ALEXANDER v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS ______________________________________ ) RALPH ALEXANDER, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) No. 15-2111 ) v. ) Filed: June 26, 2026 ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ______________________________________ ) OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs in this long-running rails-to-trails litigation own land adjacent to a 144-mile former rail line, commonly known as the Rock Island Line, in Missouri. Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on the issue of title relating to 10 representative claims that, in Plaintiffs’ view, support a finding that the Government is liable for a taking of Plaintiffs’ property in connection with the Government’s conversion of the rail line to a public recreational trail. The Government cross-moves for partial summary judgment on the same issue for the same claims. The sole question presented to the Court is whether the original source deeds associated with these 10 claims conveyed each relevant land parcel to the railroad in fee simple or whether they merely conveyed easements. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Government’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. I. BACKGROUND For purposes of the present motions, the parties do not dispute the underlying facts at issue. See Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 4, ECF No. 57; Gov’t’s Resp. & Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 4, ECF No. 58. This opinion presumes the reader’s familiarity with the factual background summarized in the Court’s summary judgment opinion and order in the related action of Abbott v. United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 445 (2022), covering claims for the same rail line. Accordingly, the Court will summarize only the additional background information relevant to resolution of the question at issue here. A. The Representative Deeds The parties identify 18 source deeds relevant to determining the property interests that were originally conveyed to the St. Louis, Kansas City & Colorado Railroad Company (“the Railroad”), which constructed the rail line in the early 20th century. See Joint App. of Source Deeds at 1–2, ECF No. 56-1; see also Abbott, 162 Fed. Cl. at 450 (describing history of rail line ownership). Plaintiffs rely on 16 of those deeds to support their claim that the Railroad acquired only easements for a railroad right of way across, over, and through the relevant parcels. See ECF No. 56-1 at 1– 2; ECF No. 57 at 4–5. The Government disagrees with Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the source deeds and, in turn, cites two additional deeds as support for its claim that the Railroad acquired fee simple title. See ECF No. 56-1 at 1–2; ECF No. 58 at 9–10, 13–14. Descriptions of the source deeds underlying each claim follow. 1. Deed Underlying Claim 1 Claim 1, brought by Plaintiff Brockman Family Trust, concerns a property parcel in Benton County identified in the Mehrtens deed (86-91).1 See ECF No. 56-1 at 1. That deed, entered into on August 21, 1901, provides that “the said parties” Jacob and Anna Mehrtens “for and in 1 In their Joint Appendix, the parties provided deed numbers for the deeds underlying Plaintiffs’ claims, which the Court includes parenthetically throughout this Opinion and Order. See ECF No. 56-1 at 1–2. Also attached to the Joint Appendix are copies of the source deeds. See generally ECF No. 56-2. Quotes from the deeds come from the parties’ joint deed transcriptions. See generally ECF No. 61-1. 2 consideration of Sixty five dollars, to [them] paid by” the Railroad “do by these presents, grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm, unto” the Railroad “the following described real estate situated in the county of Benton and State of Missouri, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railroad of said Company[.]” Source Deed Transcriptions at 2, ECF No. 61-1 (first alteration in original). The deed continues: “And also the right of entry across adjacent land of the undersigned [Mehrtens] for purposes of construction of said railroad with free and undisturbed ingress and egress to said railroad.” Id. The deed’s habendum clause states that the Mehrtens “will warrant and defend the title to the said premises unto the said party of the second part, and unto its successors and assigns forever, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.” Id. 2. Deeds Underlying Claim 2 Claim 2, also brought by Plaintiff Brockman Family Trust, concerns a nearby property parcel in Benton County. See ECF No. 56-1 at 1. Two deeds are relevant here: the Meier deed (84-370) and Meyer deed (86-157). See id. The Meier deed, recorded in probate court on October 4, 1902, Copies of Source Deeds at 5, ECF No. 56-2, evinces a conveyance on May 12, 1902, by John Meier on behalf of William and Otto Meier, two minors (“the Meier minors”), of “all the right, title and interest” of the Meier minors to the Railroad “[i]n consideration of the premises, and of the said sum of Forty four Dollars and forty five Cents.” ECF No. 61-1 at 4. That title was “described, as follows: The undivided 2/8 interest in a strip of land one hundred feet wide and having a uniform width of fifty feet on each side of the center line” of the railroad “for right of way purposes.” Id. The deed’s habendum clause provides that the Railroad would hold such privileges and appurtenances “forever.” Id. 3  The Meyer deed, acknowledged on August 16, 1902, see ECF No. 56-2 at 7, covers the same parcel of land and states that the Meyer parties “for and in consideration of One Hundred and Fifty five . . . dollars [and 55 cents] . . . do by these presents, grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm, unto” the Railroad “the following described real estate”: “A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railroad of said company.” ECF No. 61-1 at 6. The parties to the deed agreed that “[t]his deed is made in lieu of all other right of way deeds made between said parties before this time.” Id. 3. Deeds Underlying Claim 3 Claim 3, brought by Plaintiff Hartsfield Revocable Trust, concerns a property parcel in Franklin County that is the subject of four deeds. ECF No. 56-1 at 1. The Roller deed (30-509), executed on August 31, 1886; Booth deed (53-609), entered into on February 25, 1901; Whitlock deed (53-354), dated September 13, 1900; and Fischer deed (53-349), signed on September 12, 1900, all convey some property interest in the underlying parcel. See id.; ECF No. 61-1 at 8–14. The Roller deed confirms that Jacob and Eliza Roller intended to “grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm, unto” the Railroad “all that piece or parcel of land having a strip of land one hundred [100] feet in width” in “consideration of 15 dollars and the building[,] maintaining[,] and operating of a Railroad.” ECF No. 61-1 at 8 (first alteration in original). The deed continues: “And the [Rollers] agree further that the Railroad Company . . . may be allowed to encroach upon the adjoining lands outside of the limit above mentioned, over which the [Rollers] have title, for the purpose of completing its cuts and fills or for any purpose of drainage or change of channel during construction” for as long as the company maintained and operated its railroad. Id. The parties “expressly . . . agreed, however, that the title in fee simple acquired by [the Railroad] shall be confined to the strip of land first above mentioned.” Id. 4  The Booth, Whitlock, and Fischer deeds each contain a primary conveyance and a secondary conveyance. In each of the three deeds, the primary conveyance of the land underlying the main rail line is described as the grantor’s “undivided . . . interest in a strip of land,” without further qualification. Id. at 10 (Booth deed); see also id. at 12 (Whitlock deed); id. at 14 (Fischer deed). The secondary conveyances in each of the deeds grant “also a strip of land fifty (50) feet wide . . . adjacent to the foregoing described right of way, to be used for extra [right] of way.” Id. at 10 (Booth deed); see also id. at 12 (Whitlock deed); id. at 14 (Fischer deed). 4. Deed Underlying Claim 4 Claim 4, brought by Plaintiffs Wade and Heather Eberlin, concerns a property parcel in Franklin County identified in the Brinkmeyer deed (53-293). See ECF No. 56-1 at 1. The deed, entered into on August 18, 1900, provides that William and Mary Brinkmeyer intended, “for and in consideration of Seventy five Dollars, . . . [to] grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto” the Railroad “the following described real estate”: “A strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the centre line of the railroad.” ECF No. 61-1 at 16. The Brinkmeyers further conveyed “also the additional right of way as follows”: “A strip of land fifty (50) feet wide on the south side of the above described right of way and adjacent thereto[.]” Id. The deed contains a standard habendum clause assigning all rights, immunities, privileges, and appurtenances of the property parcel to the Railroad “forever.” Id. 5. Deed Underlying Claim 5 Claim 5, brought by Plaintiffs Darryl and Kathryn Harms, concerns a property parcel in Benton County identified in the Intelmann deed (86-168). See ECF No. 56-1 at 1. The deed, entered into on June 30, 1902, provides