Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 1 of 33 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-10748 ____________________ BLAKE WARNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY CLERK OF COURTS, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-01977-MSS-SPF ____________________ Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. LAGOA, Circuit Judge: Appellant Blake Warner claims that the Clerk of Courts of Hillsborough County, Florida, violated the Fifth and Fourteenth USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 2 of 33 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 Amendments of the U.S. Constitution by declaring that funds he had deposited into the court registry for an eviction proceeding were forfeited to the county under Florida Statute § 116.21. Alt- hough Warner had not claimed the funds for almost two years, he argues that he was not given sufficient notice before they were de- clared forfeited on account of abandonment. The Hillsborough County Clerk mailed a letter to Warner’s old address—for which the Clerk had already received 13 return-to-sender notices—and published notice in a predominantly Spanish-language newspaper serving less than 0.2 percent of the county. These attempts at no- tice, Warner contends, violated his due process rights and led to an unconstitutional taking. On summary judgment, the district court disagreed, finding that the newspaper notice was constitutionally sufficient, and that the forfeiture did not result in an unconstitu- tional taking. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s decision. We hold that, although § 116.21’s notice procedure is not facially unconstitutional, the Hillsborough County Clerk’s application of the statute to Warner was unconstitutional because no notice was reasonably calculated to reach him. The Clerk also effected an un- constitutional taking of Warner’s property because Warner had not abandoned the funds. USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 3 of 33 24-10748 Opinion of the Court 3 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1 On April 25, 2018, Warner’s landlord initiated an eviction proceeding against him in Hillsborough County Court. Florida Statute § 83.60 requires a tenant in an eviction proceeding to de- posit into the court registry any allegedly accrued rent until resolu- tion of the litigation.2 After eviction proceedings commenced, Warner deposited into the court registry two months’ worth of rent, which amounted to $3,398, plus an additional $101 per month, for a total of $3,600. On April 27, 2018, Warner filed an answer and a counterclaim. At the time that the eviction litigation began, Warner’s ad- dress was 3012 W. DeLeon St., Apt. 23, Tampa, Florida. On April 28, 2018, Warner registered an e-file account with the State of Flor- ida on myfloridaaccess.com. This account contained an email ad- dress, a phone number, and his mother’s mailing address, at which he received mail from 2017 to 2022. As acknowledged by the Hills- borough County Clerk during oral argument, Warner’s e-file 1 We largely adopt the district court’s factual summary, which, consistent with the standard of review for summary judgment, summarizes undisputed or stipulated facts. See Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 115 F.4th 1266, 1287 (11th Cir. 2024). 2 See Fla. Stat. § 83.60(2) (“In an action by the landlord for possession of a dwell- ing unit, if the tenant interposes any defense other than payment, including, but not limited to, the defense of a defective 3-day notice, the tenant shall pay into the registry of the court the accrued rent as alleged in the complaint or as determined by the court and the rent that accrues during the pendency of the proceeding, when due.”). USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 4 of 33 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 account was accessible to the Clerk, and the Clerk had the ability to view and send messages to Warner’s email address listed in the account. On June 22, 2018, Warner moved to 502 S. Fremont Ave., Apt. 1322, Tampa, Florida, and he filed an address-change notice in the eviction litigation in compliance with the Hillsborough County Court’s local administrative rules. The next day, Warner aban- doned the apartment that was the subject of the eviction litigation. On August 24, 2018, the landlord filed a Motion to Disburse Money from the Registry of the Court to obtain the funds that Warner had deposited. At a hearing on October 9, 2018, the Hills- borough County Court directed the landlord to submit a proposed order disbursing the funds to the landlord. Following this hearing, however, the landlord and Warner entered into an oral agreement whereby Warner would abandon his counterclaims in exchange for the landlord’s allowing Warner to claim the funds. On May 17, 2019, Warner moved to 3002 W. Cleveland St., Tampa, Florida, but this time, he did not update his address with the Hillsborough County Court. From February 24, 2020, to April 10, 2020, the Hillsborough County Clerk received thirteen re- turned mail notices for notices that the Clerk had mailed to Warner at his old 502 S. Freemont Ave. address. On June 12, 2020, the Hillsborough County Court dismissed the eviction litigation for lack of prosecution. USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 5 of 33 24-10748 Opinion of the Court 5 On February 18, 2021, apparently pursuant to Florida Stat- ute § 717.118, 3 the Hillsborough County Clerk mailed letters to the landlord and Warner to notify them that the funds in the court reg- istry would be sent to the State’s Division of Unclaimed Property if they were not claimed. 