Full Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Philadelphia Community : Development Coalition, Inc. : : v. : No. 890 C.D. 2024 : SUBMITTED: March 3, 2026 Bruce Fassett, Trustee for : Sierra Fassett, : Appellant : Philadelphia Community : Development Coalition, Inc., : Appellant : : v. : No. 946 C.D. 2024 : Bruce Fassett Trustee for Sierra : Fassett : BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: October 27, 2026 Bruce Fassett, Trustee for Sierra Fassett (Trustee), appeals from several orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dated June 21, 2024, that relate to the remediation of blighted property located at 5105 Overbrook Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Also before the Court is the Philadelphia Community Development Coalition, Inc.’s (PCDC) cross-appeal from the trial court’s order directing PCDC to reimburse Trustee $5,041.72 for the cost of property insurance on the Property. Finally, pending with the Court are Trustee’s application for relief seeking to strike PCDC’s Supplemental Reproduced Record (Application to Strike), and PCDC’s motion for partial quashal of appeal (Motion to Quash). To the extent the trial court directed PCDC to reimburse Trustee the cost of property insurance, we reverse. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. The Application to Strike and Motion to Quash are denied. This matter arose under the Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act, commonly known as Act 135.1 In December 2018, PCDC filed a petition to appoint a conservator (Act 135 Petition), alleging that the Property met the conditions for conservatorship under Section 5(d) of Act 135, 68 P.S. § 1105(d). During a May 2019 hearing, Trustee acknowledged that the Property was abandoned and blighted under Act 135 and that conditions existed for the appointment of a conservator, and Trustee agreed to remediate the blighted conditions identified in PCDC’s petition. Original Record (O.R.), Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 5/15/19, at 12. Trustee further agreed to PCDC’s appointment as conservator if he failed to remediate conditions at the Property. Id. at 13. In August 2019, following a status hearing, the trial court issued an order appointing PCDC conservator of the Property under Act 135. In December 2019, the trial court issued an order directing Trustee to remove any personal property from the Property, including vehicles, within three weeks. O.R., Item No. 22. The trial court authorized PCDC to dispose of personal property remaining on the Property after the three-week period expired. In a January 2020 status report to the trial court, PCDC noted that Trustee failed to remove any remaining items of personal property, including a vehicle located in the garage. Id., 1 Act of November 26, 2008, P.L. 1672, as amended, 68 P.S. §§ 1101-1120. 2 Item No. 24. Following an October 2020 hearing, the trial court issued an order directing PCDC to file a proposed final plan for abating the Property under Section 1106 of Act 135. A hearing on PCDC’s motion to approve a final plan occurred in April 2021. At that time, the Property had been partially remediated. PCDC proposed to either sell the Property in its current improved condition, complete additional structural improvements and sell the Property, or terminate the conservatorship, provided Trustee established the means and ability to renovate the Property and to pay the conservatorship costs. O.R., Item No. 31. PCDC argued that selling the Property in its current condition was the most financially viable option, as the increased costs of remediating the Property would exceed its existing market value of $199,000. Id. The trial court granted PCDC’s motion but directed PCDC to implement the second final plan option. In December 2021, PCDC filed a motion requesting that the trial court approve a listing to sell the Property for $199,000. O.R., Item No. 48. Trustee filed an answer opposing the motion. Id., Item No. 52. In January 2022, Trustee filed a motion to terminate the conservatorship (Termination Motion). Id., Item No. 53. The trial court granted PCDC’s motion to list the Property (Listing Order). Id., Item No. 55. Trustee filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Id., Item Nos. 57, 63. In March 2022, PCDC filed a motion to approve an agreement of sale of the Property for $278,000. Id., Item No. 62. The agreement of sale relevantly provided that settlement would occur “within 30 days of [c]ourt approval[.]” Id., Ex. C. The trial court granted PCDC’s motion to approve the agreement of sale (Sale Order), denied Trustee’s Termination Motion, and directed PCDC to submit a 3 final petition for costs and fees. Id., Item No. 63. A subsequent order reiterated that PCDC was authorized to sell the Property and specified that proceeds of the sale would be held by PCDC’s counsel in an Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Account, pending the trial court’s approval of a distribution schedule. Id., Item No. 64. PCDC filed a fee and cost report in May 2022. In response, Trustee filed a Motion to Compel Substantiation of Fees and Costs (Motion to Compel). Id., Item No. 76. Trustee appealed the trial court’s order denying his Termination Motion to this