SHERMAN v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 24-2010 Filed: September 15, 2026 ) SAMANTHA SHERMAN, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ) ) Steven M. Wald, Stewart, Wald & Smith, LLC, St. Louis, Missouri, for plaintiffs. Alexis E. Smith, United States Department of Justice, Environmental and Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C., for defendant. OPINION AND ORDER SMITH, Senior Judge The fourteen plaintiffs in this case seek compensation for the United States’ uncompensated taking of their New York properties. They now move for partial summary judgment on liability, asking the Court to find that (1) all source conveyances granted easements to the original acquiring railroad; (2) recreational trail use exceeds the scope of those easements; (3) plaintiffs regained fee simple ownership of the land underlying the railroad corridor based on their adjacency to the rail line; and (4) the issuance of a Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) constituted a taking. See Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 40 (hereinafter “Pls.’ Mot.”). The Government has cross-moved for partial summary judgment on liability, arguing that plaintiffs cannot establish (1) that they have an ownership interest in the rail corridor; (2) causation or a right to just compensation due to the existence of an existing recreational trail that predated the NITU; and (3) that the railroad would have abandoned the rail line absent the NITU. See United States’ Cross-Mot., ECF No. 41 (hereinafter “United States’ Cross-Mot.”). For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ deeds conveyed a combination of both easements and fee simple. The Government has taken a portion of plaintiffs’ property for public use, but liability remains unresolved for several claims. The Court also finds that while the pre-existing recreational trail does not affect causation, it may nevertheless impact just compensation. Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 40, is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART and the Government’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 41, is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART under Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). I. Background A. The Railroad Right-of-Way and the Maybrook Trail This rails-to-trails case concerns a 41.1-mile section of rail line running from the state line separating Connecticut and New York at Milepost 71.2 to Beacon, New York at Milepost 0 in the Hudson Valley region. See Sec. Am. Compl., ¶ 3, ECF No. 13. The segment of the rail line at issue is known as the “Beacon Line.” In 1992, the Maybrook Railroad Company (“MRC”) acquired 157 miles of railroad that included the Beacon Line. See Pls.’ Mot. at 19–20. After a series of railroad mergers and land purchases, the Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (“MNR”) acquired the Beacon Line from MRC in 1995. Id. at 20. In 2020, MNR built a 23-mile paved multi-use recreational trail known as the Maybrook Trail. See United States’ Cross-Mot. at 13. The Maybrook Trail runs parallel to the portion of the corridor in which a second track once ran before MNR purchased the line. Id. The trail has been open to the public for use as a pedestrian and bicycle trail since 2020. Id. B. STB Proceedings Under the National Trails System Act (“Trails Act”), a railroad may initiate abandonment proceedings of a rail line before the federal Surface Transportation Board (“STB”). 49 U.S.C. § 10903; see 16 U.S.C. § 10502. When the railroad notifies the STB of its intent to abandon, a qualified “trail sponsor”—usually a county, city, or qualifying non-profit—may notify the STB of its interest in managing the railroad right-of-way for public recreational purposes. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a). The Trails Act establishes a process—known as “railbanking”—under which the railroad can negotiate with the intervening party to assume financial and operational responsibility of the right-of-way. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a). During this process, the STB may issue a NITU. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29. The NITU is the governmental action that stays railroad abandonment during the pendency of the trail use and blocks the vesting of state reversionary interests in the right-of-way. Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006), holding modified by Hardy v. United States, 965 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). If the railroad and trail sponsor agree, then the parties notify the STB, the corridor is railbanked, the STB retains jurisdiction, and “interim trail use is thereby authorized.” Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (1990) (Preseault I); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(h). On the other hand, the railroad may exercise its STB-granted authority to abandon the line if an agreement is not reached. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1), (e)(2); see Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. STB, 267 F.3d 1144, 1150–53 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In December 2023, MNR filed a Verified Notice of Exemption of Abandonment with the STB. See Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company – Abandonment Exemption – In Dutchess and Putnam Counties, New York, STB Docket No. AB 1311 (Sub-No. 1X) (the “Abandonment Docket”) (Doc. No. 307697, filed Dec. 21, 2023, supplemented Jan. 3, 2024), attached as Plaintiffs’ 2 Ex. 25. MNR also requested a NITU with MNR serving as the trail sponsor, which the STB issued on February 8, 2024. See Pls.’ Mot. at 22–23. To date, MNR has received two extensions of the standard one-year period to negotiate an interim trail use agreement with a qualified trail sponsor. Id. (citing Exs. 28–29). The NITU remains in effect and has not lapsed. II. Procedural History On June 20, 2025, plaintiffs filed their operative complaint, asserting a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–25. On July 7, 2025, the Government filed an answer denying the material allegations in the complaint. See Ans., ECF No. 16. After consulting with the parties, the Court set a schedule in March 2026 for summary judgment briefing on whether the Government was liable for the taking of plaintiffs’ property burdened by the trail-use easement. See Mar. 2, 2026 Order. The parties have fully briefed their competing motions for partial summary judgment. See Pls.’ Mot; United States’ Cross-Mot.; Pls.’ Resp. and Reply in Support of Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 42; United States’ Reply Br., ECF No. 43. III. Standard of Review The Court may “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC 56(a). A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine factual dispute exists when the factfinder may reasonably resolve the dispute in favor of either party. Id. at 250. The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). However, summary judgment may still be granted when the party opposing the motion submits evidence that “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations omitted). The moving party “need not produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact but rather may discharge its burden by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Dairyland Power Co-op. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). A court may only grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). However, the court retains discretion to deny even a well-supported motion for summary judgment if the case would benefit from a full hearing. Lowery v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 28, 37 (2023) (citation omitted). The same standard applies when the parties have cross-moved for summary judgment. See Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 586 F.3d 962, 968–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “The fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not mean that the court must grant 3 judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other.” Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “Rather, the court must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Id. (citations omitted). IV. Discussion The Government’s liability for railbanking transfers under the Trails Act is well-settled. See Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 11–17). If an adjacent landowner owns property underlying the right-of-way in fee simple, the Government is liable for a taking when “government action destroys state-defined property rights” either “by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if trail use is outside the scope of the original railway easement” or by compelling the continuation of a railroad-purposes easement to accommodate negotiations for a trail-use agreement, even if the negotiations are ultimately unsuccessful. Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1019, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that the STB’s “issuance of the NITU is the . . . government action in the rail-banking process that operates to . . . preclude the vesting of state law reversionary interests in the right-of-way,” thus denying the landowners possession of their property unencumbered by the easement). The determinative issues for liability in Trails Act cases are: (1) whether the railroad acquired fee simple ownership of the land or merely an easement; (2) if only an easement was acquired, whether the easement was limited to railroad use or was broad enough to encompass a public recreational trail; and (3) whether any such easement permitting recreational trail use expired before the alleged taking, leaving the landowners with full, unencumbered ownership at that time. Galt Auto. Warehouse, Inc. v. United States, 179 Fed. Cl. 138, 143–44 (2025) (citation omitted); see also Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Property rights are defined by state law. Castillo v. United States, 952 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020). This analysis becomes more complicated when a trail use agreement has not been reached. Under those circumstances, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that issuing a NITU may cause a temporary taking where no trail-use agreement has been reached but the NITU compels the railroad to delay its abandonment. Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1023–24. To establish causation when no trail use agreement exists, it must be clear that the railroad “had every intent to abandon the railroad lines during the period of time that the NITU was in effect and was prevented from doing so by the existence of the NITU.” Memmer v. United States, 50 F.4th 136, 145 (Fed. Cir. 2022). To evaluate the railroad’s intent, the Court may consider the railroad’s initiation of abandonment proceedings, its refusal to extend the NITU, the timing of its abandonment relative to the NITU’s expiration, the scope of authority granted under the NITU, and whether the railroad undertook physical acts consistent with abandonment, such as removing track infrastructure. See Galt Auto. Warehouse, Inc., 179 Fed. Cl. at 144–45 (citing Sauer West LLC v. United States, 151 F.4th 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2025)). These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive. See Sauer West, 151 F.4th at 1346. 4  Seamless Clothes Manuf. Pls.’ Ex. 54 Co. 0-1/548 PLF000335- PLF000372 State of New York 0- 1/209 3 23-28 Creek 130200-6054-37- Van Kluck 0-1/456 Pls.’ Ex. 55 Drive LLC 037625-0000 PLF000376-PLF000384 Rothery 0-1/519 Pls.’ Ex. 59 PLF000301-PLF000334 State of New York 0- 1/209 4 Beacon 248 130200-6054-45- State of New York Holdings, 012574-0000 LLC New York Rubber 0-1/506 Pls.’ Ex. 58 5a Hilltop Sport 68.-2-40 Haines V-2/48 Pls.’ Ex. 50 & PLF000293-PLF000296 Conservation, Inc. W P & M Fowler V2/51 Pls.’ Ex. 49 PLF000284-PLF000288 5b Hilltop Sport 69.-1-5 Haines V-2/48 Pls.’ Ex. 50 & PLF000293-PLF000296 Conservation, Inc. 7 Weber 130200-6054-37- Van Kluck 0-1/456 Pls.’ Ex. 55 Projects, III 066670-0000 PLF000376-PLF000384 Rothery 0-1/519 Pls.’ Ex. 59 PLF000301-PLF000334 State of New York 0- 1/209 8 Clovebrook 132200-6758-00- Brill SC/113 PLF000289- Pls.’ Ex. 48 Farms LLC 587077-0000 PLF000292 9 John 134089-6855-02- White SC/154 Pls.’ Ex. 56 DeMarco 787556-0000 PLF000297-PLF000300 6  10 Eleventh Jam 68.-2-18 W P & M Fowler V2/51 Pls.’ Ex. 49 Development PLF000284-PLF000288 LLC 12 Niche 130200-6054-22- Blossom 0-1/539 Pls.’ Ex. 47 Modern, LLC 246892-0000 PLF000232-PLF000278 13 Sahib Singh 132800-6557-03- Baldwin SC/81 Pls.’ Ex. 46 and Maninder 283181-0000 PLF000506-PLF000509 Kaur The Group 1 plaintiffs argue that acquisition by condemnation in New York vests the railroad with an easement limited to railroad purposes. See Pls.’ Mot. at 25–26 (collecting cases). The Court finds it necessary to offer a roadmap of the claims addressed in this section. For five of the Group 1 plaintiffs—Samantha Sherman, 10 Boulevard, LLC, 23-28 Creek Drive, LLC, John DeMarco, and Sahib Singh and Maninder Kaur (Claims 1–3, 9, and 13)—the Government did not dispute that ownership in the underlying land adjacent to the rail corridor had been established. See United States’ Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, ECF No. 41-1. Rather, the Government focused on the extent of their property interests by arguing that the centerline presumption does not apply to their claims. 2 The Government only disputed ownership of three of the plaintiffs in Group 1 (Claims 5, 7, and 10). Finally, the claims of two of the Group 1 plaintiffs—Beacon 248 Holdings, LLC and Niche Modern, LLC—are addressed in the discussion of Groups 3 and 4, respectively. a. Samantha Sherman, 10 Boulevard, LLC, 23-28 Creek Drive, LLC, John DeMarco, Clovebrook Farms, LLC, and Sahib Singh and Maninder Kaur The Government has not raised any easement or ownership-related challenges against the parcels claimed by plaintiffs Samantha Sherman, 10 Boulevard, LLC, 23-28 Creek Drive, LLC, John DeMarco, and Sahib Singh and Maninder Kaur (Claims 1–3, 9, and 13). However, the Government does dispute the extent of these plaintiffs’ ownership interests by raising various arguments seeking to rebut the applicability of the centerline presumption. See United States’ Cross-Mot. at 34–43; United States’ Reply Br. at 19–24. The Court thus finds that these five plaintiffs have established ownership of the subject parcel adjacent to the corridor. The Court considers the Government’s arguments regarding the centerline presumption (i.e., whether the ownership interest extends to the centerline of the rail corridor) as to the five plaintiffs later in this opinion. Plaintiffs point out that the Government did not raise any easement, ownership-related, or scope challenges (including arguments concerning the applicability of the centerline presumption) against the parcel claimed by plaintiff Clovebrook Farms, LLC. See Pls.’ Resp. at 7; United States’ Cross-Mot., Ex. 1 at 5 (declining to categorize Clovebrook Farms, LLC into the Government’s grouping scheme). The Court agrees and thus finds that Clovebrook Farms, LLC has established ownership of the subject parcel underlying the corridor. 2 The Court ultimately resolves the Government’s liability as to plaintiff 10 Boulevard, LLC in its discussion of the Group 2 plaintiffs. See infra pp. 10–11. 