Full Opinion

Case: 24-7834 Page: 1 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS No. 24-7834 ROBERT F. HOFFMAN, APPELLANT, V. DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE. On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Argued May 12, 2026 Decided August 24, 2026) C. Nicholas Scripter, with whom Grace Hurley was on the brief, both of Providence, Rhode Island, for the appellant. Daniel B. Hausman, with whom James S. C. Baehr, General Counsel; David L. Quinn, Assistant Chief Counsel; and James B. Cowden, Deputy Chief Counsel, were on the brief, all of Washington, D.C., for the appellee. Before PIETSCH, FALVEY, and JAQUITH, Judges. FALVEY, Judge, filed the opinion of the Court. JAQUITH, Judge, filed a concurring opinion. FALVEY, Judge: After a veteran prevails in a claim for benefits, VA sets the effective date—the date from which VA starts paying benefits—based on when the veteran filed the claim. An intent to file (ITF) is a tool that helps the veteran maximize that effective date. It lets the veteran tell VA that a claim is coming and, if the veteran follows through within a year, maximizes the veteran's benefits by associating the claim with the ITF and so tying the effective date to when the veteran first expressed the intent to file. But what happens when VA uses that tool in a way that does no good for one claim and prevents the veteran from using the ITF to secure several months of benefits for another, effectively wasting the ITF or acting as if it never existed? That is what happened here. Air Force veteran Robert Hoffman filed an ITF in February 2023. A few months later, he filed a continuously pursued supplemental claim—a claim for the same or similar benefit filed within a year of an earlier denial—seeking review of earlier denials of service connection for kidney disease, hearing loss, and Meniere's disease. Then, still within a year of his ITF, he filed a new, initial, compensation claim for stroke residuals and erectile Case: 24-7834 Page: 2 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 dysfunction (ED). VA granted the stroke and ED claims, along with special monthly compensation (SMC) based on loss of use of a creative organ. But VA assigned July 21, 2023 —the date of the new compensation claim—as the effective date. Why? Because VA said that, under 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(d)(1)(ii), the continuously pursued supplemental claim was already associated with the February 2023 ITF. In effect, the ITF had been used by the time the initial claim came in. That does not work. Congress told VA how to set the date of application for a continuously pursued supplemental claim filed within a year of a prior VA decision. The date of application is the date of the initial application for that benefit. So, applying the ITF framework to that kind of supplemental claim adds nothing. Worse, it can hurt the veteran by nullifying an ITF that otherwise would support an earlier effective date on a later claim filed within the same 1-year period. Because Congress already decided the date of claim for a continuously pursued supplemental claim, we hold that VA may not apply § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) to associate a continuously pursued supplemental claim with an ITF when doing so would provide no effective-date benefit. Because the Board did just that here, it erred. For Mr. Hoffman—who appeals from a September 26, 2024, Board of Veterans' Appeals decision—this means that the Board erred when it denied an effective date before July 21, 2023, for the grants of service connection for stroke residuals and ED, and of entitlement to SMC for loss of use of a creative organ based on ED. The correct date of application for Mr. Hoffman's claims stems from his ITF. And, because the Board found that he suffered from stroke residuals for that entire period—that is, at least since he filed his ITF—we can reverse the Board's denial of an earlier effective date and order VA to set the effective date to February 28, 2023. But, because the record is less clear about ED and the SMC claim depends on that claim, we can only set aside the Board's decision on those claims and remand them for further proceedings. 1 I. BACKGROUND The dispute here is whether the effective date for the claims on appeal should go back to February 28, 2023—the date VA received Mr. Hoffman's ITF—or July 21, 2023, the date VA received his completed application. Record (R.) at 4-13, 2317-22, 2434. Mr. Hoffman believes his 1 Mr. Hoffman does not challenge the Board's denial of entitlement to (1) an initial compensable rating for ED; or (2) an initial rating above 10% for stroke residuals. Thus, we will dismiss the appeal as to these issues. See Pederson v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 276, 286 (2015) (en banc). 