F. Miller v. City of Williamsport

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Fred Miller, : Appellant : : v. : : City of Williamsport, Jason Bolt, : Justin Ottaviano, Joshua Bell, : No. 1044 C.D. 2025 and Derek Slaughter : Argued: September 17, 2026 BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY FILED: October 26, 2026 Fred Miller (Miller) appeals from the Lycoming County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) August 13, 2025 order granting the City of Williamsport’s (City), Jason Bolt’s (Bolt), Justin Ottaviano’s (Ottaviano), Joshua Bell’s (Bell), and Derek Slaughter’s (Slaughter) Motion for Summary Judgment (City’s Motion) and denying Miller’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Miller’s Motion). Miller presents four issues for this Court’s review: whether the trial court erred by holding: (1) the City did not violate the Optional Third Class City Charter Law (Optional Charter Law)1 when promoting police officers to the positions of Assistant Chief of Police (Assistant Chief) and Captain of the City’s Bureau of Police (Police Bureau); (2) the City was not required to comply with the civil service process when promoting police officers to Assistant Chief and Captain positions in the Police Bureau; (3) Miller’s right to quo warranto relief was unwarranted and without justification; and (4) there is no need for remedial action under the Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA)2 1 Act of July 15, 1957, P.L. 901, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 41101-45000. 2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-7541. where police officers’ promotions were previously subject to the civil service process. The City presents one issue for this Court’s review: whether the trial court erred by concluding that Miller had standing to bring the quo warranto action.3 After review, this Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands. Background The City is a Third Class City subject to the Third Class City Code, 11 Pa.C.S. §§ 10101-14702, that operates under Article IV of the Optional Charter Law’s Executive (Mayor)-[City] Council [(Council)] Plan A (Plan A).4 “Plan A [] establishes the mayor as a governing municipal officer and vests the city’s executive power in him.” Reed v. Harrisburg City Council, 995 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Pa. 2010); see also Section 411 of the Optional Charter Law, 53 P.S. § 41411. Slaughter is the City’s Mayor. The City and the City Employees Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #29 (Union), of which Miller was a member, negotiated a collective bargaining agreement beginning January 1, 2021 and expiring December 31, 2024 (CBA). See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 67a-90a. The City utilized the civil service testing 3 Although the City did not cross-appeal from [the trial court’s o]rder, as the prevailing party, under precedent, it was not required to do so. See McGuire on behalf of Neidig v. City of Pittsburgh, 250 A.3d 516, 526-27 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (holding an appellee did not waive its standing argument on appeal by not filing a cross-appeal when the appellee prevailed below). Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 347 A.3d 1154 n.18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025), appeal granted sub nom. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 5 by McNesby v. City of Phila., 357 A.3d 955 (Pa. 2026); see also Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 107 (Pa. 2013). 4 See 53 P.S. §§ 41401-41421. The Optional Charter Law made optional charter forms of government available to third class cities in 1957. The City has not adopted an optional charter apart from the state Optional Charter Law. 2 only for initial appointments and for promotions in the Police Bureau up to the rank of Lieutenant.5 See R.R. at 405a. The City did not provide civil service testing for promotions to Assistant Chief or Captain.6 See Original Record Item 35 (Miller Motion) Ex. A at 8, 13-14, 17. Rather, Slaughter promoted officers to the non-Union positions of Chief of Police (Chief), Assistant Chief, and Captain, as executive level appointments, at his discretion. See id. The City hired Bolt as a Patrolman in 2004. From 2007 through 2016, he was specially assigned as the school resource officer at Williamsport High School. Bolt was promoted to Agent in 2016,7 and then to Lieutenant in summer 2020, through the civil service process. In August or September of 2020, Bolt resigned from the Lieutenant position and returned to being an Agent before Slaughter promoted him to Captain in January 2021. At his discretion, rather than through the civil service process, Slaughter promoted Bolt to Assistant Chief on May 25, 2021. The City hired Ottaviano as a Patrolman in October 2008. He was promoted to Corporal in 2017, and Sergeant in 2019, through the civil service process. At his discretion, rather than through the civil service process, Slaughter promoted Ottaviano to Captain on or about May 1, 2023. 