7  b. Hilltop Sports & Conservation, Inc. and Eleventh Jam Development, LLC The Government argues that these two plaintiffs (Claims 5 and 10) do not own the three parcels underlying their takings claims because the deeds of their predecessors-in-title excluded the land underlying the corridor. See United States’ Cross-Mot. at 33. Because the land was retained by the grantor in the two deeds from 1895 and 1945, the Government claims that plaintiffs’ predecessors never owned land in the corridor and thus could not convey the land to the plaintiffs. Id. (citing United States’ Exs. 19–20). For that reason, the Government argues that these two plaintiffs cannot establish their claims. Plaintiffs disagree for two reasons. First, they argue that the Government relies on “isolated instruments untethered to a complete chain of title” and that these two “unauthenticated” deeds are insufficient to resolve title as a matter of law. See Pls.’ Resp. at 27–28. Second, plaintiffs contend that a provision “excepting and reserving land that is already subject to an exclusive easement does not have a restrictive effect” and “merely notifies the grantee that the grant was subject to the easement already conveyed to the railroad.” Id. at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, the excepting language found in the two deeds does not reflect an intent to reserve the land in fee, but rather “serves as an acknowledgment” of the preexisting easement. Id. at 29–30. The Court agrees with the Government that the language in the two deeds in plaintiffs’ chain-of-title constitutes direct evidence that this land was excluded from the grant. See United States’ Reply Br. at 18. At the same time, the arguments raised in plaintiffs’ response (at 27–30) leave much to be desired. For instance, plaintiffs—the parties with the ultimate burden to establish ownership over the disputed property—have not presented any direct evidence demonstrating their ownership over the land. Nor have they identified any legal authority showing that New York courts interpret the excepting language found in the two deeds as merely acknowledging a preexisting easement. See Pls.’ Resp. at 28 (interpreting Florida law on conveyances and asserting without authority that the law in “Florida is consistent with New York.”). Rather, plaintiffs assert that title cannot be resolved on the current record because the Government has not established that the excepting language found in the two deeds from 1895 and 1945 “persisted and remained operative through later transactions and into Plaintiffs’ ownership.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court is cognizant of its earlier order that amended the discovery schedule to allow for additional time to establish a full chain-of-title following summary judgment. See Feb. 19, 2026 Order, ECF No. 36. The Court recognizes that plaintiffs may not possess the full set of conveyance instruments for these three parcels at this time. Those records may establish plaintiffs’ ownership of the subject parcels. The Court thus finds that a full hearing on these two claims is appropriate and therefore denies both parties’ partial summary judgment motions as to whether plaintiffs Hilltop Sports & Conservation, Inc. and Eleventh Jam Development, LLC own the parcels underlying the corridor. To be clear, for these two plaintiffs to establish liability at trial, they must demonstrate that the subsequent deeds in the chain-of-title conveyed the land in dispute. If plaintiffs cannot establish that, they must come forward with authority demonstrating that the “excepting and reserving” language does not withhold the land from the grant under New York law. The Court’s 8 own review of New York law on this point suggests that this may be a tall order. See Mentiply v. Foster, 160 N.Y.S.3d 454, 459–60 (3d Dep’t 2022) (collecting cases) (“[C]ourts will generally interpret” an “exception” or “exclusion” “to mean an interest or right in an estate that is not conveyed to the grantee”). c. The Weber Projects, III The Government argues that plaintiff Weber Projects, III (“Weber” or Claim 7) lacks an ownership interest in the parcel adjacent to the rail corridor because the original railroad acquired the adjacent land in fee simple for “rail depot purposes.” See United States’ Cross-Mot. at 27–33. For this argument, the Government relies on O&W Lines, Inc. v. St. John, 20 N.Y.2d 17 (N.Y. 1867). Id. at 27. That case and its progeny recognize that a railroad acquires fee simple ownership of property condemned for rail depot purposes under New York law. The Government articulates three reasons that it believes the original railroad acquired the adjacent land in fee simple for rail depot purposes. First, “the area of the rail corridor adjacent to the Weber property has an irregular shape that expands in size beyond the strip of land on which the rail line was constructed.” Id. at 29. According to the Government, the irregular shape of this portion of the Beacon Line is evidence that the railroad acquired additional land beyond the strip needed for the rail line to accommodate a rail depot and related infrastructure for rail line operations. Id. at 29–30; see also Ellar Ests. Corp. v. Cohen, 383 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533 (2d Dep’t 1976) (affirming trial court’s finding “that the irregularity of shape” of the parcel “and its situs” established that the parcel “was obtained for depot purposes, and not as a