BEWLEY v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims ROSS BEWLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, No. 22-cv-1589 v. Filed: September 10, 2026 THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. Reed W. Ripley of Stewart, Wald, & Smith, LLC, Kansas City, MO, appeared for Plaintiffs. With him on the briefs were Thomas S. Stewart of Stewart, Wald, & Smith, LLC, Prairie Village, KS, and Steven M. Wald and Michael J. Smith of Stewart, Wald, & Smith, LLC, St. Louis, MO. Kyle Lyons-Burke of the United States Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C. appeared for Defendant. With him on the briefs were Adam R.F. Gustafson and Taylor Gamm, of the United States Department of Justice, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This is the Court’s second summary judgment ruling in a rails-to-trails dispute arising out of Mendocino, Trinity, and Humboldt counties in California. Familiarity with the Court’s first ruling, and the background information provided therein, is presumed and incorporated here. See Bewley v. United States, No. 22-1589, slip op. (Fed. Cl. Sep. 8, 2026) (First Ruling or Bewley I). In this Memorandum and Order, the Court rules upon cross-motions for summary judgment concerning fee title interest to land within the right-of-way of the North Coast Railroad Authority (NCRA or railroad) that abuts 16 parcels, which are owned by eight representative Plaintiffs. When the Surface Transportation Board (STB) authorizes the conversion of a railroad right-of- way to trail use, the STB may effect a taking of reversionary property interests. If the NCRA holds an easement whose scope does not include trail use over the right-of-way, then the conversion to trail use extinguishes the easement, and the owner of the fee simple interest 1 in the right-of-way is legally entitled to regain full use of the land, but the conversion to trail use seizes the reversionary interest. Thus, the STB’s authorization of trail effects a taking, and fee interest holders may be entitled to compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, many landowners struggle to establish their fee interest in a right-of-way, especially when, as is the case here, the railroad or its predecessors-in-interest acquired the right-of-way more than a century ago. Plaintiffs in this case all own parcels that abut the NCRA right-of-way and claim that their parcels include a fee interest in the right-of-way. In this Memorandum and Order, the Court assesses three ways in which Plaintiffs try to establish their fee interest in the right-of-way. First, Plaintiffs invoke the centerline presumption. California law presumes that when a railroad holds an easement interest in a right-of-way, a property owner whose land abuts the right- of-way owns the fee simple interest up to the centerline of the right-of-way, even when the owner’s title deed does not mention land within the right-of-way. This means that a parcel that borders a railroad right-of-way is presumed to include the fee interest to half of the right-of-way—the centerline is the middle of the railroad tracks—along the entire border between the parcel and the right-of-way. This presumption prevents the creation of narrow strips of land in rights-of-way with unidentifiable or long-lost fee owners. For example, an owner of the fee interest within the right-of-way (where the railroad had an easement) may overlook that narrow fee interest while selling a parcel that adjoins the right-of-way, and the deed of sale will not mention the fee interest 1 The fee simple is “the broadest property interest allowed by law.” Fee simple, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). An easement is “[a]n interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose.” Easement, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); see also Wright v. Best, 121 P.2d 702, 710 (Cal. 1942) (“An easement involves primarily the privilege of doing a certain act on, or to the detriment of, another’s property.”). 2 under the right-of-way. If generations of transactions ignore the fee interest in the right-of-way, it becomes difficult to identify the record owner of that fee interest. Instead, California law presumes that whoever owns land abutting a right-of-way owns the fee interest up to the centerline. However, California law also establishes that the language of the title deed (the deed by which the present owner of a parcel acquired ownership) can rebut the centerline presumption. If the title deed describes a parcel’s boundaries by a detailed metes-and-bounds description and that description ends at the outer edge of the right-of-way—the sideline of the right-of-way—the deed itself rebuts the centerline presumption. Defendant argues that the metes-and-bounds descriptions in the deeds of 14 parcels at issue in this Memorandum and Order rebut the centerline presumption. Defendant groups these parcels into Groups E, F, and G, corresponding to the language that allegedly rebuts the centerline presumption in each deed. Second, a deed may explicitly exclude the land within the right-of-way when conveying a parcel abutting a right-of-way. Deeds that rebut the centerline presumption do not explicitly state that they exclude any conveyance of land in the right-of-way. In contrast, Defendant argues that deeds for four parcels 2 at issue in this Memorandum and Order, categorized together as Group H, explicitly exclude any land within the right-of-way. These deeds each contain a metes-and-bounds description of the conveyed parcel or parcels, followed by another clause that states the deed excepts land within the right-of-way from the conveyance. Defendant argues that when a deed contains such an exception clause, the grantor does not intend to convey any fee interest in the right-of-way, even if the grantor owns the fee interest. Plaintiffs argue that rather than 2 Defendant contends that the deed for two parcels both explicitly excludes the conveyance of a property interest in the right-of-way and implicitly rebuts the centerline presumption, so those parcels are included in both Groups F and H. See ECF No. 63-1 at 3 (including Plaintiff Swallowtail Ranch’s parcels in both Group F and H). 