Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two October 27, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II In the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 61136-8-II BENJAMIN A. MAVY, Appellant, and MEGAN MAE COELHO, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Respondent. LEE, J. — Benjamin A. Mavy and Megan M. Coelho have a parenting plan for their minor children. Mavy filed a motion for contempt based on Coelho’s failure to comply with the parenting plan, which the trial court denied. Subsequently, Mavy filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied Mavy’s motion for reconsideration and awarded Coelho attorney fees related to the motion for reconsideration. Mavy appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for contempt. Mavy argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by declining to find Coelho in contempt, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Coelho attorney fees, and (3) this case should be reassigned on remand. We affirm. FACTS A. BACKGROUND Mavy and Coelho were married in 2002 and had seven children together. The family lived in Wyoming for approximately ten years before they moved to Washington. No. 61136-8-II In 2021, while residing in Wyoming, Mavy and Coelho executed an irrevocable trust pursuant to Wyoming law. The trust was funded with a house in Wyoming, personal property, and approximately $250,000 from the sale of their interest in a business. Mavy and Coelho’s children were the beneficiaries of the trust. Under the terms of the Wyoming trust, Mavy retained control over the management of the trust assets. The family later moved to Sequim, Washington. Mavy filed a petition for dissolution in November 2022. The trial court held a trial in August 2024, and entered a final parenting plan in December 2024. At the time of trial, only the five younger children were still minors: L.M. (17 years old), N.M. (15 years old), A.M. (12 years old), H.M. (10 years old), and M.M. (8 years old). At trial, the trial court considered a parenting time evaluation from Dr. Steve Tutty, who recommended a 50-50 residential schedule. Under the December 2024 parenting plan, the trial court ordered that the three youngest children, A.M., H.M., and M.M., reside with Mavy, except for visitation with Coelho every other weekend and alternating Thursdays. The trial court ordered the two older children, L.M. and N.M., to reside with Coelho. N.M. was scheduled to reside with Mavy every other weekend and every other Thursday when the younger children were also with Mavy. The trial court did not require that L.M. visit Mavy. Under the December 2024 parenting plan, the parent receiving the child was responsible for picking up the child from school. Otherwise, the parents were required to exchange the children at a set grocery store closest to the home of the parent ending their residential time with the children. With regard to major decisions, the trial court ordered that only Mavy had the authority to make major decisions related to school and education for the younger children, A.M., H.M., and M.M. The trial court also ordered that Mavy have sole authority to make major healthcare 2 No. 61136-8-II decisions for the younger children, except in emergencies. The trial court gave Coelho sole decision-making authority for the two older children, L.M. and N.M., regarding school and non- emergency healthcare. B. MOTION FOR CONTEMPT On May 7, 2025, Mavy filed a motion for contempt. Mavy requested live testimony for the contempt hearing. In his motion, Mavy argued that Coelho failed to comply with the December 2024 parenting plan because she took the three youngest children to medical visits without informing him, in violation of Mavy’s authority to make medical decisions in non-emergent situations. Mavy also asserted that Coelho repeatedly failed to make N.M. available for visitation. In his declaration, Mavy highlighted expert testimony presented at the 2024 trial from Dr. Tutty and Dr. Marsha Hedrick, who “warned of the emotional cost to children when one parent is unable to support a relationship with the other.” Suppl. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 257. On May 14, Coelho filed a declaration addressing the allegations in Mavy’s motion for contempt. With regard to the allegation of contempt based on medical care for the younger children, Coelho stated that when she picked up A.M. from school based on the parenting schedule, A.M. was feverish, had pain in her ears and throat, and had swollen tonsils. Accordingly, Coelho took A.M. to urgent care, and the medical providers diagnosed A.M. with strep throat. The next morning, the two younger children also began complaining of sore throats and had swollen tonsils, so Coelho took them to urgent care as well. Coelho stated that she communicated this information to Mavy and that the information was available to him through an online portal. 