Robert Shawn Noecker, Res/cross-app V. Stanton Bernhart Limited Partnership, App/cross-res
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket87820-4
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
ROBERT SHAWN NOECKER, No. 87820-4
Appellant/Cross Respondent,
v.
STANTON BERNHART LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, a Washington limited
partnership; CRAIG BERNHART,
individually and as a general partner of UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Stanton Bernhart Limited Partnership;
JANE DOE BERNHART; JOHN &
JANE DOES 1 through 10; JOHN DOE
CORPORATIONS 1 through 10;
OTHER JOHN DOE ENTITIES 1
through 10; and STANTON
BERNHART, LLC,
Respondents/Cross Appellants.
BOWMAN, A.C.J. — Stanton Bernhart LP, Stanton Bernhart LLC, and Craig
Bernhart (collectively Bernhart) appeal from the trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law following a bench trial. They challenge several findings and
argue that the trial court erred by concluding that the diversion of water from their
property to Robert Noecker’s property amounted to trespass, nuisance, and
statutory waste. Noecker cross-appeals, arguing the trial court erred by refusing
to award emotional distress damages flowing from Bernhart’s intentional torts.
We affirm the trial court’s findings and conclusions but reverse and remand for
No. 87820-4-I/2
the court to consider an award of damages for Noecker’s emotional distress.
And we award Noecker attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 4.24.630.
FACTS
In 2003, Bernhart1 bought a parcel of land in Bothell (Bernhart Property).
In 2006, Noecker bought and built a home on an adjacent parcel (South Noecker
Property). In 2012, Noecker bought and built a shop on a second adjacent
property (North Noecker Property). The Bernhart Property is east and uphill of
the Noecker properties.
Dam Work and Damage to South Noecker Property
In 1981, a former owner of the Bernhart Property built a dam on a natural
stream under a permit issued by the Department of Ecology. The dam blocked
the natural stream flow to the South Noecker Property to create a “live flow”
pond, which controlled the release of water through a permitted six-inch
discharge pipe. The dammed pond “acted as an effective storm water retention
facility and collected a buildup of sediment behind the dam.” The water and
sediment flowed in a regulated manner through the pipe and onto the South
Noecker property, first to an upper pond and then to a lower pond.
Starting in May 2014, Noecker expressed concern to Craig2 that the dam
was at risk of failing and causing damage. In 2017, Craig performed “repair
work” on the dam, including installing a new pipe, backfilling the dam walls with
1
Stanton Bernhart LP first bought the land, and Craig Bernhart was the general
partner. The partnership dissolved, and the property is now owned by a new entity,
Stanton Bernhart LLC.
2
We refer to Craig Bernhart by his first name when necessary for clarity and
mean no disrespect by doing so.
2
No. 87820-4-I/3
dirt, and compacting the dirt by “tapping” it with the shovel of a backhoe. Craig
contacted the Department of Ecology but did not obtain a permit or permission
for the work. He also did not consult an engineer. Ultimately, the work did not
meet industry standards.
In October 2017, the dam failed, causing the creation of a “large gaping
hole” that discharged “much of the pooled water.” On October 9, Snohomish
County Planning and Development Services (PDS) issued a “Notice of Violation”
to Bernhart for improper and unpermitted work, which included the dam failure.
The dam breach caused water to funnel in a “concentrated stream . . . towards
the South Noecker Property” and released “large quantities of sediment trapped
by the dam over the prior 40 years.” This release caused the upper pond on the
South Noecker Property to completely fill with sediment.
Below are photos of the upper pond before and after the dam failure.
3
No. 87820-4-I/4
The second downstream pond on the South Noecker Property also began
to fill—and will ultimately be entirely filled—with sediment released from the dam
failure.
Below are photos of the lower pond before and after the dam failure.
Ditch Work and Damage to North Noecker Property
The North Noecker Property is mostly wetland and has a large ditch 15 to
20 feet west of the Bernhart Property. The ditch was present when Noecker
bought the property, and the parties call it the “North-South Ditch.” Noecker
obtained a permit to drain a portion of the property to build a shop, which
required him to install a retention pond with a pump.
