Stevenson v. Schultz CA3

Filed 11/4/26 Stevenson v. Schultz CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Nevada) DOUGLAS SCHULTZ, C103755 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CU0000128) v. MARIANNE STEVENSON, Defendant and Appellant. _____________________________ C103382 MARIANNE STEVENSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. FL001430) v. DOUGLAS SCHULTZ, Defendant and Respondent. This is a consolidated appeal from (1) an interlocutory judgment ordering the partition and sale of residential property in Nevada County Superior Court case No. CU0000128 (Case No. CU0000128), and (2) the denial of a request for spousal support and for the division of community property in Nevada County Superior Court case No. FL001430 (Case No. FL001430). 1  In 2000, Douglas Schultz and Marianne Stevenson were married in the State of Nevada. In 2004, they purchased a residential property in Grass Valley, California, taking title as “husband and wife as joint tenants.” In 2020, Schultz obtained a judgment of divorce from Stevenson in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Dubai divorce decree addressed marital status and child custody only; it made no findings related to division of property or spousal support. Years later, Schultz commenced an action in Case No. CU0000128 (the partition action), to partition the Grass Valley property. Stevenson opposed partition, arguing that the Dubai divorce decree is not enforceable in California and therefore the property is community property and not subject to partition (Code Civ. Proc., § 872.210, subd. (b)).1 The trial court ultimately entered an interlocutory judgment in favor of Schultz, finding that the parties are divorced and that the property is not community property. Meanwhile, Stevenson filed a request for an order in a family law proceeding, Case No. FL001430, asking the family law court to deny comity to the Dubai divorce decree; treat the parties as a married couple seeking dissolution; assume jurisdiction over the partition action; and address issues of spousal support, child custody/visitation, and division of property. After a hearing, the family law court denied her request based on lack of personal jurisdiction and inconvenient forum. Stevenson appeals both rulings. Regarding the interlocutory judgment, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion by extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree because it was based on Islamic (Sharia) laws that violate state public policy and constitutional principles of equal protection and due process. She also challenges a pre- judgment order denying her motion to set aside an entry of default as to other (non- partition) causes of action. Regarding her request for relief in family law court, 1 Undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 Stevenson argues the court erred in finding no personal jurisdiction and abused its discretion by dismissing the case based on inconvenient forum. In the first appeal, we conclude that Stevenson’s challenges to the interlocutory judgment either have been forfeited or lack merit. We decline to review Stevenson’s challenges to the order denying her motion for relief from default because that order is not reviewable on appeal from the interlocutory judgment. In the second appeal, we conclude that Stevenson has failed to carry her burden of showing that the trial court erred in finding no personal jurisdiction. We therefore affirm the rulings in both cases. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE Schultz and Stevenson, both of whom are United States citizens and of Christian faith, were married in Nevada in 2000. In 2004, they purchased a residential property in Grass Valley, California, taking title as “husband and wife as joint tenants.” From 2004 to 2011, the couple resided at the property with their two children: A son born in 2004 and a daughter born in 2007. In 2011, the family moved to Dubai, UAE. The family lived together in Dubai from 2011 until 2017. In 2017, due in part to suspicions of marital infidelity, Stevenson left Dubai and moved back to California. Dubai Divorce Decree On January 2, 2020, Schultz initiated the process to divorce Stevenson under Dubai Sharia law by making a unilateral declaration of intent to divorce, also known as a talaq pronouncement of divorce. 2 (See Chaudry v. Chaudry (N.J. Super.Ct.App.Div. 1978) 159 N.J. Super. 566, 574-575.) 2 Stevenson contends that under applicable Sharia law only the husband had the legal right to “effectuate” such a divorce and a wife could do so only with her husband’s permission. 3  Thereafter, on February 25, 2020, Schultz filed an action in a Dubai court to “certify” (i.e., finalize) the talaq pronouncement of divorce. Stevenson retained counsel to represent her in the Dubai proceeding. After several continuances—granted, in part, to allow Stevenson time to familiarize herself with the case—the matter came on for hearing on September 6, 2020. The issues before the Dubai court included not only Schultz’s request to “certify” the divorce but also Schultz’s separate request to establish custody over the couple’s children. Schultz appeared at the hearing with counsel. It is not clear from the record whether Stevenson or her counsel was physically present for the September 6 hearing. At the hearing, the court heard testimony from Schultz and two other witnesses. On September 20, 2020, the Dubai court entered a judgment of