Full Opinion

FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE LEROY MORFORD, ) ) No. 41304-7-III Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) OFFICE MAX, INC., ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) Defendant, ) ) ) THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & ) INDUSTRIES, ) ) Respondent. ) COONEY, J. — Leroy Morford sustained an industrial injury in 1999 and thereafter received pension payments from the Department of Labor and Industries for permanent total disability. Mr. Morford died in 2021 from causes unrelated to his industrial injury. Unaware of his death, the Department continued paying the pension benefits. After learning of Mr. Morford’s death, the Department issued an overpayment order that No. 41304-7-III Morford v. Office Max directed Mr. Morford’s beneficiary to repay the benefits received after Mr. Morford’s death, inclusive of the day he died. The Beneficiary appealed the order to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals and, in a motion for summary judgment, argued the overpayment should not include the day of Mr. Morford’s death. The Department also moved for summary judgment and asserted the plain language of RCW 51.32.040(2)(a) allowed Mr. Morford to receive pension payments only through the day before his death. An Industrial Appeals Judge (IAJ) issued a proposed decision and order in the Department’s favor. The Board and the superior court both affirmed. The beneficiary now appeals to this court. We affirm the superior court. BACKGROUND Mr. Morford sustained an industrial injury in 1999 and thereafter received pension payments for permanent total disability. Mr. Morford opted to receive benefits under RCW 51.32.067(1)(a), which granted him pension benefits but did not allow for his surviving “spouse, children, or others” to receive survivor benefits upon his death. Mr. Morford died of causes unrelated to his industrial injury on September 9, 2021. The Department continued to pay Mr. Morford pension benefits after his death. Once the Department became aware of Mr. Morford’s death, it assessed an overpayment order directing the beneficiary to refund the overpayment of benefits received from September 9 through October 15, 2021. 2 No. 41304-7-III Morford v. Office Max The beneficiary appealed the overpayment order to the Board and, in a motion for summary judgment, argued the plain language of RCW 51.32.040(2)(a) required payment of a worker’s pension through the day of their death rather than the day before their death. The Department filed a response “construed as a cross motion for summary judgment” and contended the statute’s plain language allowed pension payments only through the day before Mr. Morford’s death. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 20. In reply, the beneficiary agreed that “benefits should be paid on a per day basis and not a smaller increment such as hours or minutes.” CP at 25. The IAJ issued a proposed decision and order granting summary judgment in the Department’s favor and concluded that “[p]ension benefits are payable up to the date prior to death.” CP at 22. The beneficiary petitioned for review of the proposed decision. The Board denied the petition, and the proposed decision and order became the Board’s final decision and order. The beneficiary then appealed to the superior court. The superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. The beneficiary now appeals to this court. ANALYSIS The beneficiary argues Mr. Morford was entitled to pension benefits through the day of his death rather than the day prior. The Department responds that RCW 51.32.040(2)(a) unambiguously entitles a worker to benefits only for the days before the worker’s death. We agree with the Department’s interpretation of RCW 51.32.040(2)(a). 3 No. 41304-7-III Morford v. Office Max In an appeal from a board decision, the superior court acts in an appellate capacity and reviews the board’s decision de novo. Ruse v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 138 Wn.2d 1, 5, 977 P.2d 570 (1999). “Our review of the superior court decision is governed by RCW 51.52.140.” Hendrickson v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 2 Wn. App. 2d 343, 351, 409 P.3d 1162 (2018). RCW 51.52.140 states an “[a]ppeal shall lie from the judgment of the superior court as in other civil cases.” Statutory construction is a question of law this court reviews de novo. Yuchasz v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 183 Wn. App. 879, 887, 335 P.3d 998 (2014). “The fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the Legislature.” Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991). The meaning of a statute must be derived from the statute’s words alone, provided the statute is plain and unambiguous. Id. “A statute is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in two or more ways, but it is not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable.” Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wn.2d 91, 105, 26 P.3d 257 (2001). We give substantial weight to the agency’s interpretation when an agency is interpreting a law it administers. Lang v. Dental Quality Assur. Comm’n, 138 Wn. App. 235, 243, 156 P.3d 919 (2007). A worker who sustains an industrial injury is entitled to benefits under the “Industrial Insurance Act,” Title 51 RCW. Former RCW 51.32.010 (1977). After a worker’s injury is deemed stable, the Department evaluates whether the worker is entitled 4 No. 41304-7-III Morford v. Office Max to permanent or partial disability benefits. RCW 51.32.055; RCW 51.32.080; former RCW 51.32.060 (2007). If a worker is incapable of “performing any work at a gainful occupation,” they are considered permanently disabled and are entitled to pension payments. RCW 51.08.160; former RCW 51.32.060(1). Once a worker is determined to be permanently totally disabled, the worker may choose how the Department disburses pension benefits. RCW 51.32.067(1)(a)-(c). “Option I” allows a worker to receive pension benefits during their life but does not set aside any benefits for the worker’s surviving “spouse, children, or others” upon death. RCW 51.32.067(1)(a) (emphasis omitted). “Option II” allows the injured worker to receive an “actuarially reduced benefit” that, upon the worker’s death, continues “throughout the life of and [is] paid to” the worker’s beneficiary. RCW 51.32.067(1)(b) (emphasis omitted). “Option III” permits the injured worker to receive an “actuarially reduced benefit,” one-half of which is to be continued and paid through the life of the worker’s beneficiary. RCW 51.32.067(1)(c) (emphasis omitted). Mr. Morford chose “Option I.” CP at 47 (emphasis omitted). RCW 51.32.040(2)(a) is implicated when an injured worker dies from causes unrelated to their industrial injury. RCW 51.32.040(2)(a) states, [i]f any worker suffers (i) a permanent partial injury and dies from some other cause than the accident which produced the injury before he or she receives payment of the award for the permanent partial injury or (ii) any other injury before he or she receives payment of any monthly installment covering any period of time before his or her death, the amount of the 5 No. 41304-7-III Morford v. Office Max permanent partial disability award or the monthly payment, or both, shall be paid to the surviving spouse or the child or children if there is no surviving spouse. If there is no surviving spouse and no child or children, the award or the amount of the monthly payment shall be paid by the department or self-insurer and distributed consistent with the terms of the decedent’s will or, if the decedent dies intestate, consistent with the terms of RCW 11.04.015. (Emphasis added.) The beneficiary argues the phrase “any period of time before his or her death” should be construed to mean Mr. Morford was entitled to benefits through the actual day of his death. The Department responds that Mr. Morford was entitled to benefits only through the day before his death because the plain meaning of “before” does not permit payment on the date of death and because benefits are paid by the day, not the second, minute, or hour. The beneficiary is not entitled to receive benefits for the day of Mr. Morford’s death. The word “before” is defined as “earlier than the time when” or “sooner than.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 197 (1993). Moreover, the parties agree that when a monthly installment is prorated due to a worker’s death mid-month, benefits are prorated by the day, not in smaller increments of time. See RCW 51.08.178(1); RCW 1.12.040. Consequently, payment of benefits for the day before the worker’s death, but not the day of death, accords with the plain and ordinary meaning of “before” because it covers the time “earlier than” the worker’s death. 6 No. 41304-7-III Morford v. Office Max The Department further argues that RCW 51.32.040 and RCW 51.32.067 work in harmony to provide pension benefits to the injured worker up to the day of death, and survivor benefits beginning on the day of death. We agree. Under RCW 51.32.067(l)(b) and (c), survivor benefits begin “upon death” of the injured worker. “Upon” is defined as “on,” “on the occasion of,” or “at the time of.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2517-18 (1993). The use of “upon death” indicates survivor benefits begin on the day of the injured worker’s death. Thus, when read together, RCW 51.32.040 and RCW 51.32.067 evince a legislative intent to stop pension benefits the day before an injured worker’s death and begin survivor benefits on the day of death. RCW 51.32.040(2)(a) is unambiguous. Based on the statute’s plain language, the beneficiary was entitled to benefits only through the day before Mr. Morford’s death. Lastly, the beneficiary requests attorney fees under RCW 51.52.130. That statute reads, in relevant part [i]f, on appeal to the superior or appellate court from the decision and order of the board, said decision and order is reversed or modified and additional relief is granted to a worker or beneficiary, or in cases where a party other than the worker or beneficiary is the appealing party and the worker’s or beneficiary’s right to relief is sustained, a reasonable fee for the services of the worker’s or beneficiary’s attorney shall be fixed by the court. RCW 51.52.130(1). Because the beneficiary has not prevailed in this appeal, they are not entitled to attorney fees. 7 No. 41304-7-III Morford v. Office Max CONCLUSION We affirm the superior court and deny the beneficiary’s request for attorney fees. Cooney, J. WE CONCUR: Staab, C.J. Hill, J. 8