BEWLEY v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims ROSS BEWLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, No. 22-cv-1589 v. Filed: September 8, 2026 THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. Reed W. Ripley of Stewart, Wald, & Smith, LLC, Kansas City, MO, appeared for Plaintiffs. With him on the briefs were Thomas S. Stewart of Stewart, Wald, & Smith, LLC, Kansas City, MO, and Steven M. Wald and Michael J. Smith of Stewart, Wald, & Smith, LLC, St. Louis, MO. Kyle Lyons-Burke of the United States Department of Justice, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C. appeared for Defendant. With him on the briefs were Adam R.F. Gustafson and Taylor Gamm, of the United States Department of Justice, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER More than a century ago, the North Coast Railroad Authority’s (NCRA’s or railroad’s) predecessors in interest purchased the rights to build and operate a railroad running through Mendocino, Trinity, and Humboldt counties in California. Throughout the twentieth century, railroad traffic declined, and in 1989, the State of California created the North Coast Railroad Authority to purchase railroads that would otherwise seek to abandon rail lines or discontinue service. North Coast Railroad Authority Act, § 1, 1989 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1085 (West). Eventually, trains stopped running on this line, and California decided to convert the rail right-of-way into a trail for pedestrians and bicyclists. On October 24, 2022, the Federal Surface Transportation Board (STB) issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) and approved the State’s plan to transform the disused rail line into a trail, pursuant to Section 8(d) of the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Plaintiffs contend that, at the time of the NITU, they held fee title or reversionary interests in the land underneath the railroad right-of-way. 1 Plaintiffs allege the STB’s trail agreement was a taking that deprived them of their interest in the land by operation of the Trails Act, for which they are allegedly entitled to just compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. Pending before the Court is the United States’ (Defendant’s) Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, which challenges the ability of certain Plaintiffs to prove that they owned a property interest at the time the rail line converted to recreational trail use. ECF No. 63 (Motion). The parties do not dispute that the NITU effected a taking of privately held reversionary interests in the right-of-way. Instead, the parties dispute whether the Plaintiffs hold reversionary interests. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63). BACKGROUND I. Railroad Regulation and the Trails Act In the nineteenth century, railroads were a new technology that provided “a fast and reliable way to transport people and property to those frontier lands” in the western United States. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 572 U.S. 93, 96 (2014). As railroads expanded their rights-of-way across the United States around the end of the nineteenth century, they acquired a variety of property interests through several types of transactions. Preseault v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (Preseault I). Generally, “rights-of-way were created by voluntary 1 A right-of-way is a strip of land over which a railroad holds a legal interest to lay track and run trains. See Right-of-Way, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). A right-of-way is wider than the tracks and includes the entire parcel of land which the railroad can use. 2 conveyance or through condemnation proceedings.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 850 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Railroads acquired, in different places, either fee simple absolute interests to rights-of-way (which include the entire full rights to use and possess the rights-of-way), or more limited property interests, which often “are specifically limited to railroad use and may revert to the original owner (or a successor in interest) if railroad use is discontinued.” Id. Where a railroad acquired a more limited property interest, it often held an easement or a defeasible fee. See id. During the second half of the twentieth century, the United States began to experience a sharp reduction in rail trackage. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 5. In response, Congress enacted several laws, including the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241–1251, to address the loss of trackage. See id. The Trails Act, as amended, provides for the preservation of “established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service” by authorizing the interim use of such rights-of-way 2 as recreational and historical trails. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). This process is referred to as “railbanking.” Memmer v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 706, 713 (2020). Section 1247(d) states in relevant part Consistent with the purposes of [the Trails Act], and in furtherance of the national policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of way pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent with this chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. 