dissolution. In rendering its decision, the court expressly found that “in consideration of the fact that both parties are adherents of the Christian faith and [that] neither party has advocated the application of their respective country’s legal framework, the UAE’s legal statutes have jurisdiction.” Thus, “[i]n light of the permissibility of unilateral divorce within Islamic Sharia and the UAE’s Personal Status Law derived from its precepts,” the court concluded that it had been “conclusively established” that Schultz “unequivocally divorced [Stevenson] through a definite and unequivocal declaration on 02/01/2020.” Further, because the children had surpassed the age typically associated with maternal custody under Sharia law, the court awarded Schultz full custody of the children. The Dubai divorce decree addressed marital status and child custody only; it made no findings related to division of property or spousal support. California Dissolution Proceeding On January 14, 2020, after the talaq pronouncement of divorce but before commencement of the Dubai action to “certify” the divorce, Stevenson filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Nevada County Superior Court (Case No. FL20-015613; the 4 2020 dissolution proceeding). Shortly thereafter, Schultz filed a motion to quash service of the summons in the 2020 dissolution proceeding. After briefing and argument, the family law court granted the motion to quash. The court concluded that Schultz’s contacts with the state of California are “substantial and systematic enough to support a finding of general personal jurisdiction,” but that the exercise of jurisdiction over him would not be fair and reasonable. The court held that “California has minimal to no state interest in adjudicating” Stevenson’s petition for dissolution; that exercising jurisdiction would impose a “substantial burden” on Schultz, and that Stevenson “can obtain effective relief in the [UAE] dissolution matter.” Stevenson filed a motion for reconsideration. The family law court granted reconsideration but ultimately reaffirmed its decision to grant the motion to quash. Stevenson did not appeal the order quashing service. California Partition Action In April 2022, Schultz commenced an action in Nevada County Superior Court (Case No. CU0000128; the partition action) seeking partition of the Nevada County property, among other causes of action. After unsuccessfully attempting to serve Stevenson by other means, the trial court granted Schultz’s request for service by publication. When Stevenson failed to file a responsive pleading, Schultz requested entry of default, which the court clerk entered on March 2, 2023. On March 30, 2023, Schultz filed a second amended complaint, the primary purpose of which was to eliminate a cause of action for partition of personal property. As with the first amended complaint, the summons for the second amended complaint was served by publication. In August 2023, Stevenson filed a motion to set aside the entry of default, arguing that she failed to respond to the complaint because she was unaware it had been served. The trial court denied the motion to set aside entry of default based on Stevenson’s lack 5 of diligence in seeking relief and failure to demonstrate excusable neglect. Nevertheless, a few months later, the parties stipulated to lift the default as to the partition cause of action so that it could be decided on the merits. In January 2024, Stevenson filed a motion to transfer the partition case to family law court. In support of her motion, Stevenson argued that the Dubai divorce is not entitled to comity because it is contrary to California public policy and violated Stevenson’s rights to due process and equal protection. Accordingly, Stevenson argued that she and Schultz are still married and that the Grass Valley house is community property and not subject to partition (§ 872.210, subd. (b)). The trial court denied Stevenson’s transfer motion. In its ruling, the court extended comity to the Dubai divorce decree as it relates to the status of the marriage and found that Schultz and Stevenson are “not married.” The court also held that Stevenson failed to show how recognition of the Dubai divorce decree in the partition action would prejudice Stevenson’s rights or violate California public policy. In September 2024, Schultz filed a motion for entry of interlocutory judgment concerning partition of the property. The motion argued that because Schultz and Stevenson are no longer “ ‘husband and wife,’ ” they own the property as “ ‘joint tenants,’ ” each having an undivided one-half interest in the property. The motion sought to have the property sold and the net proceeds divided amongst them. Stevenson opposed the motion for entry of interlocutory judgment and filed a motion to stay the partition action. Stevenson argued that a stay was necessary to preserve her right to challenge the validity of the Dubai judgment in family law court. The trial court denied the stay request. On April 21, 2025, the trial court granted Schultz’s motion for entry of an interlocutory judgment. In its ruling, the trial court rejected Stevenson’s claim that the parties are still married: “Despite multiple efforts by defendant to invalidate it, this court has recognized the validity of the Dubai divorce between the parties, determined that the 6 parties are no longer married and determined that plaintiff’s partition action is not barred by [Code of Civil Procedure] § 872.210.” Thereafter, on May 2, 2025, the court entered its interlocutory judgment for partition of the property. On May 8, 2025, Stevenson filed a notice of appeal of the order granting the motion for entry of an interlocutory judgment. California Family Law Proceeding In or about September 2023, Stevenson filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Schultz in Nevada County Superior Court (Case No. FL0001430; the DVRO action). 