . . serve in [his] place,” R. 41-11 (Trustee Resignation) (Page ID #1188). Upon Cole’s death, the condo was to become property of the trust. R. 41-11 (Transfer on Death Designation Aff.) (Page ID #1177). Cole also executed two wills. First, Cole signed a will in 2015 that named R.J. Connelly III as executor and Kevin Surette as one of several beneficiaries. R. 41-11 (2015 Will at 1–2, 8) (Page ID #1179–80, 1186). In 2021 Cole executed a will that “revok[ed] all other . . . Wills” and named only Karen Nelligan and Denise Surette as beneficiaries. R. 41-11 (2021 Will at 1–2) (Page ID #1189–90). Based on those estate documents, when Cole died on April 8, 2022, ownership of the condo transferred to the trust and Bender became trustee. Following Cole’s death and funeral, Bender continued to live at the condo. R. 27 (Bender Dep. at 78:9–16) (Page ID #363). Denise Surette, who is Cole’s niece and Kevin Surette’s sister, told Bender that she could reside in the condo temporarily. Id. at 82:21–83:10 (Page ID #367–68). Denise Surette was the executor and a beneficiary of Cole’s 2021 will, but she was not a trust beneficiary. R. 41-11 (First Am. to Living Trust at 1) (Page ID #1175); R. 41-11 (2021 Will at 1) (Page ID #1189). Bender planned to vacate the condo by the end of May because “that’s the amount of time [she] thought it would take [her] to get [her] things out” and she was “ill and was getting back on her feet.” R. 27 (Bender Dep. at 83:14–25, 93:11–19) (Page ID #368, 378). Bender was seventy-six years old at the time.  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 4 On May 6, 2022, Kevin Surette, Cole’s nephew, was informed by his cousins that Bender was at the condo “removing items and destroying documents.” R. 33 (Kevin Surette Dep. at 51:22–25) (Page ID #724). It is unclear how his cousins would have known this because they were “out of state.” Id. at 70:24–71:16 (Page ID #743–44).1 Kevin Surette went to the police station and asked Officers Pittsley and Rennie to accompany him to the condo because he was “concerned that” Bender “was still on the property” and wanted her “to leave.” R. 32 (Rennie Dep. at 25:3–16, 30:9–17) (Page ID #635, 640); see also R. 33 (Kevin Surette Dep. at 50:19– 51:5) (Page ID #723–24). Kevin Surette showed the Officers Cole’s 2015 will, R. 32 (Rennie Dep. at 24:12–19) (Page ID #634); R. 31 (Pittsley Dep. at 56:22–57:6) (Page ID #566–67), which listed him as a beneficiary, R. 41-11 (2015 Will at 2) (Page ID #1180).2 The Officers only glanced at the title of the will and saw that Kevin Surette’s name was in the will; they did not “inspect” or fully read the will. R. 32 (Rennie Dep. at 24:14–19) (Page ID #634); R. 31 (Pittsley Dep. at 56:22–57:25) (Page ID #566–67). We know that the Officers did not even read the first page of the will because Kevin Surette told the Officers that he was the executor of the will and the Officers accepted that as true, R. 31 (Pittsley Dep. at 58:1–9) (Page ID #568); R. 32 (Rennie Dep. at 24:14–19) (Page ID #634); R. 27-4 (Incident Report at 2) (Page ID #490), but on the very first page of the will, R.J. Connelly III was named as the executor and Kevin Surette was named only as a beneficiary on the second page, R. 41-11 (2015 Will at 1–2) (Page ID #1179– 80). Kevin Surette did not present the Officers with a court order or other documentation to support his claim to the condo. R. 32 (Rennie Dep. at 29:14–18, 52:14–19) (Page ID #639, 662); R. 31 (Pittsley Dep. at 53:7–13, 59:19–25) (Page ID #563, 569). Prior to May 6, Kevin Surette had not contacted Bender about the condo, let alone taken any legal action. R. 33 (Kevin Surette Dep. at 51:6–14, 54:15–22) (Page ID #724, 727). 1 From this point on, what occurred is disputed by the parties. This appeal comes to us in an interlocutory posture following the denial of summary judgment, so we must view the facts in the light most favorable to Bender as the nonmoving party. Therefore, we describe what transpired based on the evidence viewed in Bender’s favor, even though we acknowledge that the Officers dispute her account. See Anderson-Santos v. Kent County, 94 F.4th 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2024); Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 300, 305–06 (6th Cir. 2011). 2 The record is not entirely clear as to which will Kevin Surette showed the Officers, but he was not named in the 2021 will—so a reasonable inference is that he showed the Officers the 2015 will.  