Marriage of Orlando CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketD088368
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 Marriage of Orlando CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of COLLEEN
ORLANDO and VINCENT ORLANDO.
D088368
COLLEEN ORLANDO,
Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FLHE2206935)
v.
VINCENT ORLANDO,
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Sean Lafferty, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Beatrice L. Snider and John L. Romaker for Appellant.
Law Offices of Jill M. Church and Jill M. Church for Respondent.
Vincent Orlando appeals from a marital dissolution judgment on
all contested issues between him and his ex-wife Colleen Orlando. He
challenges only the portion of the judgment awarding Colleen a $133,788
reimbursement for her alleged contribution of separate property funds to
purchase their community property home in Temecula. We conclude that no
substantial evidence supports this reimbursement award because Colleen
failed to trace the funds used to purchase the Temecula home to her own
separate property contribution, as required under Family Code1 section 2640,
subdivision (b). Accordingly, we modify the judgment to vacate the $133,788
reimbursement award and affirm the judgment as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Colleen and Vincent were married in 2006 and had two children. They
separated in 2022.
Before the marriage, Colleen owned a home in Long Beach. In 2009,
she sold the home and received the sale proceeds by check in the amount of
$133,788. The escrow closing statement and a copy of the $133,788 check to
Colleen were admitted into evidence at trial.
Colleen testified that she deposited the proceeds from the sale of her
Long Beach home into “our bank account” because “[w]e knew we wanted to
buy another house.” She and Vincent saved and “added more money” until
they were ready to buy another house. According to Colleen, “I know it went
into a Wells Fargo bank account and [was] set aside so we can purchase a
home together.” The couple had at least two joint accounts at Wells Fargo
during the marriage, but Colleen did not identify which specific account the
money was deposited into. Colleen also produced no documentary proof of
the deposit. She explained at trial: “The proof that I had was at the
[Temecula home] that I’m not allowed to go. And the parts of the house
1 All unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.
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that it’s located in, I was prevented from going there.”2 When asked whether
bank statements from 2009 would reflect the deposit into a joint Wells Fargo
account, Colleen responded: “Yeah. Show me.”
In 2013, Colleen and Vincent purchased their home in Temecula as
joint tenants. Colleen testified that the $133,788 proceeds from the sale of
her Long Beach home were used to contribute to a down payment of $275,000
to $300,000 for the Temecula home. She did not identify which bank account
was used to make the down payment and submitted no documentation of the
transaction. The trial exhibits pertaining to the purchase include only the
grant deed for the Temecula home and a 2024 mortgage statement.
After a 10-day trial, at which Colleen was represented by counsel and
Vincent was self-represented, the court gave an oral statement of decision
on all contested issues, including child custody and visitation, child support,
spousal support, and property division. Regarding Colleen’s claim for
reimbursement relating to the Temecula home, the court concluded “that
the proof with respect to the reimbursement under [Family Code section]
2640 as to [Colleen] for her . . . separate property contribution in the amount
of $133,788 was substantiated by the evidence provided.”
The court entered judgment consistent with its oral ruling. For the
Temecula home, the judgment stated that Colleen was “entitled to a Family
Code [section] 2640 reimbursement claim for her separate property
contribution in the amount of $133,788.00.”
2 The record reflects that the court granted a restraining order against
Colleen restricting her access to the Temecula home. According to Colleen,
she retrieved some personal items from the home in October 2022 and was
granted access to the home by court order on several other occasions.
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DISCUSSION
Vincent concedes that the $133,788 proceeds from Colleen’s 2009 sale of
her Long Beach home were her separate property because she acquired the
home before the marriage. (§ 770, subd. (a).) He contends, however, that no
substantial evidence supports the reimbursement award under section 2640
because Colleen failed to produce any documentary proof tracing the 2013
purchase of the Temecula home back to the proceeds from the 2009 sale of
her Long Beach home. We agree.
Vincent and Colleen purchased the Temecula home as joint tenants
during their marriage. “Under section 2581, all property held in joint title
by spouses during marriage is presumed to be community property upon
dissolution, rebuttable only by written evidence to the contrary.” (In re
Marriage of Weaver (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 858, 865.) “But even if property
held in joint tenancy loses its separate property characterization under
section 2581, section 2640 provides a right to reimbursement upon
dissolution for the spouse who contributed separate property to the
acquisition of property held in joint title, absent a written waiver of the
right to reimbursement.” (Ibid.)
Specifically, section 2640, subdivision (b), provides that, upon
dissolution, a spouse must “be reimbursed for the party’s contributions to
the acquisition of property of the community property estate to the extent the
party traces the contributions to a separate property source.” (Italics added.)
By its terms, this statute requires the party seeking reimbursement to
trace the contributions back to a separate property source. There are two
commonly accepted methods of tracing: (1) direct tracing, and (2) the family
living expense method. (In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797,
823 (Braud).) Under direct tracing, the disputed asset must be traced to the
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withdrawal of separate property funds from a commingled account. (Ibid.)
Under the family living expense method, payments may be traced to a
separate property source by showing that community income at the time of
the payments or purchase were exhausted by family expense, so that the
payments or purchase necessarily must have been made with separate
property funds. (Ibid.) These are not necessarily the exclusive methods of
tracing. (See In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 92, 95–97
[permitting alternative method of tracing based on expert testimony of
accountant who conducted “a detailed and comprehensive tracing of all the
accounts, analyzing every transaction”].)