In 2017, Craig entered Noecker’s property to dig and create ditches to
hydrologically connect the northern part of the Bernhart Property to the North-
South Ditch on the North Noecker Property. Some of the ditch work was
completed inside a “natural swale”—a natural land depression or small trench.
The new ditches caused an increase of water and sediment to flow from the
Bernhart Property onto the North Noecker Property, which resulted in (1)
clogging Noecker’s retention pond pump because of an overload of sediment and
4
No. 87820-4-I/5
(2) increased standing water on the North Noecker Property, including around his
shop.
On October 6, 2017, PDS issued Bernhart a “Stop Work Order” because
the ditch work occurred without the necessary permit, followed by the October 9
Notice of Violation. The new drainage ditches and pathways continue to
artificially collect and drain water from the Bernhart Property onto the North
Noecker Property.
Procedural History
Noecker sued Bernhart, claiming the ditch work and dam work both
amounted to trespass, negligence, statutory waste under RCW 4.24.630, and
nuisance under chapter 7.48 RCW. The case proceeded to a bench trial in
August 2024.
At trial, the court heard testimony from several witnesses and reviewed
expert reports detailing the inadequacy of Craig’s work and describing the
damage it caused to Noecker’s property. The court issued its oral ruling on
October 24, 2024 and its written findings of fact and conclusions of law in
January 2025.
The trial court concluded that Craig’s ditch work resulted in trespass,3
nuisance per se, and statutory waste. It explained that the excess water and
sediment caused by the ditch work are a continuing trespass because
they constitute an (1) invasion of the North Noecker Property that
affects Noecker’s interest in exclusive possession; (2) were an
intentional act; (3) subject to reasonable foreseeability that the
3
It appears the court integrated Noecker’s negligence claims in its findings and
conclusions addressing his trespass claims.
5
No. 87820-4-I/6
actions would disturb Noecker’s possessory interest; and (4) have
caused actual and substantial damages.
And the court concluded the work amounted to a nuisance per se because it was
done in violation of chapter 30.63A of the Snohomish County Code (SCC).
Finally, the court explained that the ditch work violated RCW 4.24.630 as
wrongful intentional trespass causing waste to the land.
The trial court also concluded that Craig’s dam work amounted to trespass
and nuisance per se. It explained that the work was “inadequate and did not
meet the standard of care or minimum construction standards to keep the dam
safe and functional.” It determined that the “current configuration is causing an
unpermitted impediment of the natural water flow.” And the “damage will not
cease unless and until the dam is either repaired to its original state, or properly
removed and the area returned to its natural state,” as the current condition
continues to damage the South Noecker Property.
The trial court rejected Bernhart’s argument that they were shielded from
liability under Trigg4 and the common enemy doctrine. It concluded that the
defenses did not apply because the ditches artificially altered the flow of water,
causing substantial damage, and Bernhart did not act in good faith.
Finally, the trial court calculated damages based on repair cost estimates
by drainage and dirt contractor Steve Bodine. And it awarded “occupancy”
damages calculated by real estate appraiser Matthew Sloan. The court then
trebled the ditch work damages under RCW 4.24.630.
4
Trigg v. Timmerman, 90 Wash. 678, 156 P. 846 (1916).
6
No. 87820-4-I/7
The court refused to award emotional distress damages. It recognized
that Noecker experienced emotional distress “exclusively to the Dam Work and
associated impacts to the South Noecker Property” but concluded that none of
Noecker’s claims related to the dam work could legally support such damages.
The court entered judgment for Noecker, awarding $554,294.35 for
trespass and nuisance; $72,051.84 for violating RCW 4.24.630; trebled damages
of $144,103.68 under RCW 4.24.630; $24,207.62 for costs; and $65,457.62 in
attorney fees under RCW 4.24.630. And it granted Noecker’s request for an
injunction permanently enjoining Bernhart from “trespassing on, unlawfully
contributing surface water to, or otherwise interfering with, the Noecker Property
and [Noecker]’s quiet and exclusive enjoyment thereof.”