that Jurgen Intelmann intended, “for and in consideration of Five Hundred ten Dollars, . . . [to] grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm, unto” the 5 Railroad “the following described real estate”: “A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railroad.” ECF No. 61-1 at 18. The deed conveyed an additional interest: “a strip fifty feet [wide] on each side and adjacent to the right of way aforesaid” for “the purpose of cuttings and embankments necessary for the proper construction and security of said railroad across the tracts of land described aforesaid.” Id. (alteration in original). The deed contains a standard habendum clause. See id. 6. Deeds Underlying Claim 6 Claim 6, brought by Plaintiffs Gary and Donna Kranz, concerns a property parcel in Benton County that is the subject of three deeds: the Inselman deed (86-29), Inselmann deed (84-600), and Bockelman deed (88-87). See ECF No. 56-1 at 1. The Inselman deed, entered into on August 20, 1901, confirms that Jost Inselman intended, “in consideration of Ten Dollars,” to “grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm, unto” the Railroad “the following described Real Estate”: “A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railroad of said Company[.]” ECF No. 61-1 at 20. Mr. Inselman conveyed “also the right of entry across adjacent land of the undersigned for purposes of construction of said railroad with free and undisturbed ingress and egress to said railroad.” Id. The deed contains a standard habendum clause. See id. The Inselmann deed, recorded on April 7, 1903, provides that Jost Inselmann and his wife did, “in consideration of the sum of One Hundred and Seventy-Two & 25/100 ($172.25) Dollars,” “grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto” the Railroad “[a] strip of land one hundred and fifty [150] feet wide on the south side of and parallel with the right of way of the route and line” of the Railroad. Id. at 22 (second alteration in original). The Inselmanns also conveyed “a strip of land fifty [50] feet wide on the North side of and parallel with [and] adjacent to the right of way 6 of the route and line of the railroad right of way[.]” Id. (first and second alterations in original). The habendum clause indicates that the Inselmanns did “hereby covenant, promise and agree” that, at the time of the sale, the Inselmanns were “lawfully seized in their own right, of an absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance in fee simple” of the described parcel. Id. The Bockelman deed, entered into on May 21, 1903, confirms that Peter and Dina Bockelman intended to “grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto” the Railroad “[a] strip of land one hundred and fifty [150] feet wide parallel with, adjacent to and on the South side of the right of way of the route and line of” the Railroad. Id. at 24 (second alteration in original). The Bockelmans further conveyed “a strip of land fifty feet [50] wide on the North side . . . parallel with and adjacent to the right of way of the railroad;” “2 strips of land 30 feet wide parallel with and adjacent to the right of way of said railroad,” one on the north side and one on the south side; and “one strip of land 30 ft wide parallel with and adjacent to the right of way of said railroad” on the north side. Id. (alteration in original). Like the Inselmann deed, the Bockelman deed warranted in the habendum clause that, at the time of the conveyance, the Bockelmans were “lawfully seized in their own right, of an absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in fee simple, of and in all and singular the above granted and described premises.” Id. 7. Deeds Underlying Claim 7 Claim 7, brought by Plaintiffs Lyle and Linda Browning, concerns a property parcel in Benton County that is the subject of two deeds: the first Willis deed (86-159) and second Willis deed (86-243). See ECF No. 56-1 at 1. The first Willis deed, entered into on July 25, 1902, confirms that, for “Three Hundred and Ninety Dollars,” J.W. and M.L. Willis did “grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto” the Railroad “[a] strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, 7 having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railroad.” ECF No. 61-1 at 26. The deed contains a standard habendum clause. See id. The second Willis deed, entered into on September 2, 1902, provides that J.W. and M.L. Willis intended to “grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm” to the Railroad an interest in land alongside the strip conveyed in the first Willis deed. Id. at 28. Specifically, the deed characterizes the main rail line—the land identified in the first