5 The Police Bureau’s ranks include “[p]atrolman, corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, captain, assistant chief, [and] chief.” R.R. at 353a. 6 Article 27 of the CBA (Promotional System) requires the City and the Union “to develop a job evaluation policy” for promotions. R.R. at 88a. Article 10(B)(2) of the CBA (Reduction or Increase Force) declares that “[n]ew hires shall be selected from the [c]ivil [s]ervice list of eligible candidates.” R.R. at 76a. The CBA does not otherwise address the civil service appointment/promotion process. Moreover, the CBA specifies that it governs Police Bureau ranks only up to Lieutenant. See Article 3(b) of the CBA, R.R. at 70a (“[T]he [Chief] and those above the rank of Lieutenant are management positions and as such are not covered by this [CBA].”). Because the CBA does not address appointments/promotions to Assistant Chief and Captain, it does not govern review of the issues before this Court. 7 The record does not expound on an Agent’s role. 3  The City hired Bell as a Patrolman in January 2017, and while at the rank of Patrolman, he eventually worked under special assignment with the Lycoming County Narcotics Enforcement Unit. At his discretion, rather than through the civil service process, Slaughter promoted Bell to Captain on or about July 26, 2021. Miller is a Lieutenant in the Police Bureau. The City hired him as a Patrolman in 1998. He was promoted to Corporal in 2010, Sergeant in 2011, Agent in 2015, and Lieutenant in 2019, through the civil service process. See R.R. at 344a, 360a-362a, 696a. He applied for promotion to the positions to which Slaughter promoted Bolt, Ottaviano, and Bell. On October 26, 2023, Miller filed a Complaint in the trial court asserting quo warranto and declaratory judgment actions on the basis that Slaughter promoted Bolt, Ottaviano, and Bell in violation of the Third Class City Code and the City’s Ordinance.8 In his quo warranto claim, Miller asked the trial court to remove Bolt, Ottaviano, and Bell from their positions as Assistant Chief and/or Captain and direct the City to promote officers to those positions utilizing the civil service process. Regarding his declaratory judgment action, Miller requested that the trial court declare Bolt’s, Ottaviano’s, and Bell’s promotions null and void from the outset, and mandate that the City and Slaughter utilize the civil service process when promoting officers to Assistant Chief and Captain positions. Following amended pleadings, discovery, and dispositive motions,9 Miller filed his Motion on May 19, 2025, which the City opposed. On June 19, 8 City of Williamsport, Pa., Codified Ordinances of the City of Williamsport, 1961, as amended. 9 The City filed preliminary objections on November 14, 2023, which Miller opposed. Following oral argument, on February 27, 2024, the trial court overruled the City’s preliminary objections. On March 19, 2024, the City filed an Answer with New Matter to the Complaint. On March 28, 2024, Miller filed preliminary objections to the City’s New Matter, which the City 4 2025, the City filed its Motion, which Miller opposed. On August 13, 2025, the trial court denied Miller’s Motion and granted the City’s Motion. Miller appealed to this Court.10 See Trial Ct. 8/13/2025 Op. (R.R. at 1a-2a). By September 4, 2025 order, the trial court directed Miller to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), which he did on September 10, 2025. On October 27, 2025, the trial court issued a Statement of Reasons in Lieu of Formal Opinion. See Trial Ct. 10/27/2025 Op. (R.R. at 3a- 5a). Discussion Standing Because it is a threshold requirement, this Court first addresses the City’s claim that the trial court erred by concluding that Miller had standing to bring the quo warranto action.11 The City argues that the record does not support that Miller had the requisite special interest in the public Assistant Chief and Captain positions at issue here to afford him standing to challenge the City’s actions. opposed. On May 15, 2024, the trial court granted Miller’s preliminary objections and ordered the City to file amended new matter, which it did on June 3, 2024. Miller again filed preliminary objections to the City’s amended New Matter on June 13, 2024. On August 1, 2024, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Miller’s preliminary objections. Miller filed a reply to the City’s amended New Matter on August 20, 2024. On August 28, 2024, Miller filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the City opposed. On October 14, 2024 the trial court denied Miller’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. On January 16, 2025, the City filed a motion to file a second amended answer and new matter, which Miller opposed, but the trial court granted on March 24, 2025. 