Bernhart appeals, and Noecker cross-appeals.
ANALYSIS
Bernhart contests several findings of fact and argues the trial court erred
by rejecting their defenses under Trigg and the common enemy doctrine. They
also contend the trial court erred by concluding that the ditch work amounted to
trespass, waste, and nuisance and that the dam work created a nuisance per se.
Noecker cross-appeals the trial court’s refusal to award emotional distress
damages for his successful trespass and nuisance claims arising from the dam
work. Noecker also requests attorney fees and costs on appeal. We address
each argument in turn.
When reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
following a bench trial, we look to whether substantial evidence supports the
7
No. 87820-4-I/8
findings of fact and whether those findings support the conclusions of law. Chiu
v. Hoskins, 27 Wn. App. 2d 887, 892, 534 P.3d 412 (2023). The party claiming
error has the burden of showing that a finding of fact is not supported by
substantial evidence. Fisher Props., Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 364,
369, 798 P.2d 799 (1990). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to
persuade a rational, fair-minded person of the truth of the finding. Chiu, 27 Wn.
App. 2d at 892. Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. Real Carriage
Door Co. v. Rees, 17 Wn. App. 2d 449, 457, 486 P.3d 955 (2021). We review a
trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.
1. Findings of Fact
Bernhart argues several findings of fact are not supported by substantial
evidence. We disagree.
Bernhart first challenges finding of fact 16 that the water and sediment
flow resulting from the failed dam repairs “will not cease unless and until the dam
is either repaired to its original state, or properly removed and the area returned
to its natural state.” But substantial evidence supports that finding. A report from
GeoEngineers Inc. states that Bernhart’s pond, formerly regulated by the dam,
had three to seven feet of loose sediment behind it. Noecker’s expert, J. Robert
Gordon, explained that because of the dam, the Bernhart Property “had 50 years
of sediment on it,” which had been building since the dam was built in 1981. The
dam failure caused “increased water and sediment transport” in “much larger
storm flow quantities and velocities” to Noecker’s property. The report found that
the “increased flows and lack of detention continue to seasonally transport
8
No. 87820-4-I/9
sediment.” It is reasonable to infer from that evidence that the damage will not
cease unless the dam is repaired or properly removed.5
Bernhart next challenges finding of fact 22 that the ditch work caused
surface waters and sediment to be discharged from the Bernhart Property onto
the North Noecker Property in a manner that injures and damages the North
Noecker Property by causing standing water during large rain events. This
finding is supported by Gordon’s testimony that the new ditches collect water in
an “artificial manner,” causing a “[s]ignificantly greater amount of water” and a
significant disturbance to the North Noecker Property. Gordon added that the
ditches increased the velocity and volume of the water funneled toward
Noecker’s property, causing significant damage. The existence of excess
standing water on the North Noecker Property is supported by photographs in
evidence, including exhibit 27, which shows standing water pooling alongside
Noecker’s shop. Gordon testified this damage was because of the artificial
ditches created by Craig.
Finally, Bernhart challenges finding of fact 29 and the trial court’s award of
occupancy damages, arguing that the methodology used by appraiser Sloan to
measure those damages was not reasonable and that the facts do not support
the total award. But Sloan explained how he arrived at the total award of
occupancy damages and broke them down in exhibits 83 and 89. Those exhibits
support the trial court’s total award of occupancy damages. Sloan also testified
5
Bernhart also challenges finding of fact 11 that the dam trapped sediment over
the previous 40 years and that its failure caused the sediment to be released onto the
South Noecker Property. Finding of fact 11 is supported by the same substantial
evidence as finding of fact 16.
