Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0032-25 73 DUN ONE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOROTHY A. GOULD, a/k/a DOROTHY GOULD, VICKI M. WHEELDON, a/k/a VICKI WHEELDON, a/k/a VICKI MARIE TURNER-WHEELDON, individually and as co-executors for the ESTATE OF DOROTHY A. TURNER, deceased, JANICE VOGT and VICKI M. WHEELDON, a/k/a VICKI WHEELDON, a/k/a VICKI MARIE TURNER- WHEELDON, VICKI MARIE TURNER, individually and as co-trustees of the PAUL N. TURNER RESIDUARY TRUST, and GOULD HOLDINGS, LLC, Defendants-Respondents. ___________________________ Argued October 6, 2026 ‒ Decided November 19, 2026 Before Judges Rose and Bishop-Thompson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden County, Docket No. C- 000097-23. John M. Cinti argued the cause for appellant (Mintzer Sarowitz Zeris & Willis, LLC, attorneys; John M. Cinti, on the briefs). Carl Taylor argued the cause for respondents (Parker McCay, PA, attorneys; Michael E. Sullivan, on the brief). PER CURIAM This appeal arises from a dispute over a right of first refusal (ROFR) and testamentary transfer involving commercial premises (Premises) owned by defendants Estate of Dorothy A. Turner and Paul N. Turner Residuary Trust. Plaintiff 73 Dun One, Inc. is a tenant under a lease (Lease) that granted it an ROFR to purchase the Premises upon defendants' receipt of a bona fide written offer from a third-party. The Lease further obligated plaintiff to pay its proportionate share of the real estate taxes assessed against the Premises. Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing its amended complaint and granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Dorothy A. Gould, Vicki M. Wheeldon, Janice Vogt, Estate of Dorothy A. Turner, Paul N. Turner Residuary Trust, and Gould Holdings, LLC (collectively, defendants) and dismissing its 2 A-0032-25 amended complaint. 1 Plaintiff further appeals from the July 22, 2025 order fixing the amount of real estate taxes and prejudgment interest owed to defendants. Because we conclude there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding judgment as a matter of law under Rule 4:46-2(c), we affirm. We nevertheless remand for the limited purpose of directing the motion court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 1:7-4 concerning the outstanding real estate taxes and interests for years 2023 to 2025. I. We derive the following procedural history and relevant facts from the motion record, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the non-moving party. See R. 4:46-2(c); Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). Paul N. Turner and Dorothy A. Turner (collectively, the Turners) owned commercial property in Berlin Township. In May 1994, plaintiff executed the Lease with the Turners for the Premises, where it operated a franchise, then known as Dunkin' Donuts. Relevant to this appeal, Section 14.0 "Lessee's Right to Purchase" provides: 1 Because Paul and Dorothy Turner, as well as Dorothy and Joseph Gould, share the same surname, we refer to them by their first name for clarity. In doing so, we intend no disrespect. 3 A-0032-25 Lessor grants to LESSEE a right of first refusal to purchase the PREMISES at the same price and upon the same terms, provisions and conditions as shall be contained in any written bona fide offer for the purchase thereof which LESSOR shall at any time during the term of this LEASE, or any extension thereof, be ready and willing to accept, LESSOR shall give LESSEE written notice by certified mail and a complete copy of such bona fide offer, which includes all of the terms, provisions and conditions therein contained and LESSEE shall have thirty . . . days from and after the receipt of such notice from LESSOR in which to exercise such right. One or more waiver of LESSEE'S right to purchase the PREMISES under the terms of any such bona fide offer shall not constitute a waiver of LESSEE's right to receive notice and an opportunity to purchase the PREMISES under this paragraph, if the terms of such offer should thereafter be altered or with respect to any subsequent bona fide offer to LESSOR, its successor and assigns, during the remaining term of this LEASE. Paul died in July 2004. His one-half interest in the property passed to his residuary trust, and defendants Janice Vogt and Vicki Wheeldon were appointed co-trustees. Dorothy retained the remaining one-half interest and later executed a will. In November 2020, both Dorothy's estate and Paul's trust entered a lease purchase agreement with Gould Holdings for the commercial property and all existing leases thereon. Joseph, the company's owner and president, is the Turners' son. Plaintiff and the other tenants were notified the leases and 4 A-0032-25 management of the property had been assigned to Gould Holdings. Joseph certified, after plaintiff received that notice, he had several conversations with plaintiff's president regarding his new management of the property and its anticipated acquisition. Seven months later, Dorothy died, and defendants Dorothy Gould and Vicki Wheeldon were appointed co-executors of her estate. Dorothy's will directed: If, during my lifetime, I have not entered into a specific agreement with my son, Joseph R. Gould regarding my interest [in]. . . , I specifically direct my Executor to grant my son . . . , if he survives me, [or to any entity over which he has substantial control, . . . ], an option, exercisable for a period of six months following my death, to purchase any interest I may have in the real property located at . . . Berlin, New Jersey. The option price shall be the fair market value of such interest as finally