10 On August 11, 2026, the City filed an Application for Relief to File a Supplemental Reproduced Record (Application) with extra-record evidence. On August 24, 2026, Miller opposed the Application. On September 3, 2026, this Court denied the Application. 11 “Standing is a justiciability concern - a threshold requirement that must be established ‘[p]rior to judicial resolution of a dispute.’” Pa. State Educ. Ass’n v. Pub. Sch. Emps.’ Ret. Bd., 311 A.3d 1017, 1028 (Pa. 2024) (quoting Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. 2005)). 5 Specifically, relying on Commonwealth ex rel. Schermer v. Franek, 166 A. 878 (Pa. 1933), and Coghlan v. Borough of Darby, 844 A.2d 624 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), the City contends that for Miller to have a special interest in the instant case, he “must be certain to himself occupy that position in the event that the action were successful and the incumbent officeholder in question were removed from office.” City Br. at 8-9. “Quo warranto is a challenge to the title or the right to hold a public office. Commonwealth ex rel. Jud. Conduct Bd. v. Griffin, . . . 918 A.2d 87 ([Pa.] 2007). . . . Ultimately, the intention of initiating such an action is to oust a public officer.” In re Prospect Crozer LLC, 328 A.3d 37, 67 (Pa. 2024). Although quo warranto actions are generally brought by the Attorney General or the local district attorney, see Reed v. Harrisburg City Council, 995 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 2010); see also Spykerman v. Levy, 421 A.2d 641 (Pa. 1980), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (Supreme Court) has ruled: “If a private person has a special right or interest, as distinguished from the right or interest of the public generally, or he has been specially damaged, he may have standing to bring a quo warranto action.”[12] 12 “[A] private party with a special interest in the matter may institute a quo warranto action without first notifying the Attorney General or the local district attorney.” Reed, 995 A.2d at 1140 (emphasis omitted); see also Warren v. Potteiger (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1713 C.D. 2017, filed Sept. 6, 2018); but see Electors of City of York v. Helfrich (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 750 C.D. 2022, filed Feb. 26, 2024), slip op. at 12 (emphasis omitted) (“[P]rivate parties . . . were required to[:] (1) prove they had standing to file [a] quo warranto action by demonstrating that both the Attorney General and the York County District Attorney declined to bring a quo warranto action; and (2) establish they have a special right or interest in the matter that is beyond just asserting that the law should be adhered to.”). Unreported decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures. See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). The unreported decisions herein are cited for their persuasive value. Despite that Miller asserted a special interest, see Complaint ¶ 43 (R.R. at 14a), and, thus, did not need to first reach out to the Attorney General or the local district attorney, see Reed, he nevertheless “contacted both the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General and the Lycoming County District Attorney and [was] granted the right to file this quo warranto action against the [City].” Complaint ¶ 42 (R.R. at 14a); see also R.R. at 92a-93a, 111a-112a, 370a. 6 Spykerman, 421 A.2d at 649 (emphasis added); see also In re One Hundred or More Qualified Electors of the Mun. of Clairton, 683 A.2d 283 (Pa. 1996) (the plaintiffs who failed to assert any special interest in ousting a municipal board member due to his felony conviction beyond that shared in common by all citizens of the municipality lacked quo warranto standing); Warren v. Potteiger (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1713 C.D. 2017, filed Sept. 6, 2018) (the plaintiff who failed to assert any special interest in the defendant’s offices or employment lacked standing). In Complaint Count I - Quo Warranto Action, Miller sought to “remove Assistant Chief [] Bolt, Captain [] Bell[,] and