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 5 The Officers accompanied Kevin Surette to the condo and met him in the condo building’s parking lot. R. 32 (Rennie Dep. at 31:15–18) (Page ID #641). They walked to the door of the condo together and knocked. R. 33 (Kevin Surette Dep. at 53:1–4) (Page ID #726). The Officers stood in front of Kevin Surette, and when Bender answered the door, the Officers “ask[ed] her why she was in the . . . condo[].” Id. at 53:5–54:14 (Page ID #726–27). The Officers and Kevin Surette then “pushed their way into the condo,” R. 27 (Bender Dep. at 93:9– 10) (Page ID #378), and the Officers “asked her if she had a right to be there,” R. 33 (Kevin Surette Dep. at 54:1–5) (Page ID #727). Bender told them that she was staying at the condo because she was “ill and was getting back on her feet.” R. 27 (Bender Dep. at 93:11–19) (Page ID #378). She also asked the Officers to see a warrant, told them that they needed a warrant to enter the condo, asked to see the will that Kevin Surette had shown the Officers, told them that she “kn[e]w [Cole’s] last will was” executed in 2021, and told them that she “had the only true will.” Id. at 101:8–102:1 (Page ID #386–87). The Officers refused to show Bender the will that Kevin Surette presented to them. Id. Once inside the condo, one of the Officers asked Kevin Surette, “when did you want her out of here, Kevin? And Kevin said, today.” Id. at 94:16–23 (Page ID #379). The Officer then told Bender that she “ha[d] ten minutes” to gather her belongings and leave the condo. Id. Bender does not recall if the Officers physically touched her, but she testified that they were “pushing [her]” to exit the condo. Id. at 99:10–25 (Page ID #384). Rennie told Bender “at least ten times” that she “was going to jail” and to take photos of her personal belongings in the condo. Id. at 102:9–19, 106:1–25 (Page ID #387, 391). Ultimately, Pittsley issued Bender a citation. Id. at 108:23–109:2 (Page ID #393–94); R. 31 (Pittsley Dep. at 90:5–13) (Page ID #600); R. 27-4 (Incident Report at 2) (Page ID #490). Pittsley told Bender to “[g]ive [him] [her] key” to the condo and “took [her] key.” R. 27 (Bender Dep. at 122:20–123:14, 125:19–126:1) (Page ID #407–08, 410–11). The Officers then “pushed [her] out the door and harassed [her] about going to jail.” Id. at 122:20–25, 124:18–22 (Page ID #407, 409). The Officers left the condo only after they removed Bender, and Bender went to a neighbor’s condo in the same complex because she was “too shaken” to drive to her home immediately. Id. at 107:6–10 (Page ID #392). The police report states that the “Officers  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 6 made contact with Ms. Bender inside of the residence and advised her that Mr. Surette was an executor of Ms. Cole’s will, and was acting on behalf of himself and others listed in the will, and requested that Ms. Bender leave the residence and not return.” R. 27-4 (Incident Report at 2) (Page ID #490). Rennie’s daily activity log stated that he “assisted . . . with removing Mary Bender from the residence.” R. 41-12 (Rennie Activity Log at 1) (Page ID #1229). B. Procedural History Bender sued Kevin Surette, Pittsley, Rennie, Chief of Police and Fire Richard Hines, and the Village of Mariemont. R. 1 (Compl.) (Page ID #1). She alleged, as relevant here, that Pittsley and Rennie violated the Fourth Amendment by evicting her from the condo. Id. ¶¶ 35– 41 (Page ID #5–6). Following discovery, Pittsley, Rennie, Hines, and the Village of Mariemont moved for summary judgment. R. 35 (Mot. for Summ. J.) (Page ID #923). They argued that Rennie and Pittsley were entitled to qualified immunity, Bender did not have a viable Monell claim against the Village of Mariemont, and Bender’s failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim against Hines failed. Id. at 8–18 (Page ID #930–40). The district court granted the motion as to Hines and the Village of Mariemont but denied the motion as to Pittsley and Rennie. Bender v. Village of Mariemont, No. 1:23-CV-51, 2025 WL 1735764, at *13 (S.D. Ohio June 23, 2025). The district court concluded that Bender held legal title to the condo as trustee, so “Bender’s residing in the condo after Cole’s death could perhaps be understood as her undertaking an unwritten lease agreement with herself, serving as both lessor (in her capacity as trustee) and lessee (in her personal capacity).” Id. at *6–7. Even though that transaction may have constituted self-dealing by Bender as trustee, which Ohio law generally prohibits, such self- dealing would have made the transaction only voidable, not void. Id. Because Kevin Surette had taken no action to void the transaction, Bender had a possessory interest in the condo. Id. The district court then concluded that, “[o]n Bender’s telling” of what occurred in the condo, the Officers “t[ook] an active role in the . . . eviction” and were not there merely to keep the peace. Id. at *8 (quoting Middaugh v. City of Three Rivers, 684 F. App’x 522, 527 (6th Cir. 2017)). The district court highlighted that “Officers Rennie and Pittsley: (1) asked [Kevin]  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 7 Surette when