Ricardo Devengoechea v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 1 of 38 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-10029 ____________________ RICARDO DEVENGOECHEA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, a foreign state, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-23743-PCH ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges. KIDD, Circuit Judge: We vacate our prior opinion in this case and substitute the following in its place. USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 2 of 38 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10029 Ricardo Devengoechea sued the Bolivarian Republic of Ven- ezuela to recover his collection of Simón Bolívar artifacts that Ven- ezuela allegedly never returned to him. While Devengoechea’s law- suit was pending, Venezuela underwent a regime change, its attor- neys withdrew from the case, and it failed to comply with the dis- trict court’s pretrial orders. Devengoechea decided not to seek a default judgment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Instead, at Devengoechea’s request, the district court tried the case in ab- sentia—that is, without Venezuela’s presence. This was improper. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act requires courts to follow its default judgment provision, section 1608(e). We have previously held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides the proce- dural mechanism for courts to implement section 1608(e)’s require- ments. Because the district court did not follow section 1608(e) and Rule 55, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the district court. I. BACKGROUND Ricardo Devengoechea lives in Orlando, Florida, and once had a collection of Simón Bolívar artifacts. We described these ar- tifacts and their historical significance the last time this case was before us. See Devengoechea v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez. (“Deven- goechea I”), 889 F.3d 1213, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2018). According to Devengoechea, officials of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela contacted him through his cousin and expressed interest in USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 3 of 38 24-10029 Opinion of the Court 3 purchasing the collection. In response, Devengoechea provided the Venezuelan officials with copies of certain items in the collection. Shortly after, the Venezuelan officials allegedly arranged for a meeting with Devengoechea in Orlando to examine the collec- tion and negotiate its purchase. During this meeting, the officials asked Devengoechea to bring the collection to Venezuela to con- tinue negotiations. The officials and Devengoechea orally agreed to have the collection inspected in Venezuela, and after the inspec- tion, the officials would either purchase the collection or return it to Devengoechea in Orlando. In Venezuela, the officials informed Devengoechea that they needed more time to examine the collection. So Deven- goechea left the collection in Venezuela with the officials and re- turned to the United States. Ultimately, Venezuela neither paid De- vengoechea for the collection nor returned it to him. Devengoechea sued Venezuela under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1602–1611, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Because Venezuela failed to appear in the case, the clerk entered a default, the district court held a bench trial on damages, and the district court entered a default judgment against Venezuela. Then Venezuela appeared. At Devengoechea’s request, the district court vacated the clerk’s default and default judgment, and it allowed Venezuela to respond to the complaint. Venezuela even- tually moved to dismiss the operative complaint for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction, among other grounds. The district court USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 4 of 38 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10029 denied Venezuela’s motion, Venezuela appealed, and we affirmed. See Devengoechea I, 889 F.3d at 1217. On remand, Venezuela filed a motion to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds and for summary judgment. While the mo- tion was pending, a regime change occurred in Venezuela, and Ven- ezuela’s counsel withdrew from the case. Eventually, the district court denied Venezuela’s motion. The district court then set several pretrial deadlines and filing requirements that Venezuela failed to meet. The district court noted that “[t]his alone would [have] be[en] an appropriate ground for granting a default against . . . Ven- ezuela, and a ruling in favor of . . . Devengoechea, on liability.” But because Devongoechea “stated he prefer[red] to prove his case,” the district court “allowed the matter to proceed to trial on the merits.” Although Devengoechea notified Venezuela of the bench trial date, Venezuela did not appear at trial. Notwithstanding Ven- ezuela’s absence at trial, the district court ruled in favor of Deven- goechea on the merits and awarded him a $17,128,630.10 judg- ment. Soon thereafter, counsel for Venezuela appeared again, and this appeal followed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review the district court’s grant of a default judgment for abuse of discretion.” Giovanno v. Fabec, 804 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sanderford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 902 F.2d 897, 898 (11th Cir. 1990)). USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 5 of 38 