Captain [] Ottaviano from their current positions and direct the [City] to utilize the civil service process mandated by law when promoting officers to the positions of Assistant Chief and Captain[.]” Complaint Ad Damnum Clause at 8 (R.R. at 37a). In support of such remedy, Miller averred that he and Lieutenant Steven Helm “were the most qualified applicants for Assistant Chief” in December 2020 when Slaughter appointed another officer as Assistant Chief, Complaint ¶ 16 (R.R. at 10a), and that Miller “was the most qualified applicant for Captain of Detectives” when Slaughter appointed another officer to that position at that time. Complaint ¶ 17 (R.R. at 10a). In addition, Miller asserted that, in May 2021, “Slaughter refused to consider [Miller], who was more qualified for the newly re-created Assistant Chief position” than Bolt, who was appointed at that time. Complaint ¶ 24 (R.R. at 10a-11a). Miller maintained that, as a specially assigned Lieutenant, he previously performed the Captain of Detectives jobs well. See Complaint ¶ 25 (R.R. at 11a); see also Complaint ¶ 17 (R.R. at 10a). Finally, Miller declared that he had “a special interest in the matter as he was at all times the most qualified candidate for the positions of [A]ssistant [C]hief and [C]aptain, which are currently occupied by Bolt, Bell, and Ottaviano, and the civil service process would have identified him as the more qualified candidate.” Complaint ¶ 43 (R.R. at 14a). 7  The trial court concluded: [Miller] has standing to bring this quo warranto action based upon his “special interest” apart from the public generally in view of his qualifications as the aggrieved candidate for the [P]olice [Bureau] positions at issue here for which he was bypassed in not having the opportunity for selection under the civil service process[.] Spykerman[.] Trial Ct. 8/13/2025 Order at 1. The City emphasizes that, in 1933, the Supreme Court stated in Schermer that an elected alderman who sought to oust a justice of the peace who was also later elected mayor under a new form of city government lacked standing because “if a judgment of ouster would not place [the alderman] in office, it cannot be said that he has such a right as would warrant a judgment of ouster against the [justice of the peace/mayor] in office.” Id. at 879. However, Schermer involved an elected office rather than a civil service challenge, and the Schermer Court ultimately rendered its decision based on its analysis of the compatibility of the mayor and justice of the peace offices. See id. Accordingly, Schermer is inapposite. In 2004, in Coghlan, this Court cited to Schermer to likewise declare that a councilperson who would only be eligible to run for the office of the person she sought to oust lacked standing to bring a quo warranto action because “a quo warranto action cannot be brought by a plaintiff who will not be placed in the office if the action is successful.” Coghlan, 844 A.2d at 628 (emphasis omitted). Like Schermer, Coghlan involved an elected office rather than a civil service challenge, and the Coghlan Court ultimately issued a mixed ruling that focused on taxpayer and voter standing. Accordingly, Coghlan is also inapposite.13 13 The City also cites to Bird v. Borough of Moosic (M.D. Pa. Civil No. 3:18-CV-2289, filed Apr. 17, 2020) (Saporito, Jr., J.) (single-judge op.) (unreported). Therein, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, in deciding a case more factually similar to 8  Importantly, in the interim between Schermer and Coghlan, this Court concluded: “Pennsylvania courts, in addressing the question of whether an individual has standing to bring a quo warranto action, have not specifically limited the [standing] rule . . . to individuals who sought the position of the official they seek to oust.”14 Zontek v. Brown, 613 A.2d 683, 684 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), aff’d, 636 A.2d 630 (Pa. 1994) (emphasis added) (wherein municipal authority officials had an interest significant and distinct from that of the general public and, thus, had standing to bring a quo warranto action challenging the right of Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission members who would investigate the officials’ alleged violations to hold office; the officials were not seeking to become Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission members); see also Reed (wherein the mayor had standing to commence a quo warranto action because he had a special interest in the validity of an ordinance that authorized him, rather than the city council, to appoint board members; the mayor was not seeking a board member position); Stroup v. Kapleau, 313 