Willis deed—as “the right of way of the St. L., K.C. & Colo. RR.” Id. The two strips of land conveyed in the second Willis deed are each identified with respect to their location and adjacency to the Railroad’s right of way. Id. (“A strip of land . . . joining the North side of the right of way of the [Railroad] at about station 2469 thence Southeast along said right of way . . . and a strip of land on the South side of said right of way . . . .”). The deed also conveyed “for the purpose of cuttings and embankments necessary for the proper construction and security of said railroad” an interest in “such additional strips or parcels of land as may be necessary for that purpose.” Id. The deed contains a standard habendum clause. See id. 8. Deed Underlying Claim 8 Claim 8, brought by Plaintiffs Clyde and Emma Zelch, concerns a property parcel in Gasconade County that is the subject of the Idel deed (25-632). See ECF No. 56-1 at 1. The Idel deed, entered into on October 20, 1900, provides that Philip, Wilhelmena, William, and August Idel, “for and in consideration of Two Hundred Dollars,” did “grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto” the Railroad “the following described real estate”: “A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet wide on each [side] of the center line of the Railroad.” ECF No. 61-1 at 30 (alteration in original). The deed notes that August Idel “join[ed] in this deed for the purpose of releasing the above described right of way from [the] Deed 8 of Trust held by him on above described tracts of land.” Id. (second alteration in original). The deed contains a standard habendum clause. See id. 9. Deed Underlying Claim 9 Claim 9, brought by Plaintiffs James and Delores Walker, concerns a property parcel in Gasconade County that is the subject of the Diestelkamp deed (27-40). See ECF No. 56-1 at 1. The Diestelkamp deed, entered into on November 28, 1900, confirms that Henry and Lydia Diestelkamp, “for and in consideration of One Hundred and Twenty Five Dollars,” did “grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto” the Railroad “[a] strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the Railroad.” ECF No. 61-1 at 32. The document further provides that “[t]his deed is intended to take place of former deed of right of way, executed by said Henry Diestelkamp and wife to said Railroad Company, made in 1888.” Id. The deed contains a standard habendum clause. See id. 10. Deeds Underlying Claim 10 Claim 10, brought by Plaintiff Doris Moore, concerns a property parcel in Cole County that is the subject of two deeds: the Holzer deed (24-462) and Hoskins deed (24-461). See ECF No. 56-1 at 2. The Holzer deed, entered into on June 19, 1901, provides that John and Mary Holzer, for “Seventy five Dollars,” did “grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto” the Railroad “[a] strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railroad.” ECF No. 61-1 at 34. The deed continues: “The grantors further convey the right of way across a strip of land [25] [feet] wide . . . or so much of the same as is required as the road is now located.” Id. (first alteration in original). “And,” the deed states, “for the purpose of cuttings and embankments necessary for the proper construction and security of said railroad across the tracts of land described aforesaid, such additional strips or 9 parcels of land as may be necessary for that purpose[.]” Id. The Holzers further conveyed “also the right of entry across adjacent lands of the undersigned for purposes of construction of said railroad with free and undisturbed ingress and egress to said railroad.” Id. The deed contains a standard habendum clause. See id. The Hoskins deed contains similar language. Entered into on July 12, 1901, the deed confirms that T.J. and Ann Hoskins conveyed, for “eight hundred and twenty five dollars,” “[a] strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railroad[.]” Id. at 36. The Hoskins further conveyed “also the right of entry across adjacent land of the undersigned for purposes of construction of said railroad with free and undisturbed ingress and egress to said railroad.” Id. The deed contains a standard habendum clause. See id. B. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on March 2, 2015, as part of the Abbott case. See Pls.’ Compl., Abbott v. United States, No. 15-211, ECF No. 1. The Complaint was subsequently amended three times. See Pls.’ Am. Compl., Abbott ECF No. 7; Pls.’ Second Am. Compl., Abbott ECF No. 14; Pls.’ Third Am. Compl., Abbott ECF No. 27. Following a change of counsel, the Court severed Plaintiffs from Abbott into this separate action, Order to Sever Pls. and Claims, Abbott ECF No. 94, although the operative complaint as to Plaintiffs remains docketed in the Abbott case. The Court resolved cross-motions for partial summary judgment in Abbott on September 28, 2022, holding that (1) disputed issues of fact precluded judgment on some claims, see 162 Fed. Cl. at 458–59; (2) the bulk of deeds at issue conveyed easements to the Railroad, in part because some deeds conveyed interests “for right of way,” id. at 459–62; (3) the Railroad’s easements did not contemplate trail use under Missouri law, see id. at 463–67; and (4) the 10 Government conceded that the Abbott plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on certain claims, see id. at 467. Plaintiffs in this case proceeded separately, first conferring in an attempt to resolve the issue of liability without the Court’s intervention. See, e.g., Aug. 2021 Joint Status Report at 1, ECF No. 17; Mar. 2022 Joint Status Report at 1, ECF No. 24; Nov. 2024 Joint Status Report at 1, ECF No. 51. On February 4, 2025, the parties indicated that, while they had reached agreement on the liability question for a substantial number of claims, they planned to seek summary judgment on more than 100 claims as to the threshold issue of whether the source deeds underlying the claims conveyed easements or fee simple ownership to the Railroad. See Feb. 2025 Joint Status Report at 1–2, ECF No. 54. Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on March 4, 2025, see ECF No. 57, and the Government responded and filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 1, 2025, see ECF No. 58. As noted above, the parties agree that the Court’s summary judgment opinion in Abbott governs the factual and legal landscape at issue in this related litigation. See ECF No. 57 at 4; ECF No. 58 at 4. The motions are ripe for resolution. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Summary Judgment This Court must grant judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims. A “material” fact is a fact that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine” dispute exists when a factfinder could reasonably resolve the dispute “in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. Where parties cross-move for summary judgment, “each motion is evaluated on its own 11 merits and reasonable inferences are resolved against the party whose motion is being considered.” Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 586 F.3d 962, 968–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009). B. Rails-to-Trails Takings “It is settled law that a Fifth Amendment taking occurs in Rails-to-Trails cases when government action destroys state-defined property rights by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if trail use is outside the scope of the original railway easement.” Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The “threshold question” that the Court must answer in such cases is “whether the claimant has a compensable property interest in the land allegedly taken.” Chi. Coating Co., LLC v. United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Preseault v. Interstate Com. Comm’n (Preseault I), 494 U.S. 1, 16 (1990)). That question is “often answered by analyzing the original deeds that conveyed the property to the railroad.” Id. Rails-to-trails cases proceed according to a well-trodden analytical path: (1) the Court must determine “who owns the strip of land involved,” which requires determining whether the railroad originally acquired only an easement or obtained a fee simple estate; (2) “if the railroad acquired only an easement,” the Court then determines whether the terms of the easement were limited only to railroad purposes or whether the easement might include future use like a public recreational trail; and (3) if the easement was broad enough to include trail use, the Court finally considers whether the easement “terminated prior to the alleged taking so that the property owner at the time held a fee simple unencumbered by the easement.” Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Preseault v. United States (Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The determination of whether the initial transfer conveyed merely an easement or a fee simple interest requires looking to state law, which “creates and defines the scope of the 12 reversionary or other real property interests.” Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 20 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1534–40 (relying on state law to determine what interests were conveyed by the transfers at issue). The parties here agree that the only question for the Court to decide at this stage is the first step of the analysis: whether the cited deeds transferred fee simple or easement interests to the Railroad. See ECF No. 57 at 4; ECF No. 58 at 4. Because all the relevant property is located in Missouri, Missouri state law governs. See Abbott, 162 Fed. Cl. at 456. C. Missouri Law In Missouri, “[r]ailroads may hold, purchase, or convey the fee in land.” Schuermann Enters., Inc. v. St. Louis Cnty., 436 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Mo. 1969). “[F]or a deed to convey fee interest to a railroad the language in the deed must be clear.” Moore v. United States (Dorothy Moore), 58 Fed. Cl. 134, 136 (2003). A fee simple transfer is clearly intended “when the acquisition is by general warranty deed,” “for a valuable consideration,” and “without any restriction on the quantum of title conveyed.” Schuermann, 436 S.W.2d at 668; see also Nigro v. Ashley, 690 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Schuermann for the “elements” that “must appear” for a deed to convey fee simple title to the railroad). “Missouri courts have long favored interpreting grants to railroad companies as easements,” rather than fee simple estates. Dorothy Moore, 58 Fed. Cl. at 136 (collecting cases). Thus, if the railroad’s “acquisition is for right of way only, whether by condemnation, voluntary grant or conveyance in fee upon a valuable consideration, the railroad takes only an easement over the land and not the fee.” Schuermann, 436 S.W.2d at 668 (citing Brown v. Weare, 152 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Mo. 1941)); see also G.M. Morris Boat Co. v. Bishop, 631 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he expression or limitation of the use to which the property is to be put is a decisive 13 factor in determining if [the conveyance] is an easement or the grant of a fee.”). The use of the term “[r]ight of way” in a deed is not alone dispositive; the phrase “has been accorded two meanings in railroad parlance–the strip of land upon which the tract is laid [] and the legal right to use such strip.” Schuermann, 436 S.W.2d at 669. “[W]here the interest conveyed is limited to right of way or for right of way,” the Missouri Supreme Court has held that “the estate conveyed is an easement only.” Id. (emphases added). Accordingly, “Missouri courts will look to three factors to determine whether a deed passes title to a railroad in fee simple or merely grants a railroad an easement: ‘(1) whether the deed includes language conveying a “right of way;” (2) the amount of consideration; and (3) language in the deed limiting the use of the land for railroad purposes.’” Abbott, 162 Fed. Cl. at 457 (first quoting Moore v. Mo. Friends of Wabash Trace Nature Trail, Inc. (Danny Moore), 991 S.W.2d 681, 685–86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (footnote omitted); and then citing Nigro, 690 S.W.2d at 417). In determining a property interest’s scope, Missouri courts look to “the deed by which title is transferred,” Nigro, 690 S.W.2d at 417, “to ascertain the intention of the parties,” Hinshaw v. M-C-M Props., LLC, 450 S.W.3d 823, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). In doing so, the Court must consider “all the words of the deed within its four corners.” Lloyd v. Garren, 366 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Mo. 1963). If the deed “shows on its face that it includes the entire agreement and expresses all the obligations assumed by the parties thereto,” then “in the absence of fraud or mistake, parol evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, modify, or contradict the terms of the written contract.” J.B. Colt Co. v. Gregor, 44 S.W.2d 2, 6 (Mo. 1931); see also Cravens v. Jolly, 623 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (applying the parol evidence rule to exclude testimonial evidence of a grantor’s intent in using a warranty deed to convey land). 14  III. DISCUSSION The parties agree that each cited deed states valuable consideration and includes language indicative of a fee simple conveyance (e.g., “grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm”). The primary dispute is whether the deeds’ inclusion of the phrases “right of way” or “right of entry” constitutes a limitation on the use of the land at issue such that the interest conveyed to the Railroad was only an easement. Plaintiffs argue that this Court’s decision in Abbott stands for the proposition that any inclusion of the phrase “right of way” in a deed to a railroad is dispositive evidence of an easement. See ECF No. 57 at 6; id. at 4–5 (including a table identifying how the deeds use the phrase “right of way”). Because the relevant deeds presented for the 10 claims include such references, Plaintiffs