3 Notably, in her request for a DVRO, Stevenson did not argue that she and Schultz were still married. Rather, she alleged that they “used to be married.” In November 2023, Schultz moved to quash the service of the summons in the DVRO action or, in the alternative, to dismiss on grounds of inconvenient forum. In support of the motion, Schultz argued that the “main incidents” of alleged domestic abuse occurred in Florida, not California. In addition, Schultz asserted that he “lives in Dubai and has not visited the state of California since March 1, 2022, nor has he resided in the State of California since April 2007,” but that he “does spend time in Florida” and would “have the ability to appear in person in that court.” Stevenson opposed the motion to quash. She argued, among other things, that the court may exercise jurisdiction over Schultz because he owns property in California and voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by filing the partition action in California. The family law court denied the motion to quash and the motion to dismiss. 3 Around the same time, September/October 2023, Stevenson filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and request for a DVRO in Florida, where Stevenson was residing at the time Stevenson claims that the Florida action ultimately was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 7  In November 2024, Stevenson filed a request for order (using Judicial Council form FL-300) seeking additional relief in the DVRO action. Specifically, she asked the family law court to deny comity to the Dubai divorce decree; treat the parties as a married couple seeking dissolution; assume jurisdiction over the partition action; and address issues of spousal support, child custody and visitation, and division of property. In her request, she identified several alleged marital assets, including the Nevada County property, vehicles, precious metals, guns and ammunition, and a retirement fund. Schultz opposed the request. On December 30, 2024, the family law court conducted an evidentiary hearing, with live testimony, regarding the request for a DVRO. At the conclusion of testimony, the family law court concluded that it had jurisdiction, but nevertheless denied Stevenson’s request for a DVRO, finding that Stevenson had “lied … on the [witness] stand.” The court continued the hearing on Stevenson’s request for spousal support, division of property, and other relief to January 22, 2025. At a “review hearing” on January 22, 2025, the family law court denied Stevenson’s requests for non-DVRO relief. In its ruling, the court explained that it had reviewed the documents in the DVRO action, the partition action, and the 2020 dissolution proceeding, and concluded that “there are no new facts or law that persuade[] the court to modify the prior orders or ruling” and that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over this matter. The court added that “[t]his matter has been previously adjudicated, and the parties are divorced based upon a matter that occurred in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).” Further, even if the court had personal jurisdiction, it “would find … this is an inconvenient forum since the children live in Florida.” Based upon these findings, the court dismissed the action. On March 18, 2025, Stevenson appealed the order dismissing her requests for non- DVRO relief. 8  REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Schultz’s motion for judicial notice in the partition action, filed on February 19, 2026, is granted as to the material attached to the motion. Stevenson’s motion for judicial notice in the partition action, filed on February 20, 2026, is denied as unnecessary and irrelevant. DISCUSSION I Partition Action Stevenson raises two arguments on appeal in the partition action. First, she contends the trial court abused its discretion in extending comity to the Dubai judgment because the judgment was based on Sharia laws that violate state public policy and constitutional protections of due process and equal protection. Second, she contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for relief from default. 4 In opposition, Schultz argues that we should dismiss the appeal of the partition action because the challenged orders are not appealable and Stevenson has failed to provide an adequate record for appellate review. If we do not dismiss the appeal, Schultz argues that we should affirm because there was no abuse of discretion. A. Appealability We begin with Schultz’s request that we dismiss the appeal of the partition action as being taken from nonappealable orders. The existence of an appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) Reviewing courts must resolve any doubts regarding appealability before turning to the 4 Stevenson refers to the motion as seeking relief from “the default judgment,” but there is no default judgment; there is only an interlocutory judgment on the partition cause of action. 