Court. Although Trustee did not appeal the Listing Order, he did appeal the trial court’s order denying reconsideration and the Sale Order. Trustee did not request a stay of the Sale Order. In the interim, PCDC filed a petition seeking an appeal bond under Rule 1737 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure (Rules). O.R., Item No. 69. PCDC advised that it self-financed all costs of the conservatorship and, although Trustee did not seek a stay of the Sale Order, PCDC could not obtain a title insurance policy during the pendency of Trustee’s appeal. Therefore, PCDC requested an appeal bond covering 120% of the combined conservator’s costs and fees and anticipated legal fees. The trial court granted PCDC’s motion (Bond Order), which Trustee did not appeal. Because Trustee failed to post the required security, PCDC filed a motion to quash Trustee’s appeal. Although this Court declined to quash the appeal based on Trustee’s failure to post bond, we granted PCDC’s motion, as orders denying reconsideration are not reviewable on appeal and the Sale Order was a non- appealable interlocutory order. See Phila. Cmty. Dev. Coal., Inc. v. Fassett, trustee for Fassett, 312 A.3d 377 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (PCDC I). PCDC sold the Property in March 2024, pursuant to the sales agreement approved by the trial court in March 2022. In April 2024, PCDC filed a Motion to 4 Approve Distribution of Settlement Proceeds and Terminate Act 135 Conservatorship (Motion to Approve Distribution). O.R., Item No. 83. In May 2024, Trustee filed the following: (1) a motion to disqualify PCDC as conservator and PCDC’s counsel (Motion to Disqualify); (2) a motion for contempt (Contempt Motion); and (3) a motion to strike the deed transferring the Property, terminate the conservatorship, enforce various provisions of Act 135, and transfer the matter to Orphans’ Court to determine Trustee’s surcharge remedies (Motion to Strike Deed). O.R., Item Nos. 95, 99, 107. The trial court denied these motions, along with Trustee’s Motion to Compel, in June 2024. Id., Item Nos. 119, 121-22, 124. The trial court also granted PCDC’s Motion to Approve Distribution (Order Approving Distribution). Id., Item No. 118. The total costs of conservatorship, $300,627.26, exceeded the funds received from the Property’s sale, which totaled $252,703.39. As a result, the trial court ordered that all funds from the sale be distributed to PCDC, less $5,041.72, which represented the cost of property insurance for periods during which PCDC “misrepresented the Property as ‘vacant,’ while it was actually ‘under construction[.]’” Id. The trial court directed PCDC to pay $5,041.72 to Trustee. Finally, the trial court terminated the conservatorship, pursuant to Section 10(3) of Act 135.2 In July 2024, PCDC filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the trial court to remove the reference to misrepresentation from the Order Approving Distribution, and to eliminate PCDC’s obligation to pay Trustee $5,041.72. O.R., Item No. 128. The trial court granted PCDC’s motion, in part, and amended its order 2 Section 10(3) of Act 135 provides for the termination of a conservatorship where the trial court determines that the subject property has been sold and the sale proceeds distributed under Section 9(d) of Act 135. 68 P.S. § 1110(3). Section 9(d) of Act 135 establishes the priority by which sale proceeds are to be distributed. 68 P.S. § 1109(d). 5 by replacing “misrepresented” with “misstated[.]” Id., Item No. 134. The trial court denied PCDC’s request to eliminate the payment to Trustee. Trustee’s appeal and PCDC’s cross-appeal followed.3 Trustee appeals from the following orders: (1) order denying Trustee’s Motion to Strike Deed; (2) order granting PCDC’s Motion to Approve Distribution (Order Approving Distribution); (3) order denying Trustee’s Motion to Disqualify; (4) order denying Trustee’s Contempt Motion; and (5) order denying Trustee’s Motion to Compel. Notably, Trustee did not appeal the Sale Order. PCDC cross- appeals from the trial court’s order directing the payment of $5,041.72 to Trustee for insurance costs. First, the Court will address Trustee’s Application to Strike and PCDC’s Motion to Quash. Application to Strike In the Application to Strike, Trustee argues that PCDC failed to seek leave of Court before filing its Supplemental Reproduced Record, as required by Rule 1526, Pa.R.A.P. 1526. In addition, Trustee alleges that PCDC refused to cooperate in the creation of the Reproduced Record. As a result, Trustee urges the Court to strike the Supplemental Reproduced Record and direct PCDC to file an amended brief that removes all citations and references thereto. PCDC did not file an answer to the Application to Strike; however, in an August 2025 application seeking an extension of time in which to file its brief, PCDC asserted that Trustee did not coordinate with PCDC in compiling the Reproduced Record, which includes duplicates of some documents but excludes 3 Trustee filed another motion to terminate the conservatorship in August 2024. O.R., Item No. 139. 