contend that they all convey easements. See id. The Government responds that, per Abbott and other Court of Federal Claims opinions, references to the phrase “right of way” can either describe the strip of land being conveyed in fee or limit the quantum of title conveyed, depending on the context of the reference. See ECF No. 58 at 6–7; Gov’t’s Reply at 2, ECF No. 60. According to the Government, all 10 claims at issue involve deeds falling into the first category. See ECF No. 58 at 6–7. The Government has the better reading of the case law, with exceptions noted below, but the Court does not agree with the Government’s application of the law to all the deeds at issue. The Court takes each claim in turn. A. The Primary Conveyance of the Deed Underlying Claim 1 Was for Fee Simple Title. As this Court previously held in Abbott, where a secondary conveyance refers to the primary conveyance as a “right of way,” or where the deed refers to the secondary conveyance as being “for extra right of way,” the language limits the quantum of title primarily conveyed. 162 Fed. Cl. at 461–62 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs attempt to extend that holding to the Mehrtens 15 deed (86-91), but the deed shares no similar indicia that the grantors intended to convey merely an easement in the primary conveyance. The Mehrtens deed primarily conveyed “[a] strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide.” ECF No. 61-1 at 2. The primary conveyance contains no reference to “right of way.” See id. The deed then describes a secondary conveyance: “And also the right of entry across adjacent land of the undersigned for purposes of construction of said railroad with free and undisturbed ingress and egress to said railroad.” Id. The parties do not dispute that the secondary conveyance is an easement. See ECF No. 57 at 7; ECF No. 58 at 7. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the use of the word “also” indicates that the quantum of title of the primary interest conveyed must have the same scope as the secondary interest conveyed. See ECF No. 57 at 7. In Plaintiffs’ view, the plain meaning of “also” clearly confirms that the grantor intended to grant a secondary easement “in addition” to an easement granted in the primary conveyance. See id. (emphasis omitted). But Plaintiffs provide no support for why the word “also” indicates that the purpose-limiting language in the secondary conveyance—i.e., “right of entry” and “for purpose of construction of said railroad”—should also apply to the primary conveyance. Indeed, the Court takes the opposite reading. Using the word “also” to introduce the secondary conveyance makes clear that the secondary conveyance describes an interest “in addition” to—and, correspondingly, independent from—the primary interest conveyed. See Also, Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/also_adv (last visited June 23, 2026) (third definition, in use from the year 1200 A.D. to present). The word “also” differs from “extra,” which as the Court found in Abbott, impliedly refers back to the primary conveyance as being a transfer of the same type of property interest. See 162 Fed. Cl. at 461–62; see also Extra, Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/extra_adj (last visited June 23, 2026) 16 (defining the word to mean “[b]eyond or more than the usual, stipulated, or specified amount or number; additional,” i.e., modifying a “specified amount or number” with more of the same). Because the primary conveyance in the Mehrtens deed neither limits itself to a “right of way” nor includes any purpose-limiting language, it conveyed fee simple title to the 100-foot strip of land. See Abbott, 162 Fed. Cl. at 457; Brown, 152 S.W.2d at 652; Schuermann, 436 S.W.2d at 668. The reference to “right of entry” in the second conveyance does not alter that conclusion. Accordingly, the Court grants the Government’s request for partial summary judgment on Claim 1. It denies Plaintiffs’ corresponding partial summary judgment request, except the Court holds that the second conveyance in the Mehrtens deed grants an easement.2 B. The Later Deed Underlying Claim 2 Conveyed Fee Simple Title and Replaced the Earlier Easement Deed. The parties agree that the Meier deed (84-370) conveyed an easement to the Railroad by granting an “interest in a strip of land one hundred feet wide and having a uniform width of fifty feet on each side of the center line of the Railroad . . . for right of way purposes.” ECF No. 61-1 at 4; see ECF No. 57 at 8; ECF No. 58 at 8. The dispute centers on the later Meyer deed (86-157), 2 Plaintiffs urge the Court to make holdings with respect to any secondary conveyances that