A.2d 237 (Pa. 1973) (wherein state Senators had standing to commence a quo warranto action challenging gubernatorial appointments made without the Senate’s advice and consent, where each Senator had the constitutional right to confirm or reject those appointments - a clear interest that exceeds interests of members of the general public; the Senators were not seeking those gubernatorial the case at bar, relying on Coghlan, concluded that a part-time, female police officer who challenged the selections of full-time male officers under civil service requirements lacked standing to bring that quo warranto action because if she succeeded, at most, she would be among other candidates eligible to be considered for the position. The Bird Court stated: “An individual who will be placed in the challenged public office if [s]he succeeds with the quo warranto action has a special interest in the matter to have standing to seek the issuance of a writ of quo warranto.” Slip op. at 6 (emphasis omitted). However, as an unreported, single-judge, minority federal court opinion, Bird has no precedential or persuasive value. 14 At most, this Court interprets the Schermer and Coghlan rulings such that a person who would be placed in the challenged position always has a special interest affording him/her standing to bring a quo warranto action. 9 appointments); Gwinn v. Kane, 339 A.2d 838 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975), aff’d, 348 A.2d 900 (Pa. 1975) (wherein a private individual had a special interest apart from that of the general public and, thus, standing to commence a quo warranto action testing the legality of the appointment of a special prosecutor who issued an indictment against him; the individual was not seeking to be appointed special prosecutor). Therefore, the right to hold the challenged public office is not the exclusive manner in which quo warranto standing may be established. Nevertheless, Miller had to show some special interest beyond that of a general taxpayer in seeking the City’s compliance with the Optional Charter Law. See Spykerman. Here, Miller specifically pled that he was a Lieutenant qualified to be considered for open Assistant Chief and Captain positions in the Police Bureau when Slaughter appointed Bolt, Ottaviano, and Bell. Further, as Miller raised to the trial court, see R.R. at 95a, 97a, his position as a subordinate to Bolt, Ottaviano, and Bell, and his union membership governed by the CBA gave him a more particularized special interest beyond that of a general taxpayer in seeking the City’s compliance with the Optional Charter Law. Because Miller is in the most direct position to challenge the propriety of the City’s Assistant Chief and Captain selection process, he clearly has a special interest beyond that of a general taxpayer in that process, and the trial court properly concluded that Miller had standing to bring a quo warranto action against the City.15 15 At oral argument before this Court, the City raised that Miller retired in August 2026 and, thus, he no longer has quo warranto standing, thereby rendering this appeal moot. Indeed, this Court “will not decide moot questions.” Fick v. Bivens, 361 A.3d 675, 682 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2026) (quoting Chruby v. Dep’t of Corr., 4 A.3d 764, 771 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)). However, because Miller need not be eligible to fill the position he seeks to oust, see Zontek, whether he is now retired is immaterial, particularly when he remains in the most direct position to challenge the propriety of the City’s Assistant Chief and Captain selection process. Even assuming, arguendo, that Miller’s retirement renders his quo warranto action moot, “[e]xceptions to th[e mootness] principle are made where (1) the conduct complained of is capable of repetition yet likely to evade review, (2) 10 Summary Judgment “Summary judgment is appropriate in cases ‘where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Naylor v. Bd. of Supervisors of Charlestown Twp., 253 A.3d 786, 805 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting Maas v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 234 A.3d 427, 436 (Pa. 2020)). This Court’s scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary. Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., . . . 761 A.2d 1115, 1118 ([Pa.] 2000). [This Court’s] standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or clearly abused its discretion. Id. . . . The reviewing court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Basile, 761 A.2d at 1118. When the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, a trial court may properly enter summary judgment. Id. (citing Cochran v. GAF Corp., . . . 