24-10029 Opinion of the Court 5 III. DISCUSSION Venezuela argues that Devengoechea should have pro- ceeded with a default due to Venezuela’s absence, “pursuant to the procedural and substantive protections of Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and [section] 1608(e) of the FSIA.” We agree. Our discussion proceeds in two parts. We first explain why the proper resolution of this case was a default judgment under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Then we explain that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides the procedural mechanism to obtain a default judgment under section 1608(e). A. Default Judgment Under the FSIA “To sue a foreign sovereign in the courts of the United States, plaintiffs must follow the strictures of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),” which is “the comprehensive stat- ute that . . . supplies the ground rules for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country.” Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 145 S. Ct. 480, 486, 488 (2025) (citation modified). As the source of jurisdiction, the FSIA “must be applied by the district courts in every action against a foreign sovereign.” Argentine Repub- lic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434–35 (1989) (cita- tion modified). This case concerns the FSIA’s mechanism to obtain a default judgment against a foreign state, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e): No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United States or of a State against a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an agency or USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 6 of 38 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10029 instrumentality of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence sat- isfactory to the court. A copy of any such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign state or political subdivision in the manner prescribed for service in this section. Like many of the FSIA’s provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) is modeled after one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compania Intera- mericana Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “[s]ection 1608(e) is modeled after [Rule 55(d)], which similarly protects the federal government from default judgments based solely upon procedural defaults”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment (noting the stylistic changes that renumbered the for- mer Rule 55(e) as Rule 55(d)). We previously discussed the rationale supporting Rule 55(d) in Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 490–92 (5th Cir. 1962). As we then held, Rule 55(d) is limited to cases of “inaction” because it “rests on the rationale that the taxpayers at large should not be sub- jected to the cost of a judgment entered as a penalty against a gov- ernment official which comes as a windfall to the individual liti- gant.” Campbell, 307 F.2d at 491. Relying on Campbell, we applied Rule 55(d)’s rationale to interpret the FSIA’s default judgment pro- vision in Compania, where we explained that “Congress intended [section] 1608(e) to provide foreign states protection from USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 7 of 38 24-10029 Opinion of the Court 7 unfounded default judgments rendered solely upon a procedural default.” 88 F.3d at 950–51. In Compania, the plaintiffs sued Dominicana, an airline cor- poration wholly owned by the government of the Dominican Re- public. Id. at 949. Dominicana appeared in the action and re- sponded to the complaint. Id. But due to political unrest, manage- ment changes, and financial difficulties, Dominicana failed to com- ply with the district court’s orders and its counsel withdrew due to non-payment of legal fees. Id. at 949–50. Because of Dominicana’s noncompliance, the district court entered default against Domini- cana, directed the plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment, and set a response deadline for Dominicana. Id. at 950. Once the plaintiffs moved for default judgment, counsel for Dominicana re- appeared to set aside the entry of default. Id. Nonetheless, the “dis- trict court entered a final default judgment, citing Dominicana’s ‘failure to obtain . . . counsel and . . . failure to comply with [the] Court’s discovery orders.’” Id. Dominicana moved for relief from the default judgment, but the district court denied its motion and its motion to set aside the entry of default. Id. Dominicana ap- pealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in refus- ing to set aside the entry of default under Rule 55(c) and failed to follow 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) in entering a default judgment. Id. On appeal, we affirmed the denial of the motion to set aside the entry of default, finding that default was properly entered due to Dominicana’s repeated noncompliance with the district court’s orders. Id. at 952. But we vacated the default judgment because the USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 8 of 38 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10029 district court did not consider the “differing standard required by [section] 1608(e) prior to its entry of default judgment against Do- minicana.” Id. at 951. Because “a default judgment governed by [section] 1608(e) must be treated differently than an ordinary de- fault judgment . . . the claimant must ‘establish his claim or right to relief,’ and must do so by ‘evidence satisfactory to the court.’” Id. More specifically, the plaintiffs were “required to establish entitle- ment to relief by providing satisfactory evidence as to each element of the claims upon which relief was sought.” Id. Since the plaintiffs did not satisfy that requirement, we remanded the case so that the district court could properly apply section 1608(e). Id. Compania governs the outcome here. First, we must adhere to the FSIA because this is an action against a foreign state. Argen- tine Republic, 488 U.S. at 434–35. As in Compania, the foreign state —here, Venezuela—appeared in the action below, responded to the complaint, and subsequently failed to comply with the district court’s orders. 