right-of-way.”); O&W Lines, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d at 21 (“By the very shape of the property one can reasonably conclude that it had not been acquired solely for right of way purposes.”). Second, the Government presents evidence demonstrating that a former railroad depot was located near the Weber property. See United States’ Cross-Mot. at 30–32. This evidence includes the existence of a former railroad depot—the Matteawan Railroad Station Depot—located across the street from the Weber property and a valuation map prepared by the STB’s predecessor agency showing that a rail depot and various physical structures (coal silos and a shed) are located close by to the Weber property. Id. Third, the Government notes that the applicable condemnation petitions do not contain any language limiting the original railroad’s acquisition of the land abutting the Weber property to a right-of-way. Id. at 32. Taken together, the Government argues that this evidence establishes that the land adjacent to the Weber property was condemned for rail depot purposes, thereby dooming Weber’s claim. Id. at 33. Plaintiffs dispute that the railroad acquired the land adjacent to the Weber property in fee simple. See Pls.’ Resp. at 22–26. Plaintiffs respond to the Government’s first argument by claiming that the irregular shape of the parcel is irrelevant because the irregularly shaped portion sits on the other side of the rail corridor and is not directly adjacent to the Weber parcel. Id. at 24. In plaintiffs’ view, the Government’s second argument also fails because no evidence has been introduced showing that the construction or occupation of a depot was planned at the time the condemnations occurred or that subsequent construction of the depot was linked to the earlier condemnations. Id. at 23 (citing Crouch v. State, 218 N.Y.S. 173, 179 (4th Dep’t 1926) (observing that a railroad acquires condemned property in fee simple for rail depot purposes only when the 9 and appears to concede that the recorded deeds for the Group 2 parcels limited the grant to railroad purposes only. See United States’ Cross-Mot., Ex. 1 at 2–3 (declining to categorize the three Group 2 claims into the Government’s grouping scheme). Because the parties agree that the Group 2 deeds conveyed easements to the original railroad that were limited to railroad purposes, the Court finds that plaintiffs are successful as to this portion of their Group 2 claims. 3. Group 3: Deeds Referencing Railroad Purposes in Granting Clause but also Containing Broader Language regarding Use of the Easement Group 3 consists of a single parcel owned by plaintiff Beacon 248 Holdings, LLC. See Pls.’ Mot. at 34. Plaintiffs stress that the Group 3 deed is identical to the Group 2 deeds except that the Group 3 deed contains additional language about “the type of use allowed.” Id. at 35. As an example of this broader language, plaintiffs reference the granting language in the Brown Deed, which states as follows: The said party of the first part … have sold and by these Presents do grant and convey to the said Dutchess and Columbia Rail Road Company their successors and assigns for the purposes of constructing along and operating thereon a Freight and Passenger Railroad as aforesaid and for such other uses and purposes as the Company may choose to apply said land that portion of the lands of said party of the first part upon which said Railroad line is so located … Id. (quoting Pls.’ Ex. 51 at 2) (emphasis added). According to plaintiffs, this broad use language does not alter the nature of the property interest conveyed but only expands the scope of the easement granted to the railroad. Id. The Government does not disagree that the interest conveyed was an easement. See United States’ Cross-Mot. at 21. Since no dispute exists on this issue, the Court finds that the railroad only obtained an easement at the time of the original conveyance. The Government, however, cross-moves for summary judgment as to the Group 3 deed on the grounds that the easement is broad enough to encompass recreational trail-use. See United States’ Cross- Mot. at 20–27. On identical facts, Judge David Tapp just last year construed analogous deed language in Zanzarella v. United States, 180 Fed. Cl. 91 (2025). There, Judge Tapp concluded that the conversion of the same rail corridor into a recreational trail did not exceed the scope of the easement because the broad granting language in the deed allowed for “such other uses and purposes as the Company may choose to apply said land . . . .” Id. at 102–03. As Judge Tapp concluded, this phrase contemplated that the easement may be used for purposes beyond the railroad, including as a public recreational trail. Id. So too here. The use language in the Brown Deed is identical to the use language in the deed that Judge Tapp already determined was broad enough to encompass public recreational trails. The undersigned agrees with Judge Tapp’s reasoning and therefore finds that the conversion of the rail corridor into a recreational trail did not exceed the scope of the easement for the Group 3 plaintiff based on the broad language contained in the deed. See Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 76, 78 (2014), aff’d, 815 F.3d 809 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that conversion of the rail corridor into a public park fit within the terms of the easement when the easement authorized use “for railroad purposes and 11 for such other purposes as the Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, may from time to time or at any time desire to make use of the same.