666 A.2d 245, 248 ([Pa.] 1995)). Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, . . . 812 A.2d 1218, 1221-22 ([Pa.] 2002). Gilbert v. Synagro Cent., LLC, 131 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2015). Because neither party appears to have claimed that there were any outstanding issues of material fact, the the case involves issues important to the public interest, or (3) a party will suffer some detriment without the court’s decision.” Chruby, 4 A.3d at 771. Where, as here, the City has not changed its Assistant Chief and Captain selection process during the pendency of this litigation, the underlying issue is “capable of repetition yet likely to evade review[,]” and the City’s compliance with the law is an “issue[] important to the public interest[.]” Chruby, 4 A.3d at 771. Accordingly, Miller’s retirement does not render the appeal related to his quo warranto action moot. Further, because the City has not challenged Miller’s standing to seek declaratory judgment, he nevertheless had standing to challenge the City’s actions on that basis. See Apex Mortg. Corp. v. Del. Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 342 A.3d 783, 786 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) (Standing “can be waived in the event an opposing party does not raise it at the earliest possible juncture.”). 11 sole issue before the trial court was whether Miller or the City was entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. In Miller’s Motion, Miller argued that Slaughter and the City violated the requirements for civil service promotions below the position of Chief by having Slaughter fill the positions of Assistant Chief and Captain at his sole discretion rather than through the civil service process. See R.R. at 347a. Miller averred that where the Third Class City Code requires that all appointments to positions below Chief be filled through the civil service process set forth in the Optional Charter Law - which states that such powers are subject to the limitations set forth under the Third Class City Code, i.e., the civil service process - and which the City lacks the authority to alter, Bolt’s, Ottaviano’s, and Bell’s appointments must be set aside. See R.R. at 346a-347a. Miller further asserted that since simply removing those individuals from their positions would not remedy the City’s violations, the trial court should also declare that the City’s Ordinance, custom, and/or practice that permits the appointment or promotion of any person to any position below Chief by any manner other than the civil service process mandated by the Third Class City Code is unlawful and invalid. See R.R. at 347a-349a. In the City’s Motion, the City argued, inter alia, that the Optional Charter Law, the Third Class City Code, and the City’s Ordinance did not impose any civil service requirements for promotions to administrative and/or executive positions within the leadership of the Police Bureau and, thus, authorized Slaughter’s appointment of officers within the Police Bureau to the positions of Assistant Chief and Captain. See R.R. at 710a-712a. Because Miller raises pure questions of law involving statutory interpretation, this Court’s scope of review is plenary and its standard of review is de novo. See Gilbert. Relevant here, the General Assembly enacted the Optional Charter Law “to give third class cities the right and power to adopt one of several plans of optional charters and to exercise the powers and authority of local self-government subject to 12 certain restrictions and limitations.” City of Erie v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 844 A.2d 586, 589 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the City adopted the Optional Charter Law Plan A form of government which, “together with Articles III[, 53 P.S. §§ 41301-41305,] and VI[, 53 P.S. §§ 41601-45000], govern any city, the voters of which have adopted it pursuant to this [Optional Charter Law].” 