he wanted Bender out of the condo; (2) ‘forced’ her out when [Kevin] Surette answered ‘today’; (3) and threatened her ‘at least ten times’ with jail time if she didn’t comply.” Id. The seizure was unreasonable under Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 300 (6th Cir. 2011), where we held that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment despite “far less plaintiff-friendly . . . facts.” Id. In Cochran, the deputies “were prompted to act by a facially valid judgment of eviction,” which “they closely read.” Id. “Moreover, the Cochran defendants took the further step of conferring with an attorney to confirm their authority to seize the tenant’s personal property.” Id. In contrast to Cochran, “[t]he Officers here made no such inquiry [into Kevin Surette’s authority to evict Bender], admitting to giving [Kevin] Surette’s purported ‘estate documents’ at best a cursory review,” and made no “further inquiry” into Kevin Surette’s authority. Id. The district court concluded that “if the Cochran defendants’ actions didn’t pass muster under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ standard, the Officers’ actions here, under Bender’s version, do not either.” Id. Finally, again relying on Cochran, the district court held that the right was clearly established. Id. at *9. The district court noted that Cochran made clear that “where a person’s claim to have a right to evict someone from a residence rests exclusively on the purported effect of legal documents (the eviction judgment in Cochran or [an] estate document here), the Officers must at least (1) closely read the document purporting to vest them with authority to seize the property at issue, and (2) enlist the aid of an attorney, at the very minimum, to confirm that their understanding of the document is correct.” Id. Pittsley and Rennie timely filed a notice of appeal. R. 47 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #1320). II. JURISDICTION We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment under the collateral-order doctrine. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1985). Our “jurisdiction regarding [such] orders . . . , however, is narrow.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2008). Review “is limited to ‘only purely legal questions.’” Gordon v. Bierenga, 20 F.4th 1077, 1081 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting McGrew v. Duncan, 937 F.3d 664, 669 (6th Cir. 2019)). A defendant seeking interlocutory review “may not appeal a district court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 8 forth a ‘genuine’ issue of material fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1995). “[T]o the extent that the denial of qualified immunity is based on a factual dispute, [it] falls outside of [our] narrow jurisdiction.” Harrison, 539 F.3d at 517. “This limitation ensures that” our review “remains confined to the denials of qualified immunity and does not bleed over into a review of district courts’ evaluation of genuine disputes of material fact.” Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2016). Where a denial of qualified immunity is based on a factual dispute, a defendant may nonetheless “invoke [our] jurisdiction by conceding the plaintiff’s version of the facts.” Anderson-Santos v. Kent County, 94 F.4th 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2024). A defendant’s failure to concede the plaintiff’s version of the facts generally deprives us of jurisdiction. Sabo v. City of Mentor, 657 F.3d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 2011). If, however, a defendant disputes only facts that are minor and “immaterial to the legal issues raised by the appeal,” we retain jurisdiction. Gillispie v. Miami Township, 18 F.4th 909, 917 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Adams v. Blount County, 946 F.3d 940, 951 (6th Cir. 2020)). Here, the Officers generally concede Bender’s version of the facts in their arguments, even though they omit facts that are favorable to Bender. Despite this, Bender points to several “facts” that the Officers fail to concede to argue that we lack jurisdiction. Appellee Br. at 8–9. But the contested facts that Bender points to are either immaterial or are questions of law, not fact. For example, Bender argues that the Officers fail to concede that she had a possessory interest in the condo. Id. at 8. But here that is a question of law, not fact. Next, Bender points out that the Officers describe the 2015 will Kevin Surette presented to the Officers as “valid.” Id. at 9; Appellants Br. at 21. But that is immaterial, because even if the will were valid, it would not absolve the Officers of potential liability, for the reasons detailed below in Part III.B.3. The same is true of Bender’s contention that the Officers continue to argue that they believed that they went to the condo to maintain the peace. Appellee Br. at 8–9. The Officers’ subjective beliefs that they went to the property to maintain the peace are immaterial to whether their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, because the Fourth Amendment analysis turns on the objective circumstances at the time of the seizure, not on subjective intentions or opinions. Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 693 (6th Cir. 2012); see generally Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S.  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 9 306, 317 (2021); Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2010). In the end, we have jurisdiction because the few facts that the Officers dispute are immaterial. III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Framework We review de novo “the denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.” Cochran, 656 F.3d at 305 (quoting McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1541 (6th Cir. 1996)). Officers sued in their individual capacities are “entitled to qualified immunity if ‘a reasonable officer could have believed [their actions] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the . . . officer[] possessed.’” Hensley, 693 F.3d at 687 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). To determine whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity, we engage in a two-step inquiry. Howell v. McCormick, 148 F.4th 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2025). “At step one,” id., we determine “whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show a violation of a constitutional right,” Cochran, 656 F.3d at 306. “At step two” we must determine whether it was “clearly established” at the time of the violation that the defendant’s conduct violated the Constitution. Howell, 148 F.4th at 843. We “ha[ve] discretion to decide . . . the order of the analysis.” Hensley, 693 F.3d at 687. We begin with step one here. B. Step One: Constitutional Violation The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. Hensley, 693 F.3d at 687–88. To show that the Officers’ participation in an otherwise private eviction constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Bender must show three things. First, there must have been “some meaningful interference with [her] possessory interests in th[e condo].” Id. at 688 (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)). Second, the Officers must have actively participated in evicting her from the condo or chilled her right to object, because “a police officer’s presence during a [private] repossession solely to keep the peace . . . is alone insufficient to convert the repossession into state action.” Id. at 689. Third, the seizure must have been unreasonable, id. at 692, which is “particularly” likely “when there is neither a specific court order permitting the officers’ conduct nor any exigent circumstance,” Cochran, 656 F.3d at 308. We analyze each of these factors in turn.  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 10 1. Possessory Interest3 We look to Ohio law to determine whether Bender has a “[p]ossessory interest[]” in the condo. Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 F.4th 796, 810 (6th Cir. 2025).4 Under Ohio law, Bender held legal title to the condo as trustee of Cole’s living trust. Goralsky v. Taylor, 571 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Ohio 1991). Bender’s authority as trustee was governed by the terms of the trust and background principles of Ohio law. In re Binder’s Est., 27 N.E.2d 939, 949 (Ohio 1940); Biddulph v. DeLorenzo, No. 83808, 2004 WL 1902725, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004). The trust documents provided that Bender, as trustee, could “exercise all such rights and privileges as could be done, taken, or exercised by an owner of the Trust property.” R. 41-11 (Rita M. Cole Living Trust Agreement at 4) (Page ID #1166). Bender was also permitted “[t]o sell, convey, exchange, convert, improve, repair, manage, operate, and control Trust property” and “[t]o lease” the property. Id. at 3 (Page ID #1165). Therefore, under the terms of the trust, Bender could occupy the condo or lease it to herself in her individual capacity. Background Ohio law, however, prohibits trustees from self-dealing with trust property except as “authorized by the terms of the trust.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5808.02(B). Critically, self-dealing acts are “voidable by a [trust] beneficiary.” Id. (emphasis added). “A voidable act takes effect as intended, and continues to be effectual . . . until it is set aside or nullified as to all or some part of the persons or things which were affected by it.” In re Est. of Gavrilovich, No. 10718, 1982 WL 2808, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1982) (per curiam) (citation modified). In contrast, a “void” act is treated “as if it never existed.” 