2 Case: 24-7834 Page: 3 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 ITF should govern and the Secretary says that we have to go with the July 2023 application because VA had already associated a different claim with the ITF. To fully capture their disagreement, we first need to say more about the timeline of Mr. Hoffman's claims. There are three important events that we need to keep in mind. First, Mr. Hoffman filed an ITF on February 28, 2023. R. at 2434. Second, in May 2023, he filed a VA Form 20-0995 Supplemental Claim Form challenging VA's denial of his kidney disability, bilateral hearing loss, and Meniere's disease claims—claims he had filed and continuously pursued for a couple of years. R. at 2373. And third, he filed his claim for service connection for stroke residuals and ED on July 21, 2023. R. at 2317-22. This case is about which filing—the May 2023 supplemental claim or the July 2023 claim—profits from the February 2023 ITF. This issue matters because it impacts the effective date for Mr. Hoffman's stroke residuals, ED, and SMC. As stated, Mr. Hoffman applied for service connection for stroke and ED in July 2023. But he submitted his ITF in February 2023. So, if the ITF counted as his date of claim, he'd be looking at roughly six more months of benefits. Hence, having prevailed on his claim for service connection for stroke residuals and ED, as well as entitlement to SMC based on loss of use of a creative organ, Mr. Hoffman believes that VA assigned him the wrong effective date. R. at 855. As we said, before filing the three claims at issue, Mr. Hoffman had been denied benefits for a kidney disability, bilateral hearing loss, and Meniere's disease. R. at 193 -95. These initial denials preceded his February 2023 ITF. And it was these three claims that Mr. Hoffman pursued through his May 2023 supplemental claim. R. at 2373. Because these claims came before the ITF, the date of claims for these disabilities was already earlier than the February 2023 date of the ITF and could not benefit from the ITF. Then came the claims that matter here. In July 2023, and still within 1 year of the February 2023 ITF, Mr. Hoffman submitted his initial claim for stroke residuals and ED. R. at 2317-22. Along with that filing, he specifically asked VA to "establish this claim in association with the February 28, 2023, Intent to File." R. at 2316. He didn't get what he asked for. VA granted the claims. But it didn't associate them with the ITF. In its December 2023 rating decision granting service connection for stroke residuals and ED and awarding SMC, VA set a July 21, 2023, effective date for all three benefits. R. at 869-71. This was the date that VA received Mr. Hoffman's application for service connection for stroke residuals and ED. Id. As we 3 Case: 24-7834 Page: 4 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 said, Mr. Hoffman disagrees with this effective date. And he took this disagreement all the way to the Board and now this Court. R. at 99. In the September 2024 decision on appeal, the Board denied effective dates before July 21, 2023, for the stroke residuals, ED, and SMC. R. at 4-13. The Board recognized that VA received Mr. Hoffman's February 2023 ITF, May 2023 supplemental claim, and July 2023 VA Form 21- 526EZ. R. at 9. But the Board concluded that the May 2023 supplemental claim was associated with the February 2023 ITF because that was the first claim VA received after the ITF. R. at 10. Relying on 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(d)(1)(ii), the Board reasoned that, when VA receives multiple claims within 1year of an ITF, only the first claim can be associated with that ITF. Id. Because the Board treated the May 2023 supplemental claim as the first claim, it found that the ITF was effectively used up and the July 2023 application for benefits could not stem from the February 2023 ITF date. Id. II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK A. Section 5110 At its core, this case is about effective dates. Mr. Hoffman seeks an earlier effective date for his awards of service connection for stroke and ED, as well as his entitlement to SMC. Thus, we first chart the statutory provisions that govern how VA assigns effective dates. By default, "the effective date of an award based on an initial claim, or a supplemental claim, . . . shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application." 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(1). But there are several exceptions to this rule. One of them involves a "continuously pursued" claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(2). For such claims, "the date of application shall be considered the date of the filing of the initial application for a benefit if the claim is continuously pursued by filing any of the [enumerated review options], either alone or in succession." Id. Here, the only relevant review option is filing a supplemental claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(2)(A)–(E). Do so within a year of the denial, and the effective date can be tied to the initial application. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(2). This is a continuously pursued supplemental claim. Id. Wait more than a year, and the effective date is tied to the date of that supplemental claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(3). 4 Case: 24-7834 Page: 5 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 In other words, when setting effective dates, Congress told VA to pick the latter of the date of application or when facts confirm that entitlement arose. The distinguishing feature is how to decide the date of application. For the initial application, VA must go with the default rule—it anchors the effective date based on when the claimant first applied. That's subsection (a)(1). But a claimant who gets a denial might be able to continuously pursue that application by filing a supplemental claim within a year. This is continuous pursuit under (a)(2). And that opens up the possibility of continuing to use the original date of claim. Without continuous pursuit—in other words, if the claimant files another claim more than a year after VA's most recent decision —the earlier application date is lost and the new application date is the date of that supplemental claim. Importantly, in section 5110(a)(2), Congress gave veterans a full year to file a supplemental claim. With this in mind, we turn to the regulation in which VA prescribed how veterans can initiate their claims. B. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155 To that end, VA promulgated 38 C.F.R. § 3.155—aptly named, "How to file a claim." This regulation "describe[s] the manner and methods in which a claim can be initiated and filed." 38 C.F.R. § 3.155 (2026). And it is "applicable to all claims . . . , with the exception that paragraph (b) of this section, regarding intent to file a claim, does not apply to supplemental claims. " Id. In paragraph (b) of § 3.155, VA established the ITF option. That regulation allows claimants to show their intent to file a claim by submitting an ITF to VA. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b). It also states that, "[i]f VA receives a complete application form prescribed by the Secretary, as defined in paragraph (a) of § 3.160, appropriate to the benefit sought within 1 year of receipt of the intent to file a claim, VA will consider the complete claim filed as of the date the intent to file a claim was received." Id. In effect, filing an ITF starts the "application" process for purposes of calculating the effective date. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a). With § 3.155(b), VA gave veterans a year to finalize their claim after filing an ITF. We thus have two relevant 1-year periods. In section 5110, Congress gave veterans 1 year to establish continuous pursuit and tie an effective date to the initial application by filing a supplemental claim. And, in § 3.155(b), VA gave veterans 1 year to file a claim after filing an ITF to tie an effective date to the date of the ITF. 5 Case: 24-7834 Page: 6 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 Section 3.155 includes additional provisions important to our discussion. For our analysis, it helps to include them in almost their entirety, down to the section titles. (d) Claims.—(1) Requirement for complete claim and date of claim. A complete claim is required for all types of claims, and will generally be considered filed as of the date it was received by VA . . . . (i) Supplemental claims. Upon receipt of a communication indicating a belief in entitlement to benefits that is submitted in writing or electronically on a supplemental claim form prescribed by the Secretary that is not complete . . . , the Secretary shall notify the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of the information necessary to complete the application form prescribed by the Secretary. If VA receives a complete claim within 60 days of notice by VA that an incomplete claim was filed, it will be considered filed as of the date of receipt of the incomplete claim . . . . (ii) For other types of claims. If VA receives a complete claim within 1 year of the filing of an intent to file a claim that meets the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section, it will be considered filed as of the date of receipt of the intent to file a claim. Only one complete claim for a benefit (e.g., compensation, pension) may be associated with each intent to file a claim for that benefit, though multiple issues may be contained within a complete claim. In the event multiple complete claims for a benefit are filed within 1 year of an intent to file a claim for that benefit, only the first claim filed will be associated with the intent to file a claim. In the event that VA receives both an intent to file a claim and an incomplete application form before the complete claim as defined in § 3.160(a) is filed, the complete claim will be considered filed as of the date of receipt of whichever was filed first provided it is perfected within the necessary timeframe, but in no event, will the complete claim be considered filed more than one year prior to the date of receipt of the complete claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(d)(1). These provisions all do different work. Section 3.155(d)(1) gives the default rules: claimants need to file a complete claim, and a claim is considered filed when a complete claim is received. Clauses (i) and (ii) deal with exceptions to these default rules. Section 3.155(d)(1)(i) indicates that, if a claimant files an incomplete supplemental claim, VA will provide notice that the claim is incomplete and give the claimant 60 days to file a complete claim; if VA gets that complete claim during that period, the date of claim will be the date of the incomplete filing. In other words, the regulation gives a 60 -day grace period for an incomplete supplemental claim, despite the (d)(1) requirement of a complete claim. 6 Case: 24-7834 Page: 7 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 Section 3.155(d)(1)(ii) creates a much broader exception to the complete-claim rule by allowing 1 year to complete the application process started with an ITF. This regulation describes how VA handles complete filings submitted within a year of an ITF: Recognizing only one ITF at a time, VA will associate the first complete submission with an ITF for purposes of establishing the date of claim. If all is correct, the date of claim is up to a year before the completed claim was filed. With the statutory and regulatory provisions charted, we turn to case law. C. MVA As noted, in establishing § 3.155, VA decided "that paragraph (b) of this section, regarding intent to file a claim, does not apply to supplemental claims." 