6 several that pertain to the issues on appeal. As a result, PCDC indicated it may submit a Supplemental Reproduced Record. Having reviewed Trustee’s Reproduced Record, the Court agrees that it omits certain relevant documents and contains several documents that are unrelated to the instant appeal.4 PCDC’s Supplemental Reproduced Record rectifies these omissions. Moreover, Rule 2156 does not require that an appellee seek leave of Court before filing a supplemental reproduced record.5 Accordingly, we deny Trustee’s Application to Strike. Motion to Quash PCDC argues that Trustee failed to take any action to stay the sale of the Property, either before or after this Court quashed his appeal in PCDC I. According to PCDC, once the Property transferred, Trustee was divested of any interest in the Property. As a result, Trustee lacks standing to appeal any orders related to the Property’s sale, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain any challenge to the validity of the deed. To have standing, a party must have a “substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655, 660 (Pa. 2005). An interest is substantial if the party’s interest “surpasses the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.” Id. A direct interest requires a causal connection between the matter complained of and the party’s interest. To satisfy the immediate interest 4 Multiple documents in the Reproduced Record relate to the trial court’s Bond Order. In addition, while Trustee includes the motions underlying the orders on appeal, he excludes many of the exhibits originally attached to those motions, as well as PCDC’s responses thereto. 5 Appellant specifically cites to Rule 2156(b); however, Rule 2156 does not contain, and has never contained, any subparagraphs. 7 requirement, the causal connection must not be remote or speculative. The key is that the person must be “negatively impacted in some real and direct fashion.” Id. The Court rejects PCDC’s standing argument, as Trustee clearly has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of this litigation, and the Property’s sale would have negatively impacted Trustee in “some real and direct fashion.” Pittsburgh Palisades. We agree, however, that Trustee did not appeal the Sale Order or seek a stay of the sale. Additionally, Trustee failed to include any issues related to the Sale Order’s validity in his Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (1925(b) Statement). A party’s failure to include an issue in its 1925(b) Statement results in waiver of that issue on appeal.6 Wilson v. Commonwealth, 209 A.3d 1143, 1150 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). Thus, to the extent Trustee challenges the Sale Order, or the trial court’s authority to issue the Sale Order, such issues are waived.7 Rather than quash Trustee’s appeal, the Court will address any cognizable issues that have been properly preserved. Trustee’s Appeal Before turning to the issues raised by Trustee, the Court is obligated to first address Trustee’s principal brief, which fails in multiple ways to comply with the applicable Chapter 21 Rules. Such deficiencies are made all the more egregious 6 Trustee’s Motion to Strike Deed argued, in part, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Property, as property of a trust. Although Trustee appealed the order denying this motion, Trustee’s 1925(b) Statement does not raise this jurisdictional issue, beyond a vague reference to Trustee’s entitlement to “damages pursuant to surcharge proceedings[.]” O.R., Item No. 132 at 7. Accordingly, the issue is waived. 7 Trustee argues, inter alia, that the sale is invalid based on alleged violations of Act 135 by PCDC and that the sale constitutes an unconstitutional taking. The substance of Trustee’s constitutional argument is limited to citing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; Pa. Const. art. I, § 10. 8 given that the brief was prepared by Trustee’s counsel, Olivia Adams, Esquire.8 PCDC raises this issue in its brief, arguing that Trustee’s brief does not allow for reasonable appellate review, citing Walsh v. Isabella (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 577, 624, 1166 and 1235 C.D. 2022, 76 C.D. 2023, filed December 23, 2024), an unrelated Act 135 matter in which Attorney Adams represented the property owner. In Walsh, this Court quashed the appellants’ appeals due to substantial defects in their appellate brief, which Attorney Adams authored.9 Rule 2101 states that “[b]riefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material respects with the requirements of these [R]ules[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Where defects in the brief or reproduced record “are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.” Id. Rule 2116(a) provides that the Statement of Questions Involved “must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). “Each question shall be followed by an answer stating simply whether the court or government unit agreed, disagreed, did not answer, or did not address the question.” Id. A question will not be considered unless it is included in the statement of questions involved or “fairly suggested thereby.” Id. See also Kull v. Guise, 81 A.3d 148, 150 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (issue is waived where appellant fails to include issue in statement of questions involved). The note to Rule 2116 advises that the statement of questions involved should incorporate “only those details that are 8 In an April 2026 Per Curiam Order of the Supreme Court, Attorney Adams was suspended from the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for a period of five years. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. (Pa., No. 54 DB 2024, filed Apr. 17, 2026). Christian C. Nduka, Esquire, entered an appearance for Trustee on June 26, 2026. 9 The defects noted by the Court in Walsh included a 58-page Statement of the Case, which contained averments of personal opinion and argument, and an argument section that failed to address the orders on appeal and failed “to apply the law to the facts . . . in a meaningful and coherent manner[.]” Walsh, slip op. at 10-11. 9 relevant to disposition of the issues[,]” that “verbosity continues to be discouraged[,]” and “appellate courts strongly disfavor a statement that is not concise.” Id., Note. Of the five orders identified in Trustee’s Notice of Appeal, only three are specifically referenced in his Statement of Questions Involved – the orders denying Trustee’s Motion to Strike Deed, Motion to Disqualify, and Contempt Motion. Trustee attached the remaining orders to his principal brief; however, he only references these documents by arguing that the trial court erred in “awarding PCDC over $200,000 in alleged construction costs and fees[.]” Trustee’s Br. at 12. Trustee acknowledges in a footnote that his brief does not include a separate question for each order on appeal, because “the legal and factual issues significantly overlap across these orders, presenting separate questions for each would result in unnecessary redundancy.” Id. at 9 n.14. Far from concise, each question presented is followed by several paragraphs of argument that, more often than not, are unrelated to the issue at hand. Trustee’s 28-page statement of the case is likewise riddled with argument, which is explicitly prohibited by Rule 2117(b).10 Trustee asserts, for example, that PCDC “failed to present one scintilla of proof that it had completed” the final plan approved by the trial court, that PCDC’s “purported attorney fees . . . are outrageous, unreasonable[,] and non-compensable,” that PCDC made “material false statements” on insurance documents, and that PCDC has a “pattern of making material misstatements” in insurance applications. Trustee’s Br. at 29, 34, 42, 44. Per Rule 2119(a), the argument section of a brief “shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each 10 The statement of the case “shall not contain any argument.” Pa.R.A.P. 2117(b). 10 part – in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed – the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Where a party fails to include analysis and relevant authority, the issue is waived. 770 Ameribeer, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 318 A.3d 998, 1009 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) [citing Browne v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 A.2d 429, 435 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)]. This Court will neither develop an argument on a party’s behalf nor “scour the record to find evidence to support an argument.” Walsh, slip op. at 7 (emphasis removed) [quoting Milby v. Pate, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2014)].11 The argument section of Trustee’s brief complies with Rule 2119 only to the extent that it is divided into four parts. Generally, Trustee’s arguments are underdeveloped and/or unsupported by relevant legal authority. In addition, Trustee raises several issues challenging the validity of the Sale Order, which was not appealed. Given our disposition on PCDC’s Motion to Quash, the Court will not address Trustee’s arguments in opposition. Otherwise, the Court is able to discern the following arguments: (1) the deed transferring the Property was void ab initio; (2) PCDC’s accounting of its costs and fees fails to comport with Act 135; and (3) the trial court erred in denying Trustee’s Motion to Disqualify and Contempt Motion. Trustee argues that the deed transferring the Property is void because settlement did not occur within 30 days of March 25, 2022, when the trial court issued the Sale Order. Trustee does not support this argument with citation to any 11 Unreported opinions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited for their persuasive value, per Section 414(a) of the Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). 