53 P.S. § 41401. Importantly, however, “[w]hile the powers granted to [a city] under the [Optional Charter Law] are very broad and general, they are [] limited in certain specific instances.” Cuvo v. City of Easton, 678 A.2d 424, 426 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (emphasis added); see also City of Lancaster v. Fire Fighters Local Union No. 319, 834 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“As a[] . . . Third Class City governed by the [Optional Charter Law] . . . , the City possesses broad powers of self-government subject only to express or implied prohibitions.”). In particular, Section 301 of the Optional Charter Law declares that although a Third Class City’s charter under the Optional Charter Law “shall become the organic law of the city[,]” “[a]ll existing acts or parts of acts and ordinances affecting the organization, government[,] and powers of the city not inconsistent or in conflict with the organic law so adopted shall remain in full force until modified or repealed as provided by law.” 53 P.S. § 41301 (emphasis added); see also Section 623 of the Optional Charter Law, 53 P.S. § 41623 (“[A]ll ordinances and resolutions of the city to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this [Optional Charter Law] shall remain in full force and effect until modified or repealed as provided by law.”) (Emphasis added.); City of Erie. Section 412 of the Optional Charter Law further mandates, in relevant part, that “[t]he mayor shall enforce the charter and ordinances of the city and all general laws applicable thereto.” 53 P.S. § 41412 (emphasis added). 13  More specifically, Section 305 of the Optional Charter Law declares, in relevant part: Notwithstanding the grant of powers contained in this [Optional Charter Law], no city shall exercise powers contrary to or in limitation or enlargement of powers granted to the city by acts of the General Assembly which are: (1) Applicable to a class or classes of cities on the following subjects: .... (x) Relating to civil service. .... (2) Applicable in every part of the Commonwealth. (3) Applicable to all the cities of the Commonwealth. 53 P.S. § 41305 (emphasis added). Therefore, despite that the Optional Charter Law provides that the City has conferred upon it the greatest power of local self- government and powers thereunder, which are to be liberally construed in favor of the City, see Section 304 of the Optional Charter Law, 53 P.S. § 41304, and Plan A vests a Third Class City’s vast executive power in its mayor, see Reed; see also Section 411 of the Optional Charter Law, 53 P.S. § 41411 (“The executive power of the city shall be exercised by the mayor.”), the city and the mayor are still bound by the General Assembly’s civil service statutes. See 53 P.S. § 41305(1)(x); see also Mack v. Hoover, 20 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. 1941) (the Supreme Court has declared “[a] municipal ordinance cannot dispense with the [c]ivil [s]ervice examination[s]” the Third Class City Code requires); see also City of Erie v. Haas Mem’l Lodge No. 7, 434 A.2d 881, 883 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (“The promotion of policemen” is “subject to limitation [] by statutory, home rule charter, civil service[,] or merit system constraints.”). 14  This Court observes that, with the exception of Sections 305 and 624 of the Optional Charter Law, the latter of which is not relevant here,16 the Optional Charter Law does not expressly govern, let alone reference, civil service requirements or police officer promotions. Importantly, this Court has ruled that where, as in this instance, the Optional Charter Law is silent as to a particular issue (here, police officer promotions), the “provisions of the Third Class City Code are [] applicable . . . to the extent they are not inconsistent with the [Optional Charter Law].”17 City of Erie, 844 A.2d at 591 (emphasis added); see also Eichenlaub v. City of Lock Haven, 478 A.2d 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). Thus, where the Optional Charter Law expressly prohibits optional charter cities from exercising powers contrary to acts of the General Assembly relating to civil service, the Third Class City Code provisions governing civil service apply.18 Section 12001 of the Third Class City Code authorizes a Third Class City’s council to enact ordinances and promulgate rules and regulations governing the organization and governance of its police force. See 11 Pa.C.S. § 12001(a) (“Council shall fix, by ordinance, the number, grades[,] and compensation of the members of the city police force.”), (d) (“Council shall promulgate rules and regulations for the organization and governing of the police force.”). Section 16 Section 624(a) of the Optional Charter Law declares that while other appointive offices shall immediately cease upon a Third Class City’s adoption of the Optional Charter Law, those subject to tenure of office or civil service protections continue, including police officers. See 53 P.S. § 41624(a). 17 The Third Class City Code and the [Optional Charter Law] are meant to coexist and supplement each other, with the [Optional Charter Law] superseding the [Third Class City] Code only in so far as they are inconsistent. 