3 No. 61136-8-II Regarding missed visitations with N.M., Coelho refuted the allegation that she was not making N.M. available for visitation; rather, Coelho stated that she “consistently encourage[d] [N.M.] to go to visitation,” and she “attempt[ed] to deliver [N.M.]” to the location of exchanges when she was not working. Suppl. CP at 300. 1. Contempt Hearing The trial court heard Mavy’s motion for contempt on May 16. The trial court did not hear live testimony at this hearing but engaged the parties in a colloquy. Addressing the missed visitations, the trial court inquired into whether N.M. was engaged in counseling. Coelho stated that N.M. had been seeing a psychiatrist and a therapist. The trial court asked whether the psychiatrist or therapist had provided any recommendations, and Coelho stated that “they told [her] to get a restraining order.” 2 Verbatim Rep. of Proc (VRP) (May 16, 2025) at 746. The trial court then engaged Mavy in a colloquy regarding his estrangement from N.M. Mavy argued that the trial court should order reunification therapy at a minimum. 2. Trial Court Declines to Find Contempt In May 2025, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion and order addressing Mavy’s motion for contempt related to Coelho’s alleged failure to comply with the parenting plan. The trial court addressed Mavy’s argument that Coelho should be found in contempt for violating the decision-making provisions of the parenting plan. The trial court stated that Coelho took the children to see a medical provider to check for an ear infection and strep throat and noted that conditions which might require medical intervention fall within the day-to-day care that a parent can reasonably address when they are caring for the child. Thus, the trial court did not find contempt for failure to comply with decision-making provisions of the parenting plan. 4 No. 61136-8-II Related to the missed visitation between Mavy and N.M., the trial court stated that “[t]he simple truth is that for reasons that are not fully understood, [N.M.] does not want to visit his father,” yet Mavy “does not seem to accept that premise.” Suppl. CP at 245. The trial court also stated that Mavy “relies upon Dr. Tutty who has not seen [N.M.] in well over a year, and who, even at the time, did not believe that [N.M.] should be excluded from his mother” and that “[Mavy] relies upon the opinions of an expert who never saw the children nor the parties, despite the strong concerns that the court expressed about that testimony” at trial. Suppl. CP at 246. Referencing the trial court’s colloquy with Mavy and Coelho during the contempt hearing, the trial court then stated that: “When confronted with the possibility that [N.M.’s] treating experts might be currently suggesting that [N.M.] get a restraining order against [Mavy,] [Mavy] does not believe those experts should be listened to or followed.” Suppl. CP at 246. The trial court concluded that Coelho was “fulfilling her duty to make visitation between [N.M.] and [Mavy] occur as called for under the parenting plan.” Suppl. CP at 246. Accordingly, the trial court declined to find contempt related to missed visitations with N.M. 3. Motion for Reconsideration On May 30, 2025, Mavy moved for reconsideration of the denial of his contempt motion. Mavy argued that the trial court should reconsider its ruling under CR 59(a)(1), (7), and (8) based on the lack of testimony during the contempt hearing and challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary findings and application of law. Mavy also requested that the trial court judge recuse. In response, Coelho argued that Mavy had only restated his previous arguments and had not identified any reason for reconsideration under CR 59. Coelho also requested attorney fees for responding to Mavy’s motion. 5 No. 61136-8-II On June 5, 2025, the trial court denied Mavy’s motion for reconsideration, and the trial court judge declined to recuse himself from the case. Regarding Coelho’s request for attorney fees related to responding to Mavy’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated that it was reluctant to award attorney fees in situations as here, where Mavy was representing himself, but concluded that Coelho “should not be forced to incur attorney fees to respond to meritless motions.” Suppl. CP at 214. In awarding attorney fees to Coelho, the trial court considered the comparative resources of the parties as required by RCW 26.09.140, stating that the assets of the Wyoming trust were being used by Mavy to provide housing