1 Williston on Contracts § 1:20 (4th ed.). Voidable transactions must be rescinded by a successor trustee or timely challenged in court by the trust beneficiaries in order to invalidate or set aside the transaction. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5808.02(B)(3); Cleveland Tr. Co. v. Eaton, 256 N.E.2d 198, 207 (Ohio 1970). Absent such 3 The parties do not dispute that, if Bender had a possessory interest in the condo, evicting her meaningfully interfered with that interest. 4 There is debate as to whether looking to state law is the correct approach. See, e.g., Danielle D’Onfro & Daniel Epps, The Fourth Amendment and General Law, 132 Yale L.J. 910 (2023). We have already adopted this state-law approach, however, so we adhere to it here. Additionally, this case does not present the complexities that could arise if the state attempted to “sidestep” constitutional protections “by disavowing traditional property interests long recognized under state law.” Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998).  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 11 action, the transaction remains in force. Kevin Surette and the other trust beneficiaries did not challenge Bender’s residence in the condo before the May 6 eviction. See R. 33 (Kevin Surette Dep. at 51:6–14, 54:15–22) (Page ID #724, 727). Therefore, even assuming that Bender’s use of the condo was not authorized by the terms of the trust and was prohibited self-dealing, Bender had a voidable property interest in the condo at the time of the eviction in addition to legal title. A voidable interest in property, even absent legal title, creates a possessory interest that is cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. Sanders v. City of San Diego, 93 F.3d 1423, 1427 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996); cf. United States v. Thomas, 65 F.4th 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2023).5 And, despite the Officers’ argument to the contrary, Appellants Br. at 13, Bender’s possessory interest in the condo is protected by the Fourth Amendment even though Bender also owned her own home where she received mail. Mockeridge v. Harvey, 149 F.4th 826, 834 (6th Cir. 2025) (“A person does not lose Fourth Amendment protection by not continuously occupying a house or by owning multiple houses. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment [does not] ‘limit its protection to a single house or home.’” (quoting Roberson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752, 754 (6th Cir. 1948))). If “[a] hotel room, in the eyes of the Fourth Amendment, may become a person’s ‘house,’” Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962), so may the condo where Bender had resided on most nights for years. We hold that Bender had a possessory interest in the condo at the time of the eviction. 2. Active Participation Next, Bender must show that the Officers actively participated in evicting her or chilled her ability to object to the eviction. “[A] police officer’s presence during a repossession solely to keep the peace, i.e., to prevent a violent confrontation . . . is alone insufficient to convert the repossession into state action.” Hensley, 693 F.3d at 689. So, for example, an officer who merely accompanies a private party, remains in their parked car around the corner while the third 5 In United States v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a storage unit when the defendant “fraudulent[ly] and criminal[ly]” entered into the lease using a stolen identity, which resulted in the contract being voidable under state law. 584 F.3d 995, 1001–04 (10th Cir. 2009). But Johnson is distinguishable on at least three grounds. First, there are no allegations that Bender engaged in fraudulent or criminal activity. Second, the question here is not whether Bender had a reasonable expectation of privacy—it is whether she had a possessory interest in the condo. And finally, Johnson involved a storage unit, not a “residential premises” like the condo, and “courts have distinguished between searches of residential premises, searches of business premises, searches of vehicles, and searches of other places and effects.” Id. at 1004 n.9.  