4 The Clerk mailed Warner’s letter to his old address at 502 S. Fremont Ave. and never electronically served Warner at his e-mail address with any items during the eviction litigation or thereafter. On July 9, 2021, the Clerk published notice of the unclaimed funds in La Gaceta, a primarily Spanish-language local newspaper. This publication included the following entry in English: “BOUTIQUE APARTMENTS LLC, BROOKLYN FLATS VS WARNER, BLAKE 18-CC022377 05/24/2018 *717.113 $3,600.” Although the entry cited Florida Statute § 717.113, which directs unclaimed funds to the State’s Division of Unclaimed Property, 5 3 See Fla. Stat. § 717.118(1) (“In order to provide all the citizens of this state an effective and efficient program for the recovery of unclaimed property, the department shall use cost-effective means to make at least one active attempt to notify owners of unclaimed property accounts valued at more than $250 with a reported address or taxpayer identification number.”). 4 The notification letter mentions the State’s Unclaimed Property Division but does not cite to any statute. Later, the Clerk took the funds pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 116.21. In this litigation, both parties now effectively agree that Fla. Stat. § 116.21 is the applicable statute. 5 See Fla. Stat. § 717.113 (“All intangible property held for the owner by any court, government or governmental subdivision or agency, public corpora- tion, or public authority that has not been claimed by the owner for more than 1 year after it became payable or distributable is presumed unclaimed. Except as provided in s. 45.032(3)(c), money held in the court registry and for which USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 6 of 33 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 the Clerk concluded the notice by stating that the listed funds would be forfeited to the county pursuant to Florida Statute § 116.21. 6 Newspaper publication of this impending forfeiture was required by that statute, 7 and Florida Statutes §§ 50.031 and 50.011 no court order has been issued to determine an owner does not become pay- able or distributable and is not subject to reporting under this chapter.”). 6 See Fla. Stat. § 116.21(1) (“The sheriffs and clerks of the courts of the various counties of the state are authorized at their discretion on or before September 25 of each and every year hereafter to pay into the fine and forfeiture fund of their respective counties, or the fine and forfeiture fund created under s. 142.01, any or all unclaimed moneys deposited or collected by them in their official capacity, which unclaimed moneys came into their hands prior to Jan- uary 1 of the preceding year and for which moneys claim has not been made. Any unclaimed moneys collected or deposited by the clerk of the circuit court in the course of the clerk’s court-related activities may be processed under this chapter; however, the clerk must pay for the cost of publication of the list of unclaimed court-related funds. Any unclaimed court-related funds collected or deposited by the clerk which remain unclaimed must be deposited into the fine and forfeiture fund established under s. 142.01.”). 7 See Fla. Stat. § 116.21(2) (“The sheriffs and clerks of the various courts of the respective counties may, during the month of July of each year, hereafter make and compile a list of any or all unclaimed moneys which came into their hands as provided in subsection (1) above. Such compilation shall list, in ad- dition to the name of the defendant, the respective amounts of such unclaimed moneys. Such list or compilation shall be published one time during the month of July in a newspaper of general circulation in the county served by such sheriff or clerk, and the notice shall specify that unless such moneys are claimed on or before September 1 after such publication that same shall be declared forfeited to such county.”). USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 7 of 33 24-10748 Opinion of the Court 7 specified the criteria by which newspapers may be selected by the Clerk for this purpose.8 On September 1, 2021, after no response was received, the Clerk deposited the funds from the eviction litigation into the county’s fine and forfeiture fund for public use pursuant to § 116.21. On August 29, 2022, Warner initiated this action against the Clerk under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Among other claims, Warner argued that the Clerk took his property without due process of law in vio- lation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and without paying him just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Warner sought a declaratory judg- ment that the Clerk violated these constitutional provisions; a de- claratory judgment that Florida Statutes §§ 116.21 and 50.031 are unconstitutional; damages in the amount of the property allegedly 8 See Fla. Stat. § 50.031 (1999) (requiring publication “in a newspaper which at the time of such publication shall have been in existence for 1 year and shall have been entered as periodicals matter at a post office in the county where published, or in a newspaper which