9 merits of the appeal and must dismiss an appeal taken from a nonappealable order. (Ibid.; Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432.) Because the right to appeal is strictly statutory, a judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute. (Department of Water Resources Cases (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 602, 618.) Here, Stevenson’s notice of appeal identifies the April 22, 2025 order granting the motion for interlocutory judgment as the order being appealed. As Schultz correctly points out, that order is not appealable. (§ 904.1.) However, because it is reasonably clear that Stevenson was trying to appeal the judgment of partition action, and because we discern no prejudice to the respondent, we can and will liberally construe the notice of appeal to have been taken from the May 2, 2025 interlocutory judgment for partition, which is appealable. (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 20; Los Altos Golf & Country Club v. County of Santa Clara (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 198, 203; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(2), 8.104(d)(2); see Orien v. Lutz (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 957, 961, fn. 3 [interlocutory judgments directing partition are appealable]; § 904.1, subd. (a)(9).) By contrast, we conclude that the order denying Stevenson’s motion to set aside the entry of default is not an appealable order. Such an order is reviewable only on appeal from a resulting default judgment. (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 960; Scognamillo v. Herrick (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1146; § 906.) In this case, there was no default judgment. The only judgment entered by the court is the interlocutory judgment directing partition, which has nothing to do with the entry of default because the parties stipulated to lift the default as to the partition cause of action. Accordingly, we agree with Schultz that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the order denying the motion for relief from default. The appeal of that order is either moot (because of the parties’ stipulation regarding the partition cause of action) or premature (because there has been no final judicial determination of the other causes of action). 10  B. Adequacy of Record We next address whether Stevenson forfeited her challenges to the partition judgment by failing to provide an adequate record. The cardinal rule of appellate review is that the trial court’s judgment or order is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively shown. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) A necessary corollary to this rule is that the plaintiff has the burden of providing an adequate record on appeal. (Ibid.) We agree with Schultz that the record provided by Stevenson was inadequate because it does not include all the filings related to the motion which is the subject of this appeal. In particular, the record furnished by Stevenson did not include the Declarations of Schultz, Robin Shofner, and Kevin Singer, and the request for judicial notice submitted by Schultz in support of his motion for the interlocutory judgment. Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.124(b)(1)(B), an appellant’s appendix must contain any document filed or lodged in the case “that is necessary for proper consideration of the issues, including, … any item that the appellant should reasonably assume the respondent will rely on.” Stevenson failed to comply with this rule, leaving us with an incomplete record that omitted the evidence upon which Schultz’s motion was based. However, on our own motion, we have augmented the appellate record to include these omitted documents. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WallDesign Inc. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1528, fn.1.) 5 As augmented, the record is adequate for us to evaluate Stevenson’s claim on the merits. 5 Although we sometimes use our discretionary authority to augment the record with documents omitted through mistake or neglect, we are not required to do so. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WallDesign Inc., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528, fn. 1.) 11  C. Judgment for Partition Turning to the merits of Stevenson’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in granting partition, we will affirm the interlocutory judgment of partition without prejudice to Stevenson’s right to challenge the future allocation of proceeds. Partition is a “ ‘procedure for segregating and terminating common interests in the same parcel of property.’ ” (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1404-1405.) The primary purpose of a partition action is to sever the unity of possession and divide the existing property interests. (LEG Investments v. Boxler (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 484, 493.) The manner of partition may be “in kind” (physical division of the property) or “by sale” (ordering the property sold and the proceeds divided among the parties). (Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 589, 597; §§ 873.210, 873.510, 872.820.) As a general rule, a co-owner of property has “an absolute right to partition unless barred by a valid waiver.” (LEG Investments v. Boxler, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 493; §§ 872.210, subd. (a), 872.710, subd. (b).) However, no action to partition property may be commenced or