88 F.3d at 949–50. Once Venezuela failed to comply, it was arguably in default. At that point, to seek relief against Ven- ezuela, Devengoechea should have sought a default judgment un- der the FSIA. B. Procedures To Obtain a Default Judgment Under the FSIA The FSIA requires “evidence satisfactory to the court” be- fore entering a default judgment, but it does not otherwise estab- lish a procedure for obtaining a default judgment. Id. at 950. That is where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure come into play. See Compania, 88 F.3d at 950–52 (discussing Rule 55 in the context of USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 9 of 38 24-10029 Opinion of the Court 9 an FSIA default judgment). But importantly, the FSIA does not limit the triggering event for those procedures in any way. Section 1608(e) governs any circumstance that would trigger a default judgment against a foreign state. Rule 55 sets forth the process for obtaining a default judg- ment. First, the district court must enter a party’s default upon a triggering event. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Although Rule 55(a) speaks specifically of a “fail[ure] to plead or otherwise defend,” sec- tion 1608(e) does not limit default judgments to this triggering event. The purpose of entering the default is to place the defaulting party on formal notice that a triggering event has occurred. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) (authorizing a motion to set aside an entry of de- fault). Additionally, “[a]lthough Rule 55(a) contemplates that entry of default is a ministerial step to be performed by the clerk of court . . . a district judge also possesses the inherent power to enter a default.” City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation modified). Following the entry of default, a party may seek entry of a default judgment by the clerk, Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1), or by the district court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Rule 55(b)(1) and Rule 55(b)(2)). Because Devengoechea’s claims were not for a sum certain, Rule 55(b)(2) applies. See id. at 1231. It provides, in part, that if the district court intends to hold a hearing and the “party against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared person- ally or by a representative,” that party must receive “written notice USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 10 of 38 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10029 of the application” for a default judgment at least seven days before such a hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). In this case, Venezuela’s counsel withdrew, and it did not subsequently comply with the district court’s pretrial orders. At that point, Venezuela was likely in default, and if Devengoechea wished to proceed against Venezuela in absentia, he was required to follow Rule 55’s procedures for seeking a default judgment. Yet neither the clerk nor the court entered a default under Rule 55(a), and Devengoechea did not apply to the district court for a default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2). Although the record indicates that Devengoechea notified Venezuela of the trial date, Devengoechea failed to provide the notice that Rule 55(b)(2) requires prior to the district court’s proceeding to default judgment. Notably, Deven- goechea did follow Rule 55 in securing an earlier default judgment against Venezuela that he later agreed to vacate. If Devengoechea had followed Rule 55 once more, Vene- zuela would have received notice of the potential default at least seven days before any hearing and would have had an opportunity to contest the default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). While we may harbor doubts about what Venezuela would have done upon receiving such notice, those doubts do not defeat the requirement to provide the notice. See Compania, 88 F.3d at 950 (defaulting for- eign state reappeared with counsel upon plaintiffs’ motion for de- fault judgment to challenge the entry of default and default judg- ment). USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 11 of 38 24-10029 Opinion of the Court 11 Devengoechea argues that a “[d]efendant who participated pretrial in pleadings, motions, and discovery is not in ‘default’ for not attending trial.” To support this, Devengoechea quotes lan- guage from Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir. 1986), and Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949). As to Solaroll, that case did not involve a default judgment or a trial. 