Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1260-25 UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS, LLC, ASSIGNEE OF CITIBANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANGELO G. BATTAGLIA, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Submitted September 30, 2026 – Decided November 4, 2026 Before Judges Currier and Jacobs. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. DC-008499- 13. Central Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys for appellant (La Tanya R. Harry and Daniel I. Rubin, on the brief). Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM In this appeal, we decide whether a judgment debtor who already received most of the $1,000 personal property exemption provided under N.J.S.A. 2A:17- 19 in response to an earlier levy on the same judgment may claim a fresh $1,000 exemption when the creditor later levies again on that same judgment. We conclude the trial court properly limited the debtor to the unused balance of the exemption for the judgment and affirm the court's November 13, 2025 order. I. Plaintiff Unifund CCR Partners, LLC, assignee of Citibank, N.A., sued defendant, Angelo G. Battaglia, in the Special Civil Part to collect unpaid credit card debt in May 2013. The court entered default judgment in 2014, in the amount of $5,601.77. Plaintiff later sought to enforce the judgment and levied against defendant's bank account. Defendant objected. At the levy hearing that followed in 2016, defendant acknowledged the validity of the underlying judgment but stated he was unemployed and responsible for supporting his elderly father and autistic child. The court determined the bank had levied $1,348.40 from defendant's account, granted defendant an exemption in the amount of $848.40 and permitted the levy to proceed as to the remainder, $500. An April 7, 2016 order memorialized that result. The balance of the judgment A-1260-25 2 remained largely unsatisfied, with defendant making some payments toward the balance through a payment plan, according to defendant's later testimony. In September 2025, plaintiff obtained a new writ of execution against defendant's assets for an outstanding balance of $4,361.13. A second levy followed in October 2025, after plaintiff secured $463 plus a $125 levy fee from defendant's bank account. Once more, defendant filed an objection to the levy using the court-supplied objection form and checking a box for exemption labeled "[p]ersonal property up to $1,000." He did not check the box for Social Security, child support, or any other exempt source. The trial court heard the objection at a hearing in November 2025. Defendant testified he was a single father responsible for supporting an autistic child. He explained he had made payments on the judgment and wanted to resume a payment plan but plaintiff would not accept an amount he considered affordable. He said he received about $1,100 per month for serving as his child's caretaker and earned wages of approximately $558 every two weeks. After locating the 2016 order and determining defendant had already received a personal property exemption toward the same judgment in the amount of $848.40, the court noted an apparent intermingling of wages and social security benefits in defendant's bank account. The court explained the A-1260-25 3 consequence of defendant failing to submit bank statements or other documentation needed to identify the source of the monies levied: . . . [t]he problem is it's impossible for me . . . to distinguish between the Social Security amount, which is exempt, and the wages, which are not exempt. . . . So the court's going to enter an order granting [defendant] the [personal property] exemption in the amount of $151.60, but then the balance would be turned over to the creditor. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court misread N.J.S.A. 2A:17-19. He contends the statute permits a debtor to claim up to $1,000 in exempt personal property each time a creditor levies on the debtor's property. He stresses the statute does not expressly impose a lifetime bar or a one-time aggregate cap. He also argues that because the statute is remedial, it should be construed liberally to protect debtors from destitution. In his view, a contrary reading would allow a creditor to exhaust the exemption once and then use repeated levies to strip a debtor of all protection. II. On appeal, we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. A trial court's interpretation of a statute and the legal consequences flowing from established facts receive no special deference. Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of A-1260-25 4 Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). We also review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019) (citing State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018)). We consider the statutory text first. If the language does not resolve the issue, we read the provision in context with related sections and with its evident legislative purpose. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005). N.J.S.A. 2A:17-19 is a personal property exemption provision that reads: Goods and chattels, shares of stock or interests in any corporation and personal property of every kind, not exceeding in value, exclusive of wearing apparel, $1,000.00, and all wearing apparel, the property of a debtor shall be reserved, both before and after his death, for his use or that of his family or his estate, and shall not be liable to be seized or taken by virtue of any execution or civil process whatever, issued out of any court of this State. On its face, the statutory text protects property from seizure by execution or civil process. The provision does not expressly say whether the $1,000 limit applies per levy, per judgment, or once for life. We therefore read it in context. From its ruling, we deduce the trial court read the exemption to mean it could not be repeatedly used in full against the same judgment after the debtor had already received a benefit. Thus, after determining defendant received $848.40 in 2016, the court concluded defendant could receive only the A-1260-25 5 remaining $151.60 in 2025, for the total statutory limit of $1,000. We agree with the trial court's interpretation. The broader statutory scheme does not compel defendant's reading. The Legislature chose a capped amount to apply to "any execution or civil process whatever, issued out of any court of this State." Ibid. It did not create a rolling exemption that automatically replenishes each time a creditor issues another writ on the same judgment. Related provisions in N.J.S.A. 2A:17-26 address the mechanics of inventory, valuation, and reservation of exempt property during execution. Those provisions contemplate "several executions" on the same judgment and speak in terms of making up any "deficiency" so as to "make the amount reserved by law." Ibid. Such a structure is more consistent with a single aggregate reserve as to the same judgment than with a fresh $1,000 exemption each time a creditor levies anew. This reading also fits the purpose of the statute. Our case law describes the exemption as a remedial measure designed to protect a debtor from being cast into utter poverty by execution. See Redick v. O'Brien, 191 N.J. Super. 614, 616 (Ch. Div. 1983). The statute preserves a modest cushion. It does not erase the judgment, nor does it entitle a debtor to prevent collection indefinitely A-1260-25 6 by asserting a $1,000 protection each time the creditor returns to enforce the same unsatisfied obligation. The record before us reflects the trial court's approach is consistent with the statute's language and purpose. In 2016, defendant came to court and said he was unemployed, unable to work, and caring for an autistic child. In response, the court protected $848.40 from the levy and allowed collection only as to the balance levied. The statute's protective function thus operated as intended. Nearly a decade later, defendant still owed $4,361.13, and plaintiff levied on the same judgment. Defendant again described difficult financial circumstances, stating he remained the caretaker for his child. However, he was now employed, reporting earnings of about $558 every two weeks. The court rejected defendant's wish to again invoke the $1,000 personal property exemption in full and instead awarded the remaining $151.60 to which he was entitled. Across the life of this judgment, defendant thus retained the full benefit of the statutory reserve: $848.40 in 2016 and $151.60 in 2025, for a total of $1,000. We also find significance in the 2025 colloquy concerning the source of the funds. Defendant suggested some deposits may have derived from his A-1260-25 7 daughter's Social Security benefits. Had he proven that claim, a separate exemption issue may have arisen. But defendant did not check the Social Security box on the objection form, produced no bank statements, and offered no tracing of deposits. The court expressly noted it could not distinguish exempt federal benefits from wages and other funds. That finding rested firmly on the record, and we see no basis to disturb it. The only exemption claim properly established on this record was the personal property exemption under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-19. The court credited that claim to the extent of the remaining balance. In sum, the statute does not direct the answer defendant urges. Read in context, and applied to successive levies enforcing the same judgment, the trial court's interpretation was reasonable, giving defendant the full protection afforded under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-19 and allowing plaintiff to continue collecting a judgment that remained largely unpaid for more than a decade. Affirmed. A-1260-25 8