53 [P.S.] § 41411 (Purdons Supp. 1984). Because the [Optional Charter Law] is silent as to promotions and demotions of police officers, the Third Class City Code provisions pertaining to such matters govern such issues. Bennis v. Gable, 604 F. Supp. 244, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (emphasis added). 18 See 22 Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d Municipal and Local Law § 8:50 (2d ed.). 15 12001(a) of the Third Class City Code also pronounces that “the members of the city police force . . . shall, except as provided in [S]ection 12002 [of the Third Class City Code] (relating to designation of chief), be appointed in accordance with the civil service provisions of this [C]hapter [120 of the Third Class City Code (relating to the police force appointments)].” 11 Pa.C.S. § 12001(a) (emphasis added). Under Section 12002 of the Third Class City Code, while “[t]he chief of police shall be designated by the mayor from within the ranks[,]” “officers,[19] other than the chief of police, shall be designated in accordance with Chapter 144 [of the Third Class City Code, 11 Pa.C.S. §§ 14401-14410, effective January 25, 2016] (relating to civil service).”20 11 Pa.C.S. § 12002 (emphasis added).21 Section 14401 of the Third Class City Code further declares: No individual may be appointed to any uniformed position in the police . . . department, excluding chiefs, unless all of the following apply: (1) The individual passed all examinations as provided for under this [C]hapter [144]. (2) The individual was appointed in the manner and according to the terms, provisions[,] and conditions of this [C]hapter [144]. 19 The Third Class City Code does not define the term officers. 20 Until January 25, 2016, the civil service provisions of the Third Class City Code were set forth in former Chapter 81, Article XLIV of the Third Class City Code, Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 932, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 39401-39410, repealed by the Act of November 24, 2015, P.L. 242 (effective January 25, 2016). As of January 25, 2016, the civil service provisions appear in Third Class City Code Chapter 144. 21 Although Section 14406.1(b)(1) of the Third Class City Code, declares that “the mayor . . . of a city that has adopted [an optional charter pursuant to the Optional Charter Law] . . . shall retain the power to promote a candidate pursuant to that law [(i.e., Optional Charter Law)[,]” 11 Pa.C.S. § 14406.1(b)(1) (emphasis added), where, as here, the City has not adopted an optional charter, Section 14406.1(b)(1) of the Third Class City Code does not apply. To the extent that Section 14406.1(b) of the Third Class City Code applies merely because the City adopted Plan A, promotions must be made “pursuant to the [Optional Charter Law,]” id., and the Third Class City Code fills in the civil service gaps left by the Optional Charter Law. 16 11 Pa.C.S. § 14401 (emphasis added).22 Correspondingly, Section 14402 of the Third Class City Code required Third Class Cities to establish a civil service board to “provide for and oversee the examination of applicants for appointment and promotion to any position in the police or fire department.”23 11 Pa.C.S. § 14402 (emphasis added). 22 Former Section 4401 of the Third Class City Code provided: No person or persons may be appointed to any position whatever in the police department . . . except as otherwise provided by law . . . without having first passed all the examinations hereinafter provided for, and having been appointed in the manner and according to the terms and provisions and conditions of this article. Formerly 53 P.S. § 39401. Thus, the Third Class City Code previously applied the civil service requirements to all police department positions, including chief. 23 Former Section 4402 of the Third Class City Code similarly provided for the establishment of a civil service board “for the examination of applicants for appointment to any position in the police department.” Formerly 53 P.S. § 39402. According to Section 14404(a) of the Third Class City Code: The civil service board shall have the power and its duty shall be to prepare and adopt rules and regulations, subject to approval by [C]ouncil, which, in the [civil service] board’s discretion, secure and maintain the best service for the public for the selection, appointment[,] and promotion of individuals who are qualified to perform the work which is the subject of the civil service examination as provided in this [C]hapter [144] and who are to be employed, appointed[,] or promoted by the [C]ity. The rules and regulations adopted by the [civil service] board shall provide for ascertaining and determining, so f