3 demonstrating the grantor’s intent to exclude the land from a conveyance, such clauses serve as notifications from grantor to grantee that land conveyed withing the right-of-way is burdened by the railroad’s easement. Third, Plaintiffs can present chains of title. A chain of title is a series of deeds that treks through the history of every recorded conveyance affecting a parcel of land. A chain of title might show that the landowner who granted an easement to a railroad later conveyed the fee interest to the rest of the parcel and never separately conveyed or intended to retain the fee interest to the right-of-way. California law presumes that land sales convey all of the seller’s interest in property, so that a conveyance of the parcel would include the fee interest to the right-of-way unless the grantor explicitly excludes the right-of-way from the conveyance. Like the centerline presumption, this rule helps to prevent the accumulation of narrow strips of land with long- forgotten owners. If Plaintiffs can demonstrate, through chains of title, that their predecessors-in- interest held the fee interest to the right-of-way and never sold that interest, Plaintiffs establish their own fee interest in the right-of-way. Plaintiffs present chains of title for 15 parcels and argue that the chains of title establish their fee interests in the right-of-way. These issues arise from two rounds of summary judgment briefing, which the Court addresses in this Memorandum and Order. First, Defendant’s original Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63) (Defendant’s Motion or Def. Mot.) seeks a judgment that Plaintiffs in Groups E, F, and G cannot rely upon California’s centerline presumption to establish their property interest within the right-of-way and that the Group H deeds except land in the right-of-way. Defendant’s Motion originally challenged claims of 117 parcels, from 63 Plaintiffs, and included several other issues. Def. Mot. at 7. Defendant sorted the challenged parcels into Groups A through H. Groups A and B included challenges about the railroad’s interest in the right-of-way, 4 which the Court addressed in a prior opinion and are unrelated to the issues addressed in this Memorandum and Order. See Bewley I. For Groups C through G, Defendant challenged Plaintiffs’ ability to invoke the centerline presumption based on language in title deeds that allegedly rebutted the centerline presumption. For Group H, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ title deeds explicitly excluded any interest in the right-of-way. The Court has previously ruled on the other issues within Defendant’s Motion and, in this Memorandum and Order, only addresses the remaining arguments raised in Groups E through H as they apply to representative parcels. 3 In Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 91), Plaintiffs argue that they can establish an interest in the right-of-way through the centerline presumption or, alternatively, through their chains of title, for the representative parcels at issue in Groups E through H of Defendant’s original Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63). In Defendant’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 92), Defendant renews its arguments about the centerline presumption and argues that the chain of title evidence fails to prove Plaintiffs’ interests in the right-of-way for the representative parcels. Groups C and D did not include any representative parcels, so Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 91), Defendant’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 92), and this Memorandum and Order address only Groups E through H. As discussed further below, the Court finds that the metes-and-bounds description in each deed at issue in Groups E, F, and G rebuts the centerline presumption for each parcel at issue. Similarly, each deed for the Group H parcels excludes the fee interest to the right-of-way. Thus, 3 The Court previously denied without prejudice Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment for Groups C through H with regard to non-representative parcels, so that Plaintiffs, upon their own request, would have a chance to gather chains of title for non-representative parcels. ECF No. 82 at 1–2. 5 Plaintiffs may only establish their ownership of a fee interest in the right-of-way through chains of title. The Court holds that Plaintiffs have not presented evidence establishing a fee interest in the right-of-way for nine parcels, that Plaintiffs have successfully established a fee interest in the right-of-way for one parcel, and that disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for the remaining four parcels at issue. As such, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63); GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Chains of Title for Representative Parcels (ECF No. 92); and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Record Title Ownership of the Corridor for 8 Representative Plaintiffs (ECF No. 91), as set forth below. In addition, the Court recognizes that its earlier decision concerning Groups A and B in Defendant’s Motion affects some of the claims at issue here. Bewley I, slip op. at 63–65. The parties completed briefing on the pending summary judgment cross-motions before the Court issued its decision on Group A and B issues in Defendant’s original Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63). Where the railroad held the right-of-way in fee, Plaintiffs hold no interest. As such, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 91) and Defendant’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Chains of Title for Representative Parcels (ECF No. 92) with respect to the following claims, for which the Court has already granted summary judgment to Defendant: Fort Baker Ranch Company, parcel number 216-166-016; and The Hongran Cohen Trust, Trustee, Hongran Cohen & Sean Suh, parcel number 205-111-074. Bewley I, slip op. at 63–65 (dismissing claims of Fort Baker Ranch Company and The Hongran Cohen Trust). 