9
No. 87820-4-I/10
about his methodology, including that it complies with industry standards. As to
the reasonableness of the methodology, we do not reweigh evidence or evaluate
the credibility of witnesses. Garza v. Perry, 25 Wn. App. 2d 433, 453, 523 P.3d
822 (2023).
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.6
2. Conclusions of Law
Bernhart challenges several of the trial court’s legal conclusions. We
address each argument below.
A. Trigg
Bernhart argues the trial court erred by rejecting their argument that Trigg
shields them from liability because Craig only “hastened” the water flow from an
existing swale. We disagree.7
6
Bernhart also challenges the trial court’s findings of fact 19, 26, 27, and 28.
Finding of fact 19 concerns Craig’s unauthorized entry onto Noecker’s property, which is
not at issue for water trespass, and Bernhart did not challenge this fact below. Findings
of fact 26, 27, and 28 relate to the calculation of damages. These findings are not
relevant to our analysis or supported by legal argument, so we do not address them in
detail. See RAP 10.3(a)(6). In any event, after a thorough review of the record, we
conclude that substantial evidence supports these findings.
7
Noecker argues that we should decline to consider this assignment of error for
several reasons. First, he contends the argument is barred by issue and claim
preclusion because the county issued a Notice of Violation, concluding that Bernhart
altered the natural drainage course, and Bernhart abandoned appeal of the notice. But
Noecker fails to show that the claim or issue was actually litigated in a judicial form.
Second, Noecker argues that Bernhart waived the issue by failing to raise it below. But
Bernhart points out that they cited Trigg at least nine times in their trial brief (though it is
not in the appellate record) and raised the issue in their opening statement and during
witness testimony. Finally, Noecker argues any error is invited because Bernhart asked
the court to include facts related to the issue in its findings and conclusions. But
Bernhart assigns error to the court’s ruling that the facts did not warrant relief under
Trigg. He does not assert that the court erred by memorializing that ruling in the
findings. As a result, we address Bernhart’s argument on its merits.
10
No. 87820-4-I/11
In Trigg, the court found a landowner’s new ditches that fed surface water
into a preexisting swale did not lead to liability because the water was not
diverted from its “ ‘natural flow’ ” and was only “ ‘incidentally’ ” increased. 90
Wash. at 679-682. The ditches only “somewhat hastened” the flow of water
within the swale, but they did not otherwise impact how the water flowed. Id. at
680. This outcome led to the reciprocal inference—that a landowner who
discharges water onto adjoining land “in quantities greater than, or in a manner
different from, the natural flow of such surface waters” cannot rely on Trigg. See
King County v. Boeing Co., 62 Wn.2d 545, 552, 384 P.2d 122 (1963).
This case is not like Trigg. Here, the drainage ditches and pathways
created by Craig artificially collect and bring water to the natural swale, causing
the water to flow onto the North Noecker Property in an “artificial manner” that
injures the property. Gordon testified that the ditches increased the velocity and
volume of the water funneled toward Noecker’s property, causing significant
damage. Further, the ditch work caused excess water and sediment to flow to an
extent that continues to cause serious injury to the land.
Bernhart argues that Trigg should apply because the trial court found that
the ditch work did not increase the quantity of water or surface sheet flow through
the swale. And they assert that the excess flow of water did not injure the North
Noecker Property because it was already a wetland. But Bernhart misconstrues
the court’s findings. It is true that the trial court found that the ditch work did not
cause an increase in existing water volume on the Bernhart Property. But the
trial court also found that the ditch work caused an “increased flow” of water and
11
No. 87820-4-I/12
sediment toward the North Noecker Property. This changed the “manner” in
which the water flowed. And the increased flow caused injury because it
increased the sediment in Noecker’s retention pond and increased the standing
water on his property.
The trial court did not err by concluding that Trigg does not shield Bernhart
from liability for the damage caused by the ditch work.
B. Common Enemy Doctrine
Bernhart argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the common
enemy doctrine does not shield his liability for trespass and nuisance. We
disagree.
