Jordan v. Superior Court

Filed 9/30/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE LOUIS JORDAN, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A174922 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, (Contra Costa County Respondent; Super. Ct. No. 02-24-00036) THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. Petitioner Louis Jordan, defendant in the criminal case below, was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. To restore his competency, the trial court initially chose outpatient treatment but eventually reversed course and, at the request of the conditional release program, transferred Jordan to inpatient hospitalization. Jordan petitions for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its order revoking his outpatient status and committing him to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH). Jordan contends the court violated his right to due process when the court revoked his outpatient status without affording him a full evidentiary hearing under Penal Code section 1608.1 1All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 1  While this writ proceeding was pending, Jordan’s competency was restored, he entered pleas of no contest and was released from custody. We nonetheless address his challenge on the merits, as we agree with the parties it presents an issue that is both capable of repetition and likely to evade review. (People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897–898.)2 We conclude that because the outpatient treatment supervisor was the person who requested Jordan’s revocation, and because time is of the essence in restoring a defendant to competency, the trial court was not required to hold a full evidentiary hearing in this case. BACKGROUND Charges and Competency Proceedings On January 11, 2024, Jordan was charged by complaint with five felony counts of vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)). After a preliminary hearing the trial court held him to answer on all five counts, reducing one to a misdemeanor. Jordan was then released on his own recognizance with pretrial supervision. He was subsequently arraigned on the information and entered pleas of not guilty. On June 10, 2024, the trial court declared a doubt as to Jordan’s competency to stand trial. (See § 1368, subd. (a).) On August 7, the trial court found Jordan incompetent to stand trial based on a competency report by a Dr. Wilson. (See § 1369, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1).) The court then ordered Jordan evaluated for placement in a conditional release program (“CONREP”). (See § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(A).) 2 In light of this posture, we do not address Jordan’s alternate contention that even if the process afforded was proper, substantial evidence does not support the revocation of his outpatient status, as this a is factual issue that is unlikely to recur. (See Ghost Golf, Inc. v. Newsom (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 88, 101.) 2  In an August 27, 2024 CONREP evaluation report, Community Program Director Brigee Jackson, Psy.D., recommended Jordan for inpatient treatment with DSH. Dr. Jackson noted that Jordan’s “attitude and behavior were cooperative; however, he responded in a defensive manner concerning his psychiatric and criminal history” and was ultimately unwilling to comply with the requirements of the program. Outpatient Treatment On September 11, 2024, the parties submitted on the CONREP report, and the court committed Jordan to CONREP. The trial court noted that “[a]lthough CONREP recommended inpatient treatment, the basis of that recommendation was [Jordan’s] refusal to agree to CONREP terms and conditions. He has subsequently stated his agreement to those terms, and the Court has instructed him to abide by all CONREP terms to remain in outpatient treatment.” Concerns quickly emerged. In a September 23, 2024 status report on Jordan’s participation in CONREP, James Bakst, Psy.D., noted that “[a]lthough he has signed the terms and conditions of his agreement, [Jordan] has reported continued daily use of marijuana and alcohol, with no intention to discontinue use,” a violation of CONREP terms. Also, Jordan failed to meet with the psychiatrist for an assessment. In a status report three months later, Dr. Bakst noted that Jordan’s pattern of noncompliance continued with two more missed appointments. The next 90-day status update report, dated April 7, 2025, noted that Jordan “has demonstrated improved but still inconsistent participation in treatment.” Petition to Revoke Outpatient Status On November 5, 2025, CONREP filed a request for revocation of Jordan’s outpatient status pursuant to section 1608, along with a request for 3 a peace officer to take immediate custody of Jordan pursuant to section 1610. The requests were founded on a report authored by Dr. Bakst, who recommended that Jordan be “transferred to inpatient hospitalization for intensive psychiatric treatment and competency restoration.” The request was based, in part, on Jordan’s “persistent attendance and treatment noncompliance.” Dr. Bakst summarized Jordan’s haphazard attendance and lack of engagement during therapy sessions, and his inconsistent provision of samples for urinalysis. Dr. Bakst reported that Jordan was intermittently living in a relative’s garage but refused to provide that person’s contact information or to permit home visits there. Finally, Jordan was refusing to take any medication, which hindered CONREP’s ability to achieve psychiatric stabilization. Hearing on Revocation At the November 12, 2025 hearing, defense counsel asked to be heard on the revocation request at an evidentiary hearing with procedures like those applicable at a probation revocation hearing. Counsel cited People v. DeGuzman (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 414 (DeGuzman) and In re McPherson (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 332 (McPherson) as cases requiring such a hearing. The court expressed that “the statutes are . . . quite confusing,” given that the court has “authority under [section] 1370 to commit people to the appropriate facility” at the outset of their commitment after a hearing held “on the papers in front of me.” The court