State v. Young

State of Maryland, et al., v. Michael Young, No. 27, September Term, 2025. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT – ENTRY OF JUDGMENT If State personnel committed a tortious act or omission within the scope of their public duties without malice or gross negligence, then the State personnel have immunity and judgment should be entered against the State, subject to the limitations on the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity in the Maryland Tort Claims Act. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT – INCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE – CAUSE TEST If a plaintiff proves that only a single negligent act or omission proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries or damages, there is only one incident or occurrence under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. If the plaintiff proves that multiple negligent acts or omissions proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries or damages, there may be a single incident or occurrence if the acts or omissions are continuous or repeated, are causally related, give rise to the same risk, or act concurrently to produce the same injury. Multiple negligent acts or omissions may result in multiple incidents or occurrences if the acts or omissions are not causally related, introduce different risks, and operate separately to produce injury or damages. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT – INCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE – JURY DETERMINATION In a case tried before a jury, the trial court may not find multiple incidents or occurrences for the purposes of applying the limitation on the State’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act unless the jury has expressly or necessarily found that multiple negligent acts were non-concurrent proximate causes of the plaintiff’s injuries or damages. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – LONGTIN PATTERN-OR-PRACTICE CLAIMS – MOOTNESS An issue is moot if the Appellate Court determines that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to prevail on the claim and the plaintiff does not contest that determination on appeal. Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. C-03-CV-20-004543 Argued: November 4, 2025 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 27 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ STATE OF MARYLAND, ET AL. v. MICHAEL YOUNG ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Fader, C.J. ______________________________________ Filed: June 23, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.06.23 16:30:20 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  Michael Young, the respondent, suffered serious injuries when other incarcerated individuals attacked him while he was incarcerated at Maryland Correctional Training Center. He sued Sergeant Jeremy Wright, Warden Richard Dovey, and the State of Maryland, among others, for damages. A jury found Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey negligent and awarded Mr. Young $1,000,000 in damages against each of them. The jury also found the State liable for engaging in or allowing a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct by its employees, as set forth in Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450 (2011), and awarded Mr. Young $2,000,000 on that claim. On a post-trial motion, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County declined to reduce or vacate any of the awards. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland held that the awards against the individual defendants should have been reduced to a combined $800,000 to comply with the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 12-104 & 12-105 (Repl. 2021; Supp. 2025); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522 (Repl. 2020; Supp. 2025). The Appellate Court also vacated the judgment against the State on the Longtin claim. The court held that Longtin pattern-or-practice claims may be brought against the State, but that Mr. Young had failed to present sufficient evidence for the jury to find in his favor on that claim. This appeal presents three issues for our resolution. The first two concern the MTCA, in which the State partially waived its sovereign immunity as to certain torts committed by State personnel acting within the scope of their public duties without malice or gross negligence, and simultaneously granted State personnel immunity for such torts. The State’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the MTCA is generally limited to $400,000 for each “incident or occurrence” that causes injury. The first issue is whether the circuit court erred in entering judgment against the individual defendants, Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey, in the absence of a finding that they acted with malice or gross negligence. We hold that the circuit court erred. Absent a finding of malice or gross negligence, or that the individual defendants’ actions were outside the scope of their duty, a judgment in an action covered by the MTCA may be entered against only the State. The second issue presented concerns the number of “incidents or occurrences” in question, which in turn determines the limits applicable to Mr. Young’s damages. We hold that