6  BACKGROUND I. Railroad Regulation and the Trails Act During the last century, the United States experienced a sharp reduction in rail trackage, as railroads abandoned unused rights-of-way. Preseault v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990) (Preseault I). In response, Congress enacted several laws, including the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241–1251, to address the loss of trackage. See id. The Trails Act, as amended, provides for the preservation of “established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service” by authorizing the interim use of such rights-of-way 4 as recreational and historical trails. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). This process is referred to as “railbanking.” Memmer v. United States, 50 F.4th 136, 139 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Section 1247(d) states in relevant part Consistent with the purposes of [the Trails Act], and in furtherance of the national policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of way pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent with this chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Railroads and their “construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance,” including the railbanking process, fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board). 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). Its authority over railroads 4 A right-of-way is the land on which “the railroad had obtained a property interest allowing it to operate its equipment over the land involved.” Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Preseault II). A railroad can hold different property interests in a right-of-way, including fee simple or an easement. See id. at 1533. 7 is exclusive, and Congress has stated that “the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.” Id. The railbanking process works as follows. First, a rail carrier proposing to abandon any part of its rail line must either file an application to abandon pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10903 or file a notice of exemption to abandon the line proceedings pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10502. Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229–31 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Pursuant to Section 10903, a railroad company that initiates abandonment proceedings may only abandon its line “if the Board finds that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or permit the abandonment or discontinuance.” 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d). A rail carrier is exempt from Section 10903 if the carrier files a notice of exemption with the STB in accordance with Section 10502 and the accompanying regulations. 49 U.S.C. § 10502(a). Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50, a carrier petitioning for exemption must certify that “no local traffic has moved over the line for at least 2 years” and meet other specified criteria. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50(a)-(b), (d)(1). Upon receiving these certifications, the STB must publish a notice in the Federal Register within twenty days noting the submission. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50(d)(2)-(3). The purpose of the Federal Register notice is to “alert the public that following any abandonment of rail service and salvage of the line, the line may be suitable for other public uses, including interim trail use.” Id. § 1152.50(d)(3). If the prospective trail sponsor assumes responsibility for the right-of-way’s management and legal liability and the rail carrier agrees to negotiate an interim trail use agreement, the STB will issue a Certificate of Interim Trail Use (CITU) (if proceeding under 49 U.S.C. § 10903) or a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU) (if proceeding under 49 U.S.C. § 10502). 8 See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29. As is relevant in this case, a NITU acts to “permit the railroad to discontinue service, cancel any applicable tariffs, and salvage track and materials, consistent with interim trail use and railbanking . . . ; and permit the railroad to fully abandon the line if no agreement is reached one year after it is issued, subject to appropriate conditions . . . .” Id. § 1152.29(d)(1)(i). The Board will entertain requests to extend the one-year deadline to enable further negotiations. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1)(ii). If the negotiations lead to a trail use agreement between the railroad company and the interested third party, then abandonment of the railroad line is stayed for the duration of the agreement. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (“[I]f such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes.”). If this occurs, the interim trail use agreement is, in fact, interim in that relevant corridors remain available for future rail use. See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 8. Importantly, the interim trail use agreement also prevents corridors from being deemed abandoned under state law during the period of interim trail use. Id. It is this preclusion of whatever state-law abandonment might otherwise occur that gives rise to takings claims. Id. at 9. II. The NCRA Right-of-Way 5 At issue in this case are reversionary property interests that Plaintiffs claim along approximately 175 miles of the NCRA right-of-way, over which the NCRA and its predecessors ran trains in Mendocino, Trinity, and Humboldt Counties, California. ECF No. 28 (Third Amended Complaint or Complaint) ¶ 3. The State of California created the NCRA in 1989 to purchase railroads that would otherwise seek to discontinue service and abandon rail lines, as 5 Unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth in this section are undisputed. 