asked, “why would he be entitled to . . . more of a right than equivalent people at the initial commitment?” Defense counsel answered that section 1608 is the provision that applies to a petition to revoke an outpatient commitment under section 1370, and DeGuzman and McPherson require a live evidentiary hearing with the procedures required at a probation revocation hearing before outpatient 4 status may be revoked under section 1608. Defense counsel also noted that Dr. Bakst—the CONREP employee who authored the request for revocation—was present in the courtroom, and he asked the court to allow Dr. Bakst to testify about the petition and related records. The court ultimately concluded that DeGuzman and McPherson did not apply, as those cases drew analogies to section 1609, which was not at issue, and pertained to defendants who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. The court explained it was already “holding a 1608 hearing,” but doing so without procedures the case law required only for “a wholly different type of case.” Noting there was less than a year left on Jordan’s commitment for competency restoration and Jordan was reportedly “not receiving the full benefit of” CONREP’s programming because he was “unwilling or unable to fully participate in it,” the court converted Jordan’s commitment from outpatient status to the DSH. DISCUSSION Jordan contends the court violated his right to due process when it revoked his outpatient status under section 1608 without affording him an evidentiary hearing. We begin with an overview of the law regarding defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST). A defendant may not be tried or sentenced while mentally incompetent. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) If there is a doubt as to the defendant’s competency to stand trial, criminal proceedings are suspended until the defendant’s mental competence can be determined in a hearing. (§ 1368.) Defendants are mentally incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of a mental disorder or developmental disability, they are unable to understand the nature of criminal proceedings or to assist defense counsel in a rational manner. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) If a court finds a defendant incompetent to stand trial due 5 solely to a mental disorder, then trial remains suspended until the defendant regains competence. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Section 1370 is part of a “comprehensive scheme for dealing with criminal defendants whose mental competency is suspect.” (People v. Bye (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 569, 571.) Most of this scheme is codified in chapter 6 of title 10 of part two of the Penal Code, commencing with section 1367. As relevant here, if the court determines when suspending criminal proceedings that restoring a defendant with a mental disorder to competence is in the interest of justice, the case proceeds as provided in section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(C). (Id., subd. (a)(1)(B)(ii).) That is, the court orders the defendant to be committed to the DSH or to a community-based residential treatment program, or to be placed on outpatient status as specified in section 1600, for competency restoration. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C)(i).) To inform its placement decision, the court first orders the community program director to evaluate the defendant and submit a written recommendation as to whether the defendant should receive outpatient treatment. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(A)(i).) Defendants must be considered for outpatient treatment, if available, unless the court finds that either the clinical needs of the defendant or the risk to community safety warrant placement in a state hospital. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(A)(ii).) The recommendation of the community program director or their designee can inform that determination. (Ibid.) Section 1370 does not further specify the procedures the court must use in determining whether a defendant is eligible for outpatient treatment, and neither the parties nor this court have found case law addressing procedural requirements for this initial decision to grant or deny outpatient status. Title 15 of the Penal Code, beginning with section 1600, provides further guidance regarding outpatient status. Title 15 applies not only to 6 defendants committed for competency restoration, but also to those who have been adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) pursuant to section 1026. Section 1600 states: “Any person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility under the provisions of Section 1026, or Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1367) of Title 10 of this code . . . may be placed on outpatient status from that commitment subject to the procedures and provisions of this title . . . .” There are two statutory methods in Title 15 for revoking an individual’s outpatient status. Under section 1608, pursued here, the director of an outpatient program can file a request. Section 1608 provides: “If at any time during the outpatient period, the outpatient treatment supervisor is of the opinion [a defendant] requires extended inpatient treatment or refuses to accept further outpatient treatment and supervision, the . . . director shall notify the superior court . . . by means of a written request for revocation of outpatient status . . . .