2 A right-of-way is the land on which “the railroad had obtained a property interest allowing it to operate its equipment over the land involved.” Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Preseault II). A railroad can hold different property interests in a right-of-way, including fee simple or an easement. See id. at 1533. 3 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Railroads and their “construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance,” including the railbanking process, fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board). 3 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). Its authority over railroads is exclusive, Congress has stated that “the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.” Id. The railbanking process works as follows. First, a rail carrier proposing to abandon any part of its rail line must either file an application to abandon pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10903 or file a notice of exemption to abandon the line proceedings pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10502. Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Pursuant to Section 10903, a railroad company that initiates abandonment proceedings may only abandon its line “if the Board finds that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or permit the abandonment or discontinuance.” 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d). A rail carrier is exempt from Section 10903 if the carrier files a notice of exemption with the STB in accordance with Section 10502 and the accompanying regulations. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50, a carrier petitioning for exemption must certify that “no local traffic has moved over the line for at least 2 years” and meet other specified criteria. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50(a)-(b), (d)(1). 3 Congress initially conferred exclusive and plenary authority on the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate most railroad lines in the United States in the Transportation Act of 1920. Pub. L. No. 66-152, § 402, 41 Stat. 476-78. In 1995, Congress enacted the ICC Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C., including 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-16106), abolishing the ICC and establishing the STB. Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine. Cent. R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 197 (1st Cir. 2000). Under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b), Congress gave the STB exclusive jurisdiction over transportation service by rail carriers, including abandonment or discontinuance of services. 4  Upon receiving these certifications, the STB must publish a notice in the Federal Register within 20 days noting the submission. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50(d)(2)-(3). The purpose of the Federal Register notice is to “alert the public that following any abandonment of rail service and salvage of the line, the line may be suitable for other public uses, including interim trail use.” Id. § 1152.50(d)(3). If the prospective trail sponsor assumes responsibility for the right-of-way’s management and legal liability and the rail carrier agrees to negotiate an interim trail use agreement, the STB will issue a Certificate of Interim Trail Use (CITU) (if proceeding under 49 U.S.C. § 10903) or a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU) (if proceeding under 49 U.S.C. § 10502). See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29. As is relevant in this case, a NITU acts to “permit the railroad to discontinue service, cancel any applicable tariffs, and salvage track and materials, consistent with interim trail use and rail banking . . . ; and permit the railroad to fully abandon the line if no agreement is reached within one year from the date on which the NITU is issued, subject to appropriate conditions . . . .” Id. at § 1152.29(d)(1). The Board will entertain requests to extend the 180-day deadline to enable further negotiations. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1)(ii). If the negotiations lead to a trail use agreement between the railroad company and the interested third party, then abandonment of the railroad line is stayed for the duration of the agreement. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). If this occurs, the interim trail use agreement is, in fact, interim in that relevant corridors remain available for future rail use. See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 8; Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Preseault II). Importantly, the interim trail use agreement also prevents corridors from being deemed abandoned under state law during the period of interim trail use. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 8. This preclusion of whatever state-law abandonment might otherwise occur gives rise to takings claims. Id. at 9. 