38 C.F.R. § 3.155. However, this part of the regulation did not last long; it was invalidated by the Federal Circuit in Military- Veterans Advocacy v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs (MVA), 7 F.4th 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2021). But that still left the provision saying that § 3.155 is "applicable to all claims." In MVA, among other things, the Federal Circuit was asked to address VA's exclusion of supplemental claims from the ITF framework in § 3.155. VA did not defend the regulation, promising instead to change it. MVA, 7 F.4th at 1146. Because no change had yet materialized while the case was pending, the Federal Circuit invalidated the regulation. Id. at 1147. The Federal Circuit zeroed in on VA's faulty reasoning for treating supplemental claims differently than other claims. VA invoked the mandate from section 5110(a)(3) that the effective dates for supplemental claims "shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of the supplemental claim." Id. at 1146. But as the appellant in MVA noted (and the Federal Circuit agreed), section "5110(a)(1) likewise requires that the effective date of an initial claim 'shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application.'" Id. And VA allowed an ITF for section 5110(a)(1) claims but not supplemental claims despite the nearly identical language. Id. For its part, the Federal Circuit pointed out that even VA's own regulation — § 3.155(d)(1)(i)—allowed claimants to have an effective date for a 5110(a)(3) supplemental claim that was earlier than contemplated by the statute. Id. at 1147. Recall that this regulation gave a claimant 60 days to cure an incomplete supplemental claim with the completed application. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(d)(1)(i). So rather than set the effective date based on the date of claim as required by its purported reading of 5110(a)(3), VA permitted an effective date up to 60 days earlier based on the incomplete filing. 7 Case: 24-7834 Page: 8 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 In the end, the Federal Circuit concluded that, "[i]f the application for an initial claim is 'deem[ed] . . . to have been received as of the date of the intent to file a claim,' we see no reason why that same interpretation may not also apply to deem a supplemental claim received as of the date of the intent-to-file submission." Id. And so, the Federal Circuit invalidated § 3.155's preamble, holding that VA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in excluding supplemental claims from the ITF framework. Id. The Federal Circuit did not discuss how ITF and supplemental claims would work together. And VA never completed the promised rulemaking. This void prompts the dispute here. III. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS A. Mr. Hoffman's Arguments As noted, the Board associated Mr. Hoffman's supplemental claim with his February 2023 ITF under § 3.155(d)(1)(ii). Mr. Hoffman disagrees. He points out that, per their titles, paragraph (d)(1)(i) expressly deals with supplemental claims and paragraph (d)(1)(ii) deals with "other types of claims." Appellant's Brief (Br.) at 7-8. Thus, he argues that VA's own regulation excludes supplemental claims from (d)(1)(ii). Id. And he contends that MVA's inclusion of supplemental claims in the ITF framework does not hold otherwise because the Federal Circuit did not modify (d)(1)(i) or (d)(1)(ii), thus leaving VA's exclusion of supplemental claims from (d)(1)(ii) in place. Id. at 10. As Mr. Hoffman sees it, his ITF does not impact his supplemental claim. Id. at 8. What's more, VA had no reason to apply the ITF provisions to his supplemental claim because Congress expressly spoke to what happens to supplemental claims filed within a year in section 5110(a)(2). Id. Finally, Mr. Hoffman contends that, even if VA correctly interprets § 3.155(d)(1)(ii), VA waived the regulation's applicability to him because VA told him to file a specific form within a year of his February 2023 ITF with the promise that this would protect his effective date. Id. at 15. Mr. Hoffman emphasizes that, as VA suggested, he filed that form. Reply Br. at 6. He insists that VA is now reneging on that promise by refusing to associate his July 2023 application for benefits with that form. Appellant's Br. at 16. Regardless of how we construe § 3.155(d)(1)(ii), Mr. Hoffman says that we can reverse the Board decision and award his earlier effective date. Id. at 12-14. 8 Case: 24-7834 Page: 9 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 B. The Secretary's Retort The Secretary has a much different take—he believes that MVA controls. Secretary's Br. at 4. In his view, the Federal Circuit decided that the ITF framework covers supplemental claims. And § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) is part of that framework. Thus, the regulation applies and the Board did not err in how it applied the regulation. Id. at 4-11. Even so, he concedes that remand is warranted for the Board to decide whether VA might have treated Mr. Hoffman unfairly when it told him to file a specific form to get an earlier effective date based on his ITF and then denied him the effective-date benefit of that ITF. Id. at 11-14. IV. ANALYSIS A. The Secretary's Concession We start where the Secretary ends—his suggestion that remand is