maintained between spouses for partition of community or quasi- community property. (§ 872.210, subd. (b).) In finding that Schultz is entitled to partition, the trial court concluded that this was not an action to divide community property between spouses because the parties already are divorced. The trial court found that the Dubai judgment dissolved their marriage and, from that point forward, they held the property only as joint tenants and not as “husband and wife.” Stevenson attacks this finding by claiming that the Dubai divorce decree should not be recognized under the doctrine of comity. In particular, she argues that the Dubai divorce is not entitled to comity because it is based on a talaq pronouncement of divorce, which violates California’s public policy favoring gender equality and constitutional protections against gender-based disparate treatment. Stevenson contends therefore that 12 she and Schultz are still married, and that the Nevada County property is community property, which is not subject to partition. We conclude that Stevenson has failed to show that the trial court erred in extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree. Under the doctrine of comity, courts of this nation generally will give effect to the judgment of a foreign nation if the foreign court had proper jurisdiction and enforcement of the judgment will not prejudice the rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public policy. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 314.) A trial court’s decision to extend comity to a foreign judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; see Cummings v. Dessel, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 597.) Under that standard, we review the trial court’s findings of fact (express or implied) for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law de novo, and we reverse its application of the law to the facts “only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 712.) Based on the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion. Even if we agree that parts of Sharia law—such as a talaq pronouncement of divorce—are contrary to domestic public policy favoring gender equality and constitutional protections against gender-based disparate treatment, the mere fact that some laws of the foreign nation are inconsistent with those of the sovereign does not preclude application of comity. (See In re Estate of Toland (2014) 180 Wash.2d 836, 847 [mere fact that foreign and domestic laws are different does not establish a violation of public policy]; Derr v. Swarek (5th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3d 430, 443 [uniformity of laws and procedural rules between the domestic and foreign states is not necessary].) The basic principle of judicial comity is that “ ‘a court should not assume to disturb another court’s disposition of a controversy unless there are good reasons for doing so.’ ” (16 Am.Jur.2d (2026), Conflict of Laws, § 11, citing In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source (2006) 212 Ariz. 64, 81.) The standard for refusing to enforce a foreign judgment on public 13 policy grounds is high and infrequently met. (30 Am.Jur.2d (2026), Executions and Enforcement of Judgments, § 647, citing Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.) (2d Cir. 2013) 714 F.3d 127, 139, fn. 12, & Pariente v. Scott Meredith Literary Agency, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 771 F.Supp. 609, 617.) The standard “ ‘is not simply that the law is contrary to our public policy, but that it is so offensive to our public policy as to be “ ‘prejudicial to recognized standards of morality and to the general interests of the citizens….’ ” ’ [Citation omitted.] Even when a foreign law offends public policy, ‘it may still be applied in a limited context where the potential harm is minimal….’ ” (In re Marriage of Elali & Marchoud (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 668, 686; Wong v. Tenneco (1985) 39 Cal.3d 126, 136; see In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 256, 261-262 [in context of intestate succession, foreign law permitting polygamy may be applied under principles of comity].) Here, we are not persuaded that extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree impermissibly prejudiced Stevenson’s rights or flouted state public policy favoring gender equality. It is important to remember that the Dubai judgment only adjudicated two issues—marital status and child custody—and that the trial court extended comity to the judgment as it related to the status of marriage only. (See Johnson v. Johnson (Ct.App. Nov. 14, 1997, Appeal No. 02A01-9603-CH-00061) 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 806, at pp. *12-13 [a foreign divorce decree can be recognized to the extent that it dissolves a marital relationship without giving full comity to the decree].) Since Stevenson plainly did not wish to remain married to Schultz, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to recognize the Dubai judgment as dissolving marital status. (See Ashfaq v. Ashfaq (Tex.Ct.App. 2015) 467 S.W.3d 539, 543-544 [trial court acted within its discretion in recognizing Pakistani talaq divorce as valid under principles of comity]; Chaudry v. Chaudry, supra, 159 N.J.Super. at p. 575 [principles of comity dictate that Pakistan divorce should have been recognized and enforced to the extent it affects the marital status of the parties]; see also Ahmad v Khalil (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 14 2013) 40 Misc.3d 1206(A) [975 N.Y.S.2d 364] (slip opn.) [comity should be extended to uphold the validity of Jordanian divorce decree that merely terminated the marital status of the parties].) The premise underlying Stevenson’s claim of prejudice appears to be that recognizing the foreign divorce precludes her from obtaining spousal support and an equitable division of the marital property. 