the circuit court erred in not reducing the verdict to $400,000 to reflect a single incident or occurrence. Under the “cause” test, which we have applied to claims under the Local Government Tort Claims Act and now adopt with respect to the MTCA, the number of incidents or occurrences depends on the number of non-concurrently acting tortious acts or omissions that proximately cause injuries or damages. Here, Mr. Young’s claim of two incidents or occurrences is premised on his contention that Sgt. Wright engaged in two independent tortious acts, each of which was the proximate cause of a separate attack. However, the jury was not asked whether Sgt. Wright engaged in more than one tortious act and so did not find that he did. Absent such a finding, the circuit court erred in not reducing the damages award to $400,000 to reflect a single incident or occurrence. 2  The third issue is whether plaintiffs may bring so-called “Longtin claims” against the State. A Longtin claim alleges liability of a governmental entity for engaging in or allowing a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct by its employees. In Longtin, we held that plaintiffs may bring these claims against local governments. Here, the Appellate Court held that such a claim also may be brought against the State, but that Mr. Young had not presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find in his favor on that claim. As Mr. Young did not challenge the sufficiency holding, the issue of whether a Longtin claim against the State was viable is moot before this Court. Rather than allow Mr. Young’s concession of the ultimate merits of his Longtin claim to effectively insulate from this Court’s review the determination that such claims may be brought against the State, we will vacate the Appellate Court’s opinion to the extent it addresses the viability of a Longtin claim against the State. Accordingly, we will partially reverse and partially vacate the judgment of the Appellate Court. BACKGROUND A. Statutory Background Sovereign immunity is an “absolute immunity,” State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317, 347 (2021), that is “[g]rounded in ancient common law,” Condon v. State of Maryland-Univ. of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 492 (1993). Sovereign immunity “prohibits suits against the State or its entities absent its consent.” Magnetti v. Univ. of Maryland, 402 Md. 548, 557 (2007). It is “one of the highest attributes of sovereignty[.]” Katz v. Washington Suburban 3 Sanitary Comm’n, 284 Md. 503, 512 (1979) (quoting Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 288-89 (1932)). Sovereign immunity may be waived only “directly or by necessary implication.” Katz, 284 Md. at 507-08. “[T]o avoid weakening the doctrine of sovereign immunity by judicial fiat,” Stern v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. Sys. of Maryland, 380 Md. 691, 720 (2004), waivers of sovereign immunity “are strictly construed in favor of the State,” Brawner Builders, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 476 Md. 15, 32 (2021). Because sovereign immunity may be waived only through an act of the General Assembly, it may not be waived by a party to a suit, and therefore can be asserted as a defense “at any time, even ‘for the first time on appeal.’” Bd. of Educ. of Worcester County v. Beka Indus., Inc., 190 Md. App. 668, 691 (2010) (quoting Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. ARA Health Servs., 107 Md. App. 445, 459 (1995)), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 419 Md. 194 (2011). The MTCA contains a partial waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity for certain tort claims brought in a Maryland court. The waiver applies to tortious acts committed by State personnel acting within the scope of their public duties without malice or gross negligence, up to a monetary limit. State Gov’t § 12-104; Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522. For most claims, including those at issue here, that limit is $400,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single “incident or occurrence.” State Gov’t § 12-104(a)(2); Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a)(5). As originally enacted in 1981, the scope of the State’s partial waiver of immunity was further limited “to the extent and in the amount that the State is covered by a program of insurance established by the Treasurer[.]” 1981 Md. Laws, Ch. 4 298, at 1611. The Treasurer now provides coverage for tort judgments through a self- insurance program. See Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) 25.02.02.02A; Md. State Treasurer, Insurance, https://treasurer.state.md.us/insurance/, archived at https://perma.cc/UX3E-LAPW. In partially waiving the State’s sovereign immunity for certain tort actions committed by State personnel, the General Assembly granted corresponding immunity to those State personnel. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b) (“State personnel . . . are immune from suit in courts of the State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the State or its units have waived immunity under [the MTCA], even if the damages exceed the limits of that waiver.”). In essence, in enacting the MTCA, the General Assembly substituted the State, up to the limit of its partial waiver, for its personnel as the responsible party for the torts the MTCA covers. See Williams v. Morgan State Univ., 484 Md. 534, 542-44 (2023). For torts that do not fall within the scope of the MTCA waiver, the State personnel remain responsible and subject to individual liability, and the State retains its sovereign immunity. Id. B. Factual Background 1 0F The events underlying this lawsuit arose while Mr. Young was incarcerated at Maryland Correctional Training Center. He had previously been transferred out of that 1 “We review a grant or denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for legal correctness, by ‘viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 5 facility after reporting that an officer sexually harassed him, but was later transferred back. Shortly after his return, Mr. Young’s cellmate attacked him, purportedly based on orders from a corrections officer. Mr. Young believed that the attack was in retaliation for his sexual harassment claim. After the attack, Mr. Young submitted a formal complaint, called an Administrative Remedy Procedure, in which he stated that he feared for his life. Applicable regulations required that the person receiving the complaint acknowledge receipt, and that the complaint be reviewed and, if necessary, investigated within 15 days. COMAR 12.02.28.08(E)(2), (3). Mr. Young never received an acknowledgement of receipt. Worried that officers had discarded his complaint without submitting it, he asked his wife to send a letter to the warden of the facility, Richard Dovey, outlining his safety concerns. According to Warden Dovey’s correspondence log, he received the letter and assigned a lieutenant to investigate Mr. Young’s concerns. However, the section of the correspondence log for documenting the results of the investigation was left blank, and in his testimony at trial, Warden Dovey had no memory of any investigation. On the day of the events in question, Sergeant Jeremy Wright was the tier officer for Housing Unit 6-B, where Mr. Young resided. Tier officers are responsible for from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determining whether the facts and circumstances only permit one inference with regard to the issue presented.’” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Varghese, 493 Md. 1, 11 (2025) (quoting Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 706 (2015)). We therefore present the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Young. 6 supervising and ensuring the safety of the incarcerated individuals on the tier. Housing Unit 6-B was comprised of one long hallway with cells on each side. As tier officer, Sgt. Wright had access to a panel at the head of the tier that controlled the locking and unlocking of cells. A locked metal grille separated the control panel from the tier. While at the panel, Sgt. Wright could see the entire hallway. At the beginning of recreation periods, the tier officer unlocks all cell doors on the tier from the panel. Incarcerated individuals can choose to go to the recreation hall, located to the right of the control panel, or stay inside their cells. Once the individuals who choose to go to the recreation hall have left their cells, the tier officer is supposed to close and re- lock the cell doors. On the day in question, Sgt. Wright opened the cell doors at the beginning of the recreation period. Mr. Young elected to stay in his cell. After some of the incarcerated individuals left for the recreation hall and no one remained in the hallway, Sgt. Wright closed and locked all cell doors. A few minutes later, Mr. Young’s cell door opened again, and a group of “around four or five” men rushed in and attacked him with knives and a combination lock tied inside of a sock. The attack lasted for a minute or two. Mr. Young eventually escaped from his cell into the tier hallway. From the control panel, Sgt. Wright observed a bloodied Mr. Young walking towards him. 2 After making 1F 2 At trial, Sgt. Wright denied closing and re-opening the cell doors. He testified that he saw Mr. Young walking down the hallway “a minute or two” after he opened the cell doors for the first time. 7 eye contact with Sgt. Wright, Mr. Young walked into the recreation hall. Sgt. Wright called out Mr. Young’s name, but Mr. Young did not respond. Sgt. Wright stayed behind the grille because he did not believe the situation was safe for him to enter alone. He eventually called for assistance. 3 2F As Mr. Young opened the door to the recreation hall, multiple people pulled him into the bathroom area and attacked him, this time without weapons. Mr. Young could not identify whether these attackers were the same people who had attacked him in his cell. Sgt. Wright could partially see into the bathroom during the attack because the partition separating the bathroom from the rest of the area was about mid-waist high. He did not intervene during this attack because he was still waiting for “the appropriate amount of staff” to arrive to ensure his safety. Mr. Young estimated that the attack in the recreation hall lasted approximately a minute and a half, and ended when officers arrived and the attackers “just stopped.” Mr. Young then walked out of the recreation hall and saw several officers. 