for the children whereas the trust assets were not used to assist Coelho in providing housing for the children. Accordingly, the trial court awarded Coelho “the extremely reasonable amount of $180 incurred in having to respond to the motion for reconsideration.” Suppl. CP at 215. Mavy appeals. ANALYSIS Mavy argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to find Coelho in contempt for failure to comply with the December 2024 parenting plan. Further, Mavy contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Coelho attorney fees for responding to Mavy’s motion for reconsideration. And Mavy argues that this case should be reassigned on remand. We address each argument in turn. A. CONTEMPT Mavy challenges the trial court’s denial of his contempt motion on several grounds. First, Mavy argues that the trial court misapplied the law in denying his motion for contempt. Second, 6 No. 61136-8-II Mavy challenges the trial court’s findings in the order on contempt. Third, Mavy contends that the trial court erred in declining to find Coelho in contempt for missed visitations with N.M. Fourth, Mavy argues that the trial court “abused its discretion by imposing substantial logistical and emotional burdens on [him] while declining to enforce the corresponding obligations necessary for visitation to occur.” Br. of Appellant at 32. Fifth, Mavy asserts that the trial court’s denial of contempt operated as a de facto restriction under RCW 26.09.191. Finally, Mavy argues that the trial court erred in declining to hear live testimony during the contempt proceeding. We disagree. 1. Legal Principles “We review a trial court’s decision in a contempt proceeding for an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of Eklund, 143 Wn. App. 207, 212, 177 P.3d 189 (2008). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. Id. Further, “[w]e review factual findings for substantial evidence and do not review the court’s credibility determinations.” In re Marriage of DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d 39, 53, 509 P.3d 832 (2022). Under RCW 26.09.184(7), “[f]ailure to comply with a provision in a parenting plan or a child support order may result in a finding of contempt of court.” “If, based on all the facts and circumstances, the court finds after hearing that the parent, in bad faith, has not complied with the order establishing residential provisions for the child, the court shall find the parent in contempt of court.” RCW 26.09.160(2)(b). A parent is “deemed to have the present ability to comply with the order establishing residential provisions” unless by a preponderance of the evidence they establish “a reasonable 7 No. 61136-8-II excuse for failure to comply.” RCW 26.09.160(4). The noncomplying parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that they lacked the ability to comply with the parenting plan or had a reasonable excuse for noncompliance. In re Marriage of Rideout, 150 Wn.2d 337, 352-53, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003). “A parent seeking a contempt order to compel another parent to comply with a parenting plan must establish the contemnor’s bad faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” Eklund, 143 Wn. App. at 215. 2. Applicable Law As an initial matter, Mavy argues that “the trial court erred as a matter of law by shifting the burden of proving bad faith to [Mavy] after he demonstrated [Coelho’s] noncompliance with the parenting plan.” Br. of Appellant at 35. However, to find Coelho in contempt for failing to comply with the parenting plan, Mavy was required to show bad faith. Eklund, 143 Wn. App. at 215. Thus, Mavy’s argument that all he needed to show was that Coelho was noncompliant and that the trial court erred by shifting the burden of showing bad faith to him fails. 3. Challenges to Trial Court’s Order Mavy first challenges the trial court’s finding that “[w]hen confronted with the possibility that [N.M.’s] treating experts might be currently suggesting that [N.M.] get a restraining order against [Mavy,] he does not believe those experts should be listened to or followed.” Suppl. CP at 246. Mavy argues that the trial court’s statement is unsupported by the record because it relies on an unsworn statement and no documentary evidence supported the claim. However, contrary to Mavy’s argument, the trial court’s recounting of the colloquy from the hearing on the motion for contempt was not an adoption of Coelho’s answer that the therapists 8 No. 61136-8-II suggested that a restraining order be sought as a fact proven. Rather, it was merely a recitation of the trial court’s assessment as to what occurred at the contempt hearing. Even if the trial court misstated Mavy’s position during the hearing, Mavy