[¶] Within 15 judicial days, the court where the request was filed shall hold a hearing and shall either approve or disapprove the request for revocation of outpatient status. If the court approves the request for revocation, the court shall order that the person be confined in a state hospital or other treatment facility approved by the community program director.” (Italics added.) Alternatively, section 1609 sets forth a procedure for revoking an individual’s outpatient status at the instigation of the prosecutor, a circumstance not relevant here. Section 1609 provides: “If at any time during the outpatient period or placement with a local mental health program pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1026.2 [i.e., placement of an NGI acquittee awaiting hearing on restoration of sanity] the prosecutor is of the opinion that the person is a danger to the health and safety of others 7 while on that status, the prosecutor may petition the court for a hearing to determine whether the person shall be continued on that status . . . . If, after a hearing in court conducted using the same standards used in conducting probation revocation hearings pursuant to Section 1203.2, the judge determines that the person is a danger to the health and safety of others, the court shall order that the person be confined in a state hospital or other treatment facility which has been approved by the community program director.” (Italics added.) Consequently, revocation of outpatient status—whether sought under section 1608 by the program director or section 1609 by the prosecutor— requires some type of hearing. But only section 1609, which by its terms is limited to requests made by the prosecutor, expressly requires a hearing conducted using the same standards as a probation revocation hearing— including an evidentiary hearing. Section 1608, the applicable section here, does not further describe the procedures required and thus does not, by its terms, require an evidentiary hearing to revoke outpatient status. As our Supreme Court has observed, “when the Legislature intends to require a formal evidentiary hearing, it knows how to say so.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 228 (Today’s Fresh Start) [language in Ed. Code, § 47607 that “the chartering authority shall hold a public hearing” before revoking a school’s charter did not mandate a formal evidentiary hearing].) Jordan’s challenge does not rest, however, on the language of the statute but on the constitutional requirements of due process. And at least one court has determined that, as a matter of due process, defendants are entitled to an evidentiary hearing under section 1608 when their outpatient status is revoked. (See McPherson, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at pp. 337–340.) 8 In McPherson, an NGI acquittee sought a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that his outpatient status had been improperly revoked under section 1608 because the trial court failed to conduct a full hearing on the merits of the revocation. (Id. at pp. 334, 337.) The McPherson court determined “[t]he lack of reference in section 1608 to use of probation revocation hearing standards (cf. . . . § 1609) does not negate the constitutional requirements of confrontation, cross-examination, and a factfinding hearing by a neutral body applying a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.” (McPherson, at p. 340, fn. omitted.) These “were the ‘constitutional minima’ [citation] to which a patient was entitled,” the court held, following an earlier case also involving revocation of the outpatient status of an NGI acquittee. (Ibid., quoting In re Anderson (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 38, 43, 47–48 (Anderson).) Subsequently, in DeGuzman, 33 Cal.App.4th 414, another defendant acquitted on an insanity plea challenged the revocation of his outpatient status under section 1608, on the grounds that the court used a lesser standard of proof than “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Id. at p. 416.) Rejecting this challenge, the appellate court explained, “[a]lthough revocation of outpatient status requires due process, it is not part of a criminal prosecution requiring the higher standard of proof.” (Id. at p. 420.) The court then reiterated the holding of McPherson: “If the outpatient community program director requests revocation of outpatient status under section 1608, the court must hold a de novo hearing which includes ‘the constitutional requirements of confrontation, cross-examination, and a fact-finding hearing by a neutral body applying a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.’ ” (DeGuzman, at p. 420, quoting McPherson, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 340.) 9  Because Jordan’s argument, like the McPherson line of cases, rests on due process principles, we turn now to examine these. An individual bringing a due process claim must demonstrate both a protected liberty or property interest and a lack of adequate procedural protections. (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 214.) Because we do not doubt that Jordan has a protected liberty interest in remaining free of confinement in a state hospital or other treatment facility (see In re Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96, 103 [“an outpatient possesses an interest in his liberty which is entitled to due process protections”]), we will focus on the question of what process he is due. “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” (Grannis v. Ordean (1914) 234 U.S. 385, 394.) The procedural protections required “must be determined with reference to the rights and interests at stake in the particular case.” (Washington v. Harper (1990) 494 U.S. 210, 229; see also Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 268.) In this process, “ ‘[t]here is no presumption in favor of’ holding an evidentiary hearing; the ‘ “judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1094 (Lewis), quoting Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334–335 (Mathews); see also Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371, 392 (Oberholzer) [“procedural due process does not require a trial-type hearing in every instance”].) In resolving the question of what process is due, courts apply the balancing test from Mathews, weighing “three considerations: ‘First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 10 and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 213, quoting Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335.)3 As to the first Mathews factor—the private interest affected—it has been long established that revocation of outpatient status deprives a person of a “conditional liberty interest.” (Anderson, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 43.) The liberty interest is conditional, in that the defendant’s right to remain in the community has been conditioned on their observing special restrictions. (DeGuzman, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 