Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT ACHIM GINSBERG-KLEMMT and ERIKA GINSBERG-KLEMMT, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. LAWRENCE POINTE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., and ASHFORD SARASOTA LP, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. No. 2D20-3302 April 1, 2022 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Hunter W. Carroll, Judge. John S. Koda of Brick Business Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Robert K. Robinson of Rob Robinson Attorney P.A., Sarasota, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant Lawrence Pointe Condominium Association, Inc. Shane T. Costello, Scott A. McLaren, and J. Logan Murphy (withdrew after briefing) of Hill Ward Henderson, Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant Ashford Sarasota LP. BLACK, Judge. Achim and Erika Ginsberg-Klemmt appeal and Lawrence Pointe Condominium Association, Inc., and Ashford Sarasota LP cross-appeal the final judgment entered by the trial court following a nonjury trial. We affirm the final judgment in all respects except with regard to an issue raised by both Lawrence Pointe and Ashford Sarasota in their cross-appeals. Because the trial court properly determined that the quitclaim deed did not convey the submerged land to SRQUS, LLC, and in turn that the submerged land could not thereafter have been conveyed from SRQUS to the Ginsberg- Klemmts, Lawrence Pointe's claims for declaratory relief (counts III and IV) and Ashford Sarasota's counterclaim for declaratory relief were not ripe for adjudication. See Ranucci v. City of Palmetto, 317 So. 3d 270, 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting Harris v. Aberdeen Prop. Owners Ass'n, 135 So. 3d 365, 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), for the conditions that must be met for a cause of action for declaratory relief to accrue). Though the trial court properly recognized that it could not adjudicate the merits of the claims and counterclaim seeking declaratory relief since they were contingent upon the 2 Ginsberg-Klemmts having an ownership interest in the submerged land, it improperly dismissed the claims and counterclaim seeking declaratory relief with prejudice. See Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Glisson, 286 So. 3d 942, 944 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ("The dismissal of a cause of action can either be with prejudice, same being an adjudication on the merits, or without prejudice, which is not an adjudication on the merits and is no bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action." (quoting Drady v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth., 193 So. 2d 201, 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966))); Smith v. St. Vil, 714 So. 2d 603, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (explaining that a dismissal with prejudice indicates that the claims were adjudicated on the merits). While no adverse interests currently exist among the parties, that could change if, for example, the quitclaim deed is reformed.1 Therefore, we reverse the final judgment only to the extent that it dismissed with prejudice Lawrence Pointe's two claims for declaratory relief (counts III and IV) and Ashford Sarasota's counterclaim for declaratory relief and remand for the trial court to 1 A reformation action is currently pending in the circuit court. 3 enter a judgment which designates the dismissals as being without prejudice. See Smith, 714 So. 2d at 605. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded. SILBERMAN, J., and CASE, JAMES R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 4