6 We disagree with this premise. “[A]s the California Supreme Court has explained, a dissolution judgment does not affect the disposition of community property as to which the judgment is silent. ‘Under California law, a spouse’s entitlement to a share of the community property arises at the time that the property is acquired. [Citations.] That interest is not altered except by judicial decree or an agreement between the parties. Hence “under settled principles of California community property law, ‘property which is not mentioned in the pleadings as community property is left unadjudicated by decree of divorce, and is subject to future litigation, the parties being tenants in common meanwhile.’ ” [Citations.] This rule applies to partial divisions of community property as well as divorces unaccompanied by any property adjudication whatsoever.’ ” (In re Marriage of Huntley (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1053, 1059 (Huntley); accord, In re Marriage of Dunmore (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1379, fn. 6 [“[E]ven where there is an ostensible, final and complete judgment the parties may nonetheless litigate issues of property rights that are not expressly adjudicated by that judgment.”]) When a community property asset is left unadjudicated in a dissolution judgment, it remains subject to division by a subsequent request for order in a family law proceeding or by an independent partition action. (See 6 Cal. Fam. Law Practice & Procedure (2d ed. 2026) § 212.03[2]; Fam. Code, § 2556; Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th 6 Stevenson contends that issues related to child custody and support have been rendered moot as the children have reached the age of majority. 15 at pp. 1059-1061; Berry v. Berry (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1159; Zarrahy v. Zarrahy (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1, 5; Henn v. Henn (1980) 26 Cal.3d 323, 330-332; see also Irwin v. Irwin (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 317, 320 [California adheres to the concept of “ ‘divisible divorce’ ” and, hence, if issues of property division and spousal support are not mentioned in the dissolution judgment, they may be made the subject of an independent action].) Until the unadjudicated marital asset is divided, California courts treat the asset as being held by the parties as tenants in common. (Berry, at p. 1159; Zarrahy, at p. 5; Henn, at p. 330.) A California court, which otherwise has jurisdiction over the parties, is not deprived of jurisdiction to award spousal support or divide marital property by a previously entered dissolution judgment that did not address those issues. (Huntley, at p. 1061; In re Marriage of Newman (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 846, 847, 849-851.) Newman and Huntley are instructive. In In re Marriage of Newman (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 846, a husband and wife filed separate actions for dissolution of their marriage. In the husband’s action, filed in Georgia, the only relief sought or obtained was dissolution of the marriage. (Id. at p. 848.) The wife thereafter filed an action in California in which she sought both dissolution of the marriage and spousal support. (Ibid.) The wife did not appear in the Georgia action, and the husband obtained a final judgment of divorce that did not address spousal support, division of property, or any other issue. (Ibid.) Thereafter, the husband successfully moved to quash the wife’s petition for dissolution and spousal support. (Ibid.) The wife appealed and the court of appeal reversed, holding that because the Georgia action did not address the issue of support, the California court was not precluded from exercising jurisdiction to establish a support order. (Id. at p. 851; see also In re Marriage of Richardson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1244.) Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th 1053, involved a motion to divide unadjudicated community property following entry of a default dissolution judgment. (Id. at p. 1056.) The husband filed a petition for marital dissolution, which listed a house as the only 16 community property. (Id. at p. 1057.) The subsequent default judgment dissolved the marriage but did not mention community property. (Ibid.) Two years later, the wife filed a motion to adjudicate omitted community property assets, including furnishings, vehicles, and retirement benefits. (Id. at pp. 1057-1058.) The trial court denied the motion. (Id. at p. 1056.) The court of appeal concluded that the trial court erred in denying the wife’s motion because the “dissolution judgment did not divide—or even mention—any community property,” and, consequently, the community property remained subject to division as a missed asset. (Id. at pp. 1060-1061.) The appellate court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the motion under Family Code section 2556, which was enacted to “alleviate the burden of filing an entirely new action” by providing the court with “continuing jurisdiction” to award community assets “that have not been previously adjudicated by a judgment in the proceeding.” (Huntley, at p. 1059.) Newman and Huntley stand for the proposition that a spouse’s interest in a marital asset is not altered or extinguished in a dissolution proceeding where the asset was left unadjudicated by the judgment. Such is the situation here. As noted, the Dubai judgment only adjudicated the issues of marital status and child custody. It did not address, and therefore has no effect upon, spousal support or the division of community property in California. 