9 railroad traffic declined. North Coast Railroad Authority Act, § 1, 1989 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1085 (West). Eventually, trains stopped running entirely on the right-of-way, and in 2018, the California legislature directed the state government to issue a report about the possibility of turning the rail line into a recreational use trail. See North Coast Railroad Authority Closure and Transition to Trails Act, § 2, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. 934 (West). The NCRA was subsequently renamed the Great Redwood Trail Agency (GRTA). Great Redwood Trail Act, § 10, 2021 Cal. Legis. Serv. 423 (West) (codified at Cal. Gov’t Code § 93010(b)). The California legislature directed the newly-renamed GRTA to begin the regulatory process for railbanking and creating a trail on what was previously the rail line, through the federal STB’s regulatory process. Id. § 19 (codified at Cal. Gov’t Code § 93022(a)). When completed, the Great Redwood Trail is planned to become a “307-mile, world-class, multi-use rail-to-trail project connecting California’s San Francisco and Humboldt Bays.” Great Redwood Trail Agency, The Great Redwood Trail, https://thegreatredwoodtrail.org/great-redwood-trail/ (last accessed July 26, 2026). On May 14, 2021, GRTA filed a notice of exemption with the STB pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10502, which began the regulatory process to turn the NCRA right-of-way into a trail. STB, Decision and Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment, STB Docket No. AB 1305X (Oct. 24, 2022). The notice of exemption sought approval to convert 175.84 miles of the NCRA right-of- way into a trail. Id. The STB ruled upon the notice of exemption and issued the NITU on October 24, 2022. Id. Shortly thereafter, GRTA confirmed that it would begin interim trail use and railbanking. See GRTA, Notice of Consummation of Railbanking, STB Docket No. AB 1305X (Oct. 26, 2022). Plaintiffs contend that these filings constituted a taking of any reversionary interests in the rail right-of-way. ECF No. 28 (Third Amended Complaint or Compl.) ¶ 11. 10  Plaintiffs claim that they owned land adjacent to the rail line at the time of the alleged taking and that they also own fee interests to the land under the right-of-way. Compl. ¶¶ 12–108. Plaintiffs further claim that the STB’s issuance of the NITU deprived them of their reversionary interest in the land by operation of the Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), for which they are allegedly entitled to just compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶ 112. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs filed their first complaint on October 25, 2022. See ECF No. 1. After several rounds of settlement discussions, the parties stipulated dismissal of several claims on July 1, 2024. See ECF No. 27 at 1. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint, which is the current operative Complaint. See Compl. Defendant answered the Third Amended Complaint on August 13, 2024, and denied its liability toward every Plaintiff. See ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 12–108. On November 5, 2024, the Court set a schedule for discovery, which included expert and fact discovery for the valuation of representative parcels. See ECF No. 34 at 1. On May 28, 2025, Defendant filed its Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 63 (Def. Mot.). On June 27, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Response opposing Defendant’s Motion. ECF No. 66 (Pl. Resp.). On July 28, 2025, Defendant filed a Reply in support of its Motion. ECF No. 67 (Def. Reply). The Court held oral argument on Defendant’s Motion on December 17, 2025. Minute Entry dated Dec. 17, 2025. On January 6, 2026, the Court granted limited additional discovery to Plaintiffs, as they had requested at the December 17, 2025, oral argument. ECF No. 78 (Discovery Order). The Discovery Order allowed Plaintiffs to conduct discovery into chains of title for certain parcels, for which Plaintiffs had relied upon the centerline presumption to establish their interests in the right- of-way. Id. at 1–2. In doing so, the Court exercised its discretion to ensure that all parties had a 11 sufficient opportunity to complete title-related discovery. See id. at 2. The Court also stayed Defendant’s Motion in the interim. Id. at 3. On January 9, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See ECF No. 79 (Rule 60 Motion). Plaintiffs sought three forms of relief from the Discovery Order: (1) an extension of time to gather chains of title for the non-representative parcels; (2) bifurcated proceedings on representative and non-representative parcels and modify the existing Discovery Order to apply only to the representative parcels; and (3) a decision on Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63), including on the centerline presumption, before Plaintiffs gathered chains of title for non-representative parcels. Rule 60 Mot. at 2. 6 On January 22, 2026, Defendant filed its Response in opposition (ECF No. 81) and on February 5, 2026, the Court conducted two hearings on the record concerning the Rule 60 Motion. See Minute Entries dated Feb. 5, 2026. During the afternoon hearing, the Court made several rulings on the record. See Feb. 5, 2026, PM Transcript. On February 6, 2025, the Court issued an order adjusting discovery schedules and ordering further summary judgment briefing, in accordance with its rulings on the record at the previous day’s afternoon hearing. ECF No. 82. The Court denied in part, without prejudice, Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 63) “only as to the arguments advanced in pages 22 through 36 of its Summary Judgment Motion with respect to the non-representative parcels identified in Groups C through H.” Id. at 1–2. The Court ordered the parties to propose schedules to complete discovery into chains of title and to file summary judgment motions concerning chains of title and the application of California’s centerline presumption. Id. at 2–3. 