A spouse who commingles separate property with community property
assumes the burden of keeping adequate records to trace the community
property to a separate property source. (See Estate of Murphy (1976) 15
Cal.3d 907, 919 [“the burden of establishing a spouse’s separate interest in
presumptive community property is not simply that of presenting proof at the
time of litigation but also one of keeping adequate records”]; see also See v.
See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778, 784 [spouse who commingles separate property
with community funds “assumes the burden of keeping records”].)
Consistent with this record-keeping requirement, California courts
ordinarily require the party seeking reimbursement for a separate property
contribution to submit documentary proof to satisfy the burden of tracing
under section 2640. (In re Marriage of McClain (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 262,
274 [“we must conclude tracing requires documentary proof because our
Supreme Court has held records must be kept, and the point of keeping
records is to offer them in court as evidence”]; In re Marriage of Stoll (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 837, 841 (Stoll) [“Direct tracing to a separate source . . . has
traditionally been subject to a requirement that it be done by specific
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records.”]; see also In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 10, 25–27
[acknowledging the “need for specific records and documents to trace funds”
from a commingled account but finding it unnecessary where “there was no
commingling or payments from a community account”]; In re Marriage of
Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055, 1059 (Cochran) [acknowledging
that “detailed records” are “ordinarily” required for tracing but finding this
rule inapplicable where parties stipulated to relevant facts].)
As particularly relevant here, the direct tracing method “requires
specific records reconstructing each separate and community property
deposit, and each separate and community property payment as it occurs.
Separate property status cannot be established by mere oral testimony of
intent or by records that simply total all separate property funds available
during the relevant period and all the separate expenditures during that
period; such records do not adequately trace to the source of the purchase at
the time it was made.” (Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 823; accord In re
Marriage of Simonis (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1129, 1143.)
“Whether the spouse claiming a separate property interest has
adequately met his or her burden of tracing to a separate property source is a
question of fact and the trial court’s holding on the matter must be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence.” (Cochran, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1057–1058.)
Colleen contends that she met her burden of direct tracing by
submitting the escrow closing statement for her Long Beach home, the
$133,788 check she received for the sale proceeds in 2009, and her own
testimony. We disagree. The escrow statement and check established only
that Colleen had separate property funds in the amount of $133,788 after
selling her Long Beach home in 2009. That much is undisputed. Colleen
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claimed she deposited the funds into a commingled community Wells Fargo
account, but she failed to identify the specific account; she did not provide
any documentary evidence of the deposit; she did not reconstruct each
separate property and community property deposit to and payment from the
account; and she did not submit documentation of the funds used for the
down payment on the Temecula home. Colleen’s documentary evidence
established only that (1) she had separate property funds in 2009, and (2) the
parties purchased the Temecula home as joint tenants four years later.
Colleen relies mostly on her own testimony that she deposited the
proceeds from the sale of her Long Beach home into a joint Wells Fargo
account because “[w]e knew we wanted to buy another house” and the money
was “set aside” so that “we can purchase a home together.” But Colleen’s oral
testimony of the parties’ intent is insufficient as a matter of law. “Mere oral
testimony of intent has been held to be inadequate to do the job in light of the
general presumption that property acquired during a marriage is
community.” (Stoll, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 841.)
In Braud, for example, the husband deposited $10,000 of his own
separate property funds into a joint checking account and testified that these
funds were used to remodel the family home. (Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th
at p. 824.) The court concluded that without “any records to show the
$10,000 went into remodeling,” the husband’s oral testimony that this was
his intent was “plainly insufficient” for a reimbursement award under section
2640. (Ibid.) The court therefore reversed that portion of the trial court’s
order. (Id. at p. 825; see also In re Marriage of Frick (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d
997, 1011 [husband’s testimony was insufficient evidence of direct tracing
without adequate records].)
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The same reasoning logically applies here. There are no records to
show that the $133,788 Colleen received from the sale of her Long Beach
home went into the purchase of the Temecula property. Without any such
records, Colleen’s testimony is insufficient. Moreover, even Colleen’s
testimony did not trace the path of the funds into a specific account and from
there into the escrow account of the Temecula home. Colleen therefore failed
to provide sufficient evidence to meet her burden on a direct tracing theory.
Colleen also submitted no evidence to meet her burden under any
alternative method of tracing. Under the family living expense method, “the
record must demonstrate that community income was depleted at the time
the particular asset was acquired.” (Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.)
Colleen presented no such evidence. On appeal, she does not invoke the
family living expense method or any other alternative method of tracing.
Accordingly, we conclude Colleen failed to meet her burden of proving
entitlement to a reimbursement under section 2640.
Colleen notes in her brief that she did not have access to the necessary
documents because they were located in the Temecula home and Vincent
was living there after their separation. But she does not explain the legal
significance of this fact. To the extent Colleen is implicitly suggesting that
this relieved her of the normal burden of proof, she has failed to make any
cogent legal argument or cite any authority to support it. Nor has she
explained why she could not have used formal discovery procedures to obtain
the records from Vincent, Wells Fargo, or another third party. (See In re
Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022 [Civil Discovery Act
applies to marital dissolution proceedings].) We therefore reject any
suggestion that Colleen was relieved of the burden of producing the necessary
tracing records.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to vacate the $133,788 reimbursement award
to Colleen for the purchase of the Temecula home. As so modified, the
judgment is affirmed. Vincent is entitled to recover his costs on appeal.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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