fails to show any prejudice based on that statement. The trial court did not base its contempt determination on this statement; rather, the trial court found no contempt based on Coelho having a reasonable excuse for her failure to comply and based on Mavy’s failure to show bad faith. Accordingly, Mavy’s challenge fails. Mavy also challenges the following statement made by the trial court: He relies upon Dr. Tutty who has not seen [N.M.] in well over a year, and who, even at the time, did not believe that [N.M.] should be excluded from his mother. He relies upon the opinions of an expert who never saw the children or the parties, despite the strong concerns that the court expressed about that testimony. Suppl. CP at 246. Mavy contends that the trial court mischaracterized Dr. Tutty’s testimony and argues that Dr. Tutty supported separation of N.M. from Coelho as a potential remedial measure. However, contrary to Mavy’s assertion, Dr. Tutty did not testify at the dissolution trial that he supported separation of N.M. and Coelho. Dr. Tutty evaluated N.M. in February 2024, which was over a year from the May 2025 hearing on the motion for contempt. Dr. Tutty testified at the dissolution trial that he was not recommending restrictions on either parent under RCW 26.09.191. Moreover, Dr. Tutty’s evaluation recommended a 50-50 residential schedule. Mavy’s argument that the trial court mischaracterized Dr. Tutty’s testimony fails. Mavy also challenges the trial court’s statement that Mavy relied on the opinions of an expert who never saw the children nor the parties. Mavy simply states that the trial court “criticize[d] [Mavy] for relying on the expert testimony of Dr. Marsha Hedrick” and that “[t]he court . . . drew adverse inferences from [Mavy’s] reliance on uncontroverted expert testimony 9 No. 61136-8-II admitted and tested at trial, while also attributing to [Mavy] positions not reflected in the record.” Br. of Appellant at 44. Mavy does not explain what statements the trial court made that constituted a criticism or were adverse inferences nor does Mavy explain what statements made by the trial court attributed positions taken by Mavy that are not reflected in the record. Regardless, the trial court’s statement is supported by the record. Mavy relied in part on Dr. Hedrick’s opinions in a declaration in support of his motion for contempt. Dr. Hedrick testified at the dissolution trial that she only reviewed Dr. Tutty’s final report and a couple of letters or writings by Coelho’s therapist in reaching her conclusions. Dr. Hedrick did not have contact with either Mavy or Coelho. And Mavy stated in his declaration that “[e]xpert testimony—including from Dr. Hedrick and Dr. Tutty—warned of the emotional cost to children when one parent is unable to support a relationship with the other.” Suppl. CP at 257. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s statement about Mavy’s reliance on an expert who never saw the children or the parties. Mavy’s challenge fails. 4. No Contempt Mavy also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to find Coelho in contempt for missed visitations with N.M. in violation of the parenting plan. Here, the trial court found that Coelho was “fulfilling her duty to make visitation between [N.M.] and his father occur as called for under the parenting plan.” Suppl. CP at 246. Coelho stated in her declaration that she encouraged N.M. to attend visitation and that she would “attempt to deliver [N.M.]” to the location provided in the parenting plan for Mavy’s visitation with N.M. Suppl. CP at 300. However, Coelho explained that “[w]hen [she] [is] home and tr[ies] to get [N.M.] to go to visit, he locks himself in his bedroom.” Suppl. CP at 300. Accordingly, Coelho 10 No. 61136-8-II demonstrated a reasonable excuse for noncompliance—N.M. would lock himself in his bedroom despite Coelho’s efforts to support visitation with Mavy. Rideout, 150 Wn.2d at 353. Moreover, the record fails to show that Coelho acted in bad faith by a preponderance of the evidence. Eklund, 143 Wn. App. at 215. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find Coelho in contempt. 5. Travel for Visitation Mavy further argues that the trial court “abused its discretion by imposing substantial logistical and emotional burdens on [him] while declining to enforce the corresponding obligations necessary for visitation to occur.” Br. of Appellant at 32. Mavy contends that “[b]y maintaining the travel requirements [to pick up N.M. for visitation] while declining to enforce visitation or adjust logistics in light of persistent noncompliance, the court imposed a one-sided enforcement regime untethered from the purposes of the parenting plan.” Br. of Appellant at 34. To the extent Mavy’s argument challenges the manner of exchange in the December 2024 parenting plan, that issue is moot in light of a new parenting plan and relocation order entered in 2026. Moreover, Mavy’s argument is untethered to the issue on appeal, which is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for contempt. Mavy’s perception of the effects of the trial court’s ruling in the original parenting plan requiring Mavy to pick N.M. up for visitation fails to address the issue on appeal of whether Coelho failed to comply with the parenting plan. Thus, this challenge fails. 