6 Citations throughout this Memorandum and Order correspond to the ECF-assigned page numbers, which do not always correspond to the pagination within the document. 12  On March 27, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Record Title Ownership of the Corridor for 8 Representative Plaintiffs. 7 ECF No. 91 (Pl. Mot.). On April 10, 2026, Defendant filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Chains of Title for Representative Parcels. ECF No. 92 (Def. Suppl. Mot.). On April 17, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Combined Response to Defendant’s Supplemental Motion and Reply in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion. ECF No. 94 (Pl. Suppl. Reply). On April 24, 2026, Defendant filed a Reply in support of Defendant’s Supplemental Motion. ECF No. 95 (Def. Suppl. Reply). The Court issued its first decision on Defendant’s original Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on September 8, 2026. Bewley I. LEGAL STANDARD I. Summary Judgment The Court may grant summary judgment if the pleadings, affidavits, and evidentiary materials filed in a case reveal that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC or Rule(s)) 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Facts are material if they “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine factual dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. A party seeking to establish a genuine dispute of material fact must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 7 As noted, the Court previously denied, without prejudice, arguments in Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 63) concerning the title ownership issues raised for Groups C through H “with respect to the non-representative parcels.” ECF No. 82 at 2. 13 declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Rule 56(c)(1)(A). While “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962), summary judgment may still be granted when the party opposing the motion submits evidence that “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations omitted). The Court may only grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita, Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). II. Rails-to-Trails Takings The Fifth Amendment requires the federal government to pay just compensation when it “requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land.” Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992) (emphasis in original); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (observing that the appropriation of a public easement across a private landowner's premises “constitute[s] the taking of a property interest”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). “Whether a [Fifth Amendment] taking has occurred is a question of law based on factual underpinnings.” Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “[T]he property rights protected by the Takings Clause are creatures of state law.” Cedar Point v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 155 (2021); see, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1353−55 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (analyzing the scope of appellant’s property interest under California law). Said differently, “existing rules and understandings and background principles derived from an independent source, such as state, federal, or common law, define the dimensions of the requisite property rights for purposes of 14 establishing a cognizable taking.” Fishermen’s Finest, Inc. v. United States, 59 F.4th 1269, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Acceptance Ins. Cos. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). The STB’s issuance of a NITU stays the abandonment of the covered rail right-of-way. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). If this occurs, the NITU is, in fact, interim in that relevant corridors remain available for future rail use. See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 8. Importantly, the interim trail use agreement also prevents corridors from being deemed abandoned under state law during the period of interim trail use. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 8. It is this preclusion of state-law abandonment that gives rise to takings claims. Id. at 9. A plaintiff is entitled to compensation after the STB’s issuance of a NITU if the plaintiff can demonstrate a “state law reversionary interest[]” in the land subject to the railroad right-of-way that is “effectively eliminated in connection with [the] conversion of [the] railroad right-of-way to trail use.” Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1228 (citing Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1543); see also Rogers v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The government must provide just compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause if the issuance of a NITU results in the taking of private property.”). DISCUSSION The Discussion proceeds in four parts, corresponding to the arguments raised in the various motions before the Court. First, the Court evaluates the centerline presumption in California law and its application to the deeds categorized in Groups E, F, and G in Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Supplemental Motion Summary Judgment also contain arguments relevant to the centerline presumption, which 15 the Court assesses. The Court concludes that each deed in Groups E, F, and G contains a description of the conveyed property that rebuts the centerline presumption. Second, the Court evaluates the arguments concerning the Group H deeds, which, Defendant argues, contain descriptions that explicitly exclude the land within the right-of-way from any conveyance. The Court agrees that the Group H deeds convey no interest to land within the right-of-way. Third, the Court assesses the chains of title that Plaintiffs have submitted as evidence for their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Under California law, the chains of