419–420; Anderson, at p. 44.) But it is profound; loss of outpatient status disrupts any semblance of a normal life and works a “ ‘grievous’ ” loss of liberty. (Anderson, at p. 43.) As to the second factor, we consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the defendant’s liberty interest and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335.) Consistent with the requirements of section 1608, Jordan did receive some procedural protections in this case. He was presented with the evidence against him in the form of Dr. Bakst’s report recommending he be transferred to inpatient hospitalization, and he was afforded the right to be present at the hearing where the trial court considered whether to grant the request based on that report. He was also granted the right to be represented by counsel, to submit evidence, and to have counsel argue on his 3 Jordan requested at oral argument that we also consider the “dignitary interest” weighed in evaluating due process claims under the California Constitution. (See In re Harris (2024) 16 Cal.5th 292, 323.) But the parties did not address the separate requirements of the California Constitution in their appellate briefs, except in a single sentence of Jordan’s supplemental letter brief. Accordingly, we consider the point waived. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) 11 behalf at the hearing. What Jordan did not receive was the benefit of a full- blown evidentiary hearing of the sort that McPherson and DeGuzman require, including an opportunity to confront and cross-examine Dr. Bakst. In deciding whether such an evidentiary hearing was required, we are guided by our high court’s admonition: “ ‘The essence of due process is the requirement that “a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” [Citation.] All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to “the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard” [citation], to [e]nsure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.’ ” (Oberholzer, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 392, quoting Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 348–349.) Mathews provides guidance on this point. There, the United States Supreme Court held that due process did not require an evidentiary hearing prior to an administrative decision whether to terminate Social Security disability benefits. (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 340–347.) The administrative procedure in place was constitutionally sufficient because “the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon ‘routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists.’ ” (Id. at p. 344.) And “while there may be ‘professional disagreement with the medical conclusions’ [in a written medical report] the ‘specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not present.’ ” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court considered the risk of error without oral testimony to be diminished because medical sources, such as the treating physician, “are likely to be able to communicate more effectively through written documents.” (Id. at p. 345.) 12  Our colleagues in Division Two, applying the Mathews factors, cited this discussion of medical evidence in concluding that a trial court could authorize involuntary medication of an IST defendant on the basis solely of a psychologist’s report. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1086, 1096–1097 [applying § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)].) Due process did not require a full evidentiary hearing, Lewis held, in part because section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B) requires a written report by a qualified mental health expert, and the evidence of this expert, like that of the treating physician in Mathews, was “likely more amenable to written than oral presentation.” (Lewis, at p. 1097.) The Lewis court also pointed out two other safeguards against the risk of erroneous fact-finding. Before the hearing, defense counsel was free to contact the evaluating clinician or an independent clinician for additional information, and to provide reports on defendant’s behalf to supplement or correct the evaluator’s report. (Lewis, at p. 1097; see also Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 346.) Also, the court retained the discretion to order live testimony, including cross-examination, where the evidence revealed issues requiring a more extensive airing. (Lewis, at pp. 1096–1098.) For some of the same reasons, courts in a variety of other contexts have held a formal evidentiary hearing is not required when reliable evidence may be otherwise obtained. (See, e.g., In re Henry S. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 248, 259–260 [juvenile court may decide whether minor qualifies as dependent or delinquent based on joint assessment report and minor’s psychological evaluation, with no evidentiary hearing]; Runningeagle v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2016) 825 F.3d 970, 990 [federal habeas court need not hear oral testimony where “the documentary evidence submitted fully presented the relevant facts”]; In re Harris, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 318–319 [trial court may make 13 factual determinations about a defendant’s custody status based on reliable proffers, without the benefit of a full evidentiary hearing].) We conclude these principles apply to the decision whether to revoke the outpatient status of a defendant found incompetent to stand trial under section 1370. When making the initial decision whether to place an IST defendant on outpatient status, the court must “order the community program director or a designee to evaluate the defendant and to submit to the court . . . a written recommendation as to whether the defendant should be required to undergo outpatient treatment, or be committed to the [DSH] or to any other treatment facility.