The common enemy doctrine prevents liability for trespass and nuisance
arising from surface water because water is “ ‘a common enemy against which
anyone may defend himself, even though by so doing injury may result to
others.’ ” Currens v. Sleek, 138 Wn.2d 858, 861, 983 P.2d 626 (1999) (quoting
Cass v. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75, 78, 44 P. 113 (1896)). The doctrine permits
landowners, with limited exception, to dispose of unwanted surface water without
liability for any damage to neighbors. Id. at 861-62. But there are two relevant
exceptions to the common enemy doctrine—artificial collection and the failure to
use due care. Id. at 862-64.
I. Artificial Collection Exception
The first exception to the common enemy doctrine is the artificial collection
and discharge of surface water “ ‘in quantities greater than or in a manner
different from [its] natural flow.’ ” Currens, 138 Wn.2d at 862 (quoting Wilber
12
No. 87820-4-I/13
Dev. Corp. v. Les Rowland Constr. Inc., 83 Wn.2d 871, 875, 523 P.2d 186
(1974)). In other words, one cannot “concentrate and gather water into artificial
drains or channels and throw it on the land of an individual owner in such manner
and volume as to cause substantial injury to such land.” Rothweiler v. Clark
County, 108 Wn. App. 91, 99, 29 P.3d 758 (2001).
Here, the trial court found that the newly created ditches “artificially collect
and drain” water from the Bernhart Property to the North Noecker Property in a
manner causing “substantial injury.” So, the common enemy doctrine does not
apply.
Bernhart argues there is no evidence the water was dispersed in an
inconsistent manner with the natural flow given the existing swale. But the
artificial increase in flow caused by the “excavation” of the ditches is supported
by testimony from even Bernhart’s own expert. Ecologist David Teesdale
confirmed that as a result of Bernhart’s ditches, the water volume increased.
And geotechnical engineer Gordon explained that the altered water and sediment
flowed in a manner different from the natural flow. He testified that Craig dug the
ditches to “collect and divert” water toward Noecker’s property.
Because the ditch work caused the artificial collection and discharge of
surface water—both in greater volume and in a manner different from the natural
water course—the artificial collection exception to the common enemy doctrine
applies.
13
No. 87820-4-I/14
II. Due Care Exception
The second exception to the common enemy doctrine is known as the
“due care exception.” Currens, 138 Wn.2d at 868. To be “shielded from liability,”
the landowner must have changed the water flow in good faith and “in such a
way as not to cause unnecessary damage.” Id. The trier of fact evaluates
whether the landowner used due care. Id. Factors include a lack of mitigation
measures or a lack of compliance with accepted industry standards. See id.
Here, the trial court concluded Bernhart failed to act in good faith and
failed to avoid unnecessary damage to the Noecker property. This is supported
by contractor Bodine’s testimony that the ditch work was clearly done “with a lack
of respect to the Noecker property.” Bodine said that Bernhart’s ditch work
“shocked” him, as it was so “sloppy” and “poorly done” that it caused avoidable
and significant damage to Noecker’s property, which would be “quite expensive”
to repair.
Bernhart argues the ditch work was done in good faith, as the damage
was unforeseeable given Noecker’s property was already a wetland. But, as
discussed above, the evidence shows that Bernhart caused injury to the Noecker
property. And Bernhart did not contest the court’s finding that he “failed to take
any action to avoid harm to the North Noecker Property from the Ditch Work.”
Further, Bernhart did not contest that the ditch work “occurred without a
necessary land disturbance permit from Snohomish County.”
14
No. 87820-4-I/15
The trial court did not err by concluding that Bernhart failed to use due
care when engaged in the ditch work. So, the due care exception to the common
enemy doctrine applies.
C. Substantial Evidence
Bernhart next challenges the trial court’s conclusions that the excess
water from the ditch work amounted to a trespass, created a nuisance, and
resulted in waste. He also challenges the court’s conclusion that his dam work
created a nuisance per se. He argues substantial evidence does not support
those claims. We disagree.