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 12 party repossesses the property, and does not encourage or direct the repossession in any way does not “convert the repossession into state action.” United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 963–64 (6th Cir. 1980). “[W]hen officers take a more active role in the repossession,” such as by “active[ly] interven[ing] [on behalf of] and assist[ing]” the private party, it converts the repossession into state action that can give rise to liability under § 1983. Hensley, 693 F.3d at 688–89. “Even without active participation, . . . an officer’s conduct can facilitate a repossession if it chills the plaintiff’s right to object.” Id. at 689. Officers’ conduct chills the plaintiff’s right to object when their “arrival and close association with the [private party] during the repossession . . . signal[s] to the [plaintiff] that the weight of the state is behind the repossession and that the [plaintiff] should not interfere by objecting.” Id. at 690. A few cases are illustrative of when an officer’s conduct converts a private repossession into state action. In Cochran, Cochran’s landlords had obtained a valid judgment of eviction from a court and a valid warrant for possession that allowed the sheriff to evict Cochran from the home and return it to the landlords. 656 F.3d at 303. The landlords arrived at the home with the deputies, and after carefully reviewing the warrant for possession, the deputies “realized that it was silent as to Cochran’s personal property located at the premises.” Id. So they told the landlords to “secure Cochran’s personal property” so that Cochran could “take it following the eviction” because Cochran was not currently at the home. Id. The landlords informed the deputies “that the Lincoln County Attorney had told [them] that Cochran’s personal property could be sold to recover [their] losses.” Id. The deputies “then contacted the county attorney” who told them “that [the landlords] had a ‘right to sell the property.’” Id. The landlords then “removed Cochran’s personal property from the residence.” Id. At that point, Cochran arrived at the scene, and the deputies “threatened to restrain and/or arrest anyone who attempted to interfere with the [landlords’] procurement of Cochran’s personal property” despite Cochran’s protests and attempts to stop the landlords from taking the property. Id. at 304. The deputies were present for the removal of Cochran’s property, they personally carried out and loaded some of the property into the landlords’ truck, and one of the deputies purchased a TV from the landlords. Id. at 304–05. We held that those actions were sufficient to show that the deputies actively participated in the repossession of Cochran’s property.  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 13 In Middaugh, a third party contacted the police regarding repossessing a car. 684 F. App’x at 524. She told the officers that she was divorcing her husband and “that her attorney had advised her to get the [car] titled in her name and to ask the police to provide security while she retrieved the vehicle from” the house of the plaintiff6 (her brother-in-law). Id. at 525. The third party showed the officers her key to the car and “a copy of a document entitled ‘Application for Michigan Vehicle Title’ that she had obtained from the Secretary of State earlier that day.” Id. One officer drove the third party to the plaintiff’s home and parked his patrol car between the house and the car. Id. The other officer parked nearby. Id. The third party then got into the car and drove it away. The plaintiff was home and “noticed the patrol cars pulling up, but because of the way the patrol cars were parked [the plaintiff] could not see anyone getting into the [car]” and did not exit the home while the officers were there. Id. We held that the officers participated in the seizure of the plaintiff’s car because they drove the third party to the property and positioned their car, and themselves, between the plaintiff and car so that they blocked the plaintiff’s view of the car and third party. Id. at 528. The Officers’ conduct here is far more indicative of state action than the conduct in Middaugh and is akin to the actions in Cochran. As in Cochran, the Officers accompanied Kevin Surette to the condo. R. 32 (Rennie Dep. at 31:15–18) (Page ID #641). Once there, the Officers “pushed their way into the condo” without Bender’s consent and told her that she “ha[d] ten minutes” to gather her belongings and exit the condo. R. 27 (Bender Dep. at 93:9–10, 94:16– 23) (Page ID #378–79). Rennie threatened to arrest Bender multiple times during the eviction, as in Cochran. Id. at 102:9–19, 106:1–25 (Page ID #387, 391). Pittsley told Bender to “[g]ive [him] [her] key” to the condo and “took [her] key.” Id. at 122:20–123:14, 125:19–126:1 (Page ID #407–08, 410–11). Ultimately the Officers “threw [Bender] out of the condo,” “pushed [her] out the door,” and left the condo only after doing so. Id. at 122:20–25, 124:18–22, 150:2–20 (Page ID #407, 409, 435). In contrast with the facts here, the officers in Middaugh merely drove the third party to the premises and positioned themselves to block the plaintiff’s view of the car and third party. 6 There were multiple plaintiffs in Middaugh, but for simplicity, we refer to only one.  