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(A)(i), italics added.) And later, if the outpatient treatment supervisor “is of the opinion that the person requires extended inpatient treatment or refuses to accept further outpatient treatment and supervision,” the community program director must transmit that opinion to the court and counsel “by means of a written request for revocation of outpatient status.” (§ 1608, italics added.) To the extent such written recommendations and requests are based on professional conclusions and personal examinations of the defendant, as in Mathews, the “ ‘specter of questionable credibility and veracity’ ” is less present. (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 344.) And where counsel wishes to probe the veracity or completeness of statements in the written report, counsel is free to contact the author for additional information. Were an author not responsive to counsel’s inquiry and forthcoming with relevant information, that circumstance could itself be a strong basis for a request to cross-examine the clinician in open court. In this manner, the procedural protections afforded by a written report of the outpatient treatment supervisor’s opinion, the defendant’s representation by counsel, and an opportunity for the defendant to present both evidence in writing and 14 argument at a hearing are mutually reinforcing, and they are buttressed by the discretion that the trial court retains to hold an evidentiary hearing in a particular case that may warrant it. We do not doubt that due process may sometimes require, in a particular case, a full evidentiary hearing. But “procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.” (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 344.) We conclude that in the generality of revocation hearings conducted pursuant to section 1608, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of defendant’s liberty interest through the procedures the trial court employed is slight, and that the additional safeguard of a full evidentiary hearing can be reserved for those cases in which there is a demonstrated need. This determination is best made on a case-by-case basis by the trial court, which is uniquely positioned to make such discretionary decisions. (See People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 707; Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 536, 542; § 1044.) Here, Jordan fails to distinguish his case from the generality of cases addressing revocation of outpatient status pursuant to section 1608. Other than citing general principles underlying the right to confrontation, he presents no cogent argument to support his claim that in this case denial of a full hearing hampered his ability to litigate a particular issue. Indeed, at oral argument, Jordan’s counsel conceded there were no known factual disputes. Jordan thus fails to persuade us that the second Mathews factor points toward a deprivation of his right to due process here. We offer one final observation on the subject of the second Mathews factor. Although it is not dispositive of the constitutional issue, we note that the language of sections 1608 and 1609 follows the lesson of Mathews with 15 regard to reports from medical experts. Revocations pursuant to section 1608 require a clinician’s written opinion as to the form of treatment that would best serve a defendant’s clinical needs, so the statute does not require an evidentiary hearing. Section 1609 requires a different process for a prosecutor’s petition alleging that an outpatient defendant poses a “danger to the health and safety of others.” (§ 1609.) Section 1609 petitions require no written opinion, but the defendant is afforded an evidentiary hearing with the same procedures as required for probation revocation. (Ibid.) Turning to the third Mathews factor, we consider the public interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens and societal costs associated with requiring an evidentiary hearing upon demand for IST defendants facing the potential loss of outpatient status. (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 347.) In assessing this factor, we are mindful of the trial court’s question: Why would an IST defendant facing a request for revocation under section 1608 be entitled to a more fulsome hearing than an equivalent person at the time of initial commitment? The trial court explained that the initial decision to grant or deny outpatient status is usually based simply on a written report. (See § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(A).) Although the case before us involves only the procedures required for revocation, it seems likely that, if we were to find that due process mandates an evidentiary hearing for the revocation of outpatient status, an IST defendant would be able likewise to demand an evidentiary hearing at initial commitment. After all, the benefits of outpatient status hang in the balance there as well. Thus, in weighing the administrative burden associated with finding a due process right to an evidentiary hearing, we will not assume the number of affected cases to be small. 16  Moreover, as the Lewis court emphasizes, “the delays associated with requiring an evidentiary hearing in all cases” could be significant. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099.) The government has an interest in restoring an IST defendant to competency as quickly as possible, so that criminal prosecution can resume. Measured against this, the time required to subpoena documents and witnesses and resolve legal or evidentiary issues for an evidentiary hearing may be considerable. (Ibid.) As in this case, the revocation decision is sometimes made with a deadline looming. An IST defendant’s treatment must begin and end within a constitutionally reasonable period of time. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099; In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 801, superseded by statute as explained in Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 472, 486.) By statute, the maximum treatment period is two years. (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1).) “If [an IST] defendant has not regained competency within two years of the date of commitment, the defendant is either released or subject to civil conservatorship proceedings.” (Rodriguez, at p. 496.) Usually, a section 1608 petition is not brought until a considerable portion of that two-year period has elapsed. By definition, an IST defendant must be on outpatient status long enough to have demonstrated that they “require[] extended inpatient treatment,” or that they are “refus[ing] to accept further outpatient treatment and supervision.” (§ 1608.) In Jordan’s case, the trial court was mindful there was less than a year remaining on his commitment for competency restoration, lending urgency to CONREP’s request that he be transferred to a facility where he would receive the full benefit of their programming. Jordan’s case illustrates that time is of the essence in providing IST defendants with the most effective treatment available to restore their competency. 