I. Ditch Work
A trespass occurs when there is “ ‘an intentional or negligent intrusion
onto or into the property of another.’ ” Pruitt v. Douglas County, 116 Wn. App.
547, 553, 66 P.3d 1111 (2003)8 (quoting Borden v. City of Olympia, 113 Wn.
App. 359, 373, 53 P.3d 1020 (2002)). “Trespass can be shown by the discharge
of water when the water ultimately reaches another’s property.” Id. A continuing
trespass creates a new tort every moment it continues. Woldson v. Woodhead,
159 Wn.2d 215, 219, 149 P.3d 361 (2006).
Bernhart argues no evidence shows that he intended to damage
Noecker’s property, that he could “reasonably foresee a high probability of
causing injury,” or that his actions caused the damage. In so arguing, Bernhart
relies heavily on Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wn.2d 677,
709 P.2d 782 (1985). But in the portion of the opinion relied on by Bernhart, our
8
Internal quotation marks omitted.
15
No. 87820-4-I/16
Supreme Court accepted and approved “the elements of trespass by airborne
pollutants.” Id. at 691. No such claim is at issue here.
But even if Bradley were controlling here, our Supreme Court held that the
element of intent is satisfied if the act “ ‘is done with knowledge that it will to a
substantial certainty result in the entry of the foreign matter’ ” on the other’s land.
104 Wn.2d at 682 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt i (AM. L.
INST. 1965)). Here, the trial court found that Bernhart intentionally directed water
onto Noecker’s property by digging ditches that altered the water’s natural flow
and that Bernhart’s actions disturbed Noecker’s possessory interest in the form
of excess standing water and sediment. Indeed, the evidence shows that
Bernhart purposefully created the series of hydraulically connected ditches so
that water would flow to the North-South Ditch on Noecker’s property. As to
causation, Gordon testified about how Bernhart’s alteration of the natural flow of
water led to substantial damage by clogging Noecker’s pump, causing overflow
from his retention pond, and creating standing water around Noecker’s property.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the excess
water flowing from Bernhart’s ditches onto Noecker’s property amounted to a
trespass.9
9
Bernhart also argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
conclusion that Craig’s ditch work created a nuisance for the same reasons that it did not
amount to a trespass. We reject the challenge to the nuisance claims for the same
reasons that we reject the trespass claim challenge. Bernhart further argues that no
evidence shows he entered Noecker’s property and acted wrongfully as required to
show waste. But Bernhart did not dispute at trial that Craig entered Noecker’s property.
And, as discussed above, the record shows that Craig acted wrongfully by purposefully
diverting the flow of water onto Noecker’s property. So, we also reject Bernhart’s
challenge to the waste claim.
16
No. 87820-4-I/17
II. Dam Work
Bernhart challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the water flowing from
the dam amounted to a nuisance per se. They argue that no evidence showed
the dam work required a permit or that the work caused an ongoing and
increased flow of water. We disagree.
RCW 7.48.010 defines “actionable nuisance.” RCW 7.48.010 states, in
relevant part, that
whatever is injurious to health or indecent or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of the life and
property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action for damages
and other and further relief.
And RCW 7.48.120 defines “nuisance.” “A nuisance includes acts that annoy,
injure, or endanger the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others and that
‘renders other persons insecure in life, or in the use of property.’ ” MJD Props.,
LLC v. Haley, 189 Wn. App. 963, 969-70, 358 P.3d 476 (2015) (quoting RCW
7.48.120).
“Our cases have also acknowledged the concept of a nuisance per se [as]
‘an act, thing, omission, or use of property which of itself is a nuisance, and
hence is not permissible or excusable under any circumstance.’ ” Animal Legal
Def. Fund v. Olympic Game Farm, Inc., 1 Wn.3d 925, 932, 533 P.3d 1170 (2023)
(quoting Tiegs v. Watts, 135 Wn.2d 1, 13, 954 P.2d 877 (1998)). Our Supreme
Court explained:
“When the conditions giving rise to a nuisance are also a violation
of statutory prohibition, those conditions constitute a nuisance per
se, and the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct
and the weighing of the relative interests of the plaintiff and
17
No. 87820-4-I/18
defendant is precluded because the Legislature has, in effect,
already struck the balance in favor of the innocent party.”
