Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE ROBERT SHAWN NOECKER, No. 87820-4 Appellant/Cross Respondent, v. STANTON BERNHART LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Washington limited partnership; CRAIG BERNHART, individually and as a general partner of UNPUBLISHED OPINION Stanton Bernhart Limited Partnership; JANE DOE BERNHART; JOHN & JANE DOES 1 through 10; JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS 1 through 10; OTHER JOHN DOE ENTITIES 1 through 10; and STANTON BERNHART, LLC, Respondents/Cross Appellants. BOWMAN, A.C.J. — Stanton Bernhart LP, Stanton Bernhart LLC, and Craig Bernhart (collectively Bernhart) appeal from the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law following a bench trial. They challenge several findings and argue that the trial court erred by concluding that the diversion of water from their property to Robert Noecker’s property amounted to trespass, nuisance, and statutory waste. Noecker cross-appeals, arguing the trial court erred by refusing to award emotional distress damages flowing from Bernhart’s intentional torts. We affirm the trial court’s findings and conclusions but reverse and remand for No. 87820-4-I/2 the court to consider an award of damages for Noecker’s emotional distress. And we award Noecker attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 4.24.630. FACTS In 2003, Bernhart1 bought a parcel of land in Bothell (Bernhart Property). In 2006, Noecker bought and built a home on an adjacent parcel (South Noecker Property). In 2012, Noecker bought and built a shop on a second adjacent property (North Noecker Property). The Bernhart Property is east and uphill of the Noecker properties. Dam Work and Damage to South Noecker Property In 1981, a former owner of the Bernhart Property built a dam on a natural stream under a permit issued by the Department of Ecology. The dam blocked the natural stream flow to the South Noecker Property to create a “live flow” pond, which controlled the release of water through a permitted six-inch discharge pipe. The dammed pond “acted as an effective storm water retention facility and collected a buildup of sediment behind the dam.” The water and sediment flowed in a regulated manner through the pipe and onto the South Noecker property, first to an upper pond and then to a lower pond. Starting in May 2014, Noecker expressed concern to Craig2 that the dam was at risk of failing and causing damage. In 2017, Craig performed “repair work” on the dam, including installing a new pipe, backfilling the dam walls with 1 Stanton Bernhart LP first bought the land, and Craig Bernhart was the general partner. The partnership dissolved, and the property is now owned by a new entity, Stanton Bernhart LLC. 2 We refer to Craig Bernhart by his first name when necessary for clarity and mean no disrespect by doing so. 2 No. 87820-4-I/3 dirt, and compacting the dirt by “tapping” it with the shovel of a backhoe. Craig contacted the Department of Ecology but did not obtain a permit or permission for the work. He also did not consult an engineer. Ultimately, the work did not meet industry standards. In October 2017, the dam failed, causing the creation of a “large gaping hole” that discharged “much of the pooled water.” On October 9, Snohomish County Planning and Development Services (PDS) issued a “Notice of Violation” to Bernhart for improper and unpermitted work, which included the dam failure. The dam breach caused water to funnel in a “concentrated stream . . . towards the South Noecker Property” and released “large quantities of sediment trapped by the dam over the prior 40 years.” This release caused the upper pond on the South Noecker Property to completely fill with sediment. Below are photos of the upper pond before and after the dam failure. 3 No. 87820-4-I/4 The second downstream pond on the South Noecker Property also began to fill—and will ultimately be entirely filled—with sediment released from the dam failure. Below are photos of the lower pond before and after the dam failure. Ditch Work and Damage to North Noecker Property The North Noecker Property is mostly wetland and has a large ditch 15 to 20 feet west of the Bernhart Property. The ditch was present when Noecker bought the property, and the parties call it the “North-South Ditch.” Noecker obtained a permit to drain a portion of the property to build a shop, which required him to install a retention pond with a pump. In 2017, Craig entered Noecker’s property to dig and create ditches to hydrologically connect the northern part of the Bernhart Property to the North- South Ditch on the North Noecker Property. Some of the ditch work was completed inside a “natural swale”—a natural land depression or small trench. The new ditches caused an increase of water and sediment to flow from the Bernhart Property onto the North Noecker Property, which resulted in (1) clogging Noecker’s retention pond pump because of an overload of sediment and 4 No. 87820-4-I/5 (2) increased standing water on the North Noecker Property, including around his shop. On October 6, 2017, PDS issued Bernhart a “Stop Work Order” because the ditch work occurred