determined for estate/inheritance tax purposes and shall be exercised by providing written notice to my Executor within such six-month period. At all times during this six-month period, my son shall have the exclusive control of the property. If my son elects to purchase my interest in the property then, within [ninety] days of providing the Executor with written notice of his intention to purchase such interest, settlement shall be held on the property. Plaintiff asserts it did not receive notice of the sale. However, the record shows Joseph notified plaintiff of his intent to obtain financing to close on the property, and he thereafter exercised his purchase option. In October 2021, 5 A-0032-25 Joseph applied for bank financing. The property was appraised at an "as-is" market value of $1,660,000. As a condition of financing, the bank required plaintiff, as tenant of the Premises, to execute a "Subordination, Non- Disturbance, and Attornment" (SNDA) agreement and an Estoppel Certification. Joseph emailed those documents to plaintiff's president, advising that he was "going to settlement Friday" to close on the property. The SNDA identified Gould Holdings as landlord and reflected the bank would hold a $900,000 note secured by a mortgage on the property. Joseph, plaintiff's president, and a bank representative participated in a conference call regarding the transfer of title to Gould Holdings and the president's required signature. Plaintiff's president subsequently emailed Joseph and the bank representative two notarized copies of the SNDA and estoppel certificate, stating he had secured approval to receive notarized copies following closing. Gould Holdings then purchased the property from Dorothy's estate and Paul's trust for $900,000. In April 2023, plaintiff's president notified Joseph it was exercising its rights under the Lease to all remaining lease extension and renewals. The president also expressed a desire to discuss a twenty-year lease extension beyond the extension identified in the Lease. 6 A-0032-25 In November 2003, the Berlin Township tax assessor apportioned the real estate taxes attributable to the Premises based on 2003 valuations, assigning $355,000 of the property's total assessed value of $875,000 to the Premises. Plaintiff paid $1,102.87 per month as its 40.57% contribution to the property's 2003 real estate tax bill. Despite the periodic increases in the property's value for the purpose of real estate taxes calculation and the increases in the amount levied on the property, plaintiff continued to pay only $1,102.87 from 2003 through a portion of 2023. The leased Premises was not assessed separately for tax purposes. Section 6.0 "Taxes" of the Lease stated: "In addition to the annual rent . . . , LESSEE agrees to pay, before interest and penalties accrue, all general real estate taxes which may be imposed on or become due and payable with respect to the premises during the term." Section 6.1. governs the calculation of taxes when such taxes are not separately assessed. Section 6.1.1. provides: [The taxes on the land] shall be equal to the product of the sum of the total taxes attributable to land (land assessments multiplied by the aggregates of tax rates of all taking authorities) multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which shall be the square footage of the PREMISES and the denominator of which shall be the square footage of all land assessed and including in the same tax bill as the PREMISES. . . . 7 A-0032-25 Section 6.1.3 applies to the assessment of the building on the PREMISES and provides: [The taxes] shall be determined by multiplying the total taxes attributable to all assessed improvement (including LESSEE's) by a fraction, the numerator of which shall be the square footage of floor space of LESSEE's building located on the premises and the denominator of which shall be the square footage of floor space of all structures existing . . . which shall have been assessed and included in the same tax bill as LESSEES's building. Between April and July 2023, Joseph and plaintiff's president engaged in numerous conversations and email exchanges concerning the tax underpayments. In July 2023, plaintiff ceased making payments to Gould Holdings. In its initial complaint, plaintiff asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, specific performance, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint expanding its factual allegations underlying those claims. Defendants answered, asserted various affirmative defenses, and counterclaimed for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing and a declaratory judgment concerning the underpayment of real estate taxes. 8 A-0032-25 Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, which was denied. Defendants then moved for summary judgment and filed an amended counterclaim, adding all named defendants as counterclaimants. Following argument, the motion court rendered an oral decision granting judgment in favor of defendants and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. A memorializing order was entered on April 4, 2025. Pursuant to the court's directive, defendants submitted a proposed order fixing the amount of taxes due for 2023 and 2024, together with supporting calculations for interest and square footage derived from the survey under sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.3, as well as prejudgment interest. Plaintiff filed objections and submitted alternative calculations based on the same survey and base tax assessment, but using revised survey dimensions and a different pre- judgment interest rate. On July 22, 2025, the motion court