4 He was taken 3F 3 Sgt. Wright’s logbook indicates that he opened the cell doors at 12:30 p.m. and that he called for help at 12:45 p.m. However, Sgt. Wright testified that he initially saw Mr. Young “1 to 2 minutes after 12:30,” he called for assistance immediately, and the recreation hall attack was over by “12:33, 12:35.” Sgt. Wright testified that the gap in the logbook reflected the time it took him to make the logbook entry, not the time it took him to call for assistance. 4 Sgt. Wright testified that Mr. Young had returned to the grille before staff arrived. The record is unclear whether the officers arrived before Mr. Young left the recreation hall or afterwards. 8 to the hospital, where he was treated for seventeen stab wounds and two facial bone fractures. C. Procedural Background Mr. Young filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against Sgt. Wright, Warden Dovey, and the State of Maryland, among others. He asserted that: (1) the defendants violated his rights under Articles 16, 24, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; (2) the State was liable for permitting a “pattern and practice” of unconstitutional conduct by its employees under Longtin; and (3) the State and Warden Dovey were liable for negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision; negligence and gross negligence; and battery. A jury found both Warden Dovey and Sgt. Wright liable for negligence and awarded Mr. Young $1,000,000 in damages against each. The jury also found for Mr. Young on the Longtin pattern-or-practice claim and awarded $2,000,000 in damages against the State. The jury found for the defendants on all other counts. The trial court entered judgment against Sgt. Wright for $1,000,000, Warden Dovey for $1,000,000, and the State for $2,000,000. The defendants filed a post-trial motion requesting a new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a reduction in the judgment. The defendants argued that the circuit court erred in submitting the Longtin pattern-or-practice claim to the jury because the State is not subject to such a claim. Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey also contended that because the jury found that they had not acted with malice or 9 gross negligence, the circuit court erred in entering judgment against them. Finally, the defendants argued that if they were not awarded a new trial, the judgment must be reduced to $400,000 in conformance with the MTCA. Mr. Young opposed the motion. On the request to reduce the judgment, Mr. Young conceded the application of the MTCA’s $400,000 limitation per “incident or occurrence.” He contended, however, that there were two separate incidents or occurrences because he was attacked twice: once in his cell and once in the recreation hall. Accordingly, he argued that the negligence judgment against the individual defendants should be reduced from $1,000,000 to $800,000, not $400,000. 5 Notwithstanding Mr. Young’s partial concession, 4F the circuit court denied the defendants’ motion in its entirety without explanation. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part and reversed in part. State v. Young, 265 Md. App. 1, 39 (2025). As relevant here, the Appellate Court affirmed the negligence judgments entered against Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey, although it recognized that they are immune from tort liability and stated that the judgment should be “enforceable against the State.” Id. at 10. With respect to the number of incidents or occurrences, in the absence of any finding in the trial court on that issue, the Appellate Court conducted its own review of the record. Id. at 38-39. The court held that, based on the evidence at trial, the attack in the cell and the attack in the recreation hall constituted 5 Mr. Young took the position that his $2,000,000 judgment against the State for the Longtin pattern-or-practice claim was not subject to the MTCA limitation. Given the Appellate Court’s disposition of the Longtin claim, which Mr. Young has not opposed, that issue is not before us. 10 two separate incidents or occurrences. Id. As a result, the court concluded that the State’s total liability based on the negligence of the individual defendants was $800,000. Id. at 37-39. Finally, the Appellate Court held that Longtin claims may be brought against the State, id. at 19, but that Mr. Young had failed to present sufficient evidence to support a verdict in his favor on that claim, id. at 31. It therefore reversed the judgment on that claim. Id. The defendants petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. State v. Young, 491 Md. 629 (2025). The issues presented in this appeal are: (1) whether the circuit court erred in entering judgment against Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey individually; (2) whether the judgment against the State should have been limited to $400,000, for a single incident or occurrence, or $800,000, for two incidents or occurrences; and (3) whether a Longtin pattern-or-practice claim can be maintained against the State. Mr. Young did not cross-petition or otherwise challenge the Appellate Court’s Longtin sufficiency judgment. DISCUSSION I. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial under the abuse of discretion standard. Williams v. State, 462 Md. 335, 344 (2019). We review denials of motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for legal correctness, while viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” here Mr. Young. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Varghese, 493 Md. 1, 11 (2025) (quoting Cooper v. 11 Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 706 (2015)). All three issues in this appeal present questions of law that we review without deference. State v. Robertson, 463 Md. 342, 351 (2019). II. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST SGT. WRIGHT AND WARDEN DOVEY We first address whether the circuit court erred in entering judgment against Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey individually. The parties agree that, under the MTCA, the circuit court should have entered judgment against only the State. We agree as well. When State personnel commit a tort, either the State or the State personnel may be liable under the MTCA, but never both. See Williams v. Morgan State Univ., 484 Md. 534, 544 (2023) (“[L]iability of the State and liability of individual State personnel are mutually exclusive. If the State is liable, the individual is immune; if the individual is liable, the State is immune.” (quoting Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 635 (2009))). If the negligent State personnel are found to have acted within the scope of their public duties without malice or gross negligence, then they are immune, and the State is liable, subject to the limitations of its waiver. Rodriguez v. Cooper, 458 Md. 425, 451-52 (2018) (stating that in that circumstance, “the MTCA substitutes the State for the State personnel as the appropriate defendant in such an action”); State Gov’t § 12-104(a); Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b). But if the State personnel are found to have acted outside the scope of their public duties or with malice or gross negligence, then the State personnel are liable, and the State retains its sovereign immunity in full. 6 Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a)(4), (b). 5F In this respect, the MTCA diverges from the Local Government Tort Claims Act. 6 Under that Act, if a factfinder determines that local government personnel acted with 12  Here, the State, Sgt. Wright, and Warden Dovey were all proper defendants through trial. The State was a proper defendant because Mr. Young alleged that Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey acted with negligence and in the scope of their public duties. Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey were also proper defendants because Mr. Young also alleged that they acted with malice and gross negligence. In rendering its verdict, the jury concluded that Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey acted only negligently, not with malice or gross negligence. Based on that finding, which has not been challenged on appeal, Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey were immune from liability pursuant to § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and only the State was liable to Mr. Young. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in entering judgment against Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey. On remand, the circuit court should vacate the judgments against the individual defendants and enter judgment against the State. III. THE NUMBER OF “INCIDENTS OR OCCURRENCES” The State’s partial waiver of sovereign immunity under the MTCA is limited to “$400,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence.” State Gov’t § 12-104(a)(2)(i); see Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a)(5) (stating that the State’s immunity “is not waived” for “[a] claim by an individual arising from a single incident or occurrence that exceeds the amount specified in § 12-104 of the State Government Article”). The question presented in this appeal—whether Mr. Young’s claim against the malice, both the local government and its personnel are liable. See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 49 (1999) (citing Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 5-302(b), 5-303(b)). 13 State consists of one incident or occurrence, or two—seems simple. The answer is more complicated. To reach it, we must explore the meaning of “incident or occurrence” in the context of the MTCA. In doing so, we will consider how courts have addressed similar questions in the related field of insurance and under analogous tort claims statutes. A. The Meaning of “Incident or Occurrence” in the MTCA Context 1. The “Cause” Test The MTCA does not define “incident” or “occurrence.” COMAR defines “incident” as “an act or omission of State personnel that constitutes an alleged tort under the [MTCA] and is alleged to have caused injury, loss, or damage to person or property by reason of a single occurrence.” COMAR 25.02.01.02B(3). The regulation does not separately define “occurrence.” Although we have not had occasion to consider how to assess the number of incidents or occurrences under the MTCA, we have considered a related issue in the analogous context of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). See Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303(a)(1) (“[T]he liability of a local government may not exceed $400,000 per an individual claim, and $800,000 per total claims that arise from the same occurrence for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions[.]”). In Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary’s County v. Marcas, L.L.C., this Court answered a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland that asked whether multiple tort counts and injuries alleged in a complaint constitute the “same occurrence” under the LGTCA. 