11 language in the agreement of sale or other relevant legal authority.12 Instead, Trustee generally states that PCDC lacked authority to transfer the Property, “[a]bsent a valid contract or compliance with court conditions[.]” Trustee’s Br. at 58. We reject Trustee’s argument that failure to effectuate settlement within 30 days of the Sale Order voids the deed. An addendum to the agreement of sale included an acknowledgment by the prospective buyers (Buyers) that the agreement of sale and conveyance of the Property was contingent upon court approval. O.R., Item No. 62, Ex. C. Buyers also expressly waived any delays with obtaining court approval of the agreement of sale and “conveyance of the Property.” Id. Moreover, once Trustee appealed the Sale Order in PCDC I, the matter was stayed and “placed in deferred status.” Trial ct. op., 9/23/24, at 10. As a result, settlement could not occur until this Court rendered its decision in PCDC I. Buyers settled on the Property approximately 10 days thereafter. In challenging PCDC’s accounting of its fees and costs, Trustee alleges that PCDC submitted “unverified, self-interested invoices” to Mangual Demolition (Contractor), the company that remediated the Property, that PCDC failed to disclose a conflict of interest with Contractor, and that PCDC “leverage[ed] the [P]roperty’s value to pay invoices after” the Property was sold. Trustee’s Br. at 58 (emphasis removed); Trustee’s Reply Br. at 5. Trustee does not cite any evidence to support these allegations. Trustee argues that PCDC’s accounting is “nothing more than a pile of unpaid invoices,” and that Subsections 1106(c)(3) and 1106(d) of Act 135 required PCDC to provide proof of payment through cancelled checks and receipts. 12 The cases cited by Trustee – In re Jovanov’s Estate, 296 A.2d 725 (Pa. 1975), and Will v. Killmer, 39 Pa. D&C 3d 627 (Bucks Cnty. 1996) – are not pertinent to the issue. Court approval to sell the property in Jovanov’s Estate was not obtained prior to the decedent’s death. Killmer, which concerned a real estate broker’s action to recover a sales commission, is neither relevant nor binding on this Court. 12 Trustee’s Reply Br. at 9. Finally, Trustee contends that, in Walsh, PCDC argued that Act 135 required a conservator to substantiate its costs by providing “cancelled checks and receipts.” Trustee’s Reply Br. at 5. Trustee asserts that PCDC is judicially estopped from arguing a different position in the instant appeal. These arguments lack merit, as the cited provisions do not require the proof Trustee seeks. Subsection 1106(c)(3) states that a conservator’s final plan must “include a cost estimate, a financing plan and either a description of the work to be done for the rehabilitation of the building or, if rehabilitation is not feasible, a proposal for the closing, sealing or demolition of the building.” 68 P.S. § 1106(c)(3). Subsection (d) requires a conservator to “file with the court a full accounting of all income and expenditures during the period of time it took to implement the final plan.” 68 P.S. § 1106(d). Neither of these provisions require a conservator to submit proof of payment, such as cancelled checks, as part of its accounting. Trustee’s judicial estoppel argument is likewise devoid of merit. Generally, a party to an action is estopped from assuming a position that is inconsistent with his assertion in a prior action, if the assertion was successfully maintained. Bergdoll v. Commonwealth, 858 A.2d 185, 194 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) [citing Assoc. Hosp. Serv. of Phila. v. Pustilnik, 439 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Pa. 1981)]. This doctrine only applies, however, if the issues and the parties are the same in the subsequent action. Id. [citing Phila. Suburban Water Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 808 A.2d 1044, 1061 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)]. Trustee was not a party in Walsh. Trustee’s argument in support of his Motion to Disqualify PCDC’s counsel consists of unsupported allegations of conflicts of interest between counsel, PCDC, and Contractor, and of “deferred or post-sale payment schemes” that, allegedly, violate Section 1106(d) of Act 135 and invalidate PCDC’s final 13 accounting. Trustee’s Br. at 61-62. Citing Walsh, Trustee asserts that PCDC “previously convinced a court that post hoc and unverified payments were impermissible,” and that PCDC is judicially estopped from “asserting the propriety of” its relationship with Contractor or “justify[ing] payments” thereto. Trustee’s Br. at 63. The Court again rejects Trustee’s application of judicial estoppel based on Walsh, as the parties are not the same in both matters. Critically, Trustee fails to cite any legal authority or standard for the disqualification of counsel or a conservator. In light of Trustee’s failure to provide any discernible analysis or relevant legal authority, the Court is constrained to conclude that the issue is waived. Regarding the trial court’s order denying Trustee’s Contempt Motion, Trustee argues that the trial court “committed clear legal error and inflicted substantial prejudice upon” Trustee. Trustee’s Br. at 61. Although Trustee asserts multiple failings on the trial court’s part,13 Trustee fails to identify any basis for finding PCDC in contempt. Trustee dedicates a mere two sentences to the issue in the argument summary portion of his brief, stating that the trial court failed to enforce a December 2019 order that purportedly required “PCDC to sell a valuable classic car” left on the Property “and apply the proceeds to the conservatorship[.]” Id. at 52. Trustee misrepresents the December 2019 order, which merely authorized PCDC to remove any personal property, including vehicles, remaining on the Property. Although PCDC was authorized to sell any vehicles left on the Property, with the proceeds applied towards the cost of conservatorship, it was not required to do so. Moreover, the record reflects that the Pennsylvania Department 13 Trustee contends that the trial court “refus[ed] to enforce” and “ignore[d] or nullif[ied]” prior court orders. Trustee’s Br. at 64. 