is a direct successor of a newspaper which together have been so published”); Fla. Stat. § 50.011 (1999) (requiring “publi- cation in a newspaper printed and published periodically once a week or of- tener, containing at least 25 percent of its words in the English language, en- tered or qualified to be admitted and entered as periodicals matter at a post office in the county where published, for sale to the public generally, available to the public generally for the publication of official or other notices and cus- tomarily containing information of a public character or of interest or of value to the residents or owners of property in the county where published, or of interest or of value to the general public”). USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 8 of 33 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 taken, as well as nominal and punitive damages; and an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. Both Warner and the Hills- borough County Clerk moved for summary judgment on these claims. The district court granted the Clerk’s motion for summary judgment. It concluded that the letter notice did not satisfy the Due Process Clause “because [the Hillsborough County Clerk] had reason to know [Warner] no longer lived [at 502 S. Fremont Ave].” The district court, however, found that publication in La Gaceta constituted adequate notice. The district court also rejected Warner’s takings claim because “[t]he Supreme Court has consist- ently upheld statutory schemes providing for the escheatment of abandoned or unclaimed property.” Warner appealed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review a ‘summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards used by the district court.’” Yarbrough v. Deca- tur Hous. Auth., 941 F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Galvez v. Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008)) (emphasis added). “When the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judg- ment, we review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judg- ment and view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-mov- ing party on each motion.” Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 115 F.4th 1266, 1287 (11th Cir. 2024). “Sum- mary judgment is appropriate if there is ‘no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 9 of 33 24-10748 Opinion of the Court 9 “We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo.” United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005). This standard of review applies to both facial and as-applied challenges. See United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2007). III. ANALYSIS Warner challenges the Hillsborough County Clerk’s taking of the court registry funds on three grounds. First, Warner con- tends that Florida Statute § 116.21 is unconstitutional on its face because it does not provide the notice required by the Due Process Clause. Second, he argues that, even if § 116.21 is valid, the Clerk applied it in a manner that deprived him of constitutionally ade- quate notice. Third, Warner asserts that the Clerk’s taking of his funds violated the Fifth Amendment because he had not aban- doned the funds and, thus, the Clerk took them for public use with- out just compensation. We address each in turn. A. Facial Challenge to Florida Statute § 116.21 Under the Due Process Clause “[D]ue process requires the government to provide ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise inter- ested parties of the pendency of [a deprivation of property] and af- ford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). “[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge [to a statute on due process grounds] by ‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the [the statute] would be valid,’ i.e., that the law is USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 10 of 33 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (quot- ing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (third alteration in original)). Here, § 116.21 provides that Florida’s clerks of court “may, during the month of July of each year, … make and compile a list of any or all unclaimed moneys which came into their hands,” and that this list “shall be published one time during the month of July in a newspaper of general circulation in the county …, and the no- tice shall specify that unless such moneys are claimed on or before September 1 after such publication that same shall be declared for- feited to such county.” Section 116.21 thus does not require indi- vidualized notice and, instead, provides only for publication notice. Warner argues that § 116.21 violates the Due Process Clause because, under Supreme Court precedent, publication notice alone is insufficient when the government knows of other methods rea- sonably calculated to inform the property owner. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (holding that statutory notice by publication to known beneficiaries was inadequate because it was “not reasonably calcu- lated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand”); see also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212–13 (1962) (“[N]otice by publication is not enough with respect to a per- son whose name and address are known or very easily ascertaina- ble and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question.”). In short, Warner contends that USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 11 of 33 24-10748 Opinion of the Court 11 Mullane facially invalidated the statutory notice provision in that case. We disagree. To start, Mullane did not facially invalidate the statutory notice provision in that case; instead, the Court invali- dated the statute as applied in the circumstances before it. Compare Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (“Those beneficiaries represented by appel- lant whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained come clearly within this category. As to them the statutory notice is sufficient.”), with id. at 318 (“As to known pre- sent beneficiaries of known place of residence, however, notice by publication stands on a different footing. … Where the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.”). Because Mullane itself was an as-applied constitutional case, it cannot, as Warner contends, com- pel the facial invalidity of § 116.21. Moreover, the application of § 116.21 would not necessarily be unconstitutional in all circumstances. The Florida Attorney General has explained that, in comparison with another statute concerning the disposition of unclaimed funds held by a court, § 116.21 “governs the disposition of all other funds the clerk or the sheriff has collected or deposited in his or her official capacity that remain unclaimed and are not specifically directed to be otherwise disposed of by law.” Fla. Att’y Gen. Op. 99-64 (1999) (emphasis added). In other words, § 116.21 operates as a catch-all provision for funds held by the county. Indeed, Warner acknowledges that USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 12 of 33 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 “the scope” of the statute “is much broader than just the court reg- istry context.” In some circumstances, certain funds held by the county may have no identifiable owner. For example, money found and turned over to the county would appear to fall within the scope of § 116.21. There, Mullane makes clear that publication notice would be sufficient, since no owner would be known. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317. Because Warner has not established that § 116.21 is uncon- stitutional in all circumstances, his facial challenge must fail. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision on this count. B. As-Applied Challenge to Florida Statute § 116.21 Under the Due Process Clause On appeal, it is uncontested that the Hillsborough County Clerk complied with § 116.21 by publishing notice in a local news- paper of the impending forfeiture of Warner’s funds. 9 But Warner contends that publication notice in this instance was unconstitu- tional because the Clerk published the notice in a primarily Span- ish-language newspaper—despite Warner’s inability to understand Spanish—that served only 0.2 percent of the county. He further argues that the Clerk had other means of notice that were 9 “[A] § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). The first two elements here are neither contested nor open to contest on appeal. USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 13 of 33 24-10748 Opinion of the Court 13 reasonably calculated to reach him—namely, his e-mail address, phone number, and another mailing address that he actually used. Warner next asserts that, although the Hillsborough County Clerk exceeded the notice required by § 116.21 by sending a letter, that notice was still inadequate because the Clerk had previously re- ceived 13 return-to-sender notices for that outdated address. In re- sponse, the Clerk maintains that the newspaper publication was sufficient, primarily because Warner never updated his address with the court and because the general public notice of § 116.21 itself constituted sufficient notice of forfeiture in this case. For the following reasons, we hold that the County Clerk’s application of § 116.21, as applied to Warner, violated the Due Pro- cess Clause because the Clerk’s notice attempts were not reasona- bly calculated to reach him. i. General public notice of § 116.21 does not con- stitute sufficient notice to Warner in this case. At the outset, we must address the Hillsborough County Clerk’s attempt to evade a due process analysis altogether. The Clerk essentially contends that there is no situation in which § 116.21 is unconstitutional because “the mere passage of the law it- self is a notice to all citizens of Florida that they must comply with it.” For this argument, the Clerk relies on a statement in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). There, the Supreme Court ad- dressed “how a legislature must go about advising its citizens of actions that must be taken to avoid a valid rule of law that a mineral interest that has not been used for 20 years will be deemed to be USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 14 of 33 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 abandoned.” Short, 454 U.S. at 531. “Generally,” the Court an- swered, “a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to famil- iarize itself with its terms and to comply.” Id. at 532. From this, the Clerk concludes that “publication of the law itself would pro- vide sufficient notice to comport with the requirements of due pro- cess.” But the Clerk misinterprets this statement. As the Supreme Court explained, the appellants in Short “d[id] not challenge the suf- ficiency of the