5  II. The NCRA Right-of-Way 4 At issue in this case are reversionary property interests that Plaintiffs claim along 175 miles of the NCRA right-of-way, over which the NCRA and its predecessors ran trains in Mendocino, Trinity, and Humboldt Counties, California. ECF No. 28 (Third Amended Complaint or Complaint) ¶ 3. The State of California created the NCRA in 1989 to purchase railroads that would otherwise seek to abandon rail lines or discontinue service, as railroad traffic declined over the right-of-way. 5 North Coast Railroad Authority Act, § 1, 1989 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1085 (West). Eventually, trains stopped running entirely on the right-of-way, and in 2018, the California legislature directed the state government to issue a report about the possibility of turning the rail line into a recreational use trail. See North Coast Railroad Authority Closure and Transition to Trails Act, § 2, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. 934 (West). The NCRA was subsequently renamed the Great Redwood Trail Agency (GRTA). Great Redwood Trail Act, § 10, 2021 Cal. Legis. Serv. 423 (West) (codified at Cal. Gov’t Code § 93010(b)). The California legislature directed the newly-renamed GRTA to begin the regulatory process for railbanking and creating a trail on what was previously the rail line, through the federal STB’s regulatory process. Id. § 19 (codified at Cal. Gov’t Code § 93022(a)). When completed, the Great Redwood Trail is planned to become a “307-mile, world-class, multi-use rail-to-trail project connecting California’s San Francisco and Humboldt Bays.” Great Redwood Trail Agency, The Great Redwood Trail, https://thegreatredwoodtrail.org/great-redwood-trail/ (last accessed July 26, 2026). 4 Unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth in this section are undisputed. 5 The NCRA was a state-owned successor to the Northwestern Pacific Railroad. Some of the deeds at issue in this case conveyed land to the Eel River and Eureka Railroad, which was itself a predecessor of the Northwestern Pacific. ECF No. 64-28 at 21, PLT000793 (referencing conveyance to “the Eel River and Eureka Railroad Company (now Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company).”). 6  On May 14, 2021, GRTA filed a notice of exemption with the STB pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10502, which began the regulatory process to turn the rail line right-of-way into a trail. STB, Decision and Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment, STB Docket No. AB 1305X (Oct. 24, 2022). The notice of exemption sought approval to convert 175.84 miles of the NCRA right-of- way into a trail. Id. The STB ruled upon the notice of exemption and issued the NITU on October 24, 2022. Id. Shortly thereafter, GRTA confirmed that it would begin interim trail use and railbanking. See GRTA, Notice of Consummation of Railbanking, STB Docket No. AB 1305X (Oct. 26, 2022). Plaintiffs contend that these filings constituted a taking of any reversionary interests in the rail right-of-way. Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiffs claim that they owned land adjacent to the rail line at the time of the alleged taking and claim fee ownership or reversionary interests to the land underneath the right-of-way. Compl. ¶¶ 12–108. Plaintiffs further claim that the STB’s trail agreement was a taking that deprived them of their interest in the land by operation of the Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), for which they are allegedly entitled to just compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶ 112. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On October 25, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint. Subsequently, the parties engaged in several rounds of settlement discussions, and on July 1, 2024, the parties stipulated to dismissal of several claims. See ECF No. 27 at 1. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint, which is the current operative Complaint. See ECF No. 28 (Third Amended Complaint or Compl.). In their Third Amended Complaint, 106 Plaintiffs advance claims based on 177 parcels of land. ECF No. 66 (Response) at 7. 6 Defendant answered the Third Amended 6 Throughout this Memorandum and Order, page numbers for briefs and motions filed in the Court will reference the ECF-assigned page number, which does not always correspond to pagination within the document. 7 Complaint on August 13, 2024, and denied its liability toward every Plaintiff. See ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 12–108. On November 5, 2024, the Court set a schedule for discovery, which included expert and fact discovery for the valuation of representative parcels. See ECF No. 34 at 1. On May 28, 2025, Defendant filed the present Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. See Mot. The Motion seeks dismissal of claims related to 117 parcels, involving 63 Plaintiffs. Id. at 7. Defendant grouped similar claims together into Groups labeled A through H. Id. at 7–8. Plaintiffs filed their Response opposing the Motion on June 27, 2025, and Defendant lodged its Reply in support of its Motion on July 28, 2025. See ECF No. 66 (Resp.); ECF No. 67 (Reply). The Court held oral argument on the Motion on December 17, 2025. Minute Entry dated Dec. 17, 2025. During oral argument, Plaintiffs requested more discovery, and on January 6, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiffs limited, additional discovery. ECF No. 78 (Discovery