415 Md. 676, 678 (2010). Our analysis in that case is instructive. 14  In Marcas, the plaintiff claimed that subsurface methane gas and other volatile organic compounds had migrated from a landfill to adjacent properties, including the plaintiff’s. Id. at 679. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s negligence “occurred in many ways over an extended period of time,” and that “each day of contamination equals a separate occurrence.” Id. at 678-79. The defendant argued that the sub-surface migration of the hazardous materials was a single occurrence. Id. at 679. At the time, the LGTCA provided a limit of liability of “$200,000 per an individual claim, and $500,000 per total claims that arise from the same occurrence[.]” Id. at 684 (quoting Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303(a) (2001)). Engaging in an exercise of statutory construction, we observed that the limitation on liability in the LGTCA was “enacted ‘for the purpose of limiting the civil liability of local government.’” Marcas, 415 Md. at 686 (quoting S. Jud. Proc. Comm., Summary of Comm. Rep., S.B. 237, 397th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at 3 (Md. 1987)). We cited legislative history observing that the cap on liability was similar to caps in other statutes, including the MTCA, and that the cap was deemed “necessary so that local governments can predict exposure for both insurance and budgetary purposes.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 686 (quoting Governor’s Legis. Off., Off. of the Governor, Briefing Paper H.B. 253/S.B. 237, 397th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at 9-10 (1987)). We also observed that “the LGTCA was enacted at a time when local governments were having problems purchasing insurance,” which caused us to “conclude that the General Assembly intended that courts would use the insurance industry’s definitions of 15 ‘individual claim’ and ‘same occurrence’ when applying” the LGTCA. Marcas, 415 Md. at 687. We therefore looked to the insurance industry’s definition of the term “occurrence.” Id. In doing so, we quoted favorably the Supreme Court of New Mexico’s opinion in Folz v. New Mexico, 797 P.2d 246 (N.M. 1990), in which that court explained its reasoning for looking to insurance coverage cases to determine what constituted a “single occurrence” under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. Marcas, 415 Md. at 687-88. We also noted that in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co., 343 Md. 216 (1996), we had recognized that “[b]y far the vast majority of courts that have considered the [meaning of the term “single occurrence”] view it from the perspective of causation, ‘by referring to the cause or causes of the damage [or injury] and not to the number of injuries or claims.’” Marcas, 415 Md. at 690 (third alteration in Marcas) (quoting CSX Transp., 343 Md. at 233-34). Viewing that test as consistent with our statutory analysis of the LGTCA, we adopted the “cause” test as “applicable to the determination of what does, or does not, constitute the ‘same occurrence’ as that term is used in” the LGTCA. Marcas, 415 Md. at 692. We held that the proper inquiry is focused on the cause or causes of the damage or injury, not the effects. Id. At the same time, we clarified that “continuous and repeated acts of negligence may constitute the ‘same occurrence.’” Id. As support for that definition, we quoted a treatise that, in turn, cited the Folz decision for the proposition that the term “single occurrence” “refer[red] to all harm that, although proximately caused by a particular risk arising from the concurrent operation of one or more successive acts of 16 negligence, was triggered by [one] particular event.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 690 (quoting 1 Civil Actions Against State and Local Government: Its Divisions, Agencies, and Officers § 6.14 at 6-110 (2d ed. 2002)). We determined that under the LGTCA, if a local government acts negligently in maintaining a landfill, “and that negligence is the proximate cause of contamination to one or more adjacent properties, each adjacent owner’s claim for money damages would arise out of the ‘same occurrence,’ even if the local government was negligent (1) in several different ways, and (2) for an extended period of time.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 689-90. Ultimately, we concluded that “the numerous negligent acts alleged in Appellee’s complaint[,] all of which occurred at the [landfill], . . . were so uniform, routinized and regularized, and occurred at such steady and frequent intervals, that they merged into one continuous ‘same occurrence’ under” the LGTCA. Id. at 695. For largely the same reasons set forth in Marcas, we will apply the “cause” test in determining the number of incidents or occurrences under the MTCA. Like the cap on exposure of local governments in the LGTCA, the monetary limitation on the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity in the MTCA limits the State’s potential liability and makes that liability more predictable. 