title fail to establish any fee interest in the right-of-way for nine parcels and successfully establish a fee interest in the right-of-way for one parcel. Disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for the remaining four parcels at issue. Finally, where Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that they hold a fee interest in the right-of-way, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that even if there is no evidence that they hold a fee interest in the right-of-way, a disputed issue of material fact remains about who owns the fee interest in the right-of-way. As the Court discusses, Plaintiffs misunderstand the summary judgment standard. The question is not who owns the fee interest, but rather whether Plaintiffs can establish that they own a fee interest. Where Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of their ownership, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. I. Centerline Presumption The parties dispute the evidence required to rebut the centerline presumption in a deed’s metes-and-bounds description of a parcel’s boundaries. Defendant argues that, under California law, a metes-and-bounds description that does not include the right-of-way in the conveyed property can rebut the centerline presumption. In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that a metes-and- 16 bounds description that does not include an interest in the right-of-way is insufficient to rebut the centerline presumption. First, the Court evaluates California precedent concerning the rebuttal of the centerline presumption and determines that a metes-and-bounds description alone can rebut the centerline presumption, as Defendant correctly argues. Second, the Court analyzes whether the deeds in each of Groups E, F, and G contain language in their metes-and-bounds descriptions that California courts have previously held rebuts the centerline presumption. The Court finds that Defendant has rebutted the centerline presumption for all challenged deeds in Groups E, F, and G. A. California’s Centerline Presumption 1. Rebutting California’s Centerline Presumption The centerline presumption dictates that “[a] transfer of land, bounded by a highway, passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred to the soil of the highway in front to the center thereof, unless a different intent appears from the grant.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1112; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 831 (“An owner of land bounded by a road or street is presumed to own to the center of the way, but the contrary may be shown.”). California courts have extended the statute’s reference to “a highway” to railways, so that the buyer of land abutting a rail right-of-way is presumed to own to the centerline of the railroad. See Freeman v. Affiliated Prop. Craftsmen, 72 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364 (Cal. App. 1968). The presumption means that even a deed that includes a metes-and-bounds description of property can include the land underneath the right-of-way if the description “either directly or indirectly refers to the [right-of-way] as a boundary.” City of Redlands v. Nickerson, 10 Cal. Rptr. 431, 434 (Cal. App. 1961). This presumption is tied to the “monument rule” of deed descriptions: “[i]n the absence of any qualifying term, the designation in a conveyance of any physical object or monument as a boundary implies the middle or central 17 point of such boundary.” Faus v. Nelson, 50 Cal. Rptr. 483, 485 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). That means that a description’s reference to a right-of-way (without any modifier, such as a reference specifically to the sideline of the right-of-way) refers to the centerline of that right-of-way. Id. Thus, when a description states that a parcel is “bounded . . . on the north by the south side of Spring street”—the street, not the sideline of the street—the presumption applies, and the property “must be taken as carrying the title to . . . the center line of the street.” Brown v. Bachelder, 7 P.2d 1027, 1028 (Cal. 1932). In contrast, a reference to the sideline as a boundary is an essential distinction, as a reference to the sideline as a boundary is much more likely to rebut the centerline presumption. See id. The party seeking to rebut the presumption bears the burden of proof. See Taylor v. Cont’l S. Corp., 233 P.2d 577, 582 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951). The language used in a deed’s metes-and- bounds description can be sufficient proof to rebut the presumption. Millyard v. Faus, 73 Cal. Rptr. 697, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). For example, a description that says a property runs “to” or “along” the sideline of a right-of-way can rebut the presumption, whereas a description saying a property runs “along” the right-of-way itself (not the sideline) will more likely invoke the presumption. Warden v. S. Pasadena Realty & Improvement Co., 174 P. 26, 27 (Cal. 1918); see also Sutton v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 436, 441 (2012) (“[W]here a deed contains a description of property extending a boundary to the edge of a road or railroad corridor, the center line presumption is rebutted.”). California courts have repeatedly held that the presumption will be rebutted if a description of the property “uses a side line of the street, rather than the street itself, as a boundary.” Speer v. Blasker, 15 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); see Berton v. All Persons, 170 P. 151, 153 (Cal. 1917) (presumption rebutted when description stated property ran 18 “along” sideline of street); Severy v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 51 Cal. 194, 197 (1875) (presumption rebutted when description said property line ran “along the easterly line” of a right-of-way). Plaintiffs argue that the text of a deed alone is insufficient evidence to rebut the centerline presumption: “even where a legal description describes a right of way as a boundar