entered an order fixing the real estate taxes, together with prejudgment interest, owed by plaintiff to defendants. As to the 2023 tax year, the court directed plaintiff to remit to defendants $13,029.48, which consisted of $4,876.30 in taxes and $7,409.54 in pre- judgment interest. For the 2024 tax year, plaintiff was ordered to remit $24,020.81, which represented $11,867.04 for taxes and $12,153.77 in 9 A-0032-25 prejudgment interest. The court also directed plaintiff to bring its 2025 tax obligations current by remitting $8,408.09, which consisted of $6,922.44 for taxes and $2,089.10 in interest. On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, arguing a bona fide offer to purchase the commercial property existed and plaintiff did not waive its rights. We review de novo the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment. Christakos v. Badjis, 262 N.J. 447, 462 (2026). Under this standard, we "determine whether 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). In doing so, we give the non-moving party "the benefit of the most favorable evidence and most favorable inferences drawn from that evidence." Est. of Narleski v. Gomes, 244 N.J. 199, 205 (2020) (quoting Gormley v. Wood- El, 218 N.J. 72, 86 (2014)); see Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Thus, "[s]ummary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 10 A-0032-25 element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). "When no issue of fact exists, and only a question of law remains, this Court affords no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp., 224 N.J. at 199. Our review of the interpretation of a contract is de novo and guided by settled principles. Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 615 (2020). To that end, we begin with the contract's plain language. Id. at 615-16. In construing that language, we look to the parties' intent, the contract's express terms, the surrounding circumstances, and its underlying purpose. In re Cnty. of Atl., 230 N.J. 237, 254 (2017). Where "the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016). Courts enforce the contract the parties made; they do not rewrite it to make a better one. Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 342 (App. Div. 1999). Plaintiff's lease contained an ROFR and such term "limits the right of the [landlord] to dispose freely of his property by compelling him to offer it first to the party who has the first right to buy." St. George's Dragons, LP v. Newport 11 A-0032-25 Real Estate Grp., LLC, 407 N.J. Super. 464, 482 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Mazzeo v. Kartman, 234 N.J. Super. 223, 229 (App. Div. 1989)). "[T]he terms of a[n ROFR] are to be construed employing the same rules of construction applicable to any other type of contract." St. George's Dragons, LP, 407 N.J. Super. at 482. Here, the right in the 1994 lease was structured in contemplation of "any written bona fide offer" as the triggering event. "By its nature, a[n ROFR] is breached when the offeror accepts a third-party's offer without first offering to the holder of the [ROFR]." Mazzeo, 234 N.J. at 233. "Bona fide" offer has been defined as "made in good faith; without fraud or deceit" and "sincere; genuine." Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The parties have cited, and our research has not revealed, no controlling authority directly addressing this issue. In Glenn v. Seaview Country Club, the court held that the exercise of an option to purchase following a testamentary transfer did not trigger a right of first refusal. 154 N.J. Super. 69, 71-74 (Ch. Div. 1977). As we explained in Guaclides v. Kruse, a right of first refusal "as to a portion only of a tract may be exercised only if the owner determines to sell that portion for a separate consideration; and the attempted sale of the whole tract for a single price is no indication of an intention or desire to sell the portion alone." 67 N.J. Super. 348, 359 (App. Div. 1961). 12 A-0032-25 Our reading of the ROFR provision compels the conclusion plaintiff's right is triggered only upon the presentation of a bona fide written offer to purchase the Premises. The parties' intent, as expressed in the Lease, is clear and unambiguous; the provision applies only to the Premises, not the property as a whole. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, no bona fide offer was made for the Premises alone that would have triggered plaintiff's ROFR. We therefore reject plaintiff's contrary argument and conclude there are no material facts in dispute to hold defendants liable for contract claims and affirm the provision of the order granting summer judgment. Given this conclusion, the remainder of plaintiff's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). II. Plaintiff next contends the court erred in determining the amount of real estate taxes and prejudgment interest owed. The motion record reflects the parties were directed to calculate the taxes based on the square footage of the entire Premises. Notwithstanding the court's directive, plaintiff disputed and objected to defendants' calculations. There is no genuine dispute plaintiff is obligated to pay outstanding real estate taxes and prejudgment interest. The present record, however, does not 13 A-0032-25 reveal the Lease provision upon which the court relied or the methodology by which it calculated the amounts awarded. Accordingly, we remand for the limited purpose of directing the court to set forth adequate findings and conclusions of law, as required by Rule 1:7-4, consistent with this opinion. Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. 14 A-0032-25