notice that must be given prior to an adjudication purporting to determine that a mineral interest has not been used for 20 years.” Id. at 536. Instead, they “simply claim[ed] that the absence of specific notice prior to the lapse of a mineral right ren- ders ineffective the self-executing feature of the Indiana statute.” Id. Although the Court rejected this latter claim, it nonetheless ex- plained that it could have upheld the former claim under different circumstances. The Due Process Clause, the Court reasoned, “cer- tainly would preclude [a defendant] from obtaining a declaratory judgment that his adversary’s claim is barred without giving notice of that proceeding.” Id. “The reasoning in Mullane,” the Court ex- plained, “is applicable to a judicial proceeding brought to deter- mine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did not occur, but not to the self-executing feature of the Mineral Lapse Act.” Id. at 535. Here, Warner does not claim that he suffered a lack of notice about the self-executing feature of § 116.21. He is not claiming, in USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 15 of 33 24-10748 Opinion of the Court 15 other words, that there was insufficient notice of the requirements of § 116.21 such that the statute cannot operate to extinguish his property interest in the funds if the conditions of the statute are met. Rather, Warner asserts that he lacked sufficient notice of the Clerk’s determination that the conditions of § 116.21 were met with respect to his funds. Like the “judicial proceeding brought to determine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did not occur” discussed in Short, the Clerk’s determination that Warner aban- doned his funds was a factual adjudication concerning property rights that was subject to the Due Process Clause. See Lugar v. Ed- mondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding a clerk of court’s issu- ance of writ of attachment to be state action concerning property rights that is equally subject to due process requirements). In fact, specific notice of the Clerk’s determination is espe- cially required here because the Clerk’s decision to apply § 116.21 to Warner was, itself, discretionary. In Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), the Supreme Court ad- dressed due process requirements for Oklahoma’s nonclaim stat- ute, which was triggered by the commencement of court proceed- ings. “Where the legal proceedings themselves trigger the time bar, even if those proceedings do not necessarily resolve the claim on its merits,” the Court stated, “the time bar lacks the self-execut- ing feature that Short indicated was necessary to remove any due process problem. Rather, in such circumstances, due process is di- rectly implicated and actual notice generally is required.” Pope, 485 U.S. at 487. Put simply, if the State must take additional actions to implement a forfeiture statute to a specific property, “there is USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 16 of 33 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 significant state action” that implicates the Due Process Clause. Id.; see also Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any governmental deprivation of a property inter- est.”). Here, § 116.21 provides that “[t]he sheriffs and clerks of the courts of the various counties of the state are authorized at their dis- cretion” to take unclaimed moneys. Fla. Stat. § 116.21(1) (emphasis added). In accordance with the plain meaning of these terms, a Florida intermediate appellate court has interpreted the statute to be discretionary. See Baker v. State, 343 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (noting that, under an earlier version of the statute with the same relevant language, forfeiture was “invocable solely at the discretion of the sheriff and clerk of the court involved”). Even though a more recent amendment provides that, “[a]ny unclaimed court-related funds collected or deposited by the clerk which re- main unclaimed must be deposited into the fine and forfeiture fund established under s. 142.01,” § 116.21(1) (emphasis added), that lan- guage follows immediately after the provision requiring “the clerk [to] pay for the cost of publication of the list of unclaimed court- related funds.” Together, these provisions naturally read that any funds “which remain unclaimed” after publication notice (i.e., after the Clerk has decided to initiate § 116.21 proceedings) “must be de- posited into the fine and forfeiture fund.” Indeed, the Legislature that added the new language also said that unclaimed funds “may be processed under this chapter.