7 Id. at 686. The cause test is also consistent with the 6F 7 Although the LGTCA and the MTCA share origins related to insurance and both limit the amount of liability that can be imposed, they emerge from different starting points. At common law, local governments generally did not enjoy sovereign immunity from tort claims and the governmental immunity they enjoyed was substantially narrower. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 358-59 (2000). The limitation on liability under the LGTCA arose in part because local governments were having difficulty 17 statutory and regulatory language of the MTCA. Section 12-104(a)(2)(i) of the State Government Article provides that “the liability of the State and its units may not exceed $400,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence.” The limit on the State’s waiver is thus tied not to the number of injuries that are sustained, but to all injuries sustained as the result of “a single incident or occurrence.” Similarly, the definition of “incident” in COMAR emphasizes the act of negligence giving rise to liability, rather than the effect of such an act: “an act or omission of State personnel that constitutes an alleged tort under the [MTCA] and is alleged to have caused injury, loss, or damage to person or property by reason of a single occurrence.” COMAR 25.02.01.02B(3). We will now explore how the cause test has been applied in related circumstances, including in both the insurance context, where the test first emerged, and by other jurisdictions in the tort claims act context. procuring insurance to cover uncapped liability. Marcas, 415 Md. at 687. The State, on the other hand, had no need for insurance because it enjoyed sovereign immunity from tort suits, as discussed above. But in enacting a partial waiver of sovereign immunity to allow recovery in tort, the State established the MTCA in the model of an insurance program to manage the liability it was assuming. See Md. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. § 9-105(c) (2021 Repl.) (“[T]he Treasurer shall provide sufficient self-insurance, purchased insurance, or both to cover the liability of the State and its units and personnel under the [MTCA].”); State Gov’t § 12-104(c) (authorizing the Treasurer to pay MTCA claims with the State Insurance Trust Fund). The LGTCA thus imposes a cap on what was, at least in part, previously uncapped liability for local governments, while the MTCA allows limited recovery from the State where none was previously available. 18  2. Cases Applying the Cause Test in the Insurance Context Under the cause test, where a single negligent act proximately causes multiple injuries, courts have found a single occurrence, incident, or accident. 8 Thus, in the leading 7F case of St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Rutland, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that there was a single “accident” when a truck driven by an employee of the insured struck a freight train, causing it to derail and resulting in damage to 16 different freight cars with 14 different owners, as well as damage to products contained in those freight cars and to the railway’s roadbed. 225 F.2d 689, 690-91, 693 (5th Cir. 1955). The court observed that when people speak of an “accident,” they are usually “referring to a single, sudden, unintentional occurrence[,]” and that they ordinarily use that term “to describe the event, no matter how many persons or things are involved.” Id. at 691 (emphasis omitted). Courts applying the cause test also generally have found a single occurrence, incident, or accident when multiple tortious acts are causally related, are related in time or 8 Except where insurance policies define them differently, courts generally treat the terms accident, incident, and occurrence as synonyms for these purposes. See, e.g., Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., Ltd. v. Blanco, 804 P.2d 876, 879 (Haw. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Dairy Rd. Partners v. Island Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 93 (Haw. 2000) (the insurance policy defined “occurrence” as “an accident causing bodily injury” and the court referred to the events in question as “the incident”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 443 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Mich. 1989) (determining whether the “fighting incident” was an “occurrence,” which the policy defined as “accident”); Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So. 2d 263, 270 (Fla. 2003) (same); see also City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting that although “occurrence” is usually broader than “accident,” in the context of the insurance policy at issue the two words were synonymous). 19 sequence, or lead to a single, ongoing injury. An influential example is the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Appalachian Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1982). There, Liberty Mutual was found to have engaged in sex discrimination against hundreds of employees over the course of several years due to longstanding employment policies. Id. at 58. In resolving a dispute over coverage for thos