14 of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, could not locate any registration or title information for the vehicle in the garage. O.R., Item No. 23, Ex. P4. As it could not “trace ownership” of this vehicle, PCDC advised Trustee that it would have the vehicle scrapped, unless the “family would like to take it.” O.R., Item No. 23, Ex. P3-P4. The trial court noted in its September 2024 Rule 1925(a) opinion that Trustee made no effort to remove the vehicle from the Property. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in denying Trustee’s Contempt Motion. PCDC’s Cross-Appeal PCDC argues that the trial court erred in directing that PCDC remit $5,041.72 to Trustee for the cost of property insurance. According to PCDC, Trustee failed to raise any issue regarding the sufficiency of insurance coverage when the trial court approved the policy in October 2019, or in the Motion to Compel challenging PCDC’s fees and costs. Therefore, Trustee waived any right to challenge the sufficiency of insurance. PCDC disputes the trial court’s assertion that claims presented under the policy would have been denied, and PCDC relied on its insurance broker to determine the scope of coverage for the Property. In addition, PCDC argues that the trial court lacked authority to direct any payments to Trustee, who was not an insured party or a beneficiary of the policy. Section 9(d)(9) of Act 135, 68 P.S. § 1109(d)(9), which establishes a schedule of distribution for proceeds from the sale of blighted property, provides that proceeds shall first be applied to the costs and fees incurred by the conservator. Because the proceeds from the Property’s sale were insufficient to cover PCDC’s costs and fees, PCDC maintains that Trustee is not entitled to any proceeds. Accordingly, PCDC asks the Court to reverse the trial court’s Order Approving Distribution, to the extent it directs PCDC to remit any funds to Trustee. 15 In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court rejects PCDC’s waiver argument, as Trustee’s appeal in PCDC I stayed its consideration of Trustee’s challenge to PCDC’s costs and fees. The trial court notes that insurance documents described the Property as vacant. The insurance policy, however, states that buildings under construction or renovation are not vacant. According to the trial court, any claims presented during the conservatorship would have been denied and, therefore, the costs of insurance were properly stricken from PCDC’s costs. The trial court defends its decision to direct payment of insurance costs to Trustee, as Trustee was a party in interest, and Section 9(d)(9) of Act 135 permits the distribution of sale proceeds to the property owner. The Court agrees with PCDC that the trial court erred in directing the payment of $5,041.72 to Trustee. PCDC’s conservatorship costs totaled $300,637.26. Even if the Court assumes that the trial court properly struck the cost of property insurance from PCDC’s costs, the remaining costs of $295,595.54 far exceed the $252,703.39 received from the sale of the Property. While Section 9(d)(9) of Act 135 allows the distribution of proceeds to the property owner, the costs of conservatorship are given priority. Therefore, the trial court erred in directing the payment of any sums to Trustee. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the trial court’s Order Approving Distribution, to the extent the trial court directed PCDC to remit $5,041.72 to Trustee. The trial court’s orders are affirmed in all other respects. Trustee’s Motion to Strike and PCDC’s Motion to Quash are hereby denied. BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, President Judge Emerita 16 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Philadelphia Community : Development Coalition, Inc. : : v. : No. 890 C.D. 2024 : Bruce Fassett, Trustee for : Sierra Fassett, : Appellant : Philadelphia Community : Development Coalition, Inc., : Appellant : : v. : No. 946 C.D. 2024 : Bruce Fassett Trustee for Sierra : Fassett : ORDER AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2026, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting the Motion to Approve Distribution of Settlement Proceeds and Terminate Act 135 Conservatorship (Order Approving Distribution) filed by Philadelphia Community Development Coalition, Inc. (PCDC), is REVERSED to the extent the trial court directed PCDC to pay Bruce Fassett, Trustee for Sierra Fassett (Trustee), $5,041.72 for property insurance costs. The Order Approving Distribution is AFFIRMED in all other respects. The trial court’s orders denying Trustee’s motions to compel substantiation of fees and costs, to strike deed, to terminate PCDC’s conservatorship, to enforce provisions of Act 1351 to transfer the matter to orphans’ court, to disqualify conservator, and the motion for contempt are AFFIRMED. Trustee’s application for relief seeking to strike PCDC’s Supplemental Reproduced Record and PCDC’s motion for partial quashal of appeal are DENIED. BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, President Judge Emerita 1 Act of November 26, 2008, P.L. 1672, as amended, 68 P.S. §§ 1101-1120.