appropriate based on fairness. The Secretary spends little time on this argument and neither do we. If the Secretary intended to invoke fair process, we recently explained that our fair process doctrine is not a license to invent rights; it is a recognition that due process applies to the VA claim system. Bilharz v. Collins, 38 Vet.App. 366, 379 (2025). And the Secretary does not argue that this situation fits within any recognized due process analysis. Thus, to find a reason to remand, "we would have to create it. And having 'sworn off the habit' of" inventing brand-new rights, "'we will not accept [the Secretary's] invitation to have one last drink."' FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Cap. Master Fund, Ltd., 146 S. Ct. 1546, 1555 (2026). The attempted concession is simply too underdeveloped. See Locklear v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 410, 416 (2006) (holding that the Court will not entertain underdeveloped arguments); Evans v. West, 12 Vet.App. 22, 31 (1998) (noting that the Court will disregard vague assertions and unsupported contentions). Putting that aside, Mr. Hoffman does not want a remand. He argues for reversal. His primary point is that VA can't apply the regulation to him, not that it shouldn't have out of a sense of fairness. To accept the Secretary's concession, we'd effectively have to accept his premise that VA was right about § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) but wrong in its execution as to Mr. Hoffman's claim. In other words, the fairness issue is relevant only if we first decide that § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) applied to Mr. Hoffman's supplemental claim. And, as we discuss below, it doesn't. 9 Case: 24-7834 Page: 10 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 B. Mr. Hoffman's Waiver Argument Similar problems apply to Mr. Hoffman's waiver argument. Generally, waiver requires a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a legal right. Bolds v. McDonough, 37 Vet.App. 359, 366 (2024). Mr. Hoffman does not explain why the Board would have had to consider whether some agent of VA engaged in a knowing and voluntary waiver of the applicability of § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) to Mr. Hoffman's claim. And, with no suggestion of such an act in the record, we have trouble understanding why the Board should have addressed the matter. See Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552-53 (2008), aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Waiver and forfeiture do not arise every time a government employee errs or fails to take an action. Waiver generally requires some knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a legal right; forfeiture looks to whether the government pressed the right to correct a mistake at the appropriate time. See Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2026) (discussing waiver and forfeiture and explaining that "[s]taying silent—as here, not picking a fight—does not qualify" and that the government did not forfeit a right when it properly pressed it on appeal or further review). Nothing here suggested to the Court that anything resembling a knowing and voluntary relinquishment took place. And we're here precisely because VA chose to apply the regulation to Mr. Hoffman when it made that decision, so forfeiture doesn't make sense either. But, as with the Secretary's concession, we need not dwell on these issues. Both matter only if VA was right about the regulation. If the regulation simply does not apply to supplemental claims, there is nothing to waive. Thus, despite a concession of remand from VA and an alternate argument from Mr. Hoffman, we must resolve whether § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) applies to supplemental claims. And if we agree with the Secretary that it does, we would then need to resolve Mr. Hoffman's argument that the regulation clashes with the statute. We ultimately don't agree with VA, so we won't resolve the waiver or fairness arguments; this case resolves on the statute and the regulation before we get to these other arguments. C. Supplemental Claims and § 3.155(d)(1) As with any regulatory interpretation, we start with the text. See Simon v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 403, 409 (2018). Mr. Hoffman tells us that we can quickly end our inquiry because of the subsection titles. He emphasizes that VA wrote paragraph (d)(1)(i) to talk about "supplemental claims" and paragraph (d)(1)(ii) to talk about "other types of claims." 10 Case: 24-7834 Page: 11 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 We included this regulation in its entirety to help us review this argument. On the surface, it makes a lot of sense. We have "supplemental claims" and we have "other claims" and each has their own regulatory sections. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(d)(1). But "a title alone is not controlling." INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308 (2001). The title isn't the text; it becomes relevant context when resolving textual ambiguity. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998). Thus, we can't simply look to the title. We must read the whole regulation. Id. Doing so here, we see that paragraph (d)(1)(i) addresses what VA does when it receives an incomplete supplemental claim. It does not focus on all supplemental claims. Complete supplemental claims are only mentioned to elaborate on VA's treatment of the incomplete claims. The focus of the regulation remains incomplete supplemental claims. Turning to (d)(1)(ii), we see no similar focus on one type of claim. Instead, the regulation addresses what VA does when it receives an ITF and then a complete claim form—exactly the situation here. The regulation seemingly applies to all such claims. And the title confirms that. As stated, paragraph (d)(1)(i) explains what VA does when a veteran submits an incomplete supplemental claim. And the title of paragraph (d)(1)(ii) tells us that it addresses "other types of claims"—that is, claims other than incomplete supplemental claims, i.e., complete claims—and the text of the regulation explains that, if VA receives such a complete claim within a year of the ITF, it will be considered as filed on the date of the ITF. We also can't ignore that paragraph (d)(1)(ii) is part of the ITF framework. It is VA's regulation that lays out how VA will process an ITF. And the Federal Circuit has held that supplemental claims are part of that framework. MVA, 7 F.4th at 1146. True, MVA only invalidated the exclusion of supplemental claims from § 3.155(b)—the part of the regulation that effectively created the ITF framework—but that part is a key element of § 3.155(d)(1)(ii). Id. at 1147. The first sentence of § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) expressly references paragraph (b) when it tells us that, "[i]f VA receives a complete claim within 1 year of the filing of an intent to file a claim that meets the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section, it will be considered filed as of the date of receipt of the intent to file a claim." The regulation then discusses what happens with such a paragraph (b) compliant claim: "Only one complete claim for a benefit (e.g., compensation, pension) may be associated with each intent to file a claim for that benefit" and, if "multiple complete claims for a benefit are filed within 1 year of an intent to file a claim for that benefit, only the first claim filed will be associated with the intent to file a claim. " Id. 11 Case: 24-7834 Page: 12 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 In effect, paragraph (d)(1)(ii) is entirely about how VA will process an ITF and compliant claims under paragraph (b). And the relevant part of MVA concerned only whether supplemental claims were excluded from paragraph (b). MVA, 7 F.4th at 1146-47. The Federal Circuit wanted to ensure that supplemental claims worked with the ITF framework. Id. And § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) is how VA makes those ITF claims work. All to say that we disagree with Mr. Hoffman that his argument about the section titles carries the day. Particularly after MVA, paragraph (d)(1)(ii) tells us what VA does when it receives an ITF, which can apply to supplemental claims. Paragraph (d)(1)(i) kicks in, as its text tells us, only when VA receives an incomplete supplemental claim. If this plain reading of the regulation left any doubt, we can reinforce it by going back to the beginning. Recall that the regulation first says that it is "applicable to all claims." 38 C.F.R. § 3.155. With the exclusion of supplemental claims gone after MVA, we see no reason to think that VA wanted to further carve supplemental claims out when a natural reading of the text would include them. Section 3.155(d)(1)(ii) says how VA applies an ITF to all complete claims; it does not exclude complete supplemental claims. D. Section 5110(a)(2) With Mr. Hoffman's regulatory argument gone, all that remains is his statutory challenge. He tells us that, when it comes to continuously pursued supplemental claims, there is nothing for VA to do with an ITF regulation if a veteran has filed his or her supplemental claim within a year. Mr. Hoffman's argument relies on the concept that agencies lack authority to act on an issue if Congress has expressly spoken on a matter. See White v. United States, 543 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Since Congress has spoken on the issue, the agency is not free to regulate."). So let's revisit what Congress said about continuously pursued supplemental claims. Congress told VA that "the date of application shall be considered the date of the filing of the initial application for a benefit if the claim is continuously pursued." 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(2). Thus, we know that if there's a continuously pursued supplemental claim, the date of the claim is the date of the initial application for that benefit. Now we must see if the regulation jibes with that construction. Recall that § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) says that, if VA receives a claim within 1 year of the ITF, "it will be considered filed as of the date of receipt of the [ITF]." 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(d)(1)(ii). And so, under the regulation, the date of filing for a continuously pursued supplemental claim becomes the 12 Case: 24-7834 Page: 13 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 date of filing of the ITF. But we know that Congress said that for the continuously pursued supplemental claim, this date is actually "the date of the filing of the initial application." 