803 F.2d at 1131. Rather, the case in- volved the denial of a motion to vacate a reinstatement order. Id. at 1134 (noting that “the reinstatement order was not a default judgment within the meaning of Rule 55”). And while Solaroll re- lied upon Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1981), the Court in Seven Elves specifically stated that it was avoiding an- swering the question of whether the judgment at issue was a de- fault judgment because the case could be decided under Rule 60(b). Id. at 400–01. The Court’s discussions of Rule 55 in those cases are dicta because they were “not necessary to deciding the case[s].” United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Because we are not bound to follow dicta, we need not consider Devengoechea’s reliance on Solaroll. See John- son v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 132 F.4th 1309, 1315 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Johnson v. Dixon, 146 S. Ct. 314 (2025). Bass is a closer case. 172 F.2d at 210. Devengoechea reads Bass to find that the alleged default judgment in that case was im- proper because the defendant had filed an earlier answer to the plaintiff’s claims. Under Devengoechea’s reading, default judg- ment in this case would be improper because Venezuela filed an answer to his claims. Likewise, much of the dissent is spent USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 12 of 38 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10029 explaining why, in the dissent’s view, Bass was correctly decided. But that issue is not before us. We assume, without deciding, that Bass governs default judgments in the normal course of litigation. But this case does not arise out of the normal course of litigation. This is an FSIA case. Bass was decided before the FSIA was enacted, so it could not have accounted for the circumstances that could lead to a default judg- ment under the FSIA. And we see no reason to import Bass into this entirely different context. The dissent states that “Rule 55 is Rule 55, whether in an FSIA case or any other type of civil case.” We disagree. Nothing in the FSIA’s default provision limits its applicability to a single trig- gering event—it speaks only of “judgment by default.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). A myriad of circumstances may lead to default judg- ment—including, as the dissent notes, the failure to plead or de- fend, Rule 37, and the district court’s inherent powers. 1 We hold that any triggering event that would lead to a default judgment, in name or effect, against a foreign state is governed by section 1 The dissent does not clearly explain what it believes should happen when a district court uses its inherent powers to enter a default judgment. But the dissent cites both Compania and Eagle Hospital Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consult- ing, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2009), for the proposition, and a review of the dockets in both cases confirms that the district courts properly followed the notice procedures of Rule 55. That is our prescription under the FSIA as well. USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 13 of 38 24-10029 Opinion of the Court 13 1608(e). 2 And before a district court can enter a default judgment against that foreign state, it must follow the procedural require- ments of Rule 55. Our most relevant precedent is Compania, which specifically considered default judgment under the FSIA and the policy reasons underlying the statutory provision. In Compania, despite the for- eign state’s earlier answer to the plaintiffs’ claims, this Court af- firmed the entry of default based on the failure to follow court or- ders and directed the district court to follow section 1608(e) before entering a default judgment under the FSIA. 88 F.3d at 951–52. We will do the same. A final note in conclusion: Even if Devengoechea had fol- lowed the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) and Rule 55, the de- fault judgment proceedings would still have been deficient. Section 1608(e) required Devengoechea to “establish entitlement to relief by providing satisfactory evidence as to each element of the claims upon which relief was sought.” Id. at 951. This requirement “pro- vide[s] foreign states protection from unfounded default judgments rendered solely upon a procedural default.” Id. at 950–51. The 2 The dissent faults us for “offer[ing] no reason why a district court cannot try a civil defendant in absentia when the litigant ceases to defend the case.” But notably, the dissent cites no statute or precedent that provides for a trial in absentia in an FSIA case. As previously discussed, by enacting the FSIA, Con- gress provided a comprehensive scheme for litigation involving foreign states. See Republic of Hungary, 145 S. Ct. at 488. The FSIA does not provide for trials in absentia. It does provide for default judgments in section 1608(e), and that provision covers the litigation before the district court in this case. USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 14 of 38 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10029 record in this case does not reflect that the district court considered section 1608(e) at all. As such, the record would be insufficient to allow us to assess whether the district court abused its discretion in doing so, and we would nonetheless remand the case to allow the district court to consider section 1608(e)’s requirements. IV. CONCLUSION Devengoechea failed to comply with section 1608(e) of the FSIA and the procedural requirements of Rule 55. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by entering judgment against Venezuela. We therefore VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 15 of 38 24-10029 ROSENBAUM, J., Dissenting 1 ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I would affirm the judgment of the district court. The Ma- jority Opinion reaches the opposite conclusion only because, most respectfully, it confuses three distinct concepts: (1) Rule 55, Fed. R. Civ. P., defaults; (2) defaults under a district court’s inherent pow- ers; and (3) in absentia trials after proper notice to the absent party. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), the clerk of court “must” enter default against a party only if that party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” In Bass v. Hoagland, our predecessor Court held that failure to “otherwise defend” means only failure to defend at the pleading stage. 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949). 1 So under Bass, once the proceedings pass the pleading stage, Rule 55(a) de- fault is off the table. Bass means the district court here can’t engage in Rule 55’s default procedure on remand because the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela “otherwise defend[ed]” when it moved to dismiss. So no Rule 55 default ever even arguably occurred here. In contrast, under its inherent powers, a district court can enter default judgment against a party at any time in the litiga- tion—even after the pleading stage. But to do so, the court must find that the party acted in bad faith. Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). 1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted decisions of the Fifth Circuit handed down by the close of business on September 30, 1981, as binding precedent. USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 16 of 38 2 ROSENBAUM, J., Dissenting 24-10029 Then we have in absentia trials. They fill the remaining space—when a party fails to respond to the court after the pleading stage but the court cannot (or chooses not to) make a finding of bad faith. Once the parties have passed the pleading stage, the issue has been joined, 2 so as I’ve explained, the court cannot enter a Rule 55 default judgment. Bass, 172 F.2d at 209–10; Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir. 1986). Indeed, we’ve said, at that point, “Rule 55 is inapplica- ble.” Solaroll, 803 F.2d at 1134. The proper procedure then requires trial after appropriate notice to the defendant. See Bass, 172 F.2d at 210; Solaroll, 803 F.2d at 1134. Here, the case had passed the pleading stage, so Rule 55 de- fault was not an option. That left either inherent-powers default or in absentia trial, given the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s fail- ure to respond to the district court’s orders. Perhaps because the district court did not think it appropriate to find bad faith, the court expressly said that it “did not hold [the Bolivarian Republic of Ven- ezuela] in default but treated the trial as a full trial on the merits where [Devengoechea] bore all evidentiary burdens.” And after holding that trial, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law determining that Devengoechea had established his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Venezuela has not shown that the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous or that the district court erred in determining Devengoechea had 2 See Joinder of Issue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 17 of 38 24-10029 ROSENBAUM, J., Dissenting 3 established each of the elements of his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. So I would affirm the district court’s ruling. The Majority Opinion offers no reason why a district court cannot try a civil defendant in absentia when the litigant ceases to defend the case. And it doesn’t explain how—despite binding prec- edent to the contrary—a judgment following that type of trial is a default judgment. Instead, the Majority Opinion vacates the district court’s judgment because it says that the district court failed to comply with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (“FSIA”) default pro- vision, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e), which in turn incorporates the default provisions of Rule 55, Fed. R. Civ. P. But as I’ve explained, the court never entered default in this case; it entered judgment based on its factual findings and conclusions of law after Devengoechea proved his case at trial. So the FSIA’s default provision does not apply here. Nor, as the Majority Opinion asserts, does Compania Intera- mericana Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 1996), somehow alter this fact. In Compania, unlike here, the district court entered a default judgment. Not only that, but it did so based on its inherent powers, not on Rule 55. Because the district court here issued judgment for Devengoechea after trial—not on a default—Section 1608(e) and Compania do not apply. And in any case, the district court entered judgment for De- vengoechea only after it found he had proven all the elements of USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 18 of 38 4 ROSENBAUM, J., Dissenting 24-10029 his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. So even under Sec- tion 1608(e) of the FSIA, then, Devengoechea “establish[ed] enti- tlement to relief by providing satisfactory evidence as to each ele- ment of the claims upon which relief was sought.” Compania, 88 F.3d at 951. For these reasons, I would affirm. I divide my discussion into four substantive parts. Section I explains why the district court could not enter a Rule 55 default judgment in this case (and why, contrary to the Majority Opinion’s suggestion, it can’t do so on remand). Section II discusses inherent- powers