Order). Specifically, the Discovery Order permitted Plaintiffs to conduct discovery into chains of title for certain parcels, for which Plaintiffs had previously relied upon the centerline presumption to establish their interests in the right-of-way. Id. at 1–2. In doing so, the Court exercised its discretion to ensure that all parties had a sufficient opportunity to complete title-related discovery. See id. at 1. The Court also stayed the present Motion in the interim. Id. at 3. On January 9, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See ECF No. 79 (Rule 60 Motion). Plaintiffs sought three forms of relief from the Discovery Order: (1) an extension of time to gather chains of title for the non-representative parcels; (2) bifurcation of proceedings on representative and non-representative parcels and modification of the existing Discovery Order to apply only to the representative parcels; and (3) issuance of a decision on Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63), including on the centerline 8 presumption, before Plaintiffs gathered chains of title for non-representative parcels. Rule 60 Mot. at 2. On January 22, 2026, Defendant filed its Response in opposition (ECF No. 81) and on February 5, 2026, the Court conducted two hearings on the record concerning Plaintiffs’ Rule 60 Motion. See Minute Entries dated Feb. 5, 2026. During the afternoon hearing, the Court issued several rulings on the record. See ECF No. 84 (Transcript of Feb. 5, 2026 hearings) at 49:7–52:9. The Court “den[ied] in part, without prejudice, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF Number 63, as to only nonrepresentative parcels in Groups C through H.” Id. at 49:7–10. The Court extended “the discovery period . . . as to title issues related to nonrepresentative parcels in Groups C through H.” Id. at 49:20–23. Finally, the Court set a deadline for chain of title discovery for representative parcels in Groups C through H. Id. at 52:5–6. Plaintiffs withdrew their Rule 60 Motion. Id. at 52:24. Consistent with the Court’s February 5 rulings on the record, on February 6, 2025, the Court issued an order resetting some discovery schedules and ordering further summary judgment briefing. ECF No. 82. The Order reflected that the Court had denied in part, without prejudice, Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 63) “only as to the arguments advanced in pages 22 through 36 of its Summary Judgment Motion with respect to the non-representative parcels identified in Groups C through H.” Id. at 1–2. The arguments for Groups C through H challenged Plaintiffs’ ability to prove their property interests in the right-of-way with California’s centerline presumption. Mot. at 22. The Court ordered the parties to propose schedules to complete discovery into chains of title, which Plaintiffs could use to establish property interests if the centerline presumption did not apply, and file summary judgment motions concerning chains of title and the application of California’s centerline presumption. ECF No. 82 at 2–3. 9  Separately, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment concerning the impact of the chains of title for representative parcels and renewing their arguments about the application of the centerline presumption to Plaintiffs’ parcels. ECF Nos. 91, 92. These cross- motions for summary judgment address chain of title evidence that the Court allowed Plaintiffs to gather and brief separately. See ECF No. 86 at 1. For efficiency, the Court will rule upon those motions via a separately-issued opinion. LEGAL STANDARD I. Summary Judgment The Court may grant summary judgment if the pleadings, affidavits, and evidentiary materials filed in a case reveal that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Rule(s)) 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Facts are material if they “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine factual dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. A party seeking to establish a genuine dispute of material fact must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Rule 56(c)(1)(A). While “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962), summary judgment may still be granted when the party opposing the motion submits evidence that “is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 10 249–50 (internal citations omitted). The Court may only grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita, Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). II. Rails-to-Trails Takings The Fifth Amendment requires the federal government to pay just compensation when it “requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land.” Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992) (emphasis in original); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (observing that the appropriation of a public easement across a private landowner's premises “constitute[s] the taking of a property interest”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). “Whether a [Fifth Amendment] taking has occurred is a question of law based on factual underpinnings.” Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “[T]he property rights protected by the Takings Clause are creatures of state law.” Cedar Point v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 155 (2021); see, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1353−55 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (analyzing the scope of appellant’s property interest under California law). Said differently, “existing rules and understandings and background principles derived from an independent source, such as state, federal, or common law, define the dimensions of the requisite property rights for purposes of establishing a cognizable taking.” Fishermen’s Finest, Inc. v. United States, 59 F.4th 1269, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); Blevins v. United States, 158 Fed. Cl. 295, 307 (2022). The STB’s issuance of a NITU stays the abandonment of the covered rail right-of-way. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). If this occurs, the NITU is, in fact, interim in that relevant corridors remain available for future rail use. See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 8; Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1552. 11 Importantly, the interim trail use agreement also prevents corridors from being deemed abandoned under state law during the period of interim trail use. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 8; Blevins, 158 Fed. Cl. at 300. As noted, it is this preclusion of state-law abandonment that gives rise to takings claims. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 9. A plaintiff is entitled to compensation after the STB’s issuance of a NITU if the plaintiff can demonstrate a “state law reversionary interest[]” in the land subject to the railroad right-of-way that is “effectively eliminated in connection with [the] conversion of [the] railroad right-of-way to trail use.” Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1543); see also Rogers v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The government must provide just compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause if the issuance of a NITU results in the taking of private property.”); Blevins, 158 Fed. Cl. at 304. DISCUSSION In this Memorandum and Order, the Court rules upon portions of Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss claims brought by 37 Plaintiffs based on 73 parcels. As noted, the parties do not dispute that the NITU effected a taking of any privately held reversionary interests in the right-of-way. Instead, the parties dispute Plaintiffs’ ability to demonstrate that they hold a property interest in the right-of-way, which was taken via issuance of the NITU. See Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1533 (plaintiff must own property interest in trail to establish taking). The Court must apply California law to determine the rights that Plaintiffs held to the right-of-way because the right-of-way is situated in California. See ATS Ford Drive Inv., LLC v. United States, 136 F.4th 1066, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Chicago Coating Co. v. United States, 12 892 F.3d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[W]e must apply the law of the state where the property interest arises.”). For ease of organization, Defendant organized the challenged claims into several groups. To begin, Defendant groups various parcels into “A” and “B” Groups. For Groups A and B, Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s property interest in the right-of-way because, Defendant argues, the NCRA held the land in fee, rather than an easement. Defendant argues that because the NCRA’s predecessors purchased land in the right-of-way in fee, Plaintiffs do not hold any reversionary interest in the right-of-way. Mot. at 14–15. Key evidence for these arguments comes from “source deeds,” the deeds by which Plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-interest granted an interest to the right-of-way to the NCRA’s predecessors-in-interest. This Memorandum and Order will evaluate what interest each source deed in Groups A and B granted to the NCRA’s predecessors- in-interest: fee simple or an easement. Disposition of this issue requires the resolution of several sub-issues. First, the Court will address whether the reversionary interests have expired for Plaintiffs whose predecessors granted the railroad property in fee simple subject to condition subsequent, so that the NCRA now holds the right-of-way in fee simple absolute. Second, the Court will evaluate the proper standard by which to determine the property interest that a deed conveys under California law. Third, the Court will apply that standard on a whistle-stop tour of source deeds and determine whether each source deed conveyed an easement or land in fee. Fourth, the Court will assess Plaintiffs’ argument that even if they hold no interest in the right-of- way, the burden imposed upon adjoining properties by a pedestrian and bicycle trail effects a taking on adjoining properties. After analyzing the source deeds, the Court will turn to the additional issues raised in the Motion. Defendant argues that a handful of ungrouped Plaintiffs are ineligible to recover. Two 13 Plaintiffs (the First Street Plaintiffs) own parcels along a public road, for which Defendant argues an existing easement must already encompass trail use. Mot. at 36–38. One Plaintiff, Humboldt Bay Harbor, Recreation, and