17  We do not mean to make too much of the burden of delay, however. Jordan points out that section 1610 provides an option for temporary confinement and continued treatment for an IST defendant facing a revocation request under section 1608 or 1609. But even this temporary measure—this bridge between outpatient treatment and whatever placement will result from its revocation—will likely cause some disruption in the treatment process. And it may be that a judge, deciding whether to place a defendant on outpatient status at the initial commitment, will be less inclined toward this option in a close case if the revocation process is known to entail this sort of disruption. As a doctrinal matter, one important consequence of the need for expedited evaluation and treatment of IST defendants is that this provides a basis for distinguishing their cases from the McPherson line of cases, which involved outpatient revocation for NGI acquittees. (See Anderson, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at pp. 40–41; McPherson, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at pp. 334–335; DeGuzman, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 416–417.) For NGI acquittees, already adjudicated as insane at the time of their alleged offenses, the purpose of their commitment is to treat their mental illness in a manner that protects them and society from their potential dangerousness. (See People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 520–521; People v. Dobson (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1432; § 25, subd. (b).) IST defendants, by contrast, have not yet resolved their criminal cases, and the purpose of their commitment is to restore them to competency as promptly as possible so that prosecution can resume. (People v. G.H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1560; Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1109.) While IST defendants are subject to a maximum commitment period of two years, NGI acquittees may be serving terms that are decades longer; an NGI defendant’s maximum commitment period 18 corresponds to the longest term of imprisonment that could have been imposed for the underlying offenses and enhancements charged. (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) Because of the differences in purpose and timeline for commitments involving, respectively, NGI defendants and IST defendants, we decline to adopt the procedural protections embraced in McPherson and DeGuzman as constitutionally mandated for an IST defendant. Although the two groups are lumped together in sections 1608, they must be analyzed separately in weighing the Mathews factors and determining what process is due as a constitutional matter. We conclude that requiring an evidentiary hearing upon demand for all IST defendants facing a section 1608 revocation application would burden an IST defendant’s constitutional interest in timely treatment and the government’s interest in timely prosecution. Weighing this factor along with the other Mathews factors, we conclude, with the Lewis court, that the balance “ ‘favors the public interest in an expeditious IST commitment process,’ ” and that due process does not require a full evidentiary hearing for every revocation application brought under section 1608. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1100.) Jordan was fully informed of the case against him and had an opportunity to meet it, using procedures appropriate to the clinical nature of the decision to be made.4 (See Oberholzer, supra, 20 Cal.4th 4 Upon receiving a tentative version of this opinion, Jordan requested that the court redact many of the facts specific to his case that we have recounted in our Background section, asserting they were drawn from documents that were sealed in the trial court and that are “presumptively confidential” because submitted to the court pursuant to section 1370. (§ 1369.5, subd. (a).) We recognize Jordan’s privacy interest in his medical and mental health records generally, but we detect no “overriding interest” in the specific information disclosed in this opinion that would justify preventing the public access to these facts of the case. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.550(c)–(e), 8.46(f)(3).) Because we think it important for the 19 at p. 392.) Given the flexible nature of due process procedural protections, it is enough that the trial court retained the authority to order live testimony and cross-examination if it deemed this necessary, which in this case it did not. DISPOSITION We conclude the trial court did not violate Jordan’s due process rights by revoking his outpatient status without affording him a full evidentiary hearing. As a result of Jordan’s subsequent return to competency, his no contest pleas, and his release from custody we need not further address his claim that substantial evidence does not support the revocation of his outpatient status and instead dismiss the petition as moot. (See Nunez- Dosangos v. Superior Court (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 283, 297.) TUCHER, P. J. WE CONCUR: PETROU, J. RODRÍGUEZ, J. Jordan v. Superior Court (A174922) reader to understand the outlines of the basis for CONREP’s request in this case, we have by separate order authorized the unsealing of the record limited to specific enumerated references necessary for this opinion. 20 Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court Trial Judge: Hon. Julia Campins Counsel: Ellen McDonnell, Public Defender, Dante O’Connell, Ivan Zeavin-Moss, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner Diana Becton, District Attorney, Saron Tesfai, Deputy District Attorney for Real Party in Interest 21