without the necessary permit, followed by the October 9 Notice of Violation. The new drainage ditches and pathways continue to artificially collect and drain water from the Bernhart Property onto the North Noecker Property. Procedural History Noecker sued Bernhart, claiming the ditch work and dam work both amounted to trespass, negligence, statutory waste under RCW 4.24.630, and nuisance under chapter 7.48 RCW. The case proceeded to a bench trial in August 2024. At trial, the court heard testimony from several witnesses and reviewed expert reports detailing the inadequacy of Craig’s work and describing the damage it caused to Noecker’s property. The court issued its oral ruling on October 24, 2024 and its written findings of fact and conclusions of law in January 2025. The trial court concluded that Craig’s ditch work resulted in trespass,3 nuisance per se, and statutory waste. It explained that the excess water and sediment caused by the ditch work are a continuing trespass because they constitute an (1) invasion of the North Noecker Property that affects Noecker’s interest in exclusive possession; (2) were an intentional act; (3) subject to reasonable foreseeability that the 3 It appears the court integrated Noecker’s negligence claims in its findings and conclusions addressing his trespass claims. 5 No. 87820-4-I/6 actions would disturb Noecker’s possessory interest; and (4) have caused actual and substantial damages. And the court concluded the work amounted to a nuisance per se because it was done in violation of chapter 30.63A of the Snohomish County Code (SCC). Finally, the court explained that the ditch work violated RCW 4.24.630 as wrongful intentional trespass causing waste to the land. The trial court also concluded that Craig’s dam work amounted to trespass and nuisance per se. It explained that the work was “inadequate and did not meet the standard of care or minimum construction standards to keep the dam safe and functional.” It determined that the “current configuration is causing an unpermitted impediment of the natural water flow.” And the “damage will not cease unless and until the dam is either repaired to its original state, or properly removed and the area returned to its natural state,” as the current condition continues to damage the South Noecker Property. The trial court rejected Bernhart’s argument that they were shielded from liability under Trigg4 and the common enemy doctrine. It concluded that the defenses did not apply because the ditches artificially altered the flow of water, causing substantial damage, and Bernhart did not act in good faith. Finally, the trial court calculated damages based on repair cost estimates by drainage and dirt contractor Steve Bodine. And it awarded “occupancy” damages calculated by real estate appraiser Matthew Sloan. The court then trebled the ditch work damages under RCW 4.24.630. 4 Trigg v. Timmerman, 90 Wash. 678, 156 P. 846 (1916). 6 No. 87820-4-I/7 The court refused to award emotional distress damages. It recognized that Noecker experienced emotional distress “exclusively to the Dam Work and associated impacts to the South Noecker Property” but concluded that none of Noecker’s claims related to the dam work could legally support such damages. The court entered judgment for Noecker, awarding $554,294.35 for trespass and nuisance; $72,051.84 for violating RCW 4.24.630; trebled damages of $144,103.68 under RCW 4.24.630; $24,207.62 for costs; and $65,457.62 in attorney fees under RCW 4.24.630. And it granted Noecker’s request for an injunction permanently enjoining Bernhart from “trespassing on, unlawfully contributing surface water to, or otherwise interfering with, the Noecker Property and [Noecker]’s quiet and exclusive enjoyment thereof.” Bernhart appeals, and Noecker cross-appeals. ANALYSIS Bernhart contests several findings of fact and argues the trial court erred by rejecting their defenses under Trigg and the common enemy doctrine. They also contend the trial court erred by concluding that the ditch work amounted to trespass, waste, and nuisance and that the dam work created a nuisance per se. Noecker cross-appeals the trial court’s refusal to award emotional distress damages for his successful trespass and nuisance claims arising from the dam work. Noecker also requests attorney fees and costs on appeal. We address each argument in turn. When reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law following a bench trial, we look to whether substantial evidence supports the 7 No. 87820-4-I/8 findings of fact and whether those findings support the conclusions of law. Chiu v. Hoskins, 27 Wn. App. 2d 887, 892, 534 P.3d 412 (2023). The party claiming error has the burden of showing that a finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence. Fisher Props., Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 364, 369, 798 P.2d 799 (1990). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person of the truth of the finding. Chiu, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 892. Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. Real Carriage Door Co. v. Rees, 17 Wn. App. 2d 449, 457, 486 P.3d 955 (2021). We review a trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id. 1. Findings of Fact Bernhart argues several findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. Bernhart first challenges finding of fact 16 that the water and sediment flow resulting from the failed dam repairs “will not cease unless and until the dam is either repaired to its original state, or properly removed and the area returned to its natural state.” But substantial evidence supports that finding. A report from GeoEngineers Inc. states that Bernhart’s pond, formerly regulated by the dam, had three to seven feet of loose sediment behind it. Noecker’s expert, J. Robert Gordon, explained that because of the dam, the Bernhart Property “had 50 years of sediment on it,” which had been building since the dam was built in 1981. The dam failure caused “increased water and sediment transport” in “much larger storm flow quantities and velocities” to Noecker’s property. The report found that the “increased flows and lack of detention continue to seasonally transport 8 No. 87820-4-I/9 sediment.” It is reasonable to infer from that evidence that the damage will not cease unless the dam is repaired or properly removed.5 Bernhart next challenges finding of fact 22 that the ditch work caused surface waters and sediment to be discharged from the Bernhart Property onto the North Noecker Property in a manner that injures and damages the North Noecker Property by causing standing water during large rain events. This finding is supported by Gordon’s testimony that the new ditches collect water in an “artificial manner,” causing a “[s]ignificantly greater amount of water” and a significant disturbance to the North Noecker Property. Gordon added that the ditches increased the velocity and volume of the water funneled toward Noecker’s property, causing significant damage. The existence of excess standing water on the North Noecker Property is supported by photographs in evidence, including exhibit 27, which shows standing water pooling alongside Noecker’s shop. Gordon testified this damage was because of the artificial ditches created by Craig. Finally, Bernhart challenges finding of fact 29 and the trial court’s award of occupancy damages, arguing that the methodology used by appraiser Sloan to measure those damages was not reasonable and that the facts do not support the total award. But Sloan explained how he arrived at the total award of occupancy damages and broke them down in exhibits 83 and 89. Those exhibits support the trial court’s total award of occupancy damages. Sloan also testified 5 Bernhart also challenges finding of fact 11 that the dam trapped sediment over the previous 40 years and that its failure caused the sediment to be released onto the South Noecker Property. Finding of fact 11 is supported by the same substantial evidence as finding of fact 16. 9 No. 87820-4-I/10 about his methodology, including that it complies with industry standards. As to the reasonableness of the methodology, we do not reweigh evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Garza v. Perry, 25 Wn. App. 2d 433, 453, 523 P.3d 822 (2023). Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.6 2. Conclusions of Law Bernhart challenges several of the trial court’s legal conclusions. We address each argument below. A. Trigg Bernhart argues the trial court erred by rejecting their argument that Trigg shields them from liability because Craig only “hastened” the water flow from an existing swale. We disagree.7 6 Bernhart also challenges the trial court’s findings of fact 19, 26, 27, and 28. Finding of fact 19 concerns Craig’s unauthorized entry onto Noecker’s property, which is not at issue for water trespass, and Bernhart did not challenge this fact below. Findings of fact 26, 27, and 28 relate to the calculation of damages. These findings are not relevant to our analysis or supported by legal argument, so we do not address them in detail. See RAP 10.3(a)(6). In any event, after a thorough review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports these findings. 7 Noecker argues that we should decline to consider this assignment of error for several reasons. First, he contends the argument is barred by issue and claim preclusion because the county issued a Notice of Violation, concluding that Bernhart altered the natural drainage course, and Bernhart abandoned appeal of the notice. But Noecker fails to show that the claim or issue was actually litigated in a judicial form. Second, Noecker argues that Bernhart waived the issue by failing to raise it below. But Bernhart points out that they cited Trigg at least nine times in their trial brief (though it is not in the appellate record) and raised the issue in their opening statement and during witness testimony. Finally, Noecker argues any error is invited because Bernhart asked the court to include facts related to the issue in its findings and conclusions. But Bernhart assigns error to the court’s ruling that the facts did not warrant relief under Trigg. He does not assert that the court erred by memorializing that ruling in the findings. As a result, we address Bernhart’s argument on its merits. 