Id.10 (quoting Moore v. Steve’s Outboard Serv., 182 Wn.2d 151, 155, 339 P.3d
169 (2014)). To establish a nuisance per se claim, “there must be a showing that
a statutory violation has occurred and that the action is in fact a nuisance and
remains a nuisance under all circumstances.” Id.
Here, the record shows that on October 6, 2017, PDS issued a Stop Work
Order to Bernhart after observing unpermitted land-disturbing activity, which
included the dam work. On October 9, PDS issued a Notice of Violation to
Bernhart for failure to obtain a permit before the work began under SCC
30.63B.030 and .070. Those codes require a permit before commencing any
land disturbing activity unless the activity is confirmed to be exempt by PDS
before beginning the work. But Bernhart had no permit when he attempted
repairs to the dam, and no evidence shows that the repairs were exempt from the
permit process.
Still, Bernhart argues substantial evidence does not support the trial
court’s conclusion that the dam work caused an ongoing and increased flow of
water. But Gordon testified that the dam failure resulted in “increased water and
sediment transport” in “much larger storm flow quantities and velocities” to
Noecker’s property. The damage from the dam work caused the downstream
ponds on Noecker’s property to fill with sediment, as shown in the photographs
above.
10
Internal quotation marks omitted.
18
No. 87820-4-I/19
The trial court did not err by concluding that the dam work and its resulting
damage amounts to a nuisance per se.
3. Cross Appeal
Noecker argues the trial court erred by concluding it could not award
emotional distress damages on his trespass and nuisance claims arising from the
dam work. We agree.
Plaintiffs can generally recover damages for emotional distress caused by
an intentional tort such as trespass. Lavington v. Hillier, 22 Wn. App. 2d 134,
152, 510 P.3d 373, review denied, 200 Wn.2d 1010, 518 P.3d 212 (2022). This
designation has been “ ‘liberally’ ” applied “ ‘merely upon proof’ ” of an intentional
tort. Birchler v. Castello Land Co., 133 Wn.2d 106, 115-16, 942 P.2d 968 (1997)
(quoting Cagle v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 911, 916, 726 P.2d 434 (1986)).
Further, “ ‘mental anguish resulting . . . from nuisance’ ” is compensable. Miotke
v. City of Spokane, 101 Wn.2d 307, 332, 678 P.2d 803 (1984) (quoting Riblet v.
Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 45 Wn.2d 346, 353, 274 P.2d 574 (1954)).
Here, the trial court acknowledged that the damage from the dam work
caused “anxiety, stress, and emotional distress” to Noecker. But it concluded
that the law precluded an award of damages to compensate for that emotional
distress. Because emotional distress damages are generally recoverable for
intentional torts such as trespass and nuisance per se, we remand for the court
to consider an award of such damages.
19
No. 87820-4-I/20
4. Attorney Fees and Costs
Noecker asks us to award attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.24.630.
Under RAP 18.1(a), we may award attorney fees on appeal if applicable law
grants to a party the right to recover them. Attorney fees may be authorized by
statute. Dankievitch v. Lawrence, 22 Wn. App. 2d. 749, 761, 513 P.3d 804
(2022). Under RCW 4.24.630(1), violators are “liable for reimbursing the injured
party for the party’s reasonable costs, including but not limited to investigative
costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation-related costs.” Because
Noecker successfully defended Bernhart’s appeal from the trial court’s
conclusion that Bernhart violated RCW 4.24.630, we award Noecker reasonable
attorney fees and costs subject to compliance with RAP 18.1.
We affirm the trial court’s final judgment but remand for the court to
consider an award of emotional distress damages for Noecker. And we award
Noecker attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 4.24.630.
WE CONCUR:
20