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs caution that Judge Tapp’s reasoning in Zanzarella can be swept aside as “not controlling on this Court.” See Pls.’ Resp. at 12. First, plaintiffs argue that the broad use language in the Group 3 deed applies only to the original acquiring railroad company and does not extend to the original acquiring railroad’s “successor and assigns.” See Pls.’ Mot. at 40–42. Second, plaintiffs contend that a summary judgment finding in favor of the Government is unwarranted because plaintiffs anticipate introducing evidence at trial showing that the recreational trail use imposed a new and significant burden on their remainder parcel. Id. at 40–44; Pls.’ Resp. at 12. As detailed below, the Court finds both of plaintiffs’ arguments unpersuasive. Plaintiffs first argue that the broad use language found in the Group 3 deed only applies to the original acquiring railroad and that any successor-in-interest “is restricted to use of the land for railroad purposes and does not enjoy a broad easement.” See Pls.’ Mot. at 41. For this argument, plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the facts of this case from those in Romanoff Equities, Inc. There, the plaintiffs argued that the easement at issue did not permit the government to convert the right- of-way into an elevated park in New York City. The trial court disagreed, finding that the deed “clearly and unambiguously” contemplated that the easement may be used for purposes beyond the railroad. Romanoff Equities, Inc., 119 Fed. Cl. at 81. The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision. Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.3d 809 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, plaintiffs point to language contained in the easement in Romanoff Equities stating that the easement was for “railroad purposes and for such other purposes as the Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, may from time to time or at any time or times desire to make use of the same.” See Pls.’ Mot. at 40–41 (emphasis added in original) (quoting Romanoff Equities, Inc., 815 F.3d at 812–15). By contrast, the Group 3 deed states that the easement is “for the purposes of constructing along and operating thereon a Freight and Passenger Railroad as aforesaid and for such other uses and purposes as the Company may choose to apply said land.” Id. at 41 (quoting Brown Deed, Pls.’ Ex. 51) (emphasis added). Thus, plaintiffs argue that MNR—as the successor to the original railroad—“has no right to use the easement for any purpose and is instead restricted to use as if the broad language did not exist” because the Group 3 deed omits any mention of “successors and assigns.” Id. The Government disagrees for multiple reasons. See United States’ Cross-Mot. at 25–27. The Government first points out that this exact argument was considered and rejected by Judge Tapp only six months ago. Id. at 25 (citing Zanzarella, 180 Fed. Cl. at 106). In Zanzarella, Judge Tapp acknowledged that the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Romanoff Equities found that the easement’s granting clause expressly authorized successors to utilize the rail corridor for “other purposes.” 180 Fed. Cl. at 106. However, Judge Tapp cautioned that embracing the plaintiffs’ interpretation of Romanoff Equities would graft an entirely new requirement onto state property law by concluding “that failure to include the ‘successors and assigns’ language is affirmative proof of the original parties’ intent to limit the easement’s broad language to the railroad.” Id. Judge Tapp declined to do so. Id. The Government also argues that the absence of words of inheritance (such as “successors and assigns”) in the Group 3 deed is legally irrelevant because 12 New York law does not require words of inheritance to create an easement that is binding on the servient estate. See United States’ Cross-Mot. at 26 (collecting cases). Second, plaintiffs assert that the trail-use easement imposes a “new and significant burden” on the Group 3 plaintiff’s remainder parcel in the form of lost privacy and security. See Pls.’ Mot. at 42–43; Pls.’ Resp. at 11–12. In plaintiffs’ view, an easement holder cannot “significantly burden the servient estate nor its abutting land” under New York law. See Pls.’ Mot. at 42. Confronted with identical circumstances, Judge Tapp found in Zanzarella that the potential loss of privacy and security resulting from the conversion of the rail line to a recreational trail did not constitute a new and significant burden on the plaintiffs’ remainder parcels. 