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(2). And as we've said, if Congress has supplied the rule, there is nothing left for an agency to do with rulemaking. White, 543 F.3d at 1338. That has a real-world impact here. There is nothing for the ITF to do when it comes to deciding the effective date for a continuously pursued supplemental claim, because Congress has already set a rule that's better for veterans. And this will always be true. Regarding a continuously pursued claim that VA could attempt to associate with an ITF, the ITF will always come between the initial claim and the continuously pursued one. Otherwise, the ITF would come before the initial claim and that claim would be associated with the ITF, or come after the supplemental claim and apply to neither. Thus, the date of claim based on the initial claim will always favor the veteran more than the date an ITF is filed. That is how time works. Contrast this with what an ITF does for claimants under sections 5110(a)(1) and 5110(a)(3). Those claimants benefit from having their date of application anchored by the ITF if they file the ITF at any time up to a year before they file those claims. The ITF does work there and that work is beneficial. This is why the Federal Circuit's decision in MVA focused so heavily on VA's inconsistent treatment of 5110(a)(1) claims and 5110(a)(3) claims under the ITF framework. The ITF framework could benefit claimants who satisfied both statutory provisions, and VA provided no reason for excluding the 5110(a)(3) supplemental claims from that benefit. But no such benefit arises when a claimant files a supplemental claim within a year under section 5110(a)(2); this is presumably why the Federal Circuit did not mention section 5110(a)(2) when striking down the exclusion of supplemental claims from the ITF framework. This lack of any benefit for section 5110(a)(2) claims perhaps could be a useless feature of the regulatory scheme, but VA associating a section 5110(a)(2) supplemental claim with an ITF does harm. It effectively takes that ITF and renders it as if it were never filed; the ITF doesn't help the supplemental claim and it can't help any subsequent claims. For Mr. Hoffman, nullifying that ITF cut off several months of potential benefits. VA says it associated his May 2023 supplemental claim with the February 2023 ITF. But that's not true. VA never awarded him the effective date based on that ITF, and for good reason—the initial dates of application for all the disabilities involved in the continuously pursued supplemental claim 13 Case: 24-7834 Page: 14 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 predated the ITF. But if VA had associated the July 2023 claim for stroke residuals, ED, and SMC to his February 2023 ITF, the effective date for those disabilities could be February 2023 rather than July 2023. Thus, Mr. Hoffman's case perfectly exemplifies the problem with applying § 3.155(d)(1)(ii) to a section 5110(a)(2) supplemental claim. But it is easy to think of another example. Recall that Congress gave veterans a year from their last VA decision to file a supplemental claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(2). And VA has decided that veterans who use an ITF have a year after the ITF to complete their claims. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b). Both provisions give veterans a one-year grace period to complete a claim and still protect the effective date by anchoring it to the initial claim for continuously pursued supplemental claims or to the ITF for initial claims. But veterans who file a supplemental claim and an initial claim inexplicably get neither one-year grace period. Once the veteran receives a denial, there is no way to structure an ITF for a new claim and the filing of a continuously pursued supplemental claim in such a way as to use the one-year grace period for both options. Consider three veterans, Able, Baker, and Charlie, sitting down to dinner on February 1, 2026. Able mentions that she's collecting evidence to help prove her in-service injury for a respiratory claim that VA denied on August 1, 2025, after she filed it on January 2, 2025. The process is taking her awhile, but she knows that she still has 6 months of her year left to file her supplemental claim under section 5110(a)(2) and keep her potential effective date anchored to the January 2, 2025, claim. Baker realizes that he needs to file a claim for service connection of a back injury from a crash. He knows that he needs to collect evidence of his in-service injury. Thanks to his friends pointing out that he can use an ITF, he begins VA's online application that night to preserve his effective date. He thus has one year from February 1, 2026, to finish his claim under § 3.155(b) and, if he does so, his effective date can be based on the ITF and start that day. Charlie, like Able, is working on gathering evidence to file her supplemental claim following an August 1, 2025, denial of her initial claim. They applied together. She knows she'll need every day of her one-year continuous pursuit deadline to help prove her claim. But Charlie also got injured alongside Baker. She would like to submit the same claim. The problem is that, if Charlie files an ITF, she will waste that ITF by filing her supplemental claim within the next 6 months because the supplemental claim will be associated with the ITF. Charlie has no way to 14 Case: 24-7834 Page: 15 of 29 Filed: 08/24/2026 secure her effective date on her new claim like Baker while also leveraging her full statutory time to file a continuously pursued supplemental claim like Able. Perhaps Charlie could file her ITF and hope that she'll be able to file her new claim before her deadline to file a supplemental claim. But