10 No. 87820-4-I/11 In Trigg, the court found a landowner’s new ditches that fed surface water into a preexisting swale did not lead to liability because the water was not diverted from its “ ‘natural flow’ ” and was only “ ‘incidentally’ ” increased. 90 Wash. at 679-682. The ditches only “somewhat hastened” the flow of water within the swale, but they did not otherwise impact how the water flowed. Id. at 680. This outcome led to the reciprocal inference—that a landowner who discharges water onto adjoining land “in quantities greater than, or in a manner different from, the natural flow of such surface waters” cannot rely on Trigg. See King County v. Boeing Co., 62 Wn.2d 545, 552, 384 P.2d 122 (1963). This case is not like Trigg. Here, the drainage ditches and pathways created by Craig artificially collect and bring water to the natural swale, causing the water to flow onto the North Noecker Property in an “artificial manner” that injures the property. Gordon testified that the ditches increased the velocity and volume of the water funneled toward Noecker’s property, causing significant damage. Further, the ditch work caused excess water and sediment to flow to an extent that continues to cause serious injury to the land. Bernhart argues that Trigg should apply because the trial court found that the ditch work did not increase the quantity of water or surface sheet flow through the swale. And they assert that the excess flow of water did not injure the North Noecker Property because it was already a wetland. But Bernhart misconstrues the court’s findings. It is true that the trial court found that the ditch work did not cause an increase in existing water volume on the Bernhart Property. But the trial court also found that the ditch work caused an “increased flow” of water and 11 No. 87820-4-I/12 sediment toward the North Noecker Property. This changed the “manner” in which the water flowed. And the increased flow caused injury because it increased the sediment in Noecker’s retention pond and increased the standing water on his property. The trial court did not err by concluding that Trigg does not shield Bernhart from liability for the damage caused by the ditch work. B. Common Enemy Doctrine Bernhart argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the common enemy doctrine does not shield his liability for trespass and nuisance. We disagree. The common enemy doctrine prevents liability for trespass and nuisance arising from surface water because water is “ ‘a common enemy against which anyone may defend himself, even though by so doing injury may result to others.’ ” Currens v. Sleek, 138 Wn.2d 858, 861, 983 P.2d 626 (1999) (quoting Cass v. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75, 78, 44 P. 113 (1896)). The doctrine permits landowners, with limited exception, to dispose of unwanted surface water without liability for any damage to neighbors. Id. at 861-62. But there are two relevant exceptions to the common enemy doctrine—artificial collection and the failure to use due care. Id. at 862-64. I. Artificial Collection Exception The first exception to the common enemy doctrine is the artificial collection and discharge of surface water “ ‘in quantities greater than or in a manner different from [its] natural flow.’ ” Currens, 138 Wn.2d at 862 (quoting Wilber 12 No. 87820-4-I/13 Dev. Corp. v. Les Rowland Constr. Inc., 83 Wn.2d 871, 875, 523 P.2d 186 (1974)). In other words, one cannot “concentrate and gather water into artificial drains or channels and throw it on the land of an individual owner in such manner and volume as to cause substantial injury to such land.” Rothweiler v. Clark County, 108 Wn. App. 91, 99, 29 P.3d 758 (2001). Here, the trial court found that the newly created ditches “artificially collect and drain” water from the Bernhart Property to the North Noecker Property in a manner causing “substantial injury.” So, the common enemy doctrine does not apply. Bernhart argues there is no evidence the water was dispersed in an inconsistent manner with the natural flow given the existing swale. But the artificial increase in flow caused by the “excavation” of the ditches is supported by testimony from even Bernhart’s own expert. Ecologist David Teesdale confirmed that as a result of Bernhart’s ditches, the water volume increased. And geotechnical engineer Gordon explained that the altered water and sediment flowed in a manner different from the natural flow. He testified that Craig dug the ditches to “collect and divert” water toward Noecker’s property. Because the ditch work caused the artificial collection and discharge of surface water—both in greater volume and in a manner different from the natural water course—the artificial collection exception to the common enemy doctrine applies. 