granted easements to the Railroad, claiming that they could be relevant “[t]o the extent any portion of the recreational trail encroaches on the secondary easement.” ECF No. 59 at 6 n.1 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs accuse the Government of failing to provide “any evidence to demonstrate that is not the case,” id. (emphasis in original); however, Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence to show that is the case. Per the operative complaint, the alleged taking at issue pertains to the “abandoned railroad right-of-way” subject to the Surface Transportation Board’s Notice of Interim Trail Use order. Abbott ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 16, 21. That order only applies to a 144.3-mile segment of the railroad corridor. Pls.’ Third Am. Compl., Ex. 14 at 8, Abbott ECF No. 27-5. It is unclear to the Court whether any secondary conveyances in the deeds at issue (primarily for sidetrack) comprise land underlying the rail line that was converted to trail use. Additionally, the question of the interest transferred by many of the secondary conveyances in the deeds at issue is not disputed. In any event, as a matter of efficiency in case a need arises in the future, the Court will issue holdings per Plaintiffs’ request. 17 which conveyed “[a] strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, having a uniform width of fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railroad.” ECF No. 61-1 at 6. This subsequent deed expressly stated that it was “made in lieu of all other right of way deeds made between said parties before this time.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that use of the term “in lieu of” illustrates that the grantor intended to “substitute rather than eliminate that prior right of way deed granting an easement.” ECF No. 57 at 8 (emphases in original). In other words, the later deed is also a right of way deed. Viewing the later deed as a substitution, however, does not demonstrate that it continues to incorporate the purpose-limiting language of the prior right of way deed. Unlike in the earlier deed, the description of the property interest conveyed in the second deed does not mention “right of way” or limit the conveyance to “right of way” or “for right of way.” ECF No. 61-1 at 6; see Abbott, 162 Fed. Cl. at 457, 463; Schuermann, 436 S.W.2d at 668. It merely describes a strip of land and provides the geographical boundaries of that strip. See ECF No. 61-1 at 6. The reference to “all other right of way deeds”—i.e., prior deeds—cannot itself be construed to limit the quantum of title contained in this deed. Instead, the deeds together demonstrate that in May 1902 the Meier minors (through their guardian and curator, John Meier) conveyed to the Railroad an easement over their partial undivided interest in the strip of land at issue, whereas in August 1902 several grantors (including John Meyer) conveyed the same strip of land in fee simple to the Railroad. Id. at 4, 6. As the Government points out, Missouri law dictates that when a “greater estate and a lesser [estate] coincide and meet in one and the same person, in one and the same right,” the lesser estate merges into the greater estate. ECF No. 58 at 9 (quoting Curry v. La Fon, 113 S.W. 246, 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908)); see also St. Charles Cnty. v. Laclede Gas Co., 356 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Mo. 2011) (the 18 doctrine of merger applies where there is “unity of title and unity of possession”); Morgan v. York, 91 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936) (explaining that “where the legal ownership of the land and the absolute ownership of the incumbrance become vested in the same person, the intention governs the merger in equity” (quoting Dent v. Matthews, 213 S.W. 141, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919))). In this context, using “in lieu of” means, as the Government argues, that the Meyer deed (86-157) subsumed or overrode the Meier deed (84-370), thus resulting in a merger of an earlier easement interest and later fee simple interest.3 See ECF No. 58 at 9. Accordingly, the Court grants the Government’s request for partial summary judgment on Claim 2 and denies Plaintiffs’ corresponding partial summary judgment request. C. Three of the Deeds Underlying Claim 3 Conveyed Easements, and One Conveyed a Fee Interest. The parties do not dispute the legal interpretation of each of the four deeds related to Claim 3. Plaintiffs argue that three deeds—the Booth deed (53-609), Whitlock deed (53-354), and Fischer deed (53-349)—conveyed easements. See ECF No. 57 at 9. The Government agrees for the pur