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 14 684 F. App’x at 528. And even though the Officers here did not carry any of the property out of the condo as they did in Cochran, Bender claims that her eviction constituted a seizure, not that her personal property was seized. The Officers personally threw Bender out of the condo and took her key; thus, as a direct result of their actions, she could not access the property and was deprived of her possessory interest. That is analogous to the deputies in Cochran carrying the plaintiff’s personal property out of the home, which likewise directly deprived Cochran of his possessory interest. On Bender’s account of what occurred, she has easily shown that the Officers actively participated in evicting her and thereby converted the eviction into state action.7 Our sibling circuits’ cases addressing whether officers engaged in state action in the context of private repossession further support our conclusion that Bender has demonstrated that the Officers actively participated in the seizure. In Harvey v. Plains Township Police Department, the Third Circuit held that an officer engaged in state action in a repossession when the officer directed the landlord to open the door to the apartment that contained the property at issue. 421 F.3d 185, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2005). And the Ninth Circuit in Harris v. City of Roseburg, held that an officer actively participated in a repossession when the officer positioned himself between the plaintiff and the property, told the plaintiff to move away from the property, and told the plaintiff that if he interfered, he would be arrested. 664 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a jury could find an officer engaged in state action when he “advised [the third party] that she had a right to immediate possession of the” property, “ignored . . . ardent protest [against] the seizure, and threatened to arrest [the plaintiff’s attorney] if he did not move his car to make way for” the third party to seize the property); Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813, 821–23 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a jury could find officers engaged in state action when the plaintiffs objected to the 7 The Officers argue that Bender did not “attribute any comments or activity to Pittsley while in the residence.” Appellants Br. at 14–15. The Officers did not raise this argument below, so it is forfeited. R. 35 (Mot. for Summ. J.) (Page ID #923–43); Fam. Serv. Ass’n ex rel. Coil v. Wells Township, 783 F.3d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 2015). And Bender did attribute specific conduct to Pittsley. Bender testified that both Officers pushed their way into the condo and “pushed” her out the door before they left the condo, that Pittsley took and retained her key to the condo, and that Pittsley cited her for disorderly conduct. R. 27 (Bender Dep. at 108:23–109:2) (Page ID #393–94); R. 31 (Pittsley Dep. at 90:5–13) (Page ID #600); R. 27-4 (Incident Report at 2) (Page ID #490). Therefore, Pittsley was personally involved in the seizure, not merely present at the scene. See Ghandi v. Police Dep’t of City of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 352 (6th Cir. 1984).  No. 25-3540 Bender v. Village of Mariemont et al. Page 15 repossession before the officers arrived and stopped doing so only “after the police intervention” which included “the officers repeatedly t[elling] [the plaintiffs] to allow [the third party] to take possession of the automobile and threaten[ing] them with arrest if they continued to resist”); Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1106, 1116–18 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that a jury could find the officer engaged in state action when the officer, although not present at the scene of the seizure, informed the plaintiff when she called the police that the third party had a right to the property and that if the plaintiff went to the property to try to stop the repossession, the officer “would arrest her”). Some of our sibling circuits have even concluded that a uniformed officer’s mere arrival with the third party and proximity to them throughout the repossession is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they actively participated in the seizure. Jones v. Gutschenritter, 909 F.2d 1208, 1212–13 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Booker v. City of Atlanta, 776 F.2d 272, 274 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that a jury could find that an officer engaged in state action when he “arrived with the repossessor” which “gave the repossession a cachet of legality and had the effect of intimidating [the plaintiff] into not exercising his right to resist, thus facilitating t