13 No. 87820-4-I/14 II. Due Care Exception The second exception to the common enemy doctrine is known as the “due care exception.” Currens, 138 Wn.2d at 868. To be “shielded from liability,” the landowner must have changed the water flow in good faith and “in such a way as not to cause unnecessary damage.” Id. The trier of fact evaluates whether the landowner used due care. Id. Factors include a lack of mitigation measures or a lack of compliance with accepted industry standards. See id. Here, the trial court concluded Bernhart failed to act in good faith and failed to avoid unnecessary damage to the Noecker property. This is supported by contractor Bodine’s testimony that the ditch work was clearly done “with a lack of respect to the Noecker property.” Bodine said that Bernhart’s ditch work “shocked” him, as it was so “sloppy” and “poorly done” that it caused avoidable and significant damage to Noecker’s property, which would be “quite expensive” to repair. Bernhart argues the ditch work was done in good faith, as the damage was unforeseeable given Noecker’s property was already a wetland. But, as discussed above, the evidence shows that Bernhart caused injury to the Noecker property. And Bernhart did not contest the court’s finding that he “failed to take any action to avoid harm to the North Noecker Property from the Ditch Work.” Further, Bernhart did not contest that the ditch work “occurred without a necessary land disturbance permit from Snohomish County.” 14 No. 87820-4-I/15 The trial court did not err by concluding that Bernhart failed to use due care when engaged in the ditch work. So, the due care exception to the common enemy doctrine applies. C. Substantial Evidence Bernhart next challenges the trial court’s conclusions that the excess water from the ditch work amounted to a trespass, created a nuisance, and resulted in waste. He also challenges the court’s conclusion that his dam work created a nuisance per se. He argues substantial evidence does not support those claims. We disagree. I. Ditch Work A trespass occurs when there is “ ‘an intentional or negligent intrusion onto or into the property of another.’ ” Pruitt v. Douglas County, 116 Wn. App. 547, 553, 66 P.3d 1111 (2003)8 (quoting Borden v. City of Olympia, 113 Wn. App. 359, 373, 53 P.3d 1020 (2002)). “Trespass can be shown by the discharge of water when the water ultimately reaches another’s property.” Id. A continuing trespass creates a new tort every moment it continues. Woldson v. Woodhead, 159 Wn.2d 215, 219, 149 P.3d 361 (2006). Bernhart argues no evidence shows that he intended to damage Noecker’s property, that he could “reasonably foresee a high probability of causing injury,” or that his actions caused the damage. In so arguing, Bernhart relies heavily on Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wn.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1985). But in the portion of the opinion relied on by Bernhart, our 8 Internal quotation marks omitted. 15 No. 87820-4-I/16 Supreme Court accepted and approved “the elements of trespass by airborne pollutants.” Id. at 691. No such claim is at issue here. But even if Bradley were controlling here, our Supreme Court held that the element of intent is satisfied if the act “ ‘is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of the foreign matter’ ” on the other’s land. 104 Wn.2d at 682 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt i (AM. L. INST. 1965)). Here, the trial court found that Bernhart intentionally directed water onto Noecker’s property by digging ditches that altered the water’s natural flow and that Bernhart’s actions disturbed Noecker’s possessory interest in the form of excess standing water and sediment. Indeed, the evidence shows that Bernhart purposefully created the series of hydraulically connected ditches so that water would flow to the North-South Ditch on Noecker’s property. As to causation, Gordon testified about how Bernhart’s alteration of the natural flow of water led to substantial damage by clogging Noecker’s pump, causing overflow from his retention pond, and creating standing water around Noecker’s property. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the excess water flowing from Bernhart’s ditches onto Noecker’s property amounted to a trespass.9 9 Bernhart also argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that Craig’s ditch work created a nuisance for the same reasons that it did not amount to a trespass. We reject the challenge to the nuisance claims for the same reasons that we reject the trespass claim challenge. Bernhart further argues that no evidence shows he entered Noecker’s property and acted wrongfully as required to show waste. But Bernhart did not dispute at trial that Craig entered Noecker’s property. And, as discussed above, the record shows that Craig acted wrongfully by purposefully diverting the flow of water onto Noecker’s property. So, we also reject Bernhart’s challenge to the waste claim. 16 No. 87820-4-I/17 II. Dam Work Bernhart challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the water flowing from the dam amounted to a nuisance per se. They argue that no evidence showed the dam work required a permit or that the work caused an ongoing and increased flow of water. We disagree. RCW 7.48.010 defines “actionable nuisance.” RCW 7.48.010 states, in relevant part, that whatever is injurious to health or indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of the life and property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action for damages and other and further relief. And RCW 7.48.120 defines “nuisance.” “A nuisance includes acts that annoy, injure, or endanger the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others and that ‘renders other persons insecure in life, or in the use of property.’ ” MJD Props., LLC v. Haley, 189 Wn. App. 963, 969-70, 358 P.3d 476 (2015) (quoting RCW 7.48.120). “Our cases have also acknowledged the concept of a nuisance per se [as] ‘an act, thing, omission, or use of property which of itself is a nuisance, and hence is not permissible or excusable under any circumstance.’ ” Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Olympic Game Farm, Inc., 1 Wn.3d 925, 932, 533 P.3d 1170 (2023) (quoting Tiegs v. Watts, 135 Wn.2d 1, 13, 954 P.2d 877 (1998)). Our Supreme Court explained: “When the conditions giving rise to a nuisance are also a violation of statutory prohibition, those conditions constitute a nuisance per se, and the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct and the weighing of the relative interests of the plaintiff and 17 No. 87820-4-I/18 defendant is precluded because the Legislature has, in effect, already struck the balance in favor of the innocent party.” Id.10 (quoting Moore v. Steve’s Outboard Serv., 182 Wn.2d 151, 155, 339 P.3d 169 (2014)). To establish a nuisance per se claim, “there must be a showing that a statutory violation has occurred and that the action is in fact a nuisance and remains a nuisance under all circumstances.” Id. Here, the record shows that on October 6, 2017, PDS issued a Stop Work Order to Bernhart after observing unpermitted land-disturbing activity, which included the dam work. On October 9, PDS issued a Notice of Violation to Bernhart for failure to obtain a permit before the work began under SCC 30.63B.030 and .070. Those codes require a permit before commencing any land disturbing activity unless the activity is confirmed to be exempt by PDS before beginning the work. But Bernhart had no permit when he attempted repairs to the dam, and no evidence shows that the repairs were exempt from the permit process. Still, Bernhart argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the dam work caused an ongoing and increased flow of water. But Gordon testified that the dam failure resulted in “increased water and sediment transport” in “much larger storm flow quantities and velocities” to Noecker’s property. The damage from the dam work caused the downstream ponds on Noecker’s property to fill with sediment, as shown in the photographs above. 10 Internal quotation marks omitted. 18 No. 87820-4-I/19 The trial court did not err by concluding that the dam work and its resulting damage amounts to a nuisance per se. 3. Cross Appeal Noecker argues the trial court erred by concluding it could not award emotional distress damages on his trespass and nuisance claims arising from the dam work. We agree. Plaintiffs can generally recover damages for emotional distress caused by an intentional tort such as trespass. Lavington v. Hillier, 22 Wn. App. 2d 134, 152, 510 P.3d 373, review denied, 200 Wn.2d 1010, 518 P.3d 212 (2022). This designation has been “ ‘liberally’ ” applied “ ‘merely upon proof’ ” of an intentional tort. Birchler v. Castello Land Co., 133 Wn.2d 106, 115-16, 942 P.2d 968 (1997) (quoting Cagle v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 911, 916, 726 P.2d 434 (1986)). Further, “ ‘mental anguish resulting . . . from nuisance’ ” is compensable. Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wn.2d 307, 332, 678 P.2d 803 (1984) (quoting Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 45 Wn.2d 346, 353, 274 P.2d 574 (1954)). Here, the trial court acknowledged that the damage from the dam work caused “anxiety, stress, and emotional distress” to Noecker. But it concluded that the law precluded an award of damages to compensate for that emotional distress. Because emotional distress damages are generally recoverable for intentional torts such as trespass and nuisance per se, we remand for the court to consider an award of such damages. 19 No. 87820-4-I/20 4. Attorney Fees and Costs Noecker asks us to award attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.24.630. Under RAP 18.1(a), we may award attorney fees on appeal if applicable law grants to a party the right to recover them. Attorney fees may be authorized by statute. Dankievitch v. Lawrence, 22 Wn. App. 2d. 749, 761, 513 P.3d 804 (2022). Under RCW 4.24.630(1), violators are “liable for reimbursing the injured party for the party’s reasonable costs, including but not limited to investigative costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation-related costs.” Because Noecker successfully defended Bernhart’s appeal from the trial court’s conclusion that Bernhart violated RCW 4.24.630, we award Noecker reasonable attorney fees and costs subject to compliance with RAP 18.1. We affirm the trial court’s final judgment but remand for the court to consider an award of emotional distress damages for Noecker. And we award Noecker attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 4.24.630. WE CONCUR: 20