defaults. It also shows why Compania, where the district court entered a default judgment under its inherent powers, is ir- relevant to the analysis here and doesn’t somehow invalidate Bass in FSIA cases. And Section III reviews why the district court did not err in holding trial in Venezuela’s absence and entering judg- ment for Devengoechea after trial. I. Contrary to the Majority Opinion’s suggestion, un- der binding Circuit precedent, the district court could not (and cannot on remand) enter a Rule 55 default judgment in this case because the parties had passed the pleading stage. Before I review what the district court did here, it’s im- portant to understand what the district court did not do. The dis- trict court did not enter a default judgment of any type. Nor could it have done so. And despite the Majority Opinion’s suggestion to USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 19 of 38 24-10029 ROSENBAUM, J., Dissenting 5 the contrary, the district court can’t enter a Rule 55 default judg- ment on remand. This section explains why. Bass, as well as Rule 55’s text and the structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit the availability of Rule 55’s default procedure to cases that haven’t yet passed the pleading stage. But this case has passed that stage. I begin my discussion with Rule 55’s text and the structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Then I show why Bass requires the conclusion that Rule 55 default is not an option when, as here, a party has already moved to dismiss. A. Rule 55’s text and the structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit the availability of Rule 55’s default proce- dure to cases that haven’t yet passed the pleading stage. Rule 55(a) requires the clerk of court to enter default against a party if that party “fail[s] to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After the clerk enters default, “[i]f the [party]’s claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation,” the clerk “must enter judgment for that amount and costs against a de- fendant” once the plaintiff presents an affidavit “showing the amount due.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). But sometimes, a party can’t show he’s due a sum certain. In that case, if the allegedly defaulting party “has appeared personally or by a representative,” the party seeking the default judgment must serve written notice on the de- faulting party at least seven days before the court conducts a hear- ing on the motion for default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 20 of 38 6 ROSENBAUM, J., Dissenting 24-10029 In either case, though—that is, whether a party seeking de- fault proceeds under Rule 55(b)(1) through the clerk or Rule 55(b)(2) through the district court itself—the clerk must have first correctly entered default under Rule 55(a). So it’s worth examining the circumstances under Rule 55(a) that require the clerk to enter default. As relevant here, the clerk must enter default only when the allegedly defaulting party has “failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). A “fail[ure] to plead” is easy enough to understand. Rule 7 identifies what “pleadings” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit. They include (1) a complaint; (2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim; (4) an answer to a crossclaim; (5) a third-party complaint; (6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and (7) if the court orders one, a reply to an answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). And other rules limit the con- tents and form of those pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8–15. As for “otherwise defend,” we commonly understand the verb “defend” to mean “[t]o do something to protect someone or something from attack.” Defend, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). And “otherwise” means “[i]n another case; in other circum- stances; if not; else.” Otherwise, Oxford English Dictionary Online, https://perma.cc/T3JT-9ZYZ. In construing these words together, of course, we must con- sider the phrase “otherwise defend” in its context. That’s so both because we don’t evaluate the meaning of words in a vacuum, and USCA11 Case: 24-10029 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 Page: 21 of 38 24-10029 ROSENBAUM, J., Dissenting 7 the word “otherwise,” by its nature, is comparative. So we ask what ways exist to “otherwise defend” compared to a responsive “plead[ing].” In Bass, we answered that question by saying “otherwise de- fend” means other defenses at the pleading stage. 172 F.2d at 210. Though we didn’t express our reasoning, in my view, the text of Rule 55(a) and the structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandated our answer. Start with the text of Rule 55(a). Again, that rule applies when a party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). So “has failed to” applies to both “plead” and “other- wise defend.” But “has failed to defend” is not the same thing as “has ceased to defend.” In the first case, a party hasn’t defended itself in any way; it has filed neither a responsive pleading nor a responsive motion. But in the second case—“has ceased to de- fend”—the party has defended itself at some point; it must have at least filed a responsive pleading or motion, and only after that, stopped defending. So the text “failed to defend” in Rule 55(a) re- flects the drafters’ intent to cover only failures to file responsive motions, in the absence of filing a responsive pleading, at the plead- ing s