7 (See In re Marriage of Moore & Ferrie (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1481; In re Marriage of Melton (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 931, 939; Giovannoni v. Giovannoni 7 Schultz argues that Stevenson had 90 days from the date of the Dubai ruling to “ask the Dubai court for reconsideration of its determinations concerning spousal support and asset division,” but nothing in the record to shows that (1) the Dubai court made any determinations regarding spousal support or asset division, or (2) that Stevenson would have had only 90 days to seek reconsideration of any such determinations. The citations in Schultz’s brief are inadequate to support his claim. (In re Marriage of Pasco (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 585, 591-592.) 17 (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 666, 671; Ahmad v Khalil, supra, 40 Misc.3d 1206(a) [975 N.Y.S.2d 364] (slip opn.).) For purposes of division of property on dissolution of marriage, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form, including property held in joint tenancy, is presumed to be community property. (Fam. Code, §§ 760, 2580, 2581; see also Fam. Code, § 2650.) The property at issue here, acquired by the parties as “husband and wife,” is therefore presumed to be unadjudicated community property, which remains subject to litigation. 8 Because we conclude the Dubai dissolution does not preclude spousal support or an equitable division of the marital property in California, we fail to see how the trial court’s decision to recognize the Dubai dissolution (as to the status of marriage only) prejudiced Stevenson’s constitutional rights or violated state public policy. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the decision to grant comity. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the trial court has ordered the partition and sale of property but has not yet determined how the proceeds will be disbursed, reserving jurisdiction “to order the manner in which the sale proceeds are to be disbursed, and to order equitable adjustments that the Court considers just and appropriate.” It is therefore premature for us to consider whether the distribution of proceeds amounts to an abuse of discretion. (See Adoption of S.S. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 607, 626; see also Zarrahy v. Zarrahy, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at pp 5-6.) Accordingly, we shall affirm the 8 We do not view section 872.210 as an obstacle to the partition action. Indeed, it appears the result reached in this case is essentially the same result that would have occurred had the parties divorced in California and failed to include the real property in the decree dividing the community property. (Zarrahy v. Zarrahy, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at pp. 4-5; Berry v. Berry, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1159; see Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1059; cf. Fam. Code, § 2556.) 18 interlocutory judgment of partition without prejudice to Stevenson’s right to challenge the allocation of proceeds between the parties as an abuse of discretion. II DVRO Action Stevenson’s second appeal challenges the family law court’s denial of her request for an order in the DVRO action seeking spousal support and the division of community property. Stevenson argues the family law court erred in dismissing her request based on lack of personal jurisdiction and inconvenient forum. 9 In opposition, Schultz argues that Stevenson’s appeal suffers from multiple procedural defects, including unsupported contentions of fact and law, a failure to identify and apply the correct standard of review, and an inadequate record. Schultz also argues that we should dismiss this appeal because (1) the previous rulings in the 2020 dissolution proceeding and partition action are dispositive and should be followed, and (2) Stevenson has failed to demonstrate how the challenged ruling is prejudicial. We agree with Schultz that the procedural deficiencies in Stevenson’s briefing are fatal to her appeal. But even if we were to ignore the defects in the briefs, her appeal nonetheless would fail on the merits. A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 1. Background Legal Principles Generally, jurisdiction to dissolve the status of marriage is a form of jurisdiction in rem. (In re Marriage of Gray (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1250.) The “status of the parties to the marriage is considered the ‘res’ or subject matter of the divorce 9 Stevenson also reasserts her challenges to the grant of comity in the partition proceeding. Because those claims have been addressed in connection with the appeal of the partition action, we need not consider them here.