180 Fed. Cl. at 105. Judge Tapp reasoned that the plaintiffs presented “no evidence” that the alleged loss of privacy and security represented “a burden uncontemplated by the original grant such that it could be construed as significantly burdening the servient estate or imposing a new and additional burden upon it.” Id. In reaching this decision, Judge Tapp concluded that a “significant burden” on a servient estate under New York law “arises when an easement holder undertakes actions that substantially interfere with the servient owner’s use and enjoyment of the property in a manner not contemplated by the terms of the easement.” Id. (citing Lopez v. Adams, 895 N.Y.S.2d 532, 535 (3d Dep’t 2010) (emphasis added)). The conversion of the rail line to a recreational trail did not represent a “significant burden” because such a use was “fully contemplated by the easement’s terms.” Id. Consequently, any loss in the servient estate’s privacy or security “should have been contemplated at the time the easement was granted.” Id. The undersigned sees no reason to depart from Judge Tapp’s reasoning on this point. The use language in the Group 3 deed is identical to the use language that Judge Tapp found broad enough to encompass use of the rail corridor as a public recreational trail. At the same time, plaintiffs have not presented any new evidence or argument tending to show that construction of a trail is a “new and significant burden” that should not have been contemplated by the original grant. In sum, the Court agrees with the Government regarding the Group 3 deed. The deed conveyed a broad, general easement that encompasses the transformation of the rail corridor into a recreational trail. The conversion of the rail corridor into a public recreational trail is a reasonable use of the easement. The absence of “successors and assigns” language does not indicate an intent of the original parties to limit the “other purposes” conveyance to the original acquiring railroad. Any resulting loss of privacy or security does not impose new or significant burdens on the servient estate as the potential for those losses should have been contemplated at the time of the granting. Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as to claims premised on the Group 3 deed and GRANTS the Government’s cross- motion for partial summary judgment. 4. Group 4: Deeds Referencing Railroad Purposes Outside of the Granting Clause Plaintiffs move for summary judgment as to the Group 4 plaintiffs, requesting that the Court find that those deeds conveyed easements limited to railroad purposes. See Pls.’ Mot. at 36– 37. Group 4 consists of two plaintiffs reflected in the following table: 13 court may “look outside the four corners of the deed to establish the intent of the parties when . . . that instrument is found to be ambiguous”) (quoting Pepe v. Antlers of Raquette Lake, Inc., 927 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (3d Dep’t 2011)). New York law generally limits habendum clauses from cutting down the size of the estate conveyed by the granting clause. Mott, 57 N.Y. at 63–64. See also Bannin v. Peck, 41 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (1st Dep’t 1943), aff’d, 291 N.Y. 717 (N.Y. 1943) (holding that in the granting clause prevails over conflicting language in the habendum clause that creates an irreconcilable repugnancy between the two clauses); Allen v. Trs. of Great Neck Free Church, 269 N.Y.S. 341, 346 (2d Dep’t 1934) (same). However, the Mott rule “is only a rule of construction, and must yield to the manifest intent of the grantor.” Bates v. Virolet, 53 N.Y.S. 893, 895–96 (1st Dep’t 1898). If a grantor makes plain their intent to cut down an estate, “such intent makes that rule inapplicable.” Id. (citing 1 Rev. Stat. p. 748 § 2) (It is “the imperative duty of the courts to ascertain the intention of the parties from all the provisions of the instrument.”); Basile v. Rose, 7 N.Y.S.3d 1444, 1445 (3d Dep’t 2015) (citing Mott, 57 N.Y. at 63; Bannin, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 670; Bates, 53 N.Y.S. at 895–96) (“[W]here there is a conflict between the provisions set forth in the premises clause and those in the habendum clause relative to the extent of the conveyance, the premises clause will control, absent a clear indication of contrary intent elsewhere in the deed.”) (emphasis added). After careful consideration, the Court concludes that the granting clauses and habendum clauses of the Towner and Boyce deeds do not create an irreconcilable repugnancy but the manifest intent of the grantors. See Bates, 53 N.Y.S. at 896. Plaintiffs concede that the language in the Boyce Deed’s granting clause—a grant of “all” of the land to the railroad and its “successors and assigns, forever”—“is typically associated with a fee simple grant.” See Pls.’ Mot. at 37 (quoting Boyce Deed, Ex. 53). 3 However, both deeds contain habendum clauses which express the grantors’ intent to convey their parcels “expressly for Rail Road purposes & for no other.” Boyce Deed, Ex. 53 (emphasis added); Towner Deed, Pl.’s Ex. 60 (limiting conveyance “for Rail purposes.”). Here, the habendum clauses demonstrate the intent of the grantors—to expressly limit the conveyances for railroad purposes. Evans, 306 N.Y. at 304; Basile, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 1445. As such, the clauses may be harmonized to cut down the conveyances afforded to the Boston Hartford and Erie Railroad Company