Conservation District (Humboldt Bay District), is a California public corporation, which, Defendant argues, is prevented from recovery as a matter of law. Id. at 38– 40. I. Groups A and B: Does the Railway Own the Right-of-Way in Fee Simple? The disputes for Groups A and B concern the nature of the interest that NCRA holds in the right-of-way through the source deeds. The source deeds can determine whether NCRA holds fee simple to the right-of-way because the NCRA’s predecessors-in-interest 7 acquired the right-of- way with the source deeds. If the railway owns the right-of-way in fee simple absolute, then no other party can hold a reversionary interest. See Pressly v. United States, 174 F.4th 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2026) (“If . . . the railroad company holds fee simple title to the land over which the railroad operated, no taking can occur because no third party holds underlying fee simple title that would otherwise become unencumbered upon the railroad's abandonment of operations.”). Defendant argues that the NCRA holds fee title to the right-of-way in sections claimed by the Group A and B Plaintiffs, rather than an easement, so that Group A and B plaintiffs do not hold 7 The NCRA succeeded the Northwestern Pacific Railroad when the latter faced bankruptcy. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 93001 (1989). The Northwestern Pacific Railroad itself succeeded several earlier railroads, which established the right-of-way and are named as the grantee in most source deeds at issue in this Memorandum and Opinion. See, e.g., ECF No. 64-69 at 2, PLT000748 (granting interest to Eel River and Eureka Railroad Company); ECF No. 64-80 at 2, PLT000551 (granting interest to San Francisco and Northwestern Railway Company); ECF No. 64-78 at 2, PLT001167 (describing right-of-way created by Eureka and Klamath River Railroad Company); see also ECF No. 64-28 at 21, PLT000793 (referencing historic conveyance to “the Eel River and Eureka Railroad Company (now Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company)”). 14 any reversionary interest. 8 Mot. at 14–15. Defendant argues that the language used in each source deed at issue in this Motion—the deed through which the NCRA’s predecessors obtained the right- of-way—indicates a transfer in fee simple, rather than the sale of an easement. Id. at 15. Plaintiffs disagree and claim that the source deeds instead convey an estate besides fee simple absolute. First, Plaintiffs argue that most of the deeds conveyed only an easement to the railroad, so that Plaintiffs hold a reversionary interest. Resp. at 9. Second, Plaintiffs argue that even if deeds convey fee simple, they actually convey fee simple subject to condition subsequent, so that Plaintiffs still hold a reversionary interest. Id. at 9–10. Finally, for some deeds in Groups A and B, Plaintiffs argue that even if Plaintiffs have no interest in the right-of-way, the increased burdens of trail use will constitute a taking upon the parcels that Plaintiffs own next to the right- of-way. Id. at 29. Defendant additionally argues that to the extent the source deeds convey land in fee simple subject to condition subsequent, Plaintiffs have failed to preserve their interests as required by California law, so that the NCRA now holds the land in fee simple absolute. See Reply at 14. In this section, the Court will first address the issue of the preservation of reversionary interests when a deed conveys fee simple subject to condition subsequent. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to protect their reversionary interests, as required by California statute, for land that that was transferred as in fee simple subject to condition subsequent. For these claims, when Plaintiffs failed to preserve their reversionary interests, the NCRA’s fee simple subject to 8 This Memorandum and Order describes the property interest that follows the termination of an easement as a “reversionary interest.” See Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1543. Historically, this interest would have been described as a “fee simple burdened by the easement,” rather than a reversionary interest because the grantor of an easement never relinquishes fee ownership. Id. at 1533. However, the modern trend is to use the term “reversion.” Id. The “reversion” following an easement is not subject to the recording issue that affects sections of the right-of-way which NCRA held in fee simple subject to condition subsequent. See infra Discussion I.A. 15 condition subsequent converted to fee simple absolute by operation of law. Second, the Court will determine how to interpret whether a deed conveyed easement or fee under California law. Third, the Court will assess each source deed in Groups A and B to determine whether the deed conveyed land in fee or easement. 