6. De Facto Restriction Mavy also argues that the trial court’s refusal to enforce visitation and find Coelho in contempt operated as a de facto restriction under RCW 26.09.191. Mavy cites to In re Marriage 11 No. 61136-8-II of Horner1 to argue that the trial court must enter findings required by RCW 26.09.191 to restrict or deny a parent’s residential time and that “the statute applies not only to express restrictions, but also to restrictions imposed ‘in effect.’” Br. of Appellant at 30. However, Horner is inapplicable. Horner addresses relocation and holds that “trial courts must determine whether the ‘detrimental effect of the relocation outweighs the benefit of the change to the child and the relocating person’” and that trial courts must consider each child relocation factor. 151 Wn.2d at 895-96 (quoting RCW 26.09.520). Mavy provides no applicable legal authority as required by RAP 10.3(a)(6), and this court is not aware of any legal authority which supports his argument that failure to find Coelho in contempt constitutes a de facto RCW 26.09.191 restriction. In re Guardianship of Ursich, 10 Wn. App. 2d 263, 278, 448 P.3d 112 (2019) (“‘Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.’”) (quoting Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290, review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1015 (1998)), review denied, 194 Wn.2d 1022 (2020); RAP 10.3(a)(6). Accordingly, we decline to consider this argument. 7. No Live Testimony During Contempt Hearing In addition, Mavy argues that the trial court erred by limiting testimony during the contempt proceeding. Although Mavy acknowledges that live testimony is not required for all contempt proceedings, he argues that “the court foreclosed the very evidence needed to determine whether [Coelho] made reasonable efforts to comply with the parenting plan, while simultaneously faulting [Mavy] for failing to prove bad faith.” Br. of Appellant at 40. 1 151 Wn.2d 884, 895-96, 93 P.3d 124 (2004). 12 No. 61136-8-II Here, the trial court relied on declarations from Mavy and Coelho concerning the incidents at issue, and the trial court acted within its bounds by resolving factual issues through documentary evidence. See In re Marriage of James, 79 Wn. App. 436, 442, 903 P.2d 470 (1995) (“A court may conduct a hearing on contempt by affidavit, oral testimony or both.”). Based on the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Thus, Mavy’s challenge fails. B. ATTORNEY FEES FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Mavy argues that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Coelho for responding to Mavy’s motion for reconsideration. We disagree. We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 392, 409 P.3d 1184, review denied, 190 Wn.2d 1022 (2018). A trial court abuses its discretion if the decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Id. Under RCW 26.09.140, “[t]he court . . . after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter. . . and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or enforcement or modification proceedings after entry of judgment.” Here, the trial court awarded attorney fees to Coelho for responding to the motion for reconsideration under RCW 26.09.140 after considering the parties’ comparative resources. The trial court reasoned that Mavy had access to the Wyoming trust to provide housing for the children in his care, whereas Coelho did not. Accordingly, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in comparing the parties’ resources and awarding Coelho $180 in attorney fees for responding to Mavy’s motion for reconsideration. 13 No. 61136-8-II C. REASSIGNMENT ON REMAND Finally, Mavy argues that this case should be reassigned on remand. Because the trial court judge who presided over the case has since recused, this issue is moot, and we do not further consider Mavy’s argument. CONCLUSION Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mavy’s motion for contempt or in awarding attorney fees to Coelho for responding to Mavy’s motion for reconsideration, we affirm. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Lee, J. We concur: Veljacic, C.J. Maxa, J. 14