Scott R. Springer v. Lizabeth Marie Springer
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJune 11, 2021
Docket2D20-0812
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
SCOTT R. SPRINGER,
Appellant,
v.
LIZABETH M. SPRINGER, n/k/a Lizabeth M. Polly,
Appellee.
No. 2D20-812
June 11, 2021
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Doneene D. Loar,
Judge.
Alan Scott Rosenthal of Rosenthal Law Group, P.A., St. Petersburg,
for Appellant.
No appearance for Appellee.
BLACK, Judge.
Scott Springer, the former husband, challenges the order on
his motion for contempt and/or for writ of execution. In the
motion, the former husband sought the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the final judgment of dissolution to the extent
that the judgment determined that certain personal property—a
dog—is his nonmarital property.1 The former husband also
requested that Lizabeth Springer, the former wife, be held in
contempt for failing to return the dog to him; the dog was in the
former wife's custody at the time the final judgment of dissolution
was entered. Following an evidentiary hearing on the former
husband's motion, the trial court awarded the former husband the
fair market value of the dog instead of the dog itself. This was
error, and therefore we reverse in part. As there is no merit to the
former husband's assertion that the trial court erred in declining to
hold the former wife in contempt, we affirm the trial court's order in
that regard without further comment.
"Once a final judgment of dissolution of marriage is rendered,
property rights are fixed and vested and a court is without
jurisdiction to modify those rights unless it specifically reserved
1 "While a dog may be considered by many to be a member of
the family, under Florida law, animals are considered to be personal
property." Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d 109, 110 (Fla. 1st DCA
1995) (first citing County of Pasco v. Riehl, 620 So. 2d 229, 231 (Fla.
2d DCA 1993); and then citing Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329,
331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)).
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jurisdiction to do so." Frank v. Frank, 253 So. 3d 12, 14 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2018) (citing Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 877 So. 2d 960, 963
(Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). Even though the final judgment of
dissolution contained a reservation of jurisdiction for its
enforcement, such a general reservation did not authorize the trial
court to change the former husband's established property right to
a monetary award. See Bridges v. Bridges, 848 So. 2d 403, 404
(Fla. 2d DCA 2003); see also Farid v. Rabbath, 273 So. 3d 221, 222
(Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ("[U]nless there was a reservation of jurisdiction
over the distribution of property by the final judgment of
dissolution, the final judgment establishing property rights could
not be modified.").
The facts of this case are similar to those of Bridges. In that
case, Ms. Bridges filed a motion to enforce the final judgment of
dissolution, alleging that Mr. Bridges had taken personal property
from the marital home that belonged to her under the terms of the
judgment. 848 So. 2d at 404. Following an evidentiary hearing on
the motion for enforcement, the trial court entered a money
judgment against Mr. Bridges for the value of the personal property.
Id. Mr. Bridges challenged that order on appeal, and this court
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reversed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify
Ms. Bridges's property rights once those rights had been
adjudicated in the final judgment and in the absence of an express
reservation of jurisdiction to modify the final judgment. Id.; see
also Damian v. Damian, 955 So. 2d 1178, 1181–82 (Fla. 2d DCA
2007) (holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by
modifying rather than enforcing the property rights adjudicated in
the final judgment of dissolution).
The trial court erred as a matter of law by acting in excess of
its jurisdiction by modifying the final judgment of dissolution with
respect to the nonmarital property. We therefore reverse the order
on appeal to the extent that it awarded the former husband the fair
market value of the property and remand for entry of an order
enforcing the final judgment of dissolution.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
ATKINSON and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.
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Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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