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language grants the Clerk discretion to take unclaimed funds, USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 17 of 33 24-10748 Opinion of the Court 17 which is conclusive as to the statute’s meaning.10 See Cox Enters., Inc. v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 666 F.3d 697, 704 (11th Cir. 2012) (“When the language of a [Florida] statute is plain and unambigu- ous we must apply that meaning.”); Williams v. State, 186 So. 3d 989, 991 (Fla. 2016) (requiring statutes to be interpreted primarily by its plain meaning). Thus, the forfeiture of Warner’s funds was not a self-exe- cuted consequence of § 116.21. Instead, the Clerk first decided to initiate § 116.21 proceedings for Warner’s funds, and then, after re- ceiving no response to its prior notice attempts, the Clerk deter- mined that the funds met the statutory criteria for forfeiture and took the funds. Because both Short and Pope command that specific notice be provided to Warner, we conclude that general public no- tice of § 116.21’s requirements was insufficient here. ii. The Hillsborough County Clerk’s publication notice in La Gaceta was constitutionally defi- cient. Having decided to initiate § 116.21’s forfeiture procedure, the Hillsborough County Clerk made two attempts to notify Warner. One was to publish notice in a local newspaper, which 10 The Clerk suggests that, under the canon of constitutional avoidance, we should not interpret § 116.21 to provide the Clerk with discretion in its appli- cation. But the plain meaning of the statutory language is clear, and “[i]n the absence of more than one plausible construction, the canon [of constitutional avoidance] simply has no application.” Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 580 (2022) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 296 (2018)); see also Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Bridges, 402 So. 2d 411, 414 (Fla. 1981) (same). USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 18 of 33 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 was the only means of notice required by § 116.21. According to Warner, this publication notice was constitutionally deficient for two reasons: (1) other methods of notice reasonably calculated to reach him were available, and (2) the Clerk’s use of La Gaceta was not reasonably calculated to reach him as it is a primarily Spanish- language newspaper serving less than 0.2 percent of the county. The Clerk argues that publication notice was the only reasonably available means of notice because Warner failed to inform the Clerk of his new address. The Clerk also argues that the Constitu- tion does not require any characteristics for the type of newspaper used. We hold that the Clerk’s use of La Gaceta violated the Due Process Clause in this instance because other means reasonably cal- culated to notify Warner were available. Accordingly, we do not decide whether, if other means of notice were unavailable, the use of La Gaceta in this instance would be constitutionally sufficient. The Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane establishes that publication notice satisfies the Due Process Clause if, and only if, the persons so notified are unknown or otherwise unreachable. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (“This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning.”); Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 237 (2006) (“Following up by publication was not constitutionally adequate under the circumstances presented here because, as we have ex- plained, it was possible and practicable to give Jones more adequate USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 19 of 33 24-10748 Opinion of the Court 19 warning of the impending tax sale.”); Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 212–13 (“The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose le- gally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question”); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, Kan., 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (“Measured by the principles stated in the Mullane case, we think that the notice by publication here falls short of the require- ments of due process. … In the present case there seem to be no compelling or even persuasive reasons why such direct notice can- not be given. Appellant’s name was known to the city and was on the official records.”). Here, there were other reasonably possible and practicable ways to notify Warner. It is undisputed that Warner maintained an e-file account with the State that contained his correct e-mail address, telephone number, and another mailing address at which he did, in fact, receive mail. This e-file account was accessible to the Clerk, and the Clerk admits that it could have sent an e-mail to Warner. In light of Mullane, this fact alone defeats the constitu- tional sufficiency of publication notice in this case. Indeed, Mullane recognized that commonly used means of communication should be used instead of publication notice if they are available. Cf. Mul- lane, 339 U.S. at 319 (“However it may have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means of communication.”). USCA11 Case: 24-10748 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 08/17/2026 Page: 20 of 33 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10748 None of the Clerk’s arguments to the contrary prevail. The Clerk argues that it was not required to find Warner’s e-file contact information because Warner failed to update his address with the Clerk as required by the court’s rules. But the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that negligence waives the right to notice. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 231–32 (holding that something more must be done when a letter is returned unclaimed even if the addressee was required to update his address). Although the Clerk was not re- quired to conduct an open-ended search of public records for Warner’s address, see id. at 235–36, and while it may be true that the State, rather than the county, manages the e-file system, the Clerk could have easily obtained Warner’s correct contact infor-