9 The Court finds that ten source deeds conveyed land in fee and that disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment with respect to three source deeds. The Court thus finds that the railroad held fee simple for eighteen of the contemporary parcels at issue in this case. Fourth and finally, the Court will assess whether the burdens of increased trail use constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. A. Preservation of Reversionary Rights Even where the source deeds granted the railroad land in the right-of-way in fee simple subject to condition subsequent, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs no longer hold a reversionary interest because they have failed to preserve their powers of termination. Mot. at 15 n.6. The power of termination expires in California if holders do not record their interests and, every 30 years thereafter, file “a notice of intent to preserve the power of termination.” Cal. Civ. Code § 885.030(a)(3). Plaintiffs do not dispute that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interest filed such notices, but instead dispute the requirement’s applicability. Resp. at 26 (“Plaintiffs do not dispute that there is no evidence that either they or their predecessors-in-title filed a ‘notice of 9 This Memorandum and Order evaluates the source deeds individually, rather than considering Groups A and B as a whole. Defendant sorted the challenged source deeds into Groups A and B. Mot. at 15. Plaintiffs disagree about which of the deeds should be analyzed together. See ECF No. 66 (Response or Resp.) at 9–10. Due to this dispute about categorization, this Memorandum and Order considers the source deeds individually for purposes of resolving the present Motion. Defendant challenges thirteen source deeds in Groups A and B. Mot. at 18 n.9, 19 n.11. Plaintiffs argue that two other deeds not mentioned by Defendant are relevant to resolve Plaintiffs’ property interest in the right-of-way, so this section of the Discussion will analyze fifteen source deeds. See Resp. at 13. 16 intent’ such that the power of termination would be preserved pursuant to the MRTA.”). Plaintiffs argue that federal preemption blocks application of the California statute or, alternatively, that the Plaintiffs have otherwise protected their rights. Id. at 26–28. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ arguments fail. None of the Plaintiffs holding reversionary interests to land that the railroad held in fee simple subject to condition subsequent have preserved their rights, so the railroad holds fee simple absolute to all parcels in which Plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-interest originally granted fee simple subject to condition subsequent. 1. Federal Preemption of State Reversionary Rights First, Plaintiffs argue that federal railroad regulation preempts California law requiring Plaintiffs to record their property interests. Resp. at 26 (“[F]iled notice is irrelevant in the context of a federally regulated railroad corridor because federal jurisdiction completely preempts state law that would normally determine such notices’ import.”). Federal law preempts state regulation and grants the STB (and its predecessor, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)) exclusive jurisdiction over the “regulation of rail transportation,” including the abandonment or discontinuance of rail lines. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b); see also Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 321 (1981) (“The exclusive and plenary nature of the [Interstate Commerce] Commission’s authority to rule on carriers’ decisions to abandon lines is critical to the congressional scheme, which contemplates comprehensive administrative regulation of interstate commerce.”). Plaintiffs argue that they should be excused from California’s filing requirement because “neither Plaintiffs nor their predecessors-in-title could properly trigger their reversionary interests without running afoul of federal preemption.” Resp. at 27. As Defendant correctly argues, federal preemption did not reach the underlying property interests that Plaintiffs held to the right-of-way and did not prevent Plaintiffs from protecting their 17 reversionary interests. See Reply at 14–15. Federal law would only preempt state-law property interests if those interests affected the “regulation of rail transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). The STB’s jurisdiction does not preempt “the continued application of laws having a more remote or incidental effect on rail transportation.” Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001); see Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 593 F.3d 404, 410– 11 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that state-law railroad crossing disputes are only preempted if enforcement would affect management or governance of rail transportation); Adrian & Blissfield R.R. Co. v. Vill. Of Blissfield, 550 F.3d 533, 539–41 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding state law only preempted if it prevents railroad operations). Here, neither party cites precedent on the particular issue of whether the filing of a notice of reversionary interests has more than an incidental effect upon rail transportation. See Mot.; Resp.; Reply. However, there is no evidence in the record that the filing of a notice about a reversionary interest would impose more than an incidental effect upon rail transportation. See Fla. E. Coast Ry., 266 F.3d